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Abstract:
This study presents an original effort to explain referendum use through political 
science institutionalism and contributes to both the comparative referendum and 
institutionalist literatures, and to the political history of South Africa. Its source 
materials are numerous archival collections, newspapers and over 40 personal 
interviews.
This study addresses two questions relating to F.W. de Klerk's use of the 
referendum mechanism in 1992. The first is why he used the mechanism, highlighting 
its role in the context of the early stages of his quest for a managed transition. Beyond 
the politics of the transition, the second question addressed is where he acquired the 
idea. The main argument is that de Klerk used the referendum to manage white public 
opinion to execute a swift transition. His intentions were challenged by a series of un­
planned by-elections, which enabled the White conservative opposition to undermine 
his legitimacy to lead the transition. In sharp contrast to what the existing literature on 
referendums suggests, de Klerk's referendum pledge did not follow internal divisions 
in his National Party over the reform process.
He in fact anticipated a right wing demand for a new general election, which 
he could not win, and used a referendum pledge to preclude this vote. The reason he 
was able to do so is that he was a key player in earlier efforts to reform Apartheid, 
under the leadership of P.W. Botha, his predecessor. As a result, he brought with him 
an experience and template that he applied to his reform process. Understanding 
where de Klerk got the idea from, therefore, requires that we appreciate Botha's 
earlier use of the referendum. Grasping Botha, in turn, demands that we analyse the 
decision, in 1960, to deploy a referendum on South Africa's declaration of a republic. 
This referendum was the outcome of intense historical struggles within the party over 
the republican issue. The second part of this study traces those struggles.
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Introduction.
Introduction:
On 17 March 1992, South Africa’s White only electorate participated in their third 
national 'controlled'1 referendum. This vote meant that each of the country’s four National 
or Nationalist Party2 (NP) leaders, since H.F. Verwoerd’s accession, in August 1958, had 
employed a referendum in order to introduce far-reaching constitutional changes. The first 
of these was H.F. Verwoerd, in 1960 on the question of creating a republic, then B.J. 
Vorster in Namibia alone, on the Tumhalle process. P.W. Botha followed them in 1983, 
with the introduction of the tri-cameral constitution, and, finally, F.W. de Klerk in 1992.
De Klerk announced a snap referendum after his party had lost its third by-election 
in succession to the Conservative Party (CP). The party was posing an increasingly 
concerted challenge to his mandate to negotiate with the African National Congress 
(ANC), and the referendum was a key feature of the initial phase of the South African 
transition to democracy. A transition is defined as, an 'interval between one political 
regime and another.'3
Why did de Klerk deploy a referendum? Where did he get the idea to stage a 
referendum? And how was the referendum introduced into South Africa? This dissertation 
sets out to answer these questions and, in doing so, enhance our understanding of 
referendum use. The existing referendum literature does not really help us to fully 
understand de Klerk’s use of the controlled referendum. Sharp divisions in the ruling party 
or coalition are an important antecedent condition in the literature, but this NP government 
was not deeply divided over the reform process. It seems more likely that de Klerk was 
emulating his predecessor, P.W. Botha, who a decade earlier also had to deal with a 
similar right wing challenge to his reforms. F.W. de Klerk, then serving as the NP’s 
provincial leader in the conservative Transvaal, where the CP’s challenge to the 
government was most acute, not only drafted the appropriate referendum legislation, but 
also pushed Botha to deploy the referendum, in order to deal with the right wing backlash.
1 The controlled or facultative referendum allows the government full discretion as to whether and when to 
call a referendum. Such votes are more likely in entities without a codified constitution. Vernon Bogdanor, 
'Western Europe', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (ed.), Referendums Around the World: The Growing 
Use o f Direct Democracy fHoundmills. Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 30-33.
22 The Nasionale Party is interchangeably referred to as the Nationalist or National Party throughout the 
thesis.
3 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore. 1986), p. 6.
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If de Klerk was emulating Botha, then Botha found inspiration in Verwoerd’s use 
of the referendum. Like de Klerk, Botha introduced the legislation for the 1960 
referendum on Verwoerd’s behalf. Moreover, Botha had served as a party worker since 
1936, and intimately followed debates within the party over a referendum on the 
establishment of a republic. In order to understand the 1960 referendum, which represents 
the successful introduction of the referendum institution into the NP’s political repertoire, 
we need to fully appreciate post-Union White politics.
This first referendum was indeed the culmination of almost five decades of intra- 
White conflicts over White South African identity and symbols. Furthermore, it was the 
product of internal conflicts within the National Party over the republican issue and 
tactical considerations. Specifically, the desire to appeal to non-republicans at election 
time, especially prior to and after 1948. It is only through an understanding of this long 
history that we can fathom the 1960 referendum, which, in turn, helps to explain the 
behaviour of successive NP leaders.
The existing accounts of controlled referendum use, generally, fail to fully 
recognise the value of path dependency. In other words, it is argued that the successful use 
of the first referendum, as was the case in 1960, is habit forming and sets a precedent for 
future use. In John Ikenberry’s words, this vote cast 'a long shadow' over future 
behaviour.4 The sociological institutionalist literature identified with James March and 
Johan P. Olsen (1989) explains how elites use existing templates in order to respond to 
problems that are seemingly familiar. This account is, however, criticised for giving 
insufficient recognition to agency in decision-making. Accordingly, I harness the 
historical institutionalist literature in order to fortify our understanding of referendum use. 
I have chosen this account as it recognises the importance of both structure (culture, 
institutions) and agency in explaining the behaviour of political actors. The historical 
institutionalist approach does so by recognising that decision-makers, though rational, 
operate with a limited political repertoire or toolbox.
The literature on contentious politics defines repertoire as the 'culturally encoded 
ways in which people interact in contentious politics,' and notes that the notion 'conveys 
the idea that participants in public claim-making adopt scripts they have performed, or 
observed, before. They do not simply invent an efficient action or express whatever
4 John G. Ikenberry, 'Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Policy', International 
Organisation. 42. 1, 1988, p. 226.
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impulses they feel, but rework known routines in response to current circumstances.'5 
F.W. de Klerk was, therefore, not merely mimicking P.W. Botha. He was a rational agent 
drawing upon a toolbox, which contained the referendum.
Defining a referendum:
The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions defines a referendum as 'a device of 
direct democracy by which the electorate can pronounce upon some public issue put to it 
by a government, or, in the case of a transfer of sovereignty, by an international 
organisation. Where changes of sovereignty are in question, the referendum is called a 
plebiscite, although there is no uniformity of usage.'6 This definition will be employed for 
the purpose of this study.
Though Sarah Wambaugh (1920, 1933, and 1940) and Lawrence Farley (1986) 
employ the term plebiscite to describe all popular consultations on issues of sovereignty, 
the word has largely come to be associated with the rule of Mussolini, Hitler, Napoleon 
and dictatorships. Hence, Pier Vincenzo Uleri defines a plebiscite 'as any kind of popular 
vote (of the electoral or referendum type) where there is no possibility to compete in a free
7 ftand fair way.' A.V. Dicey held a similarly dim view of the plebiscite.
The plural form of the referendum employed is referenda, and not referendums. 
Referenda that deal with issues that pertain to borders, sovereignty, national identity, 
citizenship, group rights, etc. are defined as ethno-national referenda, a phrase first coined 
by Mads Qvortrup.9
The referendum as an institution?
The decision to stage a controlled referendum, ultimately, occurs within political 
structures and is an artefact of institutions, like constitutional arrangements, and electoral 
arrangements. Moreover, referenda are themselves institutions. In some countries, Ireland, 
Denmark, France, and Switzerland, for example, referendum use is highly institutionalised 
and regulated. Here, the terms under which the so-called 'uncontrolled' referendum 
mechanism is invoked are clearly stipulated by the constitution. This is especially the case
5 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics o f  Contention (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 16, 
138.
6 Vernon Bogdanor (Editor), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f Political Institutions (Oxford, 1987), p. 524.
7 Pierre Vincenzo Uleri, 'Introduction' in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds). The Referendum 
Experience in Europe (London. 1996). p. 6.
8 A.V. Dicey, 'Ought the Referendum to be Introduced into England?' The Contemporary Review. Volume 
LVII (January -  June 1890), p. 492.
9 Mads H. Qvortrup, Referendums and Ethnic Conflict (Copenhagen, 1999).
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Interviews Conducted:
(Aurett, Derrick. Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and assistant to Brand Fourie 
(Director General of the Ministry). Whilst in the MOFA, Aurett worked closely on 
the Namibia negotiations. Interview conducted on 12 December 2001, Cape Town.
(Barnard, Dr. Neil. Former Director of National Services (NIS), serving under both 
Presidents PW Botha and FW de Klerk. Interview conducted on 5 December 2002, 
Panorama, Cape Town.
Breytenbach, Prof. Willie. A former civil servant, serving as Secretary of a special cabinet 
committee investigating models for incorporating urban blacks. Under Minister 
Chris Heunis. Upon leaving the government in 1985 Breytenbach became involved 
in numerous IDASA activities and returned to academia. Interview conducted on 4 
December 2002, Stellenbosch.
Cilliers, Jakkie. Director of the Institute for Security Studies, former senior South African 
Defence Force (SADF) intelligence officer. Interview conducted on 27 November 
2001, Pretoria.
iClerck, Hennie. Founder and former Director General of the Saatchi and Saatchi (S.A) 
Advertising Agency, which ran the 1983 and 1992 referendum campaigns. 
Interview conducted on 23 November 2001, Johannesburg.
Cloete, Prof. Fanie. Served for 9 years (1980-1989) in the Prime Minister’s and later 
President’s Office as a constitutional planner, serving as Chief Director of the 
Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. Cloete is currently 
teaching at Stellenbosch University. Interview conducted on 4 December 2002, 
Stellenbosch.
Cronin, Jeremy. South African Communist Party (SACP) activist and current Member of 
Parliament.
De Klerk, Frederik Willem (F.W.). Transvaal National Party (NP) leader after 1982 split 
and cabinet minister under PW Botha. From 1989 to 1994 de Klerk served as the 
last white President. Interview conducted on 21 November 2001, Cape Town.
De Lange, Prof. Piet (J.P.). Former head of the Broederbond 1984 -  1994. Interview 
conducted on 28 November 2001, Pretoria.
Delport, Tertius. Former National Party MP and leader in the Eastern Cape. Delport 
served in the de Klerk government as Deputy Minister of Constitutional Affairs 
and, briefly, as a negotiator at CODES A. Interview conducted on 25 October 2001, 
Cape Town.
Dommisse, Ebbe. Long serving NASPERS journalist, columnist (Deur Dawie column) and 
former editor of Die Burger. In addition to his media related work, Dommisse was
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formation in 1914 until the introduction of the referendum. This analysis will seek to 
expose the interests and preferences that politicians, in this case, NP leaders, were trying 
to fulfil,16 in considering the referendum mechanism. In order to do so, I have consulted a 
wide array of primary sources, especially newspapers, in addition to personal collections 
surveyed. One major potential pitfall of using historical data is that it cannot always be
I  n
corroborated, and is ultimately interpreted by the researcher. Hence, the primary research 
was complemented and, indeed, preceded by extensive consultation of the secondary 
literature. In seeking to understand de Klerk and Botha, I not only draw on archival 
material and newspapers, but also on 46 interviews. The list of interviewees includes 
government and opposition politicians, journalists, officials, academics and analysts.
Why a single case study?
In recent decades, the focus of comparative research has shifted from its traditional single 
case focus, to a quest to include as many different case studies as possible, in order to 
ensure maximal external validity. Such studies, however, sacrifice vital internal validity, 
as every additional case implies less attention to detail. The dialectic between internal and
1 ftexternal validity, or empiricism and generality, which are essentially conflicting values, 
is a long-standing dilemma in political science.19 This research will, by design, emulate 
the more traditional approach to comparative political science, emphasising understanding 
and historical detail. In this regard, I share Samuel Finer’s conviction that political science
is unthinkable without history, and seek to stick to the 'more modest ambition of
00presenting facts.' Where relevant, insights from referendum use elsewhere will be
introduced throughout the study.
Those comparativists, who stress that comparative research needs to move from
understanding to explanation may not, as Lawrence Mayer notes, consider this research
0 1comparative political science. In practice, however, some of the most important 
contributions to political science come from single case or country studies, which were
16 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis' in Sven 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds). Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 9 ,27.
17 Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core o f New Institutionalism', p. 26.
18 Lawrence C. Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry. A Methodological Survey (Homewood Illinois, 1972), 
p. 275; Lawrence C. Mayer, Refining Comparative Politics. Promise Versus Performance (Newbury Park, 
1989), p. 8.
19 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making o f  
the Modem World (Boston. 19661. p. xxiii.
20 Mads H. Qvortrup, 'In Search o f Lost Time: S.E. Finer, History, and the Science o f  Government 
(Unpublished paper, 2003).
21 Lawrence C. Mayer, Refining Comparative Politics, p. 15
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prevalent before World War Two, and not from the positivists. Examples of seminal single 
country studies include, Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of democracy in Italy, Stein 
Rokkan’s (1967) study of cleavages and party support, based on Norway, and Arend 
Lijphart’s (1975) seminal study of consociationalism, based on his native Netherlands. 
And in their quest for science, the positivists have often overlooked the simple politics that 
leaders engage in. This research is, ultimately, about the role of the referendum in NP 
political struggles, internal and external.
Moreover, given the variation in the frequency, scope and nature of referendum 
use, the ability to produce a catchall theory of referendum use is highly debatable. Suffice 
it to add that there are many independent variables that could potentially explain 
referendum use. Amongst these we can list the regime type (presidential, Westminster, 
PR), political culture, the type of nationalism (eastern or western), colonial history, the 
date of state formation, intellectual influences, etc. It is, thus, no surprise that David Butler 
and Austin Ranney conclude that in 'most countries referendums are unique, both in origin 
and consequences. There are no universal rules; at most, there are some widely observed 
tendencies.' Arend Lijphart shares this assessment.
In effect, this study represents a comparative study, within a single case study, of 
debates on the referendum mechanism within the NP, and allows me to search for patterns 
in NP thinking. Moreover, this research provides a unique opportunity to contribute to 
what Lawrence Mayer describes as 'cumulative knowledge,'24 by adding to existing 
research on controlled referendum use. The art of applying and corroborating (or 
falsifying) the models and theories of others is an important academic challenge.
Why South Africa and the 1992 vote?
To date, most of the research on controlled referendum use has focused on Western 
Europe and Scandinavia in particular. Tor Bjorklund (1982), who looked at Norwegian 
referendum use, provides one leading example of research on controlled referendum use. 
South Africa represents the third (or rest of the) world, which has been largely ignored to 
date. Besides, most European case studies look at polities using a PR electoral system. 
South Africa, on the other hand, employed a Westminster (first-past-the-post-system),
22 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Conclusion’ in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). Referendums 
Around the World: The Growing Use o f Direct Democracy (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1994), p. 258.
23 Arend Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns o f  Maioritarian and Consensus Government in Twentv-One 
Countries (New Haven, Yale 1984), p. 206.
24 Lawrence C. Mayer, Refining Comparative Politics, pp. 47,292.
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which it inherited from Britain. Britain, like South Africa, has been a relatively rare user 
of the referendum mechanism. The low frequency of controlled national referenda (South 
African 3) is the norm and not the exception in international use. But it also serves to 
explain why countries like South Africa are often ignored. And in contrast to Europe, 
South Africa only began its referendum tradition much later, in 1960.
In the absence of a constitutional provision, referendum use is a convention or 
praxis in the political culture of polities like Norway, the UK and South Africa. 
Referendum use is thus subject to the judgement of elites. South Africa is all the more 
interesting for the reason that it provides an example of a society involved in a long 
running ethnic conflict and, therefore, represents a case where the referendum has been 
used to both exacerbate and ameliorate an ethno-national conflict. This aspect of 
referendum use has been sorely neglected to date. Finally, this research provides an in- 
depth analysis of the role of the referendum in the South African transition, thus 
highlighting its role in resolving ethno-national conflicts. Beyond providing an 
understanding of the role of the referendum as a tool for transition heresthetics and 
manoeuvring, this study allows us to revisit the South African transition and re-asses de 
Klerk’s quest for a managed transition. The 1992 referendum is one of the most important 
managed ethno-national referenda in recent history, and it played an important role in 
South Africa's transition to democracy. Hence, this vote will be the focus of the research 
on the referendum in South Africa.
Literature consulted:
As a first stage of the research I extensively surveyed the comparative and descriptive 
referendum literature. The important texts in this regard are those written by Sarah 
Wambaugh (1920, 1923), and the edited works of David Butler and Austin Ranney (1978, 
1994), Austin Ranney (1981), and Pier Vincenzo Uleri and Michael Gallagher (1996), 
whilst David B. Magelby (1984, 1994) and Thomas E. Cronin (1989) have made important 
contributions to our understanding of the use of direct democracy in the US. Other 
descriptive studies consulted include those by Phillip Goodhart (1971, 1976), Jo Grimond 
and Brian Neve (1975) and Anthony King (1977). These studies were inspired by the 
introduction of the referendum mechanism in Britain in 1975. Vernon Bogdanor (1981, 
1994) is also a leading contributor to the referendum literature. In addition, a plethora of 
articles published in academic journals were consulted. The most important of these are
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Tor Bjorklund (1982) and Laurent Morel (1993). This literature is analysed in greater detail 
in the ensuing chapter.
Having consulted the referendum literature, I reviewed the secondary literature on 
South African politics and history, in order to guide my subsequent archival research. This 
reading helped in identifying key developments within White politics and the NP, as well 
as relevant protagonists. A key source consulted was the 4-part anthology of the history of 
the Party (1975, 1980, 1980, and 1986), produced by the Institute for Contemporary 
History at the University of the Orange Free State. Other invaluable secondary resources 
include William Henry Vatcher Jr. (1965) and Dunbar T. Moodie's (1975) studies of 
Afrikaner nationalism, Dan O’Meara’s two materialist accounts (1983, 1996), and the 
works of Hermann Giliomee (1982, 2003), Hermann Giliomee and Andre du Toit (1983), 
and Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (1979). Extensive use was also made of 
autobiographies and biographies of leading political figures, and journalists, especially 
from the Naspers group. Some specific historical studies, like Harry Saker’s (1980) 
study of the flag struggle and Leonard Thompson’s (1960) study of the Union’s formation 
also proved invaluable.
Prior to embarking on the archival research I extensively consulted the 
institutionalist (sociological, rational choice and historical) literature in order to better 
understand how institutions, like referenda, are introduced and affect the behaviour of 
decision-makers. The literature is reviewed in chapter one. Given that the referendum was 
a key event in the early stages of the South African transition to democracy, the transition 
literature is also consulted.
Archives consulted:
The archival research was based on a twin strategy of initially consulting newspaper 
archives, and later, personal collections. In the first phase of the search for primary 
sources leading South African newspapers were consulted in the British Library’s 
Newspaper Archives at Collingdale.
Due to the prominence of Die Burger, the Cape Town based mouthpiece of the 
National Party this paper was most extensively consulted. The paper, which was 
established in 1915, is the only NP newspaper that covers the entire period of the study. 
Moreover, the Cape party was predominant throughout the period in question, especially 
until 1954, by which time the referendum was a central plank of the NP’s policy. From
25 Naspers stands for Nasionale Pers or National Press.
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1954 to 1978, the years under Strijdom, Verwoerd, Vorster, and again from 1989 to 1992, 
the balance of power lay in the Transvaal as this province provided the party’s leaders. 
Die Burger, however, continued to reflect and refract NP opinion and maintained its role 
as the leading paper in the Naspers stable. One potential danger of an over-reliance on this 
particular source is that it might paint a skewed (Cape) interpretation of events, hence key 
developments were also researched in Naspers papers representing other provinces, as 
well as the conservative and dissident Afrikaner press, the English and international press. 
The Round Table publication, which covers Commonwealth affairs, and Hansard were 
also consulted.
The second phase of the inquiry focused on archival research and interviews in 
South Africa, from October to late December 2001. During the excursion I visited the 
National Archive in Pretoria, the J.S. Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch, 
the University of Cape Town’s Africana Library, the Johannesburg Library, and the 
Archive of the Institute for Contemporary History (INCH) at the University of the Orange 
Free State. The latter archive is the most important for students interested in White South 
African politics. In addition, the Public Records Office (PRO) archives were consulted; in 
order to get a sense of how British officials viewed certain key developments in Southern 
Africa. In subsequent trips to South Africa (May and December 2002 and February 2003), 
I returned to the Stellenbosch Library, and visited the Cape Town branch of the National 
Archive and the National Library in Cape Town. Additional interviews were also 
conducted. Much of the material consulted is in Afrikaans and quotations cited in the 
study are my translations.
Access to certain key collections, like that of the South Africa Bureau of Race 
Relations (S.A.B.R.A.), which is held in the INCH archive, was denied. Similarly, the 
Broederbond, which had kindly provided limited information on the internal referendum 
on the de Lange paper, declined to grant me access to its archives. Given the central role 
of the group and disproportionate influence of its members, no study on White South 
African politics can be complete without access to these archives. Paul Williams notes that 
the organisation served as 'a kind of strategic planning unit for the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement, organising activities and waging the struggle for ideological hegemony within 
Afrikanerdom.'26 The secondary literature on the Broederbond, Charles Bloomberg 
(1990), Hennie Serfontein (1974), Ivor Wilkens and Hans Strydom (1978), and Dan
26 Paul Williams, Intellectuals and the End o f  Apartheid: The Afrikaner Broederbond’s Search for Security 
with Transition (Edgbaston, 2002), p. 13.
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O’Meara (1977, 1983) was consulted, but in no way compensates for the material that this 
collection might contain.
In addition to the archival research, over 40 interviews were conducted with a wide 
range of individuals active in the Botha and de Klerk eras. The interviewees comprised NP 
politicians, including former Ministers and President de Klerk, opposition politicians, 
ANC/ UDF politicians, leading journalists, academics, analysts and former officials. 
Certain leading politicians (Pik Botha, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mac Maharaj, 
Cyril Ramaphosa) and former officials (George Meiring, former Chief of Staff of the 
SADF) declined interviews. Former President F.W. de Klerk, unfortunately, declined a 
second interview that was designed to focus on the 1983 referendum and on ethical 
aspects of his use of the referendum. A detailed list of those interviewed, the archives and 
newspapers consulted, as well ass the literature used is provided in the bibliography.
Structure of the dissertation:
In the ensuing chapter I will review the referendum literature, with particular emphasis on 
accounts of referendum use. I primarily identify accounts that highlight agency, culture 
and structure. I also explore the sociological institutionalist literature, in order to account 
for repeated use of the referendum. In order to bridge the gap between accounts that 
highlight agency, and the sociological institutionalist literature, which emphasises 
structure or institutions, I will adopt the historical institutionalist paradigm. Though 
primarily applied to research that compares the varied response to key events, like the 
great depression,27 or EU legislation,28 in different settings, this approach will be applied 
in order to explain the introduction of the referendum in South African politics and its 
subsequent use. An explanation of institutional change and the introduction and spread of 
new institutions will follow this theoretical discussion, which is sprinkled with many 
practical examples of referendum use.
In chapter two, I briefly explore Ian Lustick’s (1995) analysis of processes of state 
contraction and suggests how referenda fit into such processes, in order to proffer a 
typology of ethno-national referenda. I next examine de Klerk’s effort to lead a managed 
transition and the role of the referendum in that process. This particular section of the 
study, which is most important of the cases analysed, is plainly the most detailed, and is
27 Sheri Berman, 'Path Dependency and Political Action. Re-examining Responses to Depression', 
Comparative Politics. 30 ,4 , 1998, pp. 3 7 9 -4 0 0 .
28 Mark Thatcher, The Politics o f Telecommunications. National Institutions. Convergence, and Change in 
Britain and France (Oxford. 1999), p. 21.
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divided into two separate chapters. The first provides a backdrop to de Klerk’s transition 
and highlights his assumptions and stratagems going into the transition. This is essential to 
understanding the use of the referendum in 1992, which is analysed in the fourth chapter. 
This section looks at what Alfred Stepan describes as the 'micro-politics' of the 
transition, and highlights the role of the referendum.
Having explained the 'why' of the 1992 referendum, the bulk of this thesis 
addresses the question of where de Klerk got the idea of a referendum. I first review post- 
Union White politics and intra-White conflicts. This chapter provides an invaluable 
background to key fault lines in White politics, and analyses the NP’s first years in 
opposition, from 1914 to 1924, which is essential in order to understand the party’s initial 
attraction to the referendum. Some key developments analysed are the 1914 rebellion, and 
efforts to improve the party’s image thereafter, and the impact of Wilsonian nationalism 
on the NP. I also discuss the Rhodesian referendum of 1922, through which Imperial 
Britain encouraged the NP to embrace the referendum mechanism.
The sixth chapter specifically analyses the promise to stage a referendum on a 
'clean' flag30 in 1926. The referendum pledge, which was designed to ameliorate the 
conflict within the party and the PACT government (which brought together the NP and 
English speaking Labour Party) over the flag issue, is accordant with the existing 
literature. Though this referendum was, eventually, not held, it set an important precedent 
for dealing with intra-White symbolic and constitutional conflicts.
The seventh chapter deals with the hard line element of the NP’s response to 
political Fusion, between the South Africa Party (SAP) under J.C. Smuts and the NP under 
the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog, in 1934. This particular event is perhaps one of the most 
important political events in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, and represents the 
juncture where a new and exclusive nationalism, with 'a new class basis, ideological
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orientation and organisational structures,' emerges to replace the more inclusive (in
White terms) Hertzogism. Despite the radicalisation and republicanisation of the Purified
NP under D.F. Malan’s leadership, it continued to embrace Hertzog’s referendum pledge.
An equally important crisis in this period is the war vote in September 1939. As a
m
consequence of the vote, the Purified NP and the Broederbond increasingly came to set
29 Alfred Stepan, 'Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil', in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan 
fedsY The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes. Latin America (Baltimore. 1978), p. 132.
30 By a 'clean' flag I refer to an ensign without any symbols associated with Britain and the Boer Republics.
31 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. Class. Capital and Ideology in the Development o f  Afrikaner 
Nationalism (Cambridge, 1983), p. 22.
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the agenda and jettisoned the referendum pledge, and with it the party’s commitment to 
constitutionalism. The growing recognition that Nazi Germany faced military defeat, once 
the US entered the War, strengthened the moderate, constitutional, wing of the party, and 
underscored the need to win a general election by appealing to non-republicans.
Chapter eight provides a study of the period leading up to the 1948 elections and 
after, when the party assumed power. This section analyses the role of the referendum in 
allowing the party gain dominion, consolidate its grip on power and promote its Apartheid 
agenda. The chapter also deals with the founding referendum -  the 1960 referendum. The 
tactical debate over the best way to ensure victory in the referendum, specifically the 
question of Commonwealth membership, is fascinating and highlights the differences 
between the factions in the party.
Chapter nine deals with the 1983 referendum, which followed major divisions 
within the NP and a subsequent splinter from the ruling party, after it broke with the 
traditional Verwoerdian model. The research demonstrates, unequivocally, how Botha 
explicitly referred to Verwoerd’s referendum in explaining to his party where the idea 
came from. What also emerges from Botha’s use of the referendum is how his thinking on 
the referendum evolved over time, in response to unfolding developments. Chapter 10 
explores the evolving role of the referendum in White South African politics from 1910 to 
1992, with particular emphasis on the role of the referendum in the making and un-making 
of Apartheid. I then present the principle conclusions of my research.
Cases and issues not dealt with:
Not included in this historical study is the Namibian referendum of 1977, on grounds that 
it was not a nation-wide vote. All indications suggest that Vorster’s behaviour was 
consistent with that of Botha and de Klerk. Vorster was confronted with deep divisions 
within the party over the reform process in Namibia and feared that the newly formed 
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) would profit from disaffection over the Tumhalle 
process.32 Also excluded, is the Smuts government’s 1946 consultation of Namibia’s tribal 
leaders, in order to bolster the Union's effort to annex the territory. The Smuts government
32 The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), warned o f a mixed ('bont) government, and accused (Die 
Afrikaner. 27 August, 3 and 17 September 1976) and accused the NP o f selling out SWA’s Whites (van 
Wyk, 1999: 26, 36, 40). The referendum thus served to counter claims that Pretoria was not forcing Whites 
into the new dispensation (du Pisani, 1986: 344; Interview with Chris Thirion, 29 November 2001 and 
Derrick Aurette, 12 December, 2001) Moreover, the party within South West Africa (Namibia) and South 
Africa was increasingly divided over the Tumhalle process (van Wyk, 1999: 65; Die Afrikaner. 30 July, 17 
August and 3 September 1976; Interviews with Dries van Heerden, 3 December 2002 and Andre Le Roux, 
14 December 2002).
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saw the process as a means to deflect international criticism of the government’s effort to 
incorporate the territory after World War Two. Similarly, the 1909 Natal referendum on 
joining the Union will not be treated, as it was a sub-national vote and took place prior to 
the formation of the Union.
I have, similarly, passed over the Broederbond’s internal referendum. In 1985 the 
secret organisation conducted a vote amongst its 15,000 strong membership on the so- 
called de Lange document (authored by its chairman Prof. J.P. de Lange).34 78 percent of 
the participants supported the paper, which included, amongst other things, full citizenship
^ r
rights for Blacks. I have also excluded the numerous local referenda staged on the city 
scale, by CP controlled councils after the 1990 reforms process was begun, and the King 
William’s Town referendum, staged by residents opposed to the town’s incorporation into 
the Ciskei. I have also omitted the Ciskei independence referendum of 1980. This marks 
the only occasion on which an NP government employed a referendum in executing its 
Bantustan (homeland) policy. The referendum was triggered by the report of the Quail 
Commission, created by the Ciskei government, which recommended a referendum prior 
to moving ahead on independence. Interestingly, the last Transkei leader, Banthu 
Holimisa considered staging a referendum on the homeland's re-incorporation into South 
Africa in 1990. De Klerk, however, thwarted such plans by applying pressure on the 
homeland leadership.
Two additional fascinating subjects related to the referendum are also excluded by 
design. The first is an analysis of the opinion of the excluded majority in regard to each of 
the referenda discussed. It is indeed fascinating that the ANC never staged an alternative 
referendum as the opposition movement did in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In 1961 the Black 
opposition National Democratic Party (NDP) staged its own vote in parallel to a Whites- 
only referendum on the issue of creating a Federation that would include Southern 
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Margaret Ballinger 
(1969) provides a brief description of the Black and Coloured opposition’s response to the
33 See The Star. 17, 18, 21, 22, 23 January 1946, 5, 6, 9, 12 November 1946, The New York Times. 18, 22, 
29 October 1946.
34 Afrikaner Broederbond, 'Basiese Staatkundige Voorwaardes vir die Voorbestaan van die Afrikaner', 
(Unpublished paper, 1986).
35 Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001); Alistair Sparks. Tomorrow is Another Country. The 
Inside Story o f South Africa’s Road to Change (Chicago. 1996), p. 75.
36 The Argus, for example, reported that Robert von Tonder and the Boerestaat Party had their own petition/ 
referendum in Krugersdorp. The Argus. 22 February 1992.
37 Ciskei Commission Report (Silverton. 1980), p. 127.
38 R.W. Johnson, The Times. 13 February 1990; Gavin Bell, The Times. 25 June 1990.
39 The Bulawayo Chronicle. 2 1 ,2 2 ,2 6  July 1961.
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'fraudulent' White referendum of 1960. The debates within the United Democratic Front 
(U.D.F.) over participation in the 1983 referendum, which came perilously close to 
splitting the newly forged movement, are covered by Jeremy Seekings’s (2000, chapter 5) 
excellent study of the UDF. The fact that the government considered a referendum for the 
so-called Coloured and the Indian communities makes this period particularly interesting. 
Nelson Mandela and the ANC opposed the 1992 White referendum on grounds of 
principle. The impact of the referendum mechanism, over time and in each specific case, 
on the excluded majority, certainly demands serious attention. I also refrain from 
analysing the CP’s debate over boycotting the 1992 referendum in great detail. The failure 
of this opposition party to heed the lessons of its previous defeat in the 1983 referendum, 
and the broader dilemmas of boycotting referenda also deserve attention. This latter 
question is an aspect also neglected in the referendum literature.
The argument:
The core argument of this dissertation is that de Klerk’s use of the referendum defies the 
predictions of the existing literature. This referendum was a pre-emptive move. It was, in 
fact, an integral part of the NP’s transition script, and it did not emerge as a response to 
party or coalition divisions over reform. Moreover, though driven by maximising 
motivations, history of past use played a crucial role, as de Klerk also applied a logic of 
appropriateness. De Klerk, though a rational actor, operated with a historically and 
culturally constrained political repertoire.
In order to understand the use of the 1992 referendum we need a deeper historical 
analysis of referendum use in this particular setting. As I will demonstrate, de Klerk was 
emulating Botha -  having learnt a great deal from his reforms in the 1980’s. Botha was, in 
turn, applying lessons he learnt from his rich experience as a machine politician -  under 
Malan and his successors. Perhaps the most important of these experiences was his 
involvement in the 1960 referendum, and Botha’s application of the logic of 
appropriateness will also be demonstrated.
In order to understand this founding referendum, we need to understand the 
historical struggles that produced this referendum. These pitted republicans against non- 
republicans and the Cape against the North. Moreover, the referendum came to be viewed 
as a vital tool in electoral politics, especially in allowing the party to appeal to non­
republicans. And this research -  with its extensive use of historical material -  will 
demonstrate the powerful insights that an understanding of these struggles provides. And
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whilst the existing literature is seminal to appreciating the founding referendum, path 
dependency made the institution a part of the NP's political repertoire. The theoretical 
insight that South Africa provides is that once introduced, the referendum precedent itself 
serves as a resource and constraint in the behaviour of future political actors. A script is 
set.
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Chapter One. 
Explaining referendum use.
Actors are strategic, seeking to realise complex, contingent and often 
changing goals. They do so in a context which favours certain strategies over 
others and must rely upon perceptions o f that context which are at best 
incomplete, and which may very often reveal themselves inaccurate after the 
event.
Why elites use referenda:
Despite the fact that there have been well over 1,000 referenda at the national level since 
1791, insufficient analytical attention has been assigned to understanding their use, 
especially the use of controlled or government initiated referenda. The existing literature 
has either been of a descriptive/ comparative nature, surveying referendum use, or it has 
dealt with theoretical dimensions of usage. One reason why referendum use has 
traditionally received less attention in the political science literature is that referenda are, 
relatively speaking, rare and irregular in most polities. A second reason has to do with the 
rather dim view that many political scientists have of referenda. In this chapter I review 
the referendum literature. Broadly speaking, the existing literature explains referendum 
use as being driven through, either consequential or utilitarian considerations and cultural 
traditions. I also assess the sociological institutionalist literature and suggest its 
contribution to our understanding of referendum use. Despite the appeal of this literature, 
it gives insufficient recognition to the role of agency. In order to suggest an account that 
synthesises consequential and structure driven explanations, I embrace the historical 
institutionalist approach.
A cultural explanation:
Switzerland provides an example of a polity where the explanation for referendum use 
draws heavily on culture, and it is suggested that modem referendum is an application of 
the traditional landsgemeine (or tribal gathering), which was particularly pervasive in 
Switzerland’s Germanic cantons. Wolf Linder, however, dismisses such accounts as myth
1 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure Agency and Historical Institutionalism', Political Studies. 46, 5, 
1998, p. 954.
2 Kris W. Kobach, 'Switzerland' in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World: 
The Growing use o f Direct Democracy (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1994), p.99; Phillip Goodhart, 
Referendum (London, 1976), p. 69; Benjamin Barber, 'Participation and Swiss Democracy', Government 
and Opposition. 23, 1, 1988, p. 40.
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making and submits that direct democracy was imposed upon the Swiss by Napoleon. 
Besides, culture alone, has limitations as an independent variable in explaining 
referendum use.
The fact that referenda are relatively absent from modem Greece (8 votes), where 
the original plebiscite took shape, questions the centrality of culture in accounting for 
referendum. And, the near absence of referenda in British political tradition must be 
contrasted with their prevalence in New Zealand and Australia. Moreover, there is a 
difference in patterns of referendum use between these two former colonies.4 Several 
democracies (India, U.S.A., Japan, Netherlands, Israel and post-war Germany) have thus 
far refrained from employing the referendum on a national level, and there seems scant 
evidence that would suggest a common set of cultural (or institutional) traits that might 
explain this. And, not all American states employ direct democracy.
It should also be added that political elites often make a conscience choice to 
harness culture as a political resource. One example of how elites use culture to justify a 
particular form of popular consultation is provided by the Marcos regime in the 
Philippines. Fearful that he would lose a referendum on a new constitution in 1972, 
Ferdinand Marcos postponed it and allowed for controlled consultative decision-making 
by barangay elders.5 Marcos, who held three further barangays (1973, 1975, and 1976), 
claimed that the vote marked a return to the democracy that was practised prior to Spanish 
conquest.6
Culture in South Africa:
Tempting though it may be to attribute the use of referenda to culture -  in the case of 
South Africa the Great Trek (which approximates the landsgemeine in that the Trek party 
made and unmade laws,) or the former Boer Republics in the Transvaal and Free State, and 
their debatably democratic traditions,7 there is no evidence whatsoever that this is the case.
3 W olf Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (London, 1998),
p. 88.
Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', In David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums 
Around the World, p. 154.
5 Marin Wright (ed.), Revolution in the Philippines? (Harlow, Essex, 1988), pp. 2,11-12.
6 The New York Times. 16, 17, 18 January 1976; David Wurfel, Filipino Politics. Development and Decay 
(Ithica, 1988), pp. 114-121.
7 Whilst Dunbar Moodie (1975: 30 -  31) claims that the Boer’s almost 'perfectly expressed Rousseau’s 
notion o f the general will,' within the racial constraints, his assessment merits qualification. Although 
Transvaal legislators and President Paul Kruger placed a high premium on the 'will o f  the people' 
(Kleynhans, 1966: 12, 23-26, 136; Thompson, 1960: 99 and Marais, 1961: 11), Kruger was a rather 
autocratic leader, who employed the idea o f  popular sovereignty to limit the sovereignty o f the legislature 
(Furlong, 1991: 171-175). G.H. Calpin (1941:73) speculates that had the 'Transvaal and Orange territory
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It is indeed curious that neither of the former Boer republics voted on the Union in 1909, 
whilst Natal, the most British of the former colonies, did.
Why elites use referenda?
The decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, that of political elites. French academic, 
Laurence Morel’s (1993) analysis of European votes identifies four functional roles of 
referenda, and provides a helpful insight into what motivates consequential political elites 
to use referenda. These roles include; 1) providing internal cohesion or party unity; 2) 
smoothing the adoption of legislation; 3) enhancing the political power of parties of 
leaders; 4) and giving legitimacy to decisions or policies. The first three roles will be 
explored in detail in the coming paragraphs.
The question of legitimacy is especially notable in regard to ethno-national votes, 
and legitimacy is vital if the opponents of reform are prepared to harness violent forms of 
resistance. Some problems, as Ian Lustick notes, 'such as taking a decision to contract the
O
borders of a state in order to achieve peace, are too big for democratic procedures.' In the 
ensuing chapter I discuss the role of the referendum in providing legitimacy for 
controversial processes -  like state contraction -  in greater detail.
Promoting policy and party:
The most popular perception regarding referendum use is that political actors, being 
utilitarian, view them as the most efficient mechanism to promote a certain policy or their 
party. And, a referendum often offers a low-risk route to passing potentially unpopular 
policy decisions or reforms. In the case of F.W. de Klerk, a referendum presented an 
infinitely safer option, than a general election, in order to address challenges to his 
legitimacy to lead a reform process. Given that some 80 percent9 of all controlled 
referenda produce outcomes that favour ruling elites, the referendum is, indeed, a highly 
efficient means to promote elite interests. This has ensured that many view the referendum 
a conservative mechanism that enhances elite control.10
continued uninterruptedly as republics, all forces were there to make them one-party governments, with a 
tendency towards dictatorship.'
8 Ian S. Lustick, 'Through Blood and Fire Shall Peace Arise', Tikkun. May / June 2002, p. 19.
9 Mads H. Qvortrup, 'Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-hegemonic?', Political Studies. Volume 48,
2000, pp. 821-826.
10 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Referendums and Separatism II', in Austin Ranney (ed), The Referendum Device 
(Washington DC and London, 1981), p. 132; Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', in David Butler and 
Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World p. 30; Austin Ranney, 'Reflections on Referendums', 
in Austin Ranney (ed), The Referendum Device, p. 34.
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Explaining a recent upsurge in referendum use in Latin America, Monica Barczak
(2000), suggests that dissatisfaction with the existing political system has resulted in the
rise of neo-populist and modernising leaders. Once in power, these non-party based
leaders and their followers have amended the existing constitution in order to ensconce
their position and prevent the return of the parties associated with paralysis.
In the extreme, someone like Giovanni Sartori simply views the referendum
mechanism as a means to circumvent representative democracy.11 Its association with
10Napoleon Bonaparte, inter-war fascism and Nazism, and its continued use by regimes
that flout the rules of democracy, has bolstered this perception. It should, however, be
noted that there are several examples where governments have suffered ignominious
defeats in controlled referenda. Examples include Pinochet’s defeat in a 1988 referendum,
and Charles de Gaulle, who harnessed the referendum mechanism in order to bolster his
Fifth republic, was, ultimately, the victim of the referendum mechanism and resigned after
losing a vote in 1969. In 1992 and in 2001 the Danish government and the establishment
were defeated on EU integration. A similar pattern was witnessed in Norway’s 1972
European referendum. In 1978 Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky’s, decision to turn a
referendum, on proceeding with a nuclear energy plant, into a vote of confidence proved
disastrous. Kreisky’s decision provided the conservative opposition (which supported the
11development of the plant) with an incentive to vote 'no'. More recently Zimbabwe’s 
Robert Mugabe (2000) made a similar error.14
The image of the referendum as a 'policy/power maximising'15 mechanism is 
further undermined by the fact that referendum use is, in general, very sporadic and not 
universal. Despite the clear incentive for governments to use the discretionary referendum, 
this has not been the case, and referendum use has not been addictive, or habit forming.16 
Instead, referenda tend to serve mainly as 'crisis instruments, invoked to solve a particular 
problem or in order to justify a particular solution.'17 The average number of national
11 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures. Incentives and 
Outcomes (Houndmills. Basingstoke. 1997), p. 165.
12 Ronald Butt, quoted in Austin Ranney, 'Reflections on Referendums', in Austin Ranney (ed.), The 
Referendum Device, p. 12
13 Wolfgang C. Muller, 'Party Competition and Plebsicitary Politics in Austria', Electoral Studies. 17, 1, 
1998, p. 27.
14 David Blair, Degrees in Violence. Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe (London, 
2002), p. 55.
15 Maija Setala, Referendums and Democratic Government: Normative Theories and the Analysis o f  
Institutions (Houndmills. Basingstoke. 1999), p. 89.
16 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (ed.), Referendums 
Around the World, p. 3.
17 Ibid. p. 1.
23
referenda per country (excluding Switzerland) is less than 7, measured from 1791 to
1 O2000. Moreover, it should be noted that several countries, which are relatively frequent
users of the referendum institution, in fact, further inflate this average.19 The high rate of
variation in the frequency of referendum use across countries has led David Butler and
Austin Ranney to suggest that there is indeed no pattern of referendum use.
Furthermore, a utilitarian view of political behaviour ignores the influence of
y iculture, ideas and history in decision-making. It is a curious observation that those 
European nation states that have employed the referendum mechanism on ceding 
sovereignty to the European Union are often victims of past territorial conquests. And, as 
Vernon Bogdanor has noted, neither 'constitutional principles nor political attitudes can be 
understood without grasping their roots in the historical experience of a society, which 
dominates the attitudes of the contemporary politician, even when he is least aware of it.'22 
This thesis, therefore, seeks to provide an account of referendum use, which recognises 
that instrumental rationality clearly looms large in decision-making, yet assumes that this 
rationality is itself a product of particular historical developments.
Navigating party and coalition splits:
Tor Bjorklund (1982) provides a more refined consequential understanding of why elites 
employ controlled referenda. Analysing referendum use in Norway, over time, he 
concluded that the referendum is generally demanded by a minority that is facing defeat in 
a parliamentary vote. In order for this minority to succeed in having their demands met, 
Bjorklund suggests two important conditions. The first is that the ruling political party or 
coalition must be split on the issue, and the second is that voters view the issue as salient.
18 This calculation is derived from the C2D data base. See http://c2d.unige.ch/.
19 The list o f countries that have to date used over 20 votes includes, Liechtenstein (78 since 1919), Australia 
(51 since 1898), Italy (58 since 1921), New Zealand (44 since 1902), Ecuador (34 since 1986), France (28 
since 1793), Egypt (24 since 1956), Ireland (23 since 1937), Haiti (22 since 1918), and Uruguay (21 since 
1917).
20 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Referendums: A Comparative Study o f Practice and Theory', in David 
Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums: A Comparative Study o f Practice and Theory, p. 18; David 
Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Conclusion', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the 
World, p. 258.
21Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alfrod, 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practises and Institutional 
Contradictions', in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis (Chicago, 1991), pp. 232 -  234.
22 Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System. The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British 
Politics (Cambridge. 1981), p. 4.
23 Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core o f New Institutionalism', Politics and Society. 26, 1, March 
1998, p. 18.
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Accordingly, the referendum serves to mediate party or coalition divisions, and it appears 
that party disputes are the primary reason for the use of the controlled referendum.24
The UK, where divisions over the question of EEC membership and, later, over 
devolution, produced referenda, provides an example. The referendum also served to 
mediate internal Swedish tensions in the case of Norwegian cession from Sweden in
of* *771905. Similarly, the Australian conscription referendum in 1916 and 1917, the 
prohibition question in Norway (1919 and 1926), Sweden (1922) and Finland (1931), 
were settled by referenda after they divided the ruling party. This was also the case with 
the nuclear issue in Sweden (1980) and Austria (1978), and in Spain’s (1986) referendum 
on NATO membership. In 1986 John Major was forced to pledge a referendum in the face 
of internal spats in the Tory party over European issues. Laurence Morel, however, also 
highlights an important paradox, namely, that using the referendum mechanism, may in 
fact intensify existing divisions. These differences may emerge during the campaign, as 
was the case in the West Indies Federation vote. In South Africa, Botha’s 1980 pledge to 
stage a referendum on power-sharing failed to keep the ruling party together.
The referendum as a form of heresthetics:
One of the fascinating insights that will emerge from this study, is the way the NP used 
the referendum in order to secure the support of a wider -  non-republican - constituency at 
election time. This use of a referendum pledge to de-couple a key policy issue, like 
secession, at election time was similarly applied in Quebec by the Parti Quebecois in the 
1976 elections. Similarly, Tony Blair made a referendum pledge on the question of 
additional taxation powers for the proposed Scottish Assembly. It was widely recognised 
that the undertaking was used to '‘nail forever’ the Tory lie that Labour was imposing a
24 Maija Setala, 'Referendums in Western Europe -  A Wave o f Direct Democracy?' Scandinavian Political 
Studies. 22 .4 . 1999, p. 332.
25 Jo Grimond and Brian Neve, The Referendum (London, 1975), p. 25; Phillip Goodhart, Full Hearted 
Consent (London, 1976), p. 46; Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System, p. 35; Vernon 
Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', pp. 38-44.
26 Evert Vedung, 'Why Secession o f Norway in 1905 did not lead to war', Paper prepared for the Seminar 
Quan la Llun venia del Nord -  Suecia, Noruega la Catalunyua modemista, Barcelona, November 1 5 - 1 6 ,  
1999.
27 'The Australian Conscription Referendum', Round Table. No. 26. 1917; Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and 
New Zealand', pp. 168-169.
28 The Independent. The Times and The Guardian. 8 March 1996.
29 Laurence Morel,'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums in Western Europe', West European Politics. 16, 
3, July 1993. p. 228.
30 John Mordecai, The West Indies. The Federal Negotiations (London, 1968), pp. 404-407.
31Matthew Mendelsohn and Andre Parkin, 'Introducing Direct Democracy in Canada', Choices. 
Strengthening Canadian Democracy. 7 ,5,  June 2001, p. 17.
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Tartan Tax on the people of Scotland,' thereby keeping the issue off the agenda of the 
1997 elections. Prior to committing his party to a referendum on this issue, Blair 
promised a referendum on devolution, in order to undermine John Major’s efforts to attack 
New Labour on the issue, judging that the Tory 'save the Union message' was highly 
effective against Labour in the 1992 elections. Tony Blair’s later promise to hold a 
referendum on the Euro, also served to ensure that the issue does not cloud British 
elections in 2001, as did a similar Norwegian pledge to hold a vote on EU membership 
ahead of the 1993 elections.34 In Ireland, Fianna Fail used a referendum pledge to ensure 
that pressure groups keep the abortion issue off the agenda of the Irish elections in the 
early 1980. Incumbents, or their contestants, thus seek to improve their electoral 
prospects by using a referendum pledge in order to remove a controversial issue from the 
electoral agenda.
John Matsusaka (1992) has demonstrated that Californian legislators tend to avoid 
distributional issues that are 'to hot to handle' (like abortion) by employing referenda, as 
they fear being punished by voters. Politicians, thus, also adroitly exploit the referendum 
in order to 'escape from making decisions that they fear will create as many enemies as 
friends.' Bjorklund, appropriately, suggests that the referendum serves as a 'lightening 
rod,' allowing a ruling party or coalition to avoid the wrath of voters at election time. As 
will be described in chapter four, however, the referendum does not always succeed as a 
lightening rod, and voters may, at times, use referenda to punish unpopular governments.
William Riker has introduced the handy concept of heresthetics, in order to 
describe actions taken by politicians to 'structure the world' so that they can win political 
contests.37 Referenda are a vital tool of electoral heresthetics, and their tactical use in 
electoral contests may, in fact, explain their later use. In other words, parties that 
repeatedly promise a referendum during election campaigns might have little choice but to 
honour that pledge afterwards.
32 The Independent on Sunday. 29 June 1996, Andrew Marr, The Independent. 26 June 1996, and Ian Bell, 
The Independent on Sunday. 29 June 1996.
33 The Independent. 26 June 1996. The Economist. June 29. 1996.
34 Tor Midtbo and Kjell Hines, 'The Referendum -  Election Nexus: an Aggregate Analysis o f  Norwegian 
Voting Behaviour', Electoral Studies. 17, 1, 1998, p. 79.
35 Laurence Morel, 'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums, p. 233.
36 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', p. 3.
37 William Riker, The Art o f Political Manipulation (New Haven and London, 1986), pp. Ix, 142 -  192.
26
The Logic of Appropriateness:
Whilst Bjorklund’s account qualifies the conditions under which the controlled 
referendum is viewed as an efficient mechanism, it does not help us to understand F.W. de 
Klerk’s decision to promise a referendum in 1990. For de Klerk did so despite the fact that 
there were no major divisions within his government over the reform process he launched.
One reason is that Bjorklund pays insufficient attention to the structure 
(institutions) and culture within which these elites make their decisions on referenda. 
Moreover, accounts that focus on divisions, at a particular juncture, fail to pay sufficient 
attention to the impact of path dependency on future referendum use. Applied to 
Bjorklund’s Norway, one could argue that the successful introduction of the referendum in 
1905, on the question of independence, constrained future referendum use, by inextricably 
linking sovereignty issues and referenda.
I argue that whilst controlled referenda are not addictive, patterns of referendum 
use, which are shaped by early use, are discemable. Even though a controlled referendum 
is not mandatory, convention or precedent may cause a government to feel that 'it has no 
choice but to call a referendum.'38 As Vernon Bogdanor notes, the referendum has, over 
time, come to demarcate 'some laws from others as fundamental, such that they require 
ratification by the people.'39
In the case of Britain, for example, referenda have been used to legitimate the 
transfer of Parliament’s power (devolution, the EEC, Northern Ireland), and in the build­
up to the 1975 referenda, the precedent of EC referendum loomed large.40 In South Africa 
the NP went to the volk on matters related to the definition of citizenship, and P.W. Botha 
explicitly made reference to the 1960 referendum in justifying his 1983 referendum.
In order to understand how elites emulate their predecessors, and how patterns of 
referendum use are formed, I turn to the work of James March and Johan P. Olsen. In 
sharp contrast to the choice metaphor, which guides the actions of the utilitarian actor, 
they suggest that the behaviour of political actors is driven by the 'logic of 
appropriateness.'41 One prominent example where the logic is applied is the Cuban Missile 
Crisis 42 And, in Graham Allison’s fascinating study of the crisis, he notes how Robert
38 Matthew Mendelsohn and Andre Parkin, 'Introducing Direct Democracy in Canada', p. 16.
39 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 46.
40 Barry Jones and Rick Wilford, Further Considerations on the Referendum: The Evidence o f  the Vote on 
Welsh Devolution'. Political Studies. XXX. 1, 1975, p. 18.
41 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis o f Politics. 
(New York, 1989), pp. 21 - 2 2 ,  160 -1 61 .
42Ibid. p. 25.
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Kennedy effectively ruled out the option of bombing Cuba’s naval fleet as a possible 
response, by suggesting that the USA could not conduct a ’Pearl Harbour in reverse.'43 
Hence metaphor and history not only constrained the decision maker’s search for 
alternatives, but also defined the situation.
This anecdote strongly contrasts with the image of rational decision-making. 
Namely, that all possible alternatives are canvassed and their respective costs and benefits 
are weighed up, prior to deciding on which course of action to pursue. Instead, decision­
makers are pre-occupied with questions like 'what situation is this?' and 'what should I 
do?' Actions are, therefore, fitted to situations by their appropriateness,44 and Stephen 
Krasner notes that actors operate with cognitive scripts, which serve as 'classificatory 
schemes -  cognitive models that filter perceptions and suggest appropriate behaviour. 
Scripts might or might not be followed; they can be deeply constraining or invitations to 
hypocrisy.'45 It is important to note that sociological institutionalism does not negate 
intentional behaviour. It rather replaces it with a notion of 'bounded' rationality, where 
actors are pre-occupied with'satisficing,' as opposed to maximising, behaviour. Elite pacts 
in transitions to democracy provide one form of satisficing behaviour, where each side 
obtains 'some important satisfactions' and avoids the 'worst possible disaffections.'46
Applying the logic to referendum use:
This literature, thus, recognises that once an institution or solution is applied to a 
particular issue, a script or precedent has been created. This account further implies that a 
satisfactory and legitimate course of action is chosen, often, at the expense of the most 
efficient solution.47 Applied to referenda, I suggest that whereas consequential actors view 
them as an efficient means to an end, interpretive actors rather view referenda as the right 
or legitimate way to resolve an issue.48
Denmark, a victim of past territorial aggression, insisted on conducting a 
referendum in the Danish West Indies (The Virgin Islands) before selling the islands to the
43 Graham T. Allison, The Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises (Boston, 1971), pp. 
132,183,197,203; Robert C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia, 1995), pp. 42 -  48.
44 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, p. 25.
45 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, 1995), p. 63.
46 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore. 19861. p. 70.
47 Jack Walker (1969), for example, has demonstrated how Americans moving westward inappropriately 
applied their existing institutional norms (zoning, town planning) in the drier west. And in the case o f  
Suriname, the Dutch consociationalism was applied to this former colony, even though it was ill suited 
(Thorndike, 1990: 35).
48 Mads H. Qvortrup, 'Constitutional Implications o f the Use o f the Referendum', (D. Phil Thesis, University 
o f  Oxford, 1998), p. 187.
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US.49 Danish elites (like Robert Kennedy in the Bay of Pig incident) may have felt that 
they could not behave towards others as the Prussians behaved towards them, on the 
question of Schleswig-Holstein. And by using a referendum in this particular context, 
Denmark clearly also hoped to legitimate its demand for a vote on the status of Schleswig- 
Holstein.50 French elites were equally insistent that they could not purchase St. 
Bartholomew from Sweden without the consent of the people for similar reasons.51 
Besides, such generosity would, no doubt, bolster French efforts to secure a vote on the 
future of Alsace-Lorraine.
Colin Hughes provides an apposite example of the application of this logic in 
referendum use. According to Hughes, the acceptance of Advance Australia Fair, as a 
national anthem, following a referendum in 1977, 'makes it likely that should a
e*y
replacement for the present flag be proposed, that choice would be put to a referendum.'
Given that referenda are often viewed as crisis instruments, used when 'normal 
consensual mechanisms have broken down,'53 or associated with certain situations, their 
use is limited to such situations by interpretive behaviour. And, once employed on a 
salient issue, like sovereignty, the referendum becomes an established and legitimate 
institution through which to resolve such issues. Political actors are thus obliged to act in 
accordance with these norms and may feel that ceding sovereignty to Brussels in the 
process of European integration, for example, requires popular consent, even though a 
referendum might in fact be an inefficient solution.
The referendum as a value:
Clearly on certain matters, like sovereignty, efficiency is not the only consideration. 
Eamon de Valera’s insistence that the Irish people vote on the 1937 constitution, was 
driven by his belief that such an exercise would 'symbolise that the Irish people, for the 
first time, were giving themselves a constitution and no longer owed allegiance to any 
foreign power.'54 De Valera on occasion made it clear to Jan Smuts that 'the question [of a 
republic] must be decided by the people.'55The referendum is thus the product of more 
than utilitarian consideration; it is an institution that reflects a new set of ideas about the
49 Charles Callan Tansill, The Purchase o f  the West Indies (Baltimore, 1932), pp. 59, 73-74,479.
50 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites (Washington, 1920), pp. 19, 31.
51 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, pp. 23, 156; Phillip Goodhart, Referendum, p. 109.
52 Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 169.
53 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 74.
54 Ibid. p. 78.
55 Jean van der Poel, Selections From the Smuts Papers. Volume V (Cambridge, 1973), p. 97.
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relationship between people and land. It articulates the value of popular sovereignty, and 
thanks to institutional stickiness it has endured for over 300 years in its modem form.
The institutionalist literature recognises the salience of values in adopting 
institutions, and that in their quest for social legitimacy, actors (businessman,56 politicians, 
and states) seek to be consistent or ’isomorphic' with their external environment and its
cn
values. And both the social movement and transition literatures confirm the salience of 
conformity or isomorphism in political behaviour. The referendum literature has accorded 
far less recognition.
Applied to referendum use, this desire to be isomorphic with the idea of popular 
sovereignty explains the introduction and spread of the referendum mechanism after the 
French Revolution. Besides, the referendum allowed post-Revolutionary France to balance 
its aggressive foreign policy and territorial conquests with its new domestic agenda.58 
Indicative of the growing importance of the notion of popular sovereignty, after the 
French Revolution, is the fact that several aspirants to thrones felt compelled to seek a 
popular mandate for their reign.59 In 1860 the residents of Nice and Savoy, ceded to 
France by Sardinia by the Treaty of Turin, were consulted on the matter by plebiscite. 
According to Sarah Wambaugh, Cavour insisted on the use of a referendum 'to legitimate 
in the eyes of Europe a transaction sure to be repugnant to it as well as to protect himself 
against the certain attack of Italian patriots against the cession of Sardinian soil.'60 Though 
this vote merely served to rubber stamp a decision already taken, the norms of the day 
compelled Cavour to employ a plebiscite.
In more recent times, colonial powers have also sought to be isomorphic with the 
value of popular sovereignty. Imperial Britain staged a consultation amongst tribal leaders 
before imposing a Monarch of its choice in Iraq, in order to comply with Wilsonian 
norms,61 and ensure that this 'king making might have the semblance of government by
56 John W. Meyer and Brain Rowan, 'Institutionalised Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony1, in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds). The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, p. 45.
57 Examples from the social movement theory include Elisabeth Clemens (1998: 117), and Sidney Tarrow 
(1998: 34), and from the transition literature, support for isomorphism comes from Schmitter (1997: 30-39) 
and Linz and Stepan (1996: 76).
58 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, p. 2.
59 Examples include Prince Christian Frederik in Norway in 1814 (Larsen, 1965: 376-379), an 1862 Greek 
vote to choose Prince Alfred, a British candidate for the throne (Kousoulas, 1974: 42-45) and Ferdinand 
Maximilian o f Hapsburg, in Mexico 1863 (Haslip, 1971: 191-192).
60 Sarah Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites, pp. 76, 87.
61 Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq. 1900 to 1950. A Political. Social and Economic History (London, 1953),
p. 100.
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consent of the governed.'62 In the ensuing chapter, I address the increased use of referenda 
by colonial powers in the post-colonial period, in an effort to legitimate their continued 
control over territories and peoples.
At key points in history, this value of popular sovereignty has come to enjoy 
greater value, resulting in the referendum being more fashionable. Such referendum high 
tides are similar to what Samuel Huntington’s (1991) 'waves' of democracy and Juan Linz 
and Alfred Stepan recognise the importance of the political environment in encouraging 
democratisation. They argue that there is a Zeitgeist, which is either democracy friendly or 
hostile.63 As a result, waves of democratisation produce temporal clustering.64 The 
Progressive era65 in the Unites States, which explains the introduction of direct legislation 
in the several states,66 is said to have encouraged the introduction of the referendum in 
Australia, suggesting the existence of a Progressive Zeitgeist (contagion) effect. 
Similarly, the Wilsonian Zeitgeist encouraged the spread of referenda in the early 1920s. It 
will be argued that this Zeitgeist affected the NP after World War One.
The referendum deemed inappropriate:
It is also worth noting that in some settings, institutions, though efficient, are ruled out as 
they impeni 'the cohesion of the system.' This is especially the case with referenda m 
consociational democracies, as they are liable to undermine the stability of the social 
order. Belgium’s single national referendum, held in 1950 on the reinstatement of the pre­
war Monarch, King Leopold, proved a highly divisive event. Whilst the Flemish 
(Flanders) widely supported the monarch’s reinstatement, the Walloon community voted 
against it.69 In Israel, significant voices in the academic community continue to oppose the
62 Henry A. Foster, The Making o f Modem Iraq. A Product o f World Forces (London, 1936), p. 95.
63 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp.74-76.
64 Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Influence o f  the International Context upon the Choice o f  National Institutions 
and Policies in Neo-Democracies', In Karen Dawisha (ed.). The International Dimension o f Post-Communist 
Transitions in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia ("New York. 1997), pp. 30-39.
65 Progressive-era (1890-1920) reformers mobilized against the party-machine and the lack o f public 
accountability o f the Senate. Consumer rights were also a key issue in this time period. President Theodore 
Roosevelt supported the movement and implements many o f the reforms they demand. Woodrow Wilson, 
who was elected President in 1913, also fostered many o f these reforms.
66 David B. Magleby, 'Direct Legislation in the American States', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). 
Referendums Around the World, pp. 219, 223.
67 Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 158.
68 Bart Kerremans, Do Institutions Make a Difference: Non-Institutionalism, Neo-Institutionalism, and the 
Logic o f  Common Decision Making in the European Union', Governance. 9 ,2 , 1996, p. 223.
69 E. Lamberts, 'Belgium since 1830', in J.C.H. Bloom and E. Lamberts (eds). History o f the Low Countries 
(New York, 1999), p. 371. Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 82.
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7ftintroduction of the referendum on similar grounds. It is, however, worth noting that the 
most frequent user of the referendum, Switzerland, is also a consociational democracy.
Further evidence that political institutions, deemed appropriate in one setting,
71might be inappropriate in other settings, is furnished by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which does not employ the referendum on a national level. The reason for this 
is largely linked to the collapse of the Weimar republic, which staged two referenda 
(1926, 1929), and Nazi use of the mechanism (1933, 1934, 1936, and 1938).72 Referenda, 
however, continue to be extensively used on the Lander level.
In the case of Italy, on the other hand, the referendum was embraced as part of a 
concerted effort to ensure that political power was diffused. This demonstrates a rather
7Tdifferent response to Benito Mussolini’s rule. As already noted in regard to culture, 
considerations of appropriateness are also harnessed by political elites in averting the use 
of the referendum. Vemon Bogdanor describes how Clement Atlee, for example, invoked 
Nazi use of the referendum to state his opposition to its introduction in Britain in response 
to Winston Churchill’s suggestion that a referendum would prolong the life of the wartime 
unity government.74
Accommodating structure and agency:
Though March and Olson are instructive in helping us understand later use of the 
referendum, the sociological intuitionalist account does not provide a satisfactory account 
of how institutions, like referenda, are introduced in the first place. Moreover, this 
account of behaviour is criticised for presenting an 'over socialised' account of human
7/
behaviour.
So whereas rational choice accounts tend to ignore structure (culture, class, 
norms), in favour of agency, sociological institutionalists tend to denude agency, in favour
70 Gad Barzilai, 'Parliamentarism and Populism: Theoretical Questions on the Referendum', Politika. The 
Isreal Journal o f Political Science and International Relations. 5, June 2000, pp. 47 - 59.; Dan Avnon, 'The 
Referendum in the Era Regime Revolution', Politika. The Israel Journal o f Political Science and 
International Relations. 5, June 2000, pp. 27 -  45.
71 Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle, 'Cultural Theory and New Institutionalism', Journal o f Political Theory. 
7, 1, 1995, p. 21; Andrew Abbot, 'From Causes to Events. Notes on Narrative Positivism', Sociological 
Methods and Research. 20. 4, 1992, p. 428.
72 Susan E. Scarrow, 'Party Competition and Institutional Change: The Expansion o f Direct Democracy in 
Germany', Party Politics. 3 ,4 , October 1987, p. 457.
73 Vemon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', pp. 61, 69.
74 Ibid. p. 37.
75 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', Political 
Studies. 44 ,4 , 1996, p. 954.
76 See, for example, Granovetter (1985: 484 -  485), Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997: 409 -  410, 414), Fligstein. 
(1997: 397) and Friedland and Alfrod (1991: 2 3 2 -2 4 2 ).
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of structure. Stephen Krasner succinctly captures the difference between the two 
approaches when he notes that Tor actor-orientated arguments the actors create the
77institutions; for sociological arguments institutions generate agents.' Hence, Krasner 
warns that the logic of appropriateness is limited to situations where the logic 'is
70
unambiguous and the consequences of alternative courses of action unclear.' In the 
extreme, the institutional approach might relegate agency to being a dependent variable.
Historical institutionalists attempt to resolve the structure-agency conundrum by 
adopting a more eclectic approach, accepting that political actors are both strategic 
(consequential) and cultural (appropriate).79 For, as Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor 
suggest, 'a good deal of behaviour is goal -  orientated or strategic, but the range of options 
canvassed by a strategic actor is likely to be circumscribed by a culturally specific sense of
SOappropriate action.' Anne Swidler describes this 'range of options' as a political 
'toolbox.'81 This handy metaphor will be adopted for the purpose of this study, and it will 
be argued that the referendum formed part of de Klerk’s political repertoire, making it 
more likely that he deploy one.
From the sociological account historical institutionalists, therefore, accept that 
institutions, which are inherited from the past, shape actors’ perceptions of appropriate 
actions and mould their preferences. However, in contrast to the sociological account, 
institutions are not viewed as the sole cause of outcomes. Instead, institutions provide a 
contextual guide for understanding decisions and mediating an array of forces like history, 
culture and ideas. According to historical institutionalists, like Ellen Immergut, political 
institutions influence the means, and not the ends, of political action.
Agency in the adoption of the referendum:
Historical institutionalists introduce agency by paying close attention to the relative power 
and interests of actors at the time of institutional formation.84 And the history of 
referendum use is replete with examples in which the referendum is an outcome (and
77 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, p. 63.
78 Ibid. p. 5.
79 Whilst this position is shared by Kato (1996: 561 -  563), Immergut. (1998: 28) and Grendstad and Selle 
(1995: 22), Hay and Wincott (1998: 951-954) question the scope for an integration o f  the two approaches as 
they are based on 'mutually incompatible premises or social ontologies.'
80 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', p.956.
81 Anne Swidler, 'Culture in Sanction: Symbols and Strategies', American Sociological Review. 1986, p. 51.
82 Andrew Abbot, 'From Causes to Events', p. 449.
83 Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core o f New Institutionalism', p. 21.
84 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'The Potential o f  Historical Institutionalism: The Response to Hay 
and Wincott', Political Studies. 46, 5, 1998, pp. 961, 962; Ellen M. Immergut, 'The Theoretical Core o f  
New Institutionalism', p. 16.
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resource) of political struggles. John P. McCormick, for example, suggests, ’Popular 
participation in the development of the [Roman] republic itself ensured that the nobles did
Of
not have an unhealthy predominance of power in Rome.' In Switzerland, the referendum 
mechanism served to provide vital checks and balances after the Sonderbund Wars, which 
pitted the Federal government against the Sonderbund League (of Catholic cantons formed 
in 1847), which threatened to secede. One concession to the defeated cantons was a 
double majority provision (national and amongst the cantons) on all constitutional
Of
changes, enabling Catholic and conservative cantons to block radical reforms.
In the case of Italian unification and the absorption of the Sicily, Cavour viewed 
the plebiscite as preferable to a constituent assembly, which might have plumped for a
0*7
federal and not unitary Italy, as he desired. A plebiscite was easier too manipulate. 
Cavour also believed that his emulation of Napoleon on the plebiscite would secure 
French support. Furthermore, the votes were viewed as 'proof to Europe that the 
annexations represented the will of the people. His nemesis, Garibaldi, on the other hand 
opposed the use of the plebiscite, as it 'would amount to tacit sanction to the loss of Nice,' 
which had been ceded by a similar vote.'88
The emphasis of the historical institutionalist approach on past battles 
acknowledges the impact of other variables, especially information, culture and ideas on
OQ
preference formation. And, understanding the introduction of the referendum, defined as 
the first use, therefore, requires that we fully appreciate the political, institutional and 
historical context within which it was first considered.
In modem politics, referendum debate has often revolved around the role of the 
powerful party machine. Vemon Bogdanor suggests that the early dominance of social 
democrats explains the 'infrequency of the referendum,' as these elites viewed greater 
participation as a threat to the machine.90 In Britain, A.V. Dicey sought to limit its power 
and influence through the referendum.91 Dicey viewed the referendum as a measure that 
would prevent the introduction of Irish Home Rule, which his fellow liberal Gladstone
85 John P. McCormick, 'Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism', American 
Political Science Review. 95 ,2 , June 2001, pp. 299-300.
86 Kris W. Kobach, 'Switzerland', pp. 101-103.
87 Jessie White Mario, The Birth o f Modem Italy. Edited by Duke Litta Visconti-Arese (London, 1909), p. 
160.
88 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi. A Study in Political Conflict. (Cambridge. 1985), pp. 5, 19, 
23, 31, 67, 71, 176,282, 326,403-404,437.
89 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'The Potential o f Historical Institutionalism', p. 961.
90 Vemon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', pp. 77, 91-94.
91 A.V. Dicey. A.V. Dicey, 'Ought the Referendum to be Introduced Into England?' The Contemporary 
Review. Volume LVII, January -  June 1890, p. 496.
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championed. The use of direct democracy in the US also reflects a desire by the 
Progressive movement to weaken the party machine and 'take politics out of the smoke
09filled rooms.' It was this spirit, which Woodrow Wilson also sought to inject the 
Versailles deliberations.
Institutional stickiness:
The fact that institutions, which represent 'institutionalised historical conflicts,' continue to 
exert influence over contemporary conflicts and decision-making is explained by a 
political lag effect or institutional stickiness. Institutional stickiness presupposes that 
previous 'institutional choices limit available future options,'94 thereby leading to path 
dependency. Otherwise stated by Robert Putnam, 'what comes first matters.'95
As already suggested, once independence has been won through a referendum -  as 
was the case in Norway in 1905 -  it may be hard to cede any sovereignty without the 
consent of the people. And the enduring legacy of the referendum displays the extent to 
which ideas, like self-determination and popular sovereignty, are embedded in institutions 
and continue to 'specify policy in the absence of innovation.'96
In Stephen Krasner’s discussion of sovereignty he argues that choices made in 
Europe dictated the parameters and understandings of sovereignty in post-colonial
07Africa. A cursory analysis of referendum use in post-colonial Africa demonstrates a 
greater preponderance amongst former French colonies to employ referenda than former 
British colonies. This can, in part, be explained by the fact that in 1958 Charles de Gaulle 
ran an empire-wide vote on the relationship between these colonies and France. This vote,
92 David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation. Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (Baltimore, 
1984), p. 21; Richard L. Merrit, 'Woodrow Wilson and the “Great and Solemn Referendum,” 1920', The 
Review o f  Politics. 27. 1, January 1965, p. 82.
93 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power. Volume II The Rise o f Classes and Nation States (New  
York, 1993), p. 52; Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis', in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds). Structuring Politics. Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge. 1992), p. 22.
94 Stephen. D. Krasner, Sovereignty. An institutional Perspective. Comparative Political Studies. 27, 1, 
1988, p. 71; Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause. Policy Feedback and Political Change', World 
Politics. 45. 4, 1993, pp. 608 -  609; Sheri Berman, 'Path Dependency and Political Action. Re-examining 
Responses to Depression', Comparative Politics. 30, 4, 1998, pp. 380, 389, 397; Peter A. Hall, 'Policy 
Innovation and the Structure o f the State: The Political Administration Nexus in France and Britain', The 
Annals o f the AAPSS. 466, March 1983, pp. 44,48.
95 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton N.J, 1993), 
pp. 7-8; Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure Agency and Historical Institutionalism', Political Studies. 
46 ,5 ,1998 , p 955.
96 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in Judith 
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds). Ideas. Beliefs. Institutions. Political Change and Foreign Policy 
(Ithaca, 1993), pp. 5, 13.
97 Stephen. D. Krasner, 'Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective', pp. 89 - 90.
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which was imposed on the people of these colonies, provided an analogy or template for 
post-independence rulers to follow.
Historical institutionalism and its implicit path dependency do not propose 
historical determinism, and recognises that we cannot 'read outcomes off the institutional
QO
map.' There is, however, a danger that the approach provides overly deterministic 
accounts, which de-politicise decision-making." Hence the need to demonstrate agency. A 
further drawback of the historical institutionalist accounts (and indeed all institutionalist 
accounts) is that path-dependency and institutional stickiness do not easily square with 
institutional innovation and change.100
Institutional change:
Traditionally institutionalists have accounted for institutional change in two ways. The 
first is through extreme and sudden external shocks like the Great Depression or major 
revolutions. Such external shocks are said to 'punctuate' the existing state of equilibrium, 
catalysing a 'struggle over the basic rules of the game rather than allocation within a set of 
rules,'101 and allow for the introduction of new rules and paradigms. The Great
1 (Y)Depression, for example, facilitated the introduction of liberalism in trade policy and
1 HIchanges in US corporate practices. It is also notable that the Great Depression, 
indirectly, heralded an upsurge of referendum use in both Europe and Latin America.104 In 
an era when the existing constitutions were viewed as being ineffective in dealing with the 
economic challenges of the 1930’s, and the legitimacy crises of the existing institutions, 
provided an opportunity for certain actors to challenge the institutional status quo.105 
Adolph Hitler, who consolidated his power through referenda, is the most notorious 
beneficiary of the legitimacy crisis of existing political institutions.
98 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism', pp. 18 - 20.
99 Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause', pp. 609 - 610.
100 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism, p. 15.
101 Stephen. D. Krasner, 'Approaches to the State. Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamic', 
Comparative Politics. 16,2, 1984, p. 234.
102 Judith Goldstein, 'Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy', International Organisation. 42, 1, 1988, 
pp. 182- 183.
3 Neil Fligstein, 'The Structural Transformation o f American Industry: An Institutional Account o f  the 
Causes o f Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919 -  1979', in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio 
(eds). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.
104 Some examples include, Bolivia in 1930 (Klein, 1969: 176-177), Uruguay in 1934 (Taylor, 1960: 20-25, 
30), Romania (1938) and Greece in 1935 (Mavrogordatos, 1983: 40), and the Baltic republics (von Rauch, 
1974: 147-149).
105 Alfred Stepan, 'Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil', in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan 
(Editors). The Breakdown o f  Democratic Regimes. Latin America (Baltimore. 1978), pp. 111-114.
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The drawback of this account is that institutions might move from being an 
independent variable to being a dependent variable during institutional breakdown.106 As a 
result, institutions may well explain precious little during periods of crisis. Instead, other 
factors, like agency, may predominate during such periods, as policy entrepreneurs exploit 
policy windows that result from a major crisis.107 An institutional crisis does not, however,
10Rnecessarily imply that the existing norms and institutions are totally irrelevant. 
Furthermore, periods of institutional insecurity may make institutions more receptive to 
new ideas, as external shocks undermine existing conceptions, policies and programs.109 
William Sewell contends that in the French Revolution, 'the particular shape of the 
reformed institutions was largely determined by revolutionary ideology.110 One of these 
institutions was the referendum.
The end of World War One, similarly, paved the way for the increased use of the 
referendum in order to settle territorial disputes, thereby breaking with the existing 
practices of diplomacy. Both Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin supported the right to 
popular sovereignty and referenda, for diverging reasons. Lenin, though not supportive of 
nationalism, was patently aware of the resentment that various national groups harboured 
towards Tsarist rule, as a result of Russification policies, and hoped to secure their support 
in the struggle against Tsarist rule.111 For Wilson it was the basis for lasting peace in
119Europe, and a way to mobilise support for the Allied cause. Henry Kissinger 
perceptively notes that though Europeans were still committed to the rules of Realpolitik,
W'l
both France and Britain humoured Wilson’s ideas in order to enlist his support.
Social Learning processes:
The second account of institutional change is through social learning processes, or 'politics 
as learning.' Here changes are incremental and largely straitjacketed by existing practices
106 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms', p. 942; 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 15.
107 John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and Public Policies (New York, 1995), pp. 166 -  170.
108 Neil Fligstein (1997: 316, 322) suggests that an actor’s response to such shocks depends on their 
interpretation o f the shock, whilst Sheri Berman (1998) postulates that the response to such an external crisis 
may be determined by policy legacies o f  the ruling social democratic parties.
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1,0 William H. Sewell Jr., 'Ideologies and Social Revolution: Reflections o f the French Case', Journal o f  
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and norms, as actors deliberately 'attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in 
response to past experience and new information.'114 In traditional accounts of social 
learning, the process is by and large envisaged as expert (bureaucrats and intellectuals) 
driven,115 and changes occur within the confines of existing institutional norms.116 Perhaps 
the most illustrative example is the annual budget, which is incrementally amended. 
Hence, the account leaves little scope for a major break with existing institutions, and it is 
unable to account for the impact of ideas and social pressure. It also fails to account for 
major waves of policy innovation, which are often produced by changes in opportunity 
structures.117
In order to account for social pressure, Peter Hall (1993) proposes a 'state- 
structured' theory of social learning, which he developed in order to explain the 
paradigm shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism in Britain. Hall describes how the 
persistent failure of Keynesian policies, and first and second order modifications of that 
paradigm, undermined the idea, and created an environment that was receptive to a new 
paradigm. Susan Scarrow’s (1987) explanation for the increased use of direct democracy 
in Germany, despite the long held consensus against referendum use, provides a similar 
explanation. She suggests that the German party political system’s 'diagnosis' in the 
early 1990’s that Germany 'faced an upsurge of popular disenchantment which might 
threaten the health of the political system,' encouraged party elites to grant 'citizens new 
ways to participate in political life.' Scarrow, thus, notes how public disaffection 
prompted parties 'to attack structures that have contributed to their own strength and 
importance.' One such reform was the introduction of primaries within the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) to select the party’s candidates. Moreover, Scarrow notes that 
unification made constitutional reform necessary and that these debates saw the 
referendum receive increased attention. In the East, the party tradition was weaker, and a 
'double legacy of suspicion of parties and respect for direct participation gave eastern 
parties compelling reasons to try and enhance their own legitimacy, and that of new
114 Peter A. Hall, 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State. The Case o f Economic Policy Making 
in Britain'. Comparative Politics. April 1993, p. 278.
115 Ibid. pp. 2 7 7 -2 7 8 .
116 Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause', pp. 611 -  613.
117 Sidney Tarrow, 'Social Protest and Policy Reform. May 1968 and Loi d ’Orientation in France', in Marco 
G. Giugini, Doug MacAdam, Charles Tilly (eds.). From Contention to Democracy (Lanham, Md., 1998), p. 
31.
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governmental institutions, by supporting the inclusion of plebiscitary elements in new 
systems.'118
Hall’s account, therefore, not only incorporates attributes of agency,119 but also 
provides for a feasible description of self-reflective behaviour. Self-reflective actors can 
change their policies in order to avoid repeatedly playing the same game.120 Recent 
developments in the contentious politics literature also suggest that participants in such
191politics are self-reflective. In the case of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk appears to have
199strategically 'anticipated' the potential for an institutional crisis following his decision 
to embark upon a reform process as a result of having played a similar reform game 
before. De Klerk learnt many valuable lessons from Botha’s incremental reforms, and 
one of these was that the referendum should be pre-empted, and not used as a response 
to conservative resistance to reform. What self-reflective behaviour implies is that
19^
political repertoire, like culture, is not merely inherited but rather learned.
The spread of the referendum.
Sociological institutionalists have produced an instructive account in order to explain the 
spread of institutions within organisational fields -  including nation states. They suggest 
three processes of 'isomorphism,' coercive, normative and mimetic, which explain the 
spread and homogenisation of institutions.124
In the latter form, institutions or actors copy other institutions or actors that they 
perceive as being more successful and legitimate, and are more likely to do so under
•  •  19S •conditions of uncertainty. Again it is worth noting that the transition and social
19Amovement literatures recognise the centrality of the so-called 'demonstration effect,' or 
contagion, in accounting for the spread of democracy or innovative forms of collective
1,8 Susan E. Scarrow, 'Party Competition and Institutional Change', pp. 465-468.
119 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure Agency and Historical Institutionalism', p. 956.
120 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', p. 9.
121 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics o f Contention (Lanham, Maryland, 1998), 
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125 Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Influence o f the International Context upon the Choice o f National 
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action. One of the earliest European examples of mimetic isomorphism is the Dutch
177Patriots emulation of French Revolutionaries. Cape Patriots in turn mirrored the Dutch
10RPatriots, demonstrating how such ideas spread to colonial outposts. In the use of
10Qreferenda, ancient Romans drew inspiration from earlier Greek use of direct democracy. 
Swedish Social Democrats were inspired to use the referendum on nuclear energy by 
Austria’s use of the mechanism in 1978 ahead of their impending elections, in order to
i onensure party unity. And, as already noted, Australians were inspired to adopt the
referendum by the Progressive movement in the USA.
The transition literature, importantly, recognises that contagion is more likely to be
101influential in regional contexts. Success in the Baltic republics, which broke away from 
the Soviet Union through referenda, may have triggered referendum use in other Soviet 
Republics and Eastern Europe. Mikhail Gorbachov compounded this process by using a
107referendum to counter these centripetal tendencies.
In sharp contrast to Gorbachov, French officials were mindful of the potential
1 00consequences of a contagion effect in Africa and Asia. And, in the 1958 referendum, de 
Gaulle created a huge disincentive for any colony to vote against his new constitution. The 
cost of such a vote was an immediate end to French aid and blocking off French export 
markets, and only Guinea voted for independence.134 Don McHendry feared that the US 
precedent of referenda on self-determination in Micronesia would set an example for 
South Africa to emulate in Namibia, where White protagonists and Herero leader, 
Clemens Kapuuo, dreamt of facilitating secession of the centre and south of the 
territory.136
127 J. Roegiers and N.C.F. van Sas, 'Revolution in the North and South, 1780 -  1813', in J.C.H. Blom, E 
Lamberts (edsl. History o f the Low Countries (New York, 1999), pp. 271-273.
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VolLXXVI, 1986, pp. 3,9.
130 Laurence Morel, 'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums, p. 231.
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Referendum Experience in Europe (London, 1996), pp. 151 -  161; Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, 
'Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). Referendums 
Around the World, p. 183.
133 Robert Aldrich, France and South Pacific Since 1940 (London, 1993), pp. 60-62.
134 Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and de Gaulle. From French Empire to Independence 
(Pennsylvania, 1979), p. 209.
135 The Sunday Times. 1 May 1977.
136 At van Wyk. Dirk Mudge, Reenmaker van die Namib (Pretoria, 1999), pp. 33, 37-38.
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Napoleonic and French revolutionary use of the referendum provide examples of 
coercive isomorphism as the mechanism was exported to The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy,
t nn
Switzerland, and later colonies, by conquest. The empire-wide 1958 referendum
provides another example, as do US led colonial votes (to be discussed in the next
chapter). These votes were also, however, the outcome of normative isomorphism. The
desire to be isomorphic with values, like popular sovereignty, is perhaps best
demonstrated by the era of Woodrow Wilson, and explains the dramatic rise in the use of
plebiscites in the 1920’s. The use of plebiscites by aspiring regents is another example of
the impact of normative isomorphism. Cavour clearly emulated the French in Italy and
1 ^ 0
popular consultations became a feature of state building. Italian state builders also
employed this practical expression of the popular will, in order to legitimate state
110consolidation to the wider public. Normative isomorphism also explains Danish 
behaviour in the Danish West Indies and the behaviour of many other colonial powers 
since World War Two. The quest for normative isomorphism also serves important 
tactical goals. Colonial national movements sought to be isomorphic with Wilsonian 
values, in order to undermine British hegemony and demonstrate that leaders, like Wilfred 
Laurier and Jan Smuts, served the interests of the Empire, capital, and not those of the 
volk.
Referenda as a form of organised hypocrisy:
One negative implication of mimetic isomorphism, already noted, is that the copying of 
institutions and practices from other settings might lead to inappropriate institutions being 
applied. Stephen Krasner notes how third world states copy institutions (health care, 
education) operating in the West, even though they are unable to maintain them. He 
describes this behaviour, in which actions and norms are de-coupled from the objective 
reality (available budgets) as 'organised hypocrisy.'140 In the case of the inter-war Baltic 
republics, for example, these adopted the Weimar constitution with PR, which proved to 
be disastrous at the time of the depression.141
Organised hypocrisy also leads to a de-coupling of behaviour and norms. James 
Ron notes how the Israeli Army developed an operating code that 'broke the rules while
137 W olf Linder. Swiss Democracy, p. 88.
138 Phillip Goodhart, Referendum, p. 104; Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (London, 1985), pp. 200 -201.
139 Sarah Wambaugh. A Monograph on Plebiscites pp. 10; Phillip Goodhart, Referendum, p. 104.
140 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, pp. 64-66.
141 Juris Dreifelds, Latvia in Transition (Cambridge, 1996), p. 29.
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appearing to remain within the bounds of the "legal,"' in an effort to balance repression, 
with the need for international legitimacy.142 In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington points 
out that even those leaders whose 'actions were clearly anti-democratic often justified their 
actions by [espousing] democratic values.'143 In Baathist Syria, for example, Hafez Assad 
had such votes to 'insistently and systematically avoided giving the impression of relying 
on military support or of endorsing a single party system.'144 Viewed in this light we can 
far better understand the use of the referendum mechanism by leaders who impose 
themselves (or are imposed) upon the people. The referendum allows repressive leaders to 
de-couple their un-democratic behaviour by creating the impression that they have a 
veneer of popular legitimacy. The notorious Haitian dictator Doc Duvallier’s idea of 
staging a referendum on his rule served to counter charges that he repressed his people.145 
And the referendum has become an integral part of the template, or script, of the coup 
d'etat, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe.146
Understanding referendum use:
What has emerged from this discussion is that cultural accounts are deficient, as the 
decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, political. And, whilst it is clear that agency 
explains referendum use, consequential accounts are also wanting. For one, referendum 
use is not that frequent, nor universal. And referenda are not always efficient (especially if 
a government is unpopular) or deemed appropriate. More importantly, these accounts 
ignore variables like values (especially, the notion of popular sovereignty), culture and 
history. These accounts are also limited to situations of party divisions, and do not give 
enough attention to the consequences of using referendum pledges in incumbency 
struggles. Finally, the existing consequential accounts are not universal, and they are 
unable to explain de Klerk’s use of the referendum.
In addition, it is impossible to ignore the impact of past referendum use on future 
use, through path dependency. Once the referendum has been employed, a precedent is
142 James Ron, 'Savage Restraint: Israel, Palestine and the Dialectics o f Legal Repression', Social Problems. 
4 7 ,4 , 2000, pp. 446,461.
143 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 47.
144 Moshe Maoz, Asad. The Sphinx o f  Damascus. A Political Biography (London, 1988), pp. 48-49.
145 Elizabeth Abbot, Haiti. The Duvaliers and their Legacy (New York, 1988), pp. 118-119.
146 Examples include, Chile in 1933 (Caviedes, 1991: 28) Guatemala in 1954, Venezuela in 1957 
(Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1984: 224 and Kolb, 1974: 166-171), Mexico in 1867 (Vanderwood: 2000: 393), 
Haiti in 1928 (Schmidt, 1971: 192-193), Guatemala in 1935 (Lloyd Jones, 1940: 97-98), and Paraguay in 
1940 (Lewis, 1993: 176-179 and Lewis, 1980: 24). The intensive struggle between royalists or and 
republicans in Greece also led to numerous referenda (Kousoulas, 1974: 119-120, 135, 162-163) and 
referenda served to legitimate pacts in Colombia in 1957 (Kline, 1995: 47-48) and Uruguay in 1951 (Alisky, 
1969: 35).
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established and a convention created. Moreover, a template or script for dealing with 
similar problems has been suggested. Path dependency and institutional stickiness explain 
why this institution has endured. Past use does not, however, pre-ordain future use, and 
the decision to use a referendum is, ultimately, driven by consequential considerations. 
Successful past use does, however, make future use more likely. John W. Kingdon 
suggests that there is a ’spill-over' effect of institutional or policy success.147 In other 
words, success in the 1960 referendum encouraged others to use it. The 'spill over' effect 
can also be negative.148 Even once introduced, the success, or otherwise, of referendum 
use might affect the pace of use. It is argued that the Australian electorate’s rejection of 
the 1951 communism referendum made the then Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, 
reluctant to 'risk another such rejection by the electorate.'149 No referendum was held in 
Australia until 1967. And as has been suggested, the institutionalist literature explains the 
spread of the referendum mechanism, though coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism.
Accommodating this latter logic cannot, however, be at the expense of the logic of 
consequentiality. In order to merge these two accounts I suggest that the initial decision to 
employ the referendum is a consequential one, explained by particular struggles in a 
particular institutional context. Path dependency and spill over effects, however, 
increasingly feature in future use.
In South Africa the referendum served to navigate internal party divisions over the 
republican issue. It also served to aid the party at election times, by enabling it to appeal to 
a wider constituency, forming part of the NP’s electoral heresthetics. The party was pre­
occupied with precluding the emergence of a competing Afrikaner party in a Westminster 
system (thereby creating a three-way tie favouring the ruling party). And, a referendum on 
a republic allowed the NP to be all things to all Afrikaners, by furnishing maximal 
ambiguity, and uniting the disparate provinces with varying levels of support for the 
republican ideal. Besides, these historical struggles, the use of the referendum in Southern 
Rhodesia, and the desire to be isomorphic with Wilsonian ideals and the Zeitgeist of the 
period during and after the War explain why the NP showed an interest in the idea from 
1917 onwards.
147 John W. Kingdon, Agendas. Alternatives and Public Policies (New York, 1995), pp. 190 -  194,203.
148 David Ben Gurion's 1935 defeat in the Histadrut (Trade Union) referendum may have reinforced the 
tendency o f Mapai elites to oppose referenda. Though subject to what James Feron (1991) describes as 
counterfactual speculation, success in that vote might have led Ben Gurion to take a more positive view 
regarding the referendum.
149 Colin A. Hughes, 'Australia and New Zealand', p. 165.
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It is important to note that support for a referendum was intensively contested 
within the party. In addition to being embroiled in a struggle with their political 
opponents, the South African Party and, later, the United Party there was another game. 
Within the National Party there was an ongoing struggle over the focus of the party and 
the Nationalist project. One reason why Hertzog, and later Malan managed to impose their 
will on the party, in regard to a referendum, was their political standing and control of the 
resources (especially in the case of the Cape after 1934). His predecessors tied H.F. 
Verwoerd’s hands, and he inherited a referendum pledge that was a product of struggles 
within the NP that took place before he was even active in politics.
Once established as a praxis or convention in 1960, the referendum became part of 
the NP’s political repertoire. This precedent made it more likely, though not certain, that 
future NP leaders would apply the referendum to problems that deemed worthy of a 
referendum. Over time, each leader amended his logic of appropriateness. The decision to 
use a referendum, ultimately, remained a political one.
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Chapter Two,
The referendum as a war of manoeuvre.
Wars o f position are fought over beliefs and expectations that can enshrine 
and protect the legality o f regimes and the governing coalitions that rise to 
power them. Wars o f manoeuvre are fought over the nature o f these regimes, 
especially the stipulated rules for legal political competition and control o f the 
mechanisms for their enforcement. 1
Referenda and ethno-national conflicts:
The relationship between ethno-national referenda and the evolution of a particular ethno- 
national conflict has not been given due attention by the existing referendum literature. 
Though the typologies of Gordon Smith (1976) and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (1996) recognise 
the interplay between the interests of those who promote referenda and the impact of the 
result on broader political processes, they seem deficient in assessing the full impact of 
ethno-national referenda. In this chapter I provide a typology for ethno-national referenda 
that blends the strengths of the existing typologies, yet takes cognisance of the full impact 
of ethno-national referenda and their role in navigating struggles that might emerge from 
efforts to redraw social, political, and physical borders. This typology will be developed 
on the basis of Ian Lustick’s (1995) model of state contraction processes.
Control, interest and outcomes in referenda:
As already noted, the existing referendum literature highlights the importance of who 
controls the referendum process, in terms of setting the question and the timing of the 
vote. Votes are either viewed as 'controlled' or 'uncontrolled.' In the latter case, the 
conditions under which referenda are triggered are strictly defined by the country’s 
constitution and the government has scant control over the process. Uncontrolled 
referenda also include cases in which the government is compelled to hold a referendum 
by its opposition, public opinion or elements within the coalition. Hence there are degrees 
of control, or lack thereof. The controlled referendum, on the other hand, gives the ruling
11an Lustick, Unsettled States. Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland. France and Algeria. Israel and the West 
Bank (Ithaca, 1993), p. 302.
2 Nevil Johnson, 'Types o f Referendum', .in Austin Ranney (ed.), The Referendum Device (Washington DC 
and London, 1981), pp. 19 -  21, 28 -  29; Vemon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', in David Butler and Austin 
Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use o f Direct Democracy (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke , 1994), p. 31.
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government maximum control and allows it to set the agenda. Hence Arend Lijphart 
described the controlled referendum as a political weapon in the hand of governments.
Unfortunately, the referendum literature largely ignores what I describe as 
’informal' referenda. Such referenda are uncontrolled votes staged by non-state or state 
actors, or their proxies, though more often by the former. Examples include the 1961 
referendum by Southern Rhodesia’s black opposition, on the same day as an all white 
referendum, and the 1950 Cyprus vote on Enosis, through the Church.4 In Swaziland, 
Paramount Chief Shoguza called an informal referendum in 1967, in order to demonstrate 
opposition to the Sandys constitution, which threatened to undermine the existing tribal 
structures.5 Walloon disaffection over the proposed 1967 Belgian constitution was 
similarly given expression through an informal referendum that year.6 More recently, 
Gibraltar’s leaders have threatened to hold their own referendum to scupper Spanish -
»7
British rapprochement on the future status of the territory. The post-World War One
o
debates on the future of the region’s borders also spawned informal votes, and since 1989 
Eastern Europe has witnessed several informal votes by groups seeking to challenge the 
legitimacy of the borders, constitutions and national character of re-founded states.
Gordon Smith (1976) was the first scholar to go beyond the narrow pre-occupation 
with the 'source of initiation' of the vote, and to highlight the broader outcome or impact 
of the referendum on a particular regime. Smith argued that 'if the real source [of the 
referendum] can be accurately located, there is a clear indication of the intended direction 
of effect.' He accordingly defined the referendum’s outcome, or 'ultimate effect,' as a 
'latent function' that 'has to be viewed as the sum of its consequences which on balance 
may be supportive or detrimental to a regime.' Smith described the impact of a vote on a 
particular regime as being, either 'pro-hegemonic' or 'anti-hegemonic.' Blending 
considerations of control, and an evaluation of the ultimate effects of a vote, Smith
3 Arend Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns o f Maioritarian and Consensus Government in Twentv-One 
Countries (New Haven, 1984), p. 204.
4 The New York Times. 16, 22,30 January 1950.
5 The Times. 16,23 January 1967.
6 The Times. 20 January 1967.
7 Nicholas Watt and Giles Tremlett, The Guardian. 26 July 2002.
8 Such consultations took place in Vilnus (1922) in Lithuania, which voted to join Poland, and in the 
Voraalberg (1919) whose citizens wished to break from Austria and join Switzerland, after the burden o f  the 
Versailles agreement became apparent. Informal cession votes were also held in Austria’s Salzburg (1921) 
and Tyrol (1921), in favour o f Anschluss with Germany, and served as an act o f  defiance against a ban on 
Anschluss by the victorious allies. Yugoslav representatives at the Paris peace talks claimed that informal 
plebiscites indicated strong opposition to the incorporation o f parts o f Trieste, Pula and large parts o f  the 
Istrian peninsula into Italy (Herschy, 1993: 52-53).
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proposed that referenda are either, controlled/ pro-hegemonic, controlled/ anti-hegemonic, 
uncontrolled/ pro-hegemonic, and uncontrolled/ anti-hegemonic.
Pier Vincenzo Uleri’s (1996) subsequent typology similarly synthesises the criteria 
of control, ('who promotes the popular vote'), and the 'objective of the vote.' Uleri defines 
the objective of a referendum as being, to either counter or promote an initiative or policy, 
and referenda or initiatives are either 'decision promoting' or 'decision controlling.' In the 
decision controlling vote, the author of the question and promoter of the vote coincide, 
whilst in the case of decision controlling vote, the promoter of referendum is not the agent 
that asks the question.
Whereas the strength of Uleri’s typology lies in its emphasis on the intentions of 
key protagonists, Smith’s typology gives greater recognition to the immediate and longer- 
term impact of referenda, especially on the fortunes of a political party, or a regime. 
Smith’s typology does not, however, fully assess the impact of referenda on key ideas of 
statehood, citizenship, identity and borders, the very ideas that often lie at the heart of 
ethno-national contests. The Uleri typology similarly fails to incorporate the full extent to 
which disputes over ethno-national issues influence the calculus of politicians when 
considering certain referenda. In order to appreciate the impact of referenda on a society’s 
institutions (social and political), and their role in navigating ethno-national questions, Ian 
Lustick’s 'two-threshold' model of state expansion and contraction processes9 will be 
considered and adapted.
The referendum as a mechanism for state-contraction and expansion.
Recognising that borders are institutionalised features of states, Lustick’s framework 
views changes to these borders as 'institution transforming' episodes, and recognises that 
attempts to amend them can potentially trigger intense political struggles. And Lustick 
notes that the nature and level of resistance to processes of territorial disengagement 
provides a measure of the degree of institutionalisation or integration of that territory in 
the core state. For the purpose of this research a broader definition of borders is adopted, 
in order to include social, racial and ethnic boundaries. In South Africa these racial 
borders were institutionalised through Apartheid legislation, and the level of white 
resistance to a more inclusive identity similarly indicated the acceptance of Apartheid in 
the society. Lustick identifies two thresholds in the institutionalisation of borders, the 
'regime' threshold and the 'ideological hegemony' threshold. In negotiating these two
9 Ian Lustick, Unsettled States. Disputed Lands, pp. 26 - 51.
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thresholds, elites contend with three phases of struggle, the intensity of which corresponds 
to the degree of institutionalisation.
Prior to crossing the first threshold, the ’regime threshold,' actors find themselves 
in the incumbency stage. In practical terms, the struggles of this phase are limited to 
political bargaining, coalition building and electoral campaigns. In the initial stages of a 
process of altering borders, electoral majorities and coalitions are sufficient to begin or 
reverse the process, and in South Africa, for example, the early 1950’s were crucial years 
in which the NP sought to both entrench Apartheid and tighten the party’s grip on power.
But once passed the regime threshold, and into the regime stage, attempts to 
disengage from a territory tend to involve struggles over the integrity of the regime and 
the legitimacy of leaders to engage in such processes. The struggle, therefore, becomes 
one over the very right of the state to alter its borders (or definitions of citizenship), and 
the opponents of such changes may consider extra-legal means of opposition to reform 
processes. Once over the regime threshold, the conflict is therefore over institutions and 
does not take place within them. Incumbency struggles, on the other hand, take place 
within institutions. In the regime stage, efforts to redraw borders require an intense and 
demanding struggle, but are not imponderable. These struggles are referred to as 'wars of 
manoeuvre.'
Increasingly successful institutionalisation of territory or ideas of citizenship 
propels a society over the ideological threshold into the third and final phase of struggle, 
the 'ideological hegemony stage.' Here the struggle is over maintaining or undermining 
embedded beliefs. So effective is the institutionalisation of borders that the idea of 
territorial disengagement (or inclusion of an excluded ethnic group) is imponderable and 
no serious political contender can risk advising it. Changes in the status quo will require 
struggle over the very idea of the state. This represents the least reversible stage of 
institutionalisation, and the incorporation of a territory is very broadly accepted. The 
struggles in this stage are referred to as 'wars of position,' and their objective is to either 
nurture or erode ideological hegemony.
Accordingly, Lustick identifies three levels of political competition -  incumbency, 
regime and ideological - in the institutionalisation of borders. The referendum clearly has 
a role in each of these stages of institutionalisation or de-institutionalisation of borders, 
and serves as an often-indispensable tool for navigating incumbency struggles, wars of 
manoeuvre and wars of position. Applying Lustick’s model, a typology for classifying 
controlled ethno-national referenda in suggested. The categories correspond with the level
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of institutionalisation; i.e. incumbency referenda; wars of manoeuvre referenda; and wars 
of position referenda. Such referenda are, of course, either 'hegemonic' or 'anti- 
hegemonic.'
Incumbency referenda:
As already suggested, incumbency (or first order) ethno-national referenda are employed 
by contestants for incumbency, in order to aid them in electoral struggles where an ethno -  
national issue is salient. Incumbents can reduce the prospects of electoral defeat using the 
referendum as a 'lightening rod,' or they can use the referendum to strengthen their 
prospects for victory, assuaging public opinion. Incumbency ethno-national referenda thus 
serve as heresthetics resources in incumbency struggles, fulfilling a primarily tactical role.
In addition, incumbency referenda (or pledges) ensure the stability of a coalition or 
party. Yitzhak Rabin’s pledge on a Golan referendum provides one example. The 
undertaking was -  in part -  designed to placate the Third Way formation within his 
party.10 The referendum also provides a common unifying factor for secessionist and 
autonomy movements, by furnishing them with a modicum of'constructive ambiguity.'11 
In Scotland, for example, a referendum pledge serves to provide common ground between 
the gradualist and fundamentalist wings of the SNP, reducing internal differences to 
timing considerations.12
In some cases, referenda on ethno-national issues may serve to bolster the 
popularity of a ruling party, as Georges Pompidou did on the issue of EU expansion in 
1972. In 2000, the ruling Zimbabwean ZANU-PF regime’s attempt to introduce a populist 
constitution (confiscating white farms), in order to improve its electoral prospects13 
backfired. The demand for a referendum over a sensitive issue, like the incorporation of 
Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa, also allows opposition parties to 
portray the incumbent government as serving narrow and not national interests. One 
additional role that the referendum plays is in allowing a ruling party to pursue policies 
that constitute a major break with its stated policies. Adolph Hitler provided one example, 
when he agreed to hold a series of plebiscites on the transfer of the volks Deutsch from
10 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink o f  Peace. The Israeli-Svrian Negotiations (Princeton, N.J, 1998), pp. 189 -  
191.
11 Aahron Kleiman. Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peace Making (Tel Aviv, 1999), p p .12-20.
12 The Guardian. September 23, 2000.
13 The Guardian. Leader, 12 February 2000.
South Tyrol. This compromise, designed to placate his ally Benito Mussolini, contradicted 
the Nazi party’s stated policy of regaining Germans lands lost at Versailles.14
Referenda in wars of manoeuvre:
In attempting to redraw borders, governments, particularly democracies, are liable to face 
challenges to their legitimacy to pursue these processes. Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov (1997) 
warns that the absence of formal legitimacy, which is produced by conforming to 
’established constitutional and legal stipulations,' undermines the informal or public 
legitimacy of peace processes. Wars of manoeuvre referenda allow governments to out­
manoeuvre their opponents in navigating the regime threshold. A successful war of 
manoeuvre referendum, therefore, undermines challengers to the legitimacy of a leader or 
government to lead a reform process and effectively moves the struggle over the regime 
threshold. Alternately, such referenda can institutionalise borders, taking them beyond 
incumbency struggles. The 1960 referendum in South Africa provides an example.
The referendum literature recognises the central role of the referendum in 
legitimating decision processes, especially where Parliament alone cannot secure that 
legitimacy.15 Moreover, numerous leading scholars highlight the important role of the 
referendum in settling territorial issues in particular,16 and David Butler and Austin
17Ranney claim that decisions taken by referendum are perceived as the most legitimate. In 
Scotland, the 1979 referendum defused the devolution issue by taking it out of the hands
1 ftof extremists. And in the case of French disengagement from Algeria, two consecutive 
referenda helped to isolate extremists, by showing that they do not enjoy wide support.19 
In such situations, a referendum serves to 'de-certify,' or marginalise, opponents to 
reforms.
Laurent Morel is, however, rather dismissive of claims that referenda serve to 
legitimate decisions, and notes that the 'legitimating function often has more to do with the
14 Anthony Evelyn Alcock, The History o f the South Tyrol Question (Geneva, 1970), pp. 45-57.
15 David Butler and Austin Ranney, ’Practice1, in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). Referendums: A 
Comparative Study o f Practice and Theory (Washington, 1978), pp. 18-19; Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western 
Europe', pp. 89-90.
16 Sarah Wambaugh Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933), pp. 485 -  486; John T. Rourke, 
Richard P. Hiskes and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh, Direct Democracy and International Politics: Deciding 
International Issues Through Referendums (Boulder and London, 1992), p. 35.
17 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Practice', p. 25.
18 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Referendums and Separatism II', in Austin Ranney (ed.), The Referendum Device, p. 
6 .
19 Vernon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe', p. 45.
20 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics o f Contention (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 122- 
123,204-205.
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official explanation than with the real intentions of its initiators.' Morel adds that this 
legitimating function is 'often difficult to distinguish from a sort of ‘divesture of 
responsibility’ function,' as party’s or leaders 'avoid being charged with the possible 
negative consequences.'21
The demand for a referendum by the opposition, on the other hand, often serves as a tactic 
to question the ruling party’s legitimacy to redraw the borders of a particular demos or 
polis. Informal referenda can also be used to undermine their legitimacy. In South Africa
the councils of 9 towns controlled by the Conservative Party staged referenda designed to
00reject government reforms to integrate local town council in March 1991. The mere act 
of agreeing to a referendum can allow incumbents to outmanoeuvre their opponents, and 
'take the wind out of their sails.' Referenda also provide an important ritual for negotiating 
transitions, enabling symbolic involvement of the public in a peace process. In some 
cases, referenda may also serve as 'symbolic distraction game,' allowing politicians to get
O 'Xon with things behind the scene.
In order for referenda pledges to be effective, it is vital that their use is not too 
frequent. Referenda like symbolic rewards (i.e. medals) are relatively cheap to produce, 
but scarcity begets value 24 It is also worth emphasising that existence of an underlying
Oc
desire for agreement is a vital ingredient for making the referendum effective. Referenda 
do not produce support or opposition; they merely give expression to it. The referendum 
can play a vital role in reflecting support for reform in cases where a first-past-the-post- 
system distorts the real extent support for reform, as was the case in South Africa.
Wars of position referenda:
In wars of position, referenda are deployed in order to either embellish or undermine the 
hegemony of notions of state, borders and citizenship. In practice, wars of position 
referenda are votes that allow elites to deepen the institutionalisation of borders and pass 
the so-called 'psychological' threshold. French and Italian nation-state builders sought to 
harness the referendum in processes of state building and consolidation. Norway’s 1905
21 Laurence Morel, 'Party Attitudes Towards Referendums in Western Europe', West European Politics. 16, 
3, July 1993, pp. 239-240.
22 Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right. The New White Power in South Africa (London, 1994), p. 177.
23 Robin E. Goodin, Manipulatory Politics (New Haven and London, 1980), pp. 142 -  143,145.
24 Ibid. p. 133.
25 Austin Ranney (Ed.), The Referendum Device (Washington DC and London, 1981). 144.
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referendum on separation from Sweden was also harnessed to facilitate a 'national
96festival.' Commenting on Cavour’s use of the device, Denis Mack Smith notes.
But as a device carefully suited to a certain limited objectives there was much 
to be said for it. The moderates had known what they were about when 
adopting such a bold innovation. From that point of view it was essential that 
the people should give the semblance of popular approval to annexation; and 
they could feel quite sure that, with the national guard on duty, with a public 
ballot, with Garibaldi’s personal directive, and presiding magistrates all of 
whom had taken an oath of loyalty to King Victor Emanuel two months 
before, there could be no doubt of the results. All that was needed was to
97combine discipline with excitement.
Though these votes (plebiscites) have been severely criticised by the likes of A.V.
9RDicey, it is worth bearing in mind that they represented a qualitative break with 
participation until then. Modem state building thus required and heralded wider political 
participation. The efficacy of the referendum in this regard, however, seems rather 
limited. The turnout in the Italian votes was very low (20% in Sicily) and Mack Smith 
warns against the assumption that the 'almost unanimous vote of the south signified a
90ready willingness to be absorbed into the northern kingdom.' For within days of the 
plebiscite in Sicily the mood swung against Victor Emmanuel.
Instead, the main role of these votes seems to be in convincing international public 
opinion that a territory’s incorporation, or continued rule from the metropole, in cases of 
colonial domination, is 'legitimate' and enjoys the support of the local population. In 1958, 
Charles de Gaulle staged an empire wide referendum in order to legitimate France’s 
colonial empire, which countered the spirit of Atlantic Charter of August 1941. Perhaps 
the most significant users direct democracy to legitimate its colonial interests is the US. It 
has persistently done so in an effort to de-couple between its domestic norms and its 
foreign policy. Commenting on a the 1952 Puerto Rico vote, The New York Times opined 
that the 'referendum was a cause for quiet satisfaction for all Americans,' as it was 'in the 
good tradition of United States colonialism.' The paper added that, 'We are depriving the 
communist and nationalist agitators of their charges of ‘Yankee imperialism.’ They will
26 Thomas Chr. Wyler, 'Norway the Exception to the Rule1, in Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri 
(eds.), The Referendum Experience in Europe (London, 1996), p. 141.
27 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi. A study in Political Conflict (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 386-386.
28 A.V. Dicey, ’Ought the referendum to be introduced into England?' The Contemporary Review. Volume 
LVII (January -  June 1890), p.. 492.
29 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, p. 396.
30 Ibid. pp. 418,424,435.
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no longer be able to sustain their propaganda.'31 This American tradition of 'organised 
hypocrisy' dates back to the US intervention in Haiti, and was continued by the Kennedy 
and Carter Administrations after World War Two, in Central America and the Asia -
17Pacific. Some view the 1973 'border poll' in Northern Ireland as a means to show the
O'!
world that Britain was not suppressing the province’s population by force. In post-War 
Cambodia, Son Ngoc Thangh manufactured an independence referendum in order to 
bolster his bargaining position against the French who were planning their return.34 
National movements can, therefore, use such referenda to expose the hypocrisy of colonial 
powers and undermine colonial hegemony.
The demand for a referendum by secessionist and irredentist opponents can also 
serve to undermine the legitimacy and hegemony of the existing borders and notions of 
national identity. Talk of a Scottish or Basque independence referendum chips away at the 
edifice of British or Spanish notions of state-hood. And the two referenda on the status of 
Quebec have dramatically reshaped the debate on Canadian identity. More recently, 
numerous informal referenda (designed to challenge existing borders and notions of 
identity) were held in the former Yugoslavia, the Trans-Dniester conflict, and many 
other East European countries. Belgium has produced two such votes, the first was in 
1962, when the people of Fourons (Belgium) staged an informal referendum to 
demonstrate their opposition to the town’s transfer from Walloon Liege to Flemish 
Limbourg. The transfer was produced by a new linguistic frontier. Walloons also 
arranged a 1967 vote against a proposed constitution. In Italy, Umberto Bossi’s Northern
31 The New York Times. 5 March 1952.
32 In 1918 the US encouraged its client regime to adopt a new constitution, after the US invasion, in order to 
legitimate the occupation and it’s client regime (Nicholls, 1986: 147 and Schmidt, 1971: 98-100), and the 
Kennedy Administration used direct democracy to justify its continued control o f UN Trust Territories in 
Micronesia (Willens and Siemer, 2000: 3-4 and McHenry, 1975: 12-19, 101). Under Carter, the US insisted 
on a referendum in Panama in 1977, prior to US ratification o f the Panama Canal treaty (Koster and Sanchez 
Bourbon, 1990: 194-196). A vote was again held in Puerto Rico in 1962, just ahead o f a UN debate on the 
Island’s status. (Lewis, 1963: 432).
33 Vernon Bogdanor, The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reform in British 
politics (London, 1981), p. 149.
David P. Chandler A History o f Cambodia (Boulder, Colorado, 1983), p. 172.
35 Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, ’Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union’, in David Butler 
and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World, pp. 206-215.
36 Charles King, The Moldovans. Romania. Russia and the Politics o f  Culture (Stanford, Ca, 1999), p. 187.
37 Examples include a vote in the unrecognised republic o f South Ossetia (April 2001), by the Russian 
speaking communities o f Narva and Sillamae o f Estonia (1993), and in the Ukraine the residents o f  Crimea 
and the cities o f Donetesk and the region o f Lugansk voted for greater autonomy and closer ties with Russia 
in 1994. Residents o f  the Slovakian city o f Sturovo (April 1999), with a predominantly Hungarian 
population, voted against NATO membership in an informal plebiscite.
Keesines. 1962.
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League staged its own vote on creating the Federal Republic Padania. Elsewhere such 
votes have been staged on the island of Anjouan, in favour of separation from the 
Comoros in 1997, Rhodesia (1961), Swaziland (1967) and Nagaland (1951),40 -Assam, 
India and Mexico by the Chiapas movement (1995,1999).
Towards a typology -  of sorts:
In this brief excursus I have sought to give greater attention to the role of the controlled 
referendum in ethno-national struggles over political and social borders. According to the 
typology, three types of ethno-national referenda are identified. The first are incumbency 
referenda, and such votes essentially include situations in which the referendum serves as 
a form of her esthetics. In the event that the referendum, or the use of a pledge succeeds, it 
is considered pro-hegemonic. The second type of referendum is a war of manoeuvre 
referendum, and provides the title for this dissertation. A war of manoeuvre referendum 
abets incumbents in their efforts to de-certify or de-legitimise those who threaten to 
challenge their legitimacy to re-draw borders. A referendum that neutralises groupings 
that are prepared to challenge the government’s legitimacy is considered pro-hegemonic. 
Finally, wars of position referenda are votes that are designed to embellish or erode the 
hegemony of an idea of demos or polis. These votes are more often informal votes and are 
designed to undermine efforts to impose a particular hegemony.
39 The so-called republic consists o f a region stretching from the Po River to Italy’s northern border and 
includes the cities o f  Turin, Milan, Bologna, and Venice.
40 V.K. Anand, Conflict in Nagaland. A Study o f Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency (Dehli, 1980), p. 71.
Chapter Three.
Understanding Klerk fs transition:
He [F.W. de Klerk] was well aware o f what he was about to do to our 
country's politics on February 2, 1990. He was confident that it was the right 
thing to do, and that the exigencies o f our situation demanded that leap o f  
faith.1
Why a referendum?
This chapter seeks to understand why F.W. de Klerk employed a referendum and its role 
in the transition. To date, scant critical attention has been paid to the all White referendum 
of 17 March 1992,2 and perusal of the literature that documents the transition and media 
coverage from that period provides at least five explanations for F.W. De Klerk's use of 
the referendum. These accounts, which will be shortly explored, fail to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the use of the referendum. I also consider the nature of the 
right wing threat that de Klerk faced in the transition process, exploring the link between 
the political right, the security forces and extra-parliamentary groupings.
F.W. De Klerk, who argues that his decision was driven by his commitment to 
democracy, provides the first explanation for the use of the referendum. A second and 
widely noted reason, also listed by de Klerk, is the argument that the President deployed 
the referendum in order to undermine his right wing detractors. This after the CP made 
significant inroads in numerous by-elections, and undermined de Klerk's mandate for 
negotiations. A third reason, and linked to the former, specifically highlights the threat 
posed by right wing elements in the security forces. Dan O'Meara (1994) provides a fourth 
and less sanguine account, claiming that the referendum formed part of an NP strategy to 
manage the transition and impose its 'bottom line' on the ANC in the negotiations. 
Commenting at the time of the referendum, Professor Sampie Terreblanche suggests a 
further reason for the referendum, namely a desire to 're-build' de Klerk's bruised image 
after the opening ceremony of the deliberations of the Convention for a Democratic South
1 Willem De Klerk, F.W. de Klerk: The Man in His Time (Johannesburg, 1991), p. 129.
2Deon Geldenhuys, The Foreign Factor in South Africa’s 1992 Referendum', Politikon. 19, 3, 1992, pp. 45 
-  60; Annette Strauss, 'The 1992 Referendum in South Africa', The Journal o f Modem African Studies. 31, 
2, 1993, pp. 3 3 9 -3 6 0 .
3 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f  a Miracle. The End o f Apartheid and the Birth o f the New South Africa. 
(New York, London, 1997), p. 98; Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country. The Inside Story o f  
South Africa’s Road to Change (Chicago. 1996), pp. 133-134.
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Africa (CODESA),4 where Mandela described de Klerk as a discredited and illegitimate 
leader.
It is argued that the NP and de Klerk's motivations included many of the above 
considerations, which are not mutually exclusive, though the De Klerk and O'Meara 
accounts will be partially or entirely dismissed. Their sequence and salience, was rather 
determined by developments during the first 28 months of the transition. De Klerk's 
thinking on the referendum was tailored to his negotiating tactics. Anticipating right wing 
resistance to his transition, de Klerk employed the referendum pledge in order to reassure 
White voters that he was leading them on a fail-safe process. The promise of a referendum 
assured Whites that they would have a final say over the outcome of negotiations and also 
served to undermine the CP's attempts to charge that de Klerk was negotiating without a 
mandate. More importantly, a referendum obviated the need for another general election, 
which the NP would not have been able to win with a clear majority. It is also argued that 
de Klerk's thinking on the referendum was aligned with his desire to lead a swift 
negotiation process in which he would seize the initiative and hold the 'high ground' in his 
dealings with the ANC. De Klerk's ability to maintain the 'high, ground' was increasingly 
threatened by the growth of the CP, reflected in by-election gains that the party made. 
These CP gains, coupled with the humiliation that de Klerk suffered at the hands of 
Nelson Mandela, on the occasion of the opening of the CODESA talks, led de Klerk to 
view a referendum as a means to regain the initiative and strengthen his hand in these 
talks.
President de Klerk was always assured of victory in a referendum, especially one 
on the principle of negotiations, and not the details of a deal. NP defeat in the 
Potchefstroom by-election, provided the perfect opportunity for de Klerk to out­
manoeuvre his White detractors, and regaining the initiative in the wider transition 
process. Beguiled by the referendum result, which exceeded NP expectations, de Klerk 
sought to exploit his mandate in order to impose his will on the ANC. Though this 
corresponds with O'Meara's account, this thinking was rather a product of the NP's 
impressive victory.
De Klerk's initial pre-occupation with the referendum was primarily driven by his 
fears of the CP and the threat they might pose to his transition. In this regard he was 
clearly influenced by Botha's experience with the 1983 referendum, which he viewed as a 
template to guide his reform actions. One essential difference between the two votes is
4 Die Vrve Weekblad. 28 February -  5 March 1992.
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that the referendum was an integral part of de Klerk's transition script and that he pre­
empted pressure for a vote. Prior to assessing de Klerk's negotiation tactics, which is 
critical to understanding the later deployment of the referendum, some of the 
aforementioned accounts for the referendum's use will be explored.
De Klerk the democrat?
In his autobiography F.W. de Klerk suggests that, 'as a democrat,' he 'always believed that 
a government should have a valid mandate from the voters for the implementation of 
important policies.'5 De Klerk also emphasised his 'democrat' account for his decision to 
stage the referendum in interviews granted to The Sunday Times6 and 702 Radio? prior to 
the 1992 referendum.
Despite these 'democratic' protestations, it, however, seems highly unlikely that de
Q
Klerk would have pursued a democratic whim had he not been assured of victory. As in 
the case of Botha, a referendum provided a more certain outcome than a general election, 
and de Klerk was well aware that opinion polls indicated broad support for his reforms. In 
1991 Willem de Klerk, who was privy to his brother's thinking, confidently predicted 
victory in a White referendum.9 De Klerk on several occasions signalled his conviction 
that he would win a referendum.10 Both Botha and de Klerk harnessed direct democracy 
to circumvent the distortion of public opinion that resulted from the Westminster electoral 
system, especially in by-elections. The system had historically favoured the NP, especially 
due to the weighting that rural seats enjoyed. But once the party lost its grip on its rural 
power base, the system was less conducive to Nationalist hegemony. And in exceptional 
circumstances a referendum allowed the NP to reduce the political risks of reform by 
stepping out of the system. This was especially the case after the formation of the CP in 
1983. De Klerk's failure to honour his oft-made pledge to stage a second White 
referendum, prior to the introduction of the new constitution, and his refusal to agree to a 
referendum for Whites on the question of a volkstaat in the 1994 elections - despite the
5 F.W. De Klerk, The Last Trek -  A New Beginning. The Autobiography (London, 1998), p. 229.
6 The Sunday Times. 23 February 1992.
7 The Star. 13 March 1992.
8 The Star. 21 February 1992, Patrick Laurence, The Sowetan. 3 March 1992.
9 Willem De Klerk, F.W. de Klerk, p. 88.
10 In November 1991, he informed Irish Foreign Minister Desmond Malley and his French counterpart, 
Laurent Fabius, that he was confident o f  a victory. Die Beeld. 26 November 1990; Die Burger. 16 February
1991.
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ANC's apparent willingness to countenance such a referendum11 - also undermines his
17democrat thesis. Moreover, had he been able to do so, de Klerk would have averted a 
non-racial democracy in South Africa, and he actively sought to ensure that 'the power of
1 7'No' would remain in the hands of the old oligarchy.' The NP remained a racist party and 
believed that 'not all votes had the same value,'14 and actively sought to blunt the full 
impact of majority rule by promoting a consociational arrangement.15 De Klerk did not 
lead the transition out of a conviction that democratising the country was the right thing to 
do.16 He did so, as he had no choice. And once forced to reform, the reluctant reformer 
sought to maintain control and power.
17De Klerk was neither a 'gambler' nor a 'democrat.' He was a crafty tactician who 
witnessed, at first hand, the efficacy of a referendum tactic, as the Transvaal leader of the 
NP in 1983. Based on his past experience with the CP and his understanding of the 
referendum mechanism, it was an appropriate solution for a seemingly familiar problem. 
The referendum was, ultimately, a tried and tested NP tactical ploy, which de Klerk 
dressed up in democratic garb. As Patti Waldmeier perspicaciously notes, in F.W. de
1 o
Klerk's mind, 'conscience only follows where pragmatism leads.'
The great NP game plan:
Based on an interview with NP backbencher Boy Geldenhuys, Dan O'Meara claims that 
the referendum was part of a broader NP strategy designed to strengthen its hand in its 
negotiations with the ANC and secure its 'bottom-line' position. This 'bottom line' position 
was the NP's insistence that any amendment of the interim constitution would require 75 
percent support in the legislature. In effect, entrenching a White veto. O'Meara, quite 
correctly, notes that the NP envisioned a dispensation that was an extension of the tri- 
cameral consociationalist system in which own affairs were to be managed separately.
11 The idea emerged from talks between Thabo Mbeki and Constand Viljoen over a Volkstaat, designed to 
coax the right into the 1994 elections. There may simply not have been enough time to facilitate such a 
referendum, due to the proximity o f the 1994 elections. And de Klerk opposed a suggestion that the vote for 
the Volksvront serve as an indication o f Afrikaner support for a volkstaat, fearing that this would 'swing 
significant numbers o f Afrikaners away from' the NP (Sparks, 1996, 205).
12 Interview with Constand Viljoen (23 November 2001).
13 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 127.
14 Die Burger. Leader, 20 April 1990.
15 Roelf Meyer, 'Paradigm Shift: The Essence o f Successful Change, A Personal Experience', INCORE 
Occasional Paper. (2001), p. 13.
16 Chapter eight o f Alistair Sparks’s (1996, 91-108) book analyses the factors behind de Klerk’s decision to 
engage in the transition.
17 In his Radio 702 interview, de Klerk stated, 'I am not a gambler. I am a democrat.' The Star. 13 March
1992.
18 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f a Miracle, p. 115.
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O'Meara also charges that the NP 'took a fall' in the Potchefstroom by-election in order to 
engineer a pretext for the referendum.19 A claim supported at the time.20
O'Meara's account is, nonetheless, dismissed for severed reasons. Firstly, Boy
91Geldenhuys denies the comments attributed to him. Similarly, de Klerk and senior 
negotiators Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels dismiss the suggestion that the referendum
99formed part of some pre-meditated strategy to secure the bottom line. Whilst leading 
commentators and de Klerk's chief negotiators recognise his tactical acumen, they criticise
9*5
his weakness as a strategist. Roelf Meyer encapsulates this consensus in describing de 
Klerk as a 'contingency leader, a pragmatist, someone who made use of opportunities 
when they presented themselves.'24 The referendum result then presented an opportunity 
for de Klerk to exploit in order to insist on his 'bottom line.' But this only happened once 
the scale of the result became evident. Finally, CP and NP politicians, as well as leading 
journalists, roundly refute the claim that de Klerk 'took a dive' in the Potchefstroom by-
9 c
election. And as will be demonstrated, the party leadership had planned to stage a 
referendum in August 1992, once an interim deal had been secured, at the time of the
9/
February 1992 by-election. The link between this by-election, which explains the timing 
of the vote, and the referendum will be explored in greater detail. But first, we turn to the 
political realities, which forced de Klerk to end White hegemony, his negotiation tactics 
and some of the key assumptions that guided his thinking.
De Klerkfs end game:
P.W. Botha's sham reforms failed to placate the National Party regime's domestic and 
international critics, and Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert suggests an amalgam of 'intended and 
unintended' developments -  both internal and external -  made the perpetuation of
19 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years. The Apartheid State and the Politics o f  the National Party. 1948 - 1994 
(Randburg, 1996), p. 411.
20 Ismael Langardien, The Sowetan. 17 February 1992.
21 Interview with Boy Geldenhuys (25 October 2001).
22 Interviews with F.W. de Klerk (21 November 2001), Leon Wessels (26 November 2001), and Roelf 
Meyer (28 November 2001).
23 Interviews with Hermann Giliomee (18 October 2001), Jannie Gagiano (19 October 2001), Leon Wessels 
(26 November), Roelf Meyer (28 November 2001); Hermann Giliomee. 'Surrender Without Defeat: 
Afrikaners and the South African "Miracle"', Daedalus. Spring 1997, p. 126.
24 Roelf Meyer, 'Leadership in South Africa. From Dogma to Transformation, An Account o f  Paradigm 
Shift', Occasional paper commissioned by UNU Leadership Academy (2000), p. 12.
25 Interviews with Leon Wessels (26 November, 2001), Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001) and Come and 
Pieter Mulder (23 October 2001).
26 Anne Marie Mischke, Rapport. 19 January 1992.
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7 7Apartheid impossible. The planned internal factors included rental boycotts and the 
activities of opposition groups like the United Democratic Front (UDF), which made 
many South African townships ungovernable. The former head of the National 
Intelligence Agency, Neil Barnard, suggests that internal factors are what, ultimately, 
drove Pretoria to settle with the ANC.28 His claim corroborates the transition literature, 
which suggests that international factors play a secondary role in prompting transitions to 
democracy.29
Some of the unanticipated internal developments listed by Slabbert include 
demographic trends, along with a worsening economic situation. The former Minister of 
Finance notes that the country was on the verge of bankruptcy, as the cumulative costs 
of the war in Namibia, internal repression and the homelands project depleted the 
country's treasury. Moreover, the rapidly worsening demographics or the 'arithmetic of
i
Apartheidr were compelling and had been a major trigger for reformist thinking.
On the external front, the planned factors include the impact of sanctions and the 
Namibian settlement, whilst the unexpected developments include the collapse of the gold 
price, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union Furthermore, South Africa's allies had 
made it clear to de Klerk that a deal without the ANC would be unacceptable to the 
international community. Until the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US had relegated the 
'promotion of democracy to a lower priority' amongst its foreign policy objectives. That 
all changed with Perestroika, and the international community delegated the role of 
coaxing de Klerk into a reform process to Britain's Margaret Thatcher.34 According to 
Sampie Terreblanche, Nelson Mandela's release will only be understood once the 
exchange of letters between de Klerk and Thatcher in late 1989 becomes public
i t
knowledge.
27 Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, 'The Basis and Challenges o f  Transition in South Africa', in Robin Lee and 
Lawrence Schlemmer (eds), Transition to Democracy. Policy Perspectives (Cape Town, 1991), p.4.
28 Interview (5 December 2002); see also Michael Macdonald, 'Power Politics in the New South Africa', 
Journal o f Southern African Studies. 22 ,2 , June 1996, p, 224.
29 Though Samuel Huntington (1991: 87) gives greater recognition to external factors in explanation o f  the 
third wave o f  democratization, Linz and Stepan (1996: 73-74, 235) and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 18- 
19) highlight internal factors. Willie Breytenbach (1997: 79-97) explores this debate in relation to South 
Africa.
30 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
31 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 92; Willem de Klerk, F.W. de Klerk, p. 59.
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'Pretoriastroika
One key, unanticipated, external development, which the transition literature describes as 
fortuna, was the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasised by the physical 
destruction of the Berlin Wall. This development had multiple ramifications on White 
South Africa. On the one hand, it changed the interests of the superpowers, who had either 
shielded Pretoria or sponsored its arch-nemesis, the African National Congress (ANC). In 
August 1989 the Bush Administration made it explicitly clear to de Klerk that he had less 
time than was previously taken for granted in order to 'act with determination' against 
Apartheid and cautioned that dithering would trigger a drive for new sanctions in the 
Congress. Margaret Thatcher, considered a friend of South Africa, similarly informed a 
delegation of Black journalists visiting London that the National Party did not have 5 
years 'to get negotiations with Black leaders going.'38 Commenting after the September 
1989 general elections, Max du Preez suggested that the new President in fact only had six 
months within which to 'take certain fundamental steps that would place South Africa on 
the road to peace and a negotiated settlement.'39 Subsequent developments seem to have 
vindicated his reading at the time.
On the other hand, the fall of the Wall also removed Pretoria's primary reason for 
refusing to negotiate with the ANC, and 'freed' de Klerk's hands.40 The widely supported 
total onslaught paradigm that P.W. Botha and his securocrats had peddled, which 
portrayed majority rule as a precursor to communist rule, crumbled along with the Berlin 
Wall. Samuel Huntington has already noted that modem authoritarian mle has been 
justified by 'nationalism and ideology,' and points out that the efficacy of the former 
depends 'on the existence of a credible enemy to the national aspirations of a people.'41 
Perestroika clearly undermined an important ideological construct for the regime's 
repression. Die Burger, for example, suggested that this 'great political earthquake of the 
twentieth century' had doomed socialism in Africa.42
36 Phillip C. Schmitter, 'The Influence o f the International Context upon the Choice o f National Institutions 
and Policies in Neo-Democracies', in Karen Dawisha (ed.), The International Dimension o f Post-Communist 
Transitions in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia (New York, 1997), p. 35.
37 Die Burger. 29 August 1989, Die Afrikaner 6 September 1989,11 October 1989.
38 The Cape Times. 3 October 1989.
39 Max du Preez, Die Vrve Weekblad. 22 September 1989.
40 Hennie van Deventer, Kroniek van 'n Koerantman (Welgemoed, 1998), p. 140; Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow 
is Another Country, p. 98.
41 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and 
London, 1991), p.46.
42 Die Burger. Leader, 14 November 1989.
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Some commentators even suggested that Mikhail Gorbachov's reforms provided 
inspiration for de Klerk, and comparisons between the two leaders and their efforts at 
leading managed transitions were made, and de Klerk's reforms were waggishly dubbed as 
'Pretoriastroika.'42 More importantly events in Europe deeply affected the NP's 
assessment of dealing with the ANC, convincing it that it was opportune to settle with the 
movement. F.W. de Klerk made explicit reference to this factor in his landmark speech of 
2 February 1990,44 proclaiming the un-banning of the ANC and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), as well as Nelson Mandela's release from prison. Die Burger's 
editor, Ebbe Dommisse, penning the Deur Dawie column, reflected this new assessment 
and suggested that Soviet support for the ANC would now 'count against it.'45 In Willem 
de Klerk's biography, his brother succinctly captures the strategic opportunity that the 
collapse of Communism provided for the NP.
At the same time, the decline and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
and Russia put a new complexion on things. The ANC was formerly an 
instrument of Russian expansionism in South Africa; when that threat fell 
away, the carpet was pulled from under the ANC; its base of financing, 
counselling and support had crumbled. It was as if God had taken a hand - a 
new turn on World history. We had to seize the opportunity 46
F.W. de Klerk, under immense pressure to end Apartheid, therefore, identified the 
news from Eastern Europe as both a portent and opportunity to seek a deal, that favoured 
Whites, with an ANC which he reasoned was weakened by these developments. Anxious 
to 'ride the wave of history,'47 de Klerk, therefore, sought to pursue a swift and controlled 
reform process, which would unsettle and further weaken the ANC. Assuming that the 
ANC was in disarray, and that he could control the transition process, de Klerk thus 
viewed his arch nemesis the CP as the key threat to his swift negotiations process.
De Klerk’s blitzkrieg:48
Visiting South Africa as a guest of the government in 1981, Harvard academic Samuel 
Huntington offered South African academics, many of whom were influential in
43 Max Du Preez and Hennie Serfontein. Die Vrve Weekblad. 10-16 May 1991.
44 Willem De Klerk. F.W. de Klerk. 35.
45 Die Burger. 14 November 1989.
46 Willem De Klerk. F.W. de Klerk, p. 27.
47 F.W. Klerk, quoted in Die Burger. 05 February 1997.
48 Willie Esterhuyse describes the 2 February 1990 and what followed as a 'blitzkrieg.' Interview (30 October 
2001).
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government and Broederbond circles, an appealing recipe for transforming South Africa 
into a consociational democracy. Delivering the keynote address at the conference of the 
Political Science Association of South Africa, on 17 September 1981, Huntington 
proposed that the government pursue a 'combination of a Fabian Strategy and blitzkrieg 
tactics' in order to secure this outcome.49 These proposals were repeated in his seminal 
1991 study of the Third Wave of democratisation.50 The essence of Huntington's advice 
was to 'decompose' or dis-aggregate the reforms, and implement the process through a 
series of bold moves or blitzes.
The extent to which Huntington influenced Botha's thinking is the subject of some 
debate and a sympathetic Botha biography, claims that Botha insists that he never met 
with, or was influenced by, Huntington. Brian Pottinger, on the other hand, suggests that 
Huntington had a dramatic impact on Botha.51 A key government official, who worked on 
constitutional reform in Botha's office, Fanie Cloete, confirms Pottinger's analysis, as does 
Huntington. Visiting the country in 1991, he expressed his satisfaction that his recipe had 
worked,52 as he did in The Third Wave.53
The Botha reforms, however, ground to a halt under the spectre of the growing CP 
threat,54 and the ANC had successfully managed to discredit each of his reforms abroad.55 
The net result was erosion of NP support from both the left and right. And for reasons 
already described above, de Klerk had little room for Botha style reform by stealth. 
Moreover, the international community expected deeds and not words, and a loyal 
journalist, writing after the 1989 election, hinted that delays and foot dragging would be 
'political suicide.'56 Max du Preez noted that whilst Botha spent the latter part of his term 
trying to 'stop the snowball of reform which he had set in motion,' de Klerk understood 
that that snowball could not be stopped. Instead, he sought to direct it.57 The use of blitz 
reforms was designed to enable de Klerk to do so, and in December 1989 Die Afrikaner 
lamented that whereas his predecessors moved cautiously in dismantling Apartheid, de
49 Samuel Huntington, 'Reform and Stability in a Modernizing Multi-Ethic Society', Politikon. 8, 2, 1981, 
pp. 17-18.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 141-142.
51 Daan Prinsloo, Stem Uit die Wilderness (Mosselbay, 1997),p. 102; Brian Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency 
(Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 79-83.
52 Dries van Heerden, Rapport. 24 February 1991.
53 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp, 154-155.
54 The Argus. Leader, 8 May 1978.
55 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 101.
56 Anne-Marie Mischke, Rapport. 10 September 1989, Interview with Fanie Cloete (4 December 2002).
57 Max du Preez, Die Vrve Weekblad. 15-21 November 1991.
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Klerk does so in ’leaps.'58 Addressing the corporate sector in late 1991, De Klerk himself 
indicated his desire for a swiftly negotiated process in order to end the uncertainty.59
The referendum, like Mandela's release and earlier reforms, were all leaps 
designed to ensure de Klerk's control over a process, and intended to convince the ANC to 
accept what de Klerk describes as the 'best minimal package.'60 De Klerk thus sought to 
secure what the transition literature describes as a transformation or 'limited democracy,' 
and not the subsequent 'transplacement,' and eventual regime change.61 De Klerk, as his 
chief negotiator explains, wanted to outwit the enemy in the transition process and speed 
was essential.
The reasoning was that if the NP made a number of far reaching reforms and 
did so quickly, this would 'un-balance' their 'enemies' at home and abroad. In 
this way the NP, by gaining the goodwill that these reforms would produce, 
could manoeuvre themselves in a position where it was even possible that they 
could end up as the winning party in any democratic election, certainly if a 
system of power sharing, first mentioned by Botha was introduced.62
In essence, de Klerk hoped for swift negotiations, followed by a long interim 
period with substantial guarantees for minority (White) rights. Former officials, who 
were well acquainted with P.W. Botha's negotiations, also believe that de Klerk was 
rushed.64 The ANC, on the other hand, was well aware of de Klerk's stratagem, and 
engaged in delay tactics, initially through consultation with the outside leadership and 
later through 'calculated sulks.'65 De Klerk concedes that the negotiations, after his 
February 1990 speech, took longer than he had anticipated.66
Roelf Meyer's frank assessment, set against the Huntington recipe, provides a vital 
insight into de Klerk's mindset and some of his assumptions going into the transition. 
Understanding these suppositions is essential in order to understand de Klerk's referendum 
thinking. Five core suppositions will be discussed in the ensuing pages. The first is that the
58 Die Afrikaner. 20 December 1989.
59 Die Burger. 26 November 1991.
60 Interview with F.W. de Klerk (12 December 2001).
61 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, 1986), p. 9; Alfred Stephan, 'Paths Toward 
Redemocratization', in Guillermo O’Donnel, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), 
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, p. 72; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 114, 152,162-163.
62 Roelf Meyer, 'Leadership in South Africa', p. 13; Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 101.
63 Roelf Meyer, 'Leadership in South Africa', p. 17.
64 Interviews with Bill Sass (23 November 2001), Constand Viljoen (23 November 2001), Willie 
Breytenbach (4 December 2002) and Fanie Cloete (4 December 2002).
65 Interviews with Willie Breytenbach (4 December 2002), and Fanie Cloete (4 December 2002).
66 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek - ’n Nuwe Begin (Kaapstad, 1999), p. 193.
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NP could control or manage the process and ensure an outcome that favoured Whites. The 
ruling party strongly believed that speed or blitz was a vital means to control the process, 
as it would enable the NP set the agenda and catch the ANC off-guard. The second key 
ingredient of de Klerk's stratagem was the centrality of maintaining the moral high 
ground, in order to neutralise the advantage the ANC enjoyed in the international 
community. Thirdly, the NP assumed that they were dealing with a weak and divided 
ANC, and that this weakness could allow the NP to steamroll the ANC into a deal that 
favoured it. A derivative assumption was that the NP would out-negotiate the ANC, and 
that early concessions and swift negotiations, followed by a long interregnum, could 
further divide and weaken the party. Fourthly, the NP surmised that it could do very well 
(possibly even win) in an election that was held as soon as possible. Finally, the NP 
assumed that it would have to complete this process within five years before the next 
Whites only scheduled election. A referendum was one way of bypassing this impediment.
Control through speed:
One key assumption made by de Klerk was that he could control or 'manage' the transition 
process, and evidence of his confidence in his ability to do so is provided by comments 
made shortly after Mandela's release. In an address given to Cape Town Press Club at the 
end of March, de Klerk emphasised that the 'initiative is in our hands. We have the means 
to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an orderly way.'68 De Klerk also 
displayed such confidence in mid-April, whilst addressing parliament, noting, 'We are not 
acting under pressure from a position of weakness. The initiative is in our hands and we 
have at our disposal the means to ensure that the process of negotiation and change 
proceeds peacefully.'69
De Klerk assumed that he could cease and maintain the initiative through a series 
of 'quantum leaps,' or blitz moves, which would pressurise the ANC and Mandela to make 
concessions. In an early April 1990 leader, entitled 'The moral head start,' Die Burger 
opined that government's February initiative had 'wrong footed the ANC.' The leader 
added that bold measures provide de Klerk and his negotiators 'a moral advantage in 
politics that has not been seen for years. This moral advantage, which is enlarged by the
67 Interviews with Tim du Plessis (28 November 2001) and Boy Geldenhuys (25 October 2001).
68 Hermann Giliomee, 'Surrender Without Defeat1, p. 136; Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f a Miracle, p. 196; 
Die Burger. 31 March 1990.
69 President F.W. De Klerk, Hansard. 17 April 1990, Column 6522.
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ANC's behaviour, will become increasingly important.'70 Later, the paper again argued 
that de Klerk had caught the ANC 'off side' with its reforms.71 Reading de Klerk's 
autobiography, one is struck by his pre-occupation with taking the initiative, and the
7  7
premium he places on surprise as a means to control the process.
Thus, bold gestures, like dismantling petty Apartheid laws, releasing political 
prisoners, unbanning the ANC, were seen as granting the NP the 'high ground.' Ken Owen 
notes that de Klerk 'saw what was coming' and simply rolled all of the inescapable reforms
7-1
into one package, which was his 1990 speech, in order to 'get ahead of the coming wave.' 
Again, de Klerk's autobiography is instructive. He notes that his speech was a package, 
designed to overwhelm the expectations of both the greatest optimists and the 
government's critics, in order to convince friends and detractors that the NP had made a 
paradigm shift and change people's perceptions of the NP.74
De Klerk's behaviour, in this regard, conforms to the pattern of initial liberalisation 
by authoritarian regimes, whereby 'innovations initially introduced by the regime rarely go 
beyond highly controlled (and often indirect) consultations and the restitution of some
7 c
individual rights (not extensive to social groups or opposition parties).' Interestingly, this 
literature recognises that 'there are certain advantages' if the softliners, leading the 
transition feel that they 'are taking the initiative in most of the first moves during the 
transition.'76
Steamrolling a weak and divided ANC:
De Klerk and his advisers were aware that the ANC, operating for so long in exile and as a 
banned underground organisation, was organisationally weak and potentially fraught with 
divisions. In the words of one analyst, the government could 'afford to be friendly with a 
weak enemy, especially if you are praised for this and sanctions and boycotts are tumbling
7 7
down.' The ANC's precarious position, and the rapid demise of its patron, the Soviet 
Union, were viewed as key advantages in the negotiations. Moreover, de Klerk and his 
team believed they could out-negotiate the ANC. This assumption was not only a function 
of events in Eastern Europe, but also produced by an amalgam of arrogance, racism and a
70 Die Burger. Leader, 2 April 1990.
71 Die Burger. Leader, 22 June 1990.
72 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, pp. 178-183, 193.
73 Interview (10 December 2002).
74 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, pp. 180,183,200.
75 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, p. 17.
76 Ibid. p. 67.
77 Max du Preez, Die Vrve Weekblad. 15-21 November 1991.
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miscalculation that the NP and the White bureaucracy was indispensable to the ANC.78 A 
further reason for the blitz was the desire to force Mandela into negotiations as soon as 
possible, without significant substantive concessions, in order to divide between the inside 
and outside leadership, and the militants and moderates. The idea that a swift reform 
process would 'split the ANC and possibly later even cause the ANC to reposition itself 
more broadly into the likely settlement [deal] area' had been introduced to F.W. de Klerk
70as early as June 1986 by businessman Nick Frangos, and was quite pervasive m NP 
circles. Addressing the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 1990, Gerrit 
Viljoen suggested that the February 1990 initiative had placed Mandela under pressure
on
from the younger generation, which opposed his pursuit of peaceful negotiations.
Besides, de Klerk presupposed that the transition would realign political identities 
and loyalties along new fault-lines. Influenced by an old D.F. Malan maxim that those 
who 'belong together by inner conviction should come together,' the NP believed in an 
ideological re-alignment based on common political philosophies in a post Apartheid 
South Africa.81 Accordingly, de Klerk assumed that a swift transition (negotiations and 
elections), followed by a long interregnum, would undermine the traditional alliance 
between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC, by creating tensions 
between socialists and capitalists.83 Frederick van Zyl Slabbert notes that a senior NP 
representative, close to de Klerk, once confided in him that the party's game plan was to 
'drag the ANC into negotiations politics, take a ten year rest [after a unity government was 
forged] and govern away the ANC's support.'84 Speaking in June 1990, Gerrit Viljoen 
presumed splits between outsiders and insiders, young and old, communists and capitalists
Of
explained the ANC's delay tactics. It is also important to note that speed was viewed as 
an advantage in the party's dealings with the conservative right, which had profited from
Of
Botha's incremental approach to reforms.
78 Hermann Giliomee, 'Surrender Without Defeat', p. 143.
79 Nicholas J. Frangos, 'A Framework for Political, Economic and Social Reform in South Africa' (March 
1986), pp. 73, 80-82. The paper was submitted to NP leaders, including F.W. de Klerk, who according to 
Frangos, (interview, 27 November 2001) was the most responsive o f the recipients
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The NP's electoral optimism:
Willie Breytenbach suggests that democratisation processes in Africa may have provided
additional encouragement for a blitzkrieg approach. He submits that South African
officials -  especially in the intelligence services -  would have followed the successful
Ivory Coast transition process with great interest.88 The country's leader Felix Houphouet-
Boigny, who had long collaborated with Pretoria, led a successful blitz transition in which
he called snap elections after having unbanned his opposition. A senior security official
80confirms Breytenbach's analysis, which confirms the existence of a contagion effect as 
predicted by the transition literature.90 Besides, the advantages of snap elections for 
incumbents were quite possibly drawn to Pretoria's attention by Huntington's academic 
work.91
Several key NP ministers were initially bullish with regard to the first democratic 
elections, and some believed that the party could even win these elections by building a
07coalition with other moderate and ethnic parties. Explaining these optimistic assessments 
by the likes of Pik Botha, Anne-Marie Mischke proffered that the 'psychology of a party 
that has been in the saddle for more than 40 years and unable to imagine itself not winning 
again,' needs to be considered.93 The transition literature, similarly, recognises that 
authoritarian regimes tend to exaggerate assessments of their electoral prospects as they 
'have few feedback mechanisms,' or simply believe their own propaganda.94 Initial 
optimism regarding the prospect of winning elections, or at least doing well, is said to 
have encouraged Spain's post-Franco leaders to persist with the transition.95 Optimism in 
the NP was bolstered by polls in early 1991, which showed that 80 percent of urban 
Blacks were satisfied with de Klerk's rule.96 These polls, in fact, prompted leading 
political analysts, by no means sympathetic to the NP, to also predict that it could put up a
87 In 1990 and 1991 countries like the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cape Verde, Sao Tome, Benin and Zambia, 
democratic elections followed swift and brief transitions (some only three months long) in which the 
opposition was un-banned. The speed o f these processes caught the opposition o ff guard and favoured the 
ruling elites.
88 Interview with Willie Breytenbach, (4 December 2002).
89 Interview with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002).
90 Phillip C. Schmitter, 'The Influence o f the International Context upon the Choice o f  National Institutions 
and Policies in Neo-Democracies', pp. 30, 37-39.
91 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 182-183.
92 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f a Miracle, p. 195. Interviews with Chris Thirion (29 November) and 
Wynand Malan (23 October 2001).
93 Rapport. 17 February 1991.
94 Samuel P. Huntington,. The Third Wave, pp. 181-182.
95 Alfred Stepan, 'Paths Toward Redemocratization', in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, p. 74.
96 Rapport. 21 April 1991.
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Q7good fight against the ANC. According to Neil Barnard, even de Klerk was susceptible
QO
to such electoral optimism An NP propaganda brochure, published in late 1990, quotes 
de Klerk as saying that 'our goal is a winning coalition. I believe that it is absolutely 
attainable.'99 Speaking on a television talk show, Agenda, in early 1991 de Klerk 
confidently noted that he was working to ensure that the NP was part of a future 
government by forming alliances with other parties.100 And in a leader in September 1991, 
Die Burger, supported confident assertions made by President de Klerk that the NP 'was a 
party of the future.'101
The Namibian Transition:
A major reason for this NP optimism regarding a competitive election was the Namibian 
election result in late 1989. Pretoria was heartened by the fact that SWAPO, under the 
leadership of Sam Nujoma, had only secured 57 percent of the vote, and reasoned that the 
Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA) alliance had done phenomenally well -  despite the 
fact that the Owambo group (seen as SWAPO supporters) were so demographically 
significant. Thus Pretoria, susceptible to its own ethnic conceptions of politics, reasoned 
that an alliance similar to the DTA, including Coloureds, Indians, Zulus and other ethnic 
homeland leaders could do well against the ANC, which it perceived as a Xhosa 
movement.102 Even the likes of Willie Esterhuyse suggested that the NP's initiative would 
deny the ANC the benefits of the image of a 'liberation movement,' as had been the case 
with SWAPO in Namibia.103
In F.W. de Klerk's ideal world, Black moderates, so-called Coloureds and Indians 
and Whites would join the NP on the basis of its liberal economic platform in order to 
defend conservative values. The NP, as Douglas Pierce notes, simply ignored the distinct 
possibility that 'voters will choose not on the basis of who represents their immediate 
interests, but who expresses their symbolic aspirations.'104 Based on experience elsewhere 
in Africa, the government further fancied that its well-oiled electoral machine would 
outperform that of the recently un-banned ANC. By 1992 the majority of the party's
97 Thandeka Gqubule, Die Vrve Weekblad. 13 July 1990.
98 Interview (5 December 2002).
99 Hennie Serfontein, Die Vrve Weekblad. 16 November 1990.
100 Die Burger. 16 February 1991.
101 Die Burger. Leader, 5 September 1991.
102 Max du Preez, Die Vrve Weekblad. 9 February 1990.
103 Rapport. 22 April 1990.
104 Douglas Pierce, Post Apartheid South Africa. Lessons from Brazil’s ‘Nova Republica1 (Johannesburg:, 
The Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no. 21, February 1992).
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leading strategists had in any event come to recognise that they could not win an election 
and the party began to increasingly view power sharing as its preferred option.105
International sympathy as a transition resource:
Dave Stewart, who served as the director of de Klerk's bureau, explains the importance of 
the blitz gestures in securing the moral 'high ground' in the transition, arguing 'there would 
be no sympathy for the NP if it did not show good faith.'106 Speaking in parliament on 19 
April 1990, de Klerk noted that whilst he was not engaging in reforms in order to placate 
the international community, he argued that his government 'must ensure that our country 
gets credit for the change and reforms we have initiated.'107 In other words, de Klerk and 
his coterie believed that support from the international community, which would be 
generated by dramatic compromises and gestures, would strengthen his hand in the
1 AO
negotiations. Stellenbosch academic, Jannie Gagiano, suggests that Britain in fact gave 
the de Klerk government assurances that it would seek to moderate the ANC.109
At the very least, de Klerk hoped that taking the moral liigh ground' would 
undermine the clear advantage that the ANC enjoyed in the international community and 
change perceptions of the NP. Steven Friedman, who notes that moral legitimacy is 'an 
importance strategic resource -  weapon of war'110 in ethno-national conflicts, submits that 
NP strategists viewed the maintenance of the moral high ground as essential in 
'neutralising the liberation movement's most important asset.'111 The transition literature 
recognises that the declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, often due to failure to
119perform economically, for example, triggers transition processes.
Hence, many of the early gestures and reforms of the blitz were viewed as vital to 
convincing the international community of de Klerk's sincerity, and garnering its 
sympathy for the NP.113
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Moreover, Alistair Sparks suggests that according to Herman Cohen, a former US 
Assistant Secretary of State, Pretoria, though publicly defiant of international pressure, 
yearned for the 'understanding and approval of outsiders.'114 Given earlier disappointment 
Botha and his proverbial failure to 'cross the Rubicon,'115 winning such goodwill for the 
NP was essential. As will be discussed shortly, some even view the referendum as part of 
this effort to convince the international community of the NP's commitment to reform.
The credulity of the assumption that the NP could neutralise the ANC's advantage 
abroad was shown in the way which America, to the NP's annoyance, feted Nelson 
Mandela on his first visit to the country.116 One key early concession that de Klerk hoped 
for was the lifting of sanctions in the early stages of the transition. And much to the NP's 
chagrin, the international community deferred to the ANC on sanctions.
Avoiding another general election:
Yet a further parameter that shaped de Klerk's thinking in regard to need for speed was his 
assumed political timetable. On the basis of the 1987 election and the results of the 1989 
general election, de Klerk could no longer take for granted an NP victory in another 
general election. Despite the fact that the 1987 election saw the NP enjoy massive English
117support, which approximated the English 'yes' vote in the 1983 referendum, the CP 
assumed the mantle of the official opposition, defeated a Minister and two deputy
1 1 o
Ministers, and notched up 'widespread support of ominous proportions.' One analyst 
warned that the 1987 result suggested that a mere 24 percent defection amongst Afrikaner 
voters would allow the CP to assume power.119 By June 1990 the CP's by-election gains 
seemed to hint at such a defection.
This spectre, despite the fact that there was an overall increase of support for a
170reformist agenda, was an outcome of the particular institutional context within which de 
Klerk operated. In South Africa, the Westminster or first-past-the-post electoral system,
114 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 98.
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designed to stave o f pressure for sanctions, disappointed an anxious international community. In response to 
the speech the currency rapidly depreciated.
116 Die Burger. Leader, 25 June 1990.
117 The NP ran a conservative campaign that successfully presented the liberal opposition as soft on security 
issues. The Argus. Leader, 8 May 1987.
118 The Argus. Leader, 7 May 1987.
119 Lawrence Schlemmer, ’Assessment: The 1987 Election in the South African Political Process', in D.J. van 
Vuuren, L. Schlemmer, H.C. Marais and J. Latakgomo (eds). South African Election 1987. Context. Process 
and Prosoect (Pinetown, 1987), p. 325.
120 Ibid. pp. 321-325.
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which gave greater weight to rural conservative constituencies served as a potentially 
serious barrier to a reform process. It did so by distorting the real support of the contesting 
parties and by allowing the CP to mobilise opposition on national issues (reform) in local 
contexts, especially at the time of by-elections. Given the results of the 1987 and 1989 
general elections, and assuming that a significant number of Afrikaners might abandon the 
NP after far-reaching reforms were begun, the negotiations had to be completed by de 
Klerk within 5 years. With hindsight, the fact that de Klerk presented the electorate with a 
five-year plan for negotiations prior to the September 1989 elections attested to this time 
pressure.
De Klerk did, nonetheless, take for granted a victory in a referendum on reform. 
This assumption was based on his involvement in the 1983 referendum. An experienced 
machine politician, he correctly presumed that the majority of Whites backed reform and 
negotiations with the ANC. Such support would not, though, necessarily be expressed in a 
general election under the Westminster system. Moreover, ensuring stability in White 
politics was essential if the NP were to control the process and keep the high ground in its 
dealings with the ANC. This explains de Klerk's early preference for a referendum, which 
he assumed he would win. And it is argued that the referendum, in fact, served as a tool of 
transition her esthetics, and was part of his transition script.
Pre-empting the CP threat:
The 1989 general elections took place in the most disadvantageous of circumstances for 
the NP. The National Party, which had now been in power for four decades, had just 
emerged from a long and acrimonious struggle, in which the party leadership unseated 
P.W. Botha, forcing him to resign as State President. In addition, the NP was facing a 
concerted threat from both left and right, and the middle ground that it had attempted to 
stake out for itself in 1983 was beginning to erode with greater speed. On the left, the 
formation of the Democratic Party (DP)121 in 1989 provided a new and united political 
home for verligtes, who were disillusioned with the years of political stagnation under 
P.W. Botha, and liberals. The DP secured just under a quarter of the popular vote in the 
1989 elections, and some analysts viewed this achievement as a 'factor, which can be 
expected to heighten expectations of rapid reform.'122 Moreover, the candidate of the
121 The Democratic Party united the left wing opposition by bringing together the Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP), the Independent Party, headed by Dennis Worral, and the National Democratic Movement (NDM) 
under the leadership o f Wynand Malan.
122 Gavin Evans, Shaun Johnson and Ivor Powell. The Weekly Mail. 8-14 September 1989.
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verligte wing of the NP, Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis, came surprisingly close to 
defeating de Klerk in the leadership race, signalling a growing internal demand for 
reform. De Klerk received 69 votes, as opposed to 61 votes for du Plessis from the 
caucus in the closest leadership race ever.
To its right the NP was faced with continued growth of the CP. Support for the NP 
amongst the NP’s Afrikaner constituency had already fallen from 80 percent in the 1981 
general election to 60 percent by the 1987 general election,124 and the party was in danger 
of becoming a minority party amongst Afrikaners. The CP continued to make inroads 
amongst conservative Afrikaners in the 1989 elections, and of the 29 seats the NP lost in 
these elections, 17 were lost to the CP, which garnered 31 percent of the popular vote. 
With a small gain of three percent compared to 1987, the CP therefore managed to 
increase its parliamentary representation by 77 percent, from 22 to 39 seats. Moreover, 
some 31 seats, including traditionally safe NP seats, had become marginal seats after the 
1989 vote. Of these, seven were held with majorities of less than 500, 9 with majorities of 
less than 1,000 votes and the remaining 14 marginal seats were defended by majorities of 
less than 1,500 voters.126
The real extent of the threat that the CP posed to the NP is better understood by 
looking at the party's support in the Free State and de Klerk's Transvaal, 46 percent and 40
197percent respectively. The CP gains in the 1989 elections, despite the fact that an
1 9 o
impressive 48 percent of Afrikaners supported negotiations with the ANC in 1989, 
underscored the extent to which the existing electoral institutions distorted public opinion, 
in favour of conservative rural constituencies.
The cardinal lesson of the 1989 elections, which was the party's worst performance
1 *50since coming to power in 1948, was that the NP could no longer safely assume that they 
would win another general election in a first-past-the-post system, especially once they 
embarked upon a significant reform process. The best that the NP could have hoped for 
after embarking on such far-reaching reforms was a hung parliament. It therefore seems
123 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek, p. 152.
124 Hermann Giliomee, 'Broedertwis: Intra Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid 1969 -  
1991', in Norman Etherington (ed). Peace. Politics and Violence in the New South Africa (London, 1992), p. 
172.
125 Nicholas J. Frangos, 'A framework', p 13.
126 Johann van Rooyen, Hard Right. The New White Power in South Africa (London, 1994), p. 136.
127 The Weekly Mail. 8-14 September 1989.
128 Willem de Klerk, F.W. de Klerk, p. 103.
129 Die Burger. Leader, 8 September 1989.
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highly feasible that de Klerk embarked on his reform process in 1989 knowing, full well, 
that he would not hold another general election under the existing dispensation.130
A referendum was the only democratic form of legitimation that he could assume 
and risk during his transition. Having been intimately involved in the 1983 referendum de 
Klerk was aware that he could count on the support of DP voters and the core of the NP 
support base in a referendum on reforms. In newspaper editor Ken Owen's words, de 
Klerk reassembled the P.W. Botha reform constituency of 1983 in order to widen his base 
for reforms.131 Writing at the time, Mike Robertson, similarly, suggested that the 1983 
vote provided de Klerk with model he could emulate. A referendum constituted a 'two- 
way gunfight' with minimal risks, compared to a general election.
De Klerk's post-6 September 1989 thinking on a referendum is best understood in 
the context of his negotiating tactics and the assumptions already outlined. It had little to 
do with a commitment to democracy, as de Klerk claimed. His major challenge during the 
blitz was placating Whites and ensuring that he carried his constituency, and in this regard 
the referendum was an essential device.
Coping with the right wing threat:
The real strength of the White right was some point of speculation in the media at the 
time. Some analysts dismissed the right wing threat, arguing that the existence of a
133pragmatic wing in the right would, ultimately, see it participate in negotiations. On the 
other hand, many role players took the threat seriously enough, and warned against 
dismissing the right,134 Veteran editor, Harold Pakendorf, suggests that the aggrandised 
fear of the right, which was so pervasive amongst the ANC leadership, was produced by 
the exaggerated view of the English press.135. Three linked, yet distinct, right wing groups 
posed a threat to de Klerk's post-1989 transition.
The first was the political arm of the White right, embodied by the Conservative 
Party (CP) and the diminutive Herstigte Nasionale [Refounded National] Party (HNP). 
The second right wing threat was the ever-increasing number of extra-parliamentary 
groups, many of which had developed their own militias. These mushroomed from 60 in
130 Interview with Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001) and Wynand Malan (23 November 2001).
131 Interview (10 December 2002).
132 The Sunday Times. 23 February 1992.
133 The Weekly Mail. 15 - 22 February 1991.
134 The Weekly Mail. 1-7 March 1991.
135 Interview (9 December 2002).
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mid 1990,136 to some 138 by mid 1991,137 and some 193 organisations by the time of the
11Qreferendum. Some of the right wing movements that were prominent in these activities 
included the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB), the Boere Weerstands Beweging 
(BWB), the Boerekommando and the Boerestaat Party. As was demonstrated in Israel, a 
few extremists have tremendous potential to derail such processes, and in South Africa the 
pool of roughly 20,000 radicals had the potential to derail the process. It is worth noting 
that most White South African male Whites were conscripted, though for a two year long 
period, and thus received military training. Furthermore, there were concerns that
11Qgraduates of the Special Forces were joining such movements. One major handicap 
facing these organisations was the divisions -  often a function of personality differences.
Finally, there were elements within the security establishment, which had the 
ability to scupper the reform process, either independently or in conjunction with the right 
wing militias, with whom they had forged links.140 At the time of the referendum there 
was media speculation of a military coup by conservative officers,141 and one analyst 
suggested that the CP enjoyed significant support in the police force (80-95 percent) and 
the South African Defence Force (70-80 percent).142 In addition to standing units of the 
regular army, the SADF was built on a reserve system of local commandos, with their own 
arms and ammunition depots and military hardware. It is also worth noting that elements 
in the security forces were involved in so-called Third Force activities, designed to thwart 
the transfer of power.
The transition literature notes that the 'possibility of a coup is not fictitious,' though 
it depends on the presence of 'swingmen' to execute them.143 The 'sunset clause,' which 
was an integral part of the power sharing understanding of 12 February 1993, went a long 
way to calm the fears of those in the military and civil service who might intervene to stop
i  .  .  1 4 4the transition.
136 Willie Kuhn, Insig. September 1990.
137 Hennie Serfontein and Ina Van der Linde, Die Vrve Weekblad. 19-25 July 1991.
138 Strategy Insights, 'Rightwing Resistance: How Big the Threat?', Strategy Insights, 2 ,4 , June 1993.
139 Hennie Serfontein and Ina Van der Linde, Die Vrve Weekblad. 19-25 July 1991.
140 Die Vrve Weekblad. 20 October 1989,9 February 1990, Leader, 15 June 1990.
141 The Star. 22 February 1992 (quoting Africa Confidential, which reported that the SADF wished to force a 
change in the NP leaders, rather than carry out a traditional coup). Stanley Uys, The Star. 12 March 1992.
142 The Star. 28 February 1992.
143 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, pp. 23-25.
144 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f  a Miracle, pp. 213, 218, 272. For an elaboration on amnesties and for the 
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Though the CP eschewed violence, the party successfully manipulated right wing 
emotions and hinted that it would support violence under certain circumstances.145 In 
doing so, it contributed towards and atmosphere that encouraged violence by the latter two 
groups. The CP's rhetoric that de Klerk did not have a mandate thus threatened to create an 
environment that sanctioned violence. As Yaakov Bar Siman-Tov (1997) has argued, the 
absence of 'formal legitimacy,' which is obtained from formal political institutions, for 
peace processes tends to undermine the 'informal' or public legitimacy of such processes. 
And in the absence of 'informal' legitimacy, extremists find exhortation to pursue violence 
as a means to scupper peace. In the South African case, a string of NP by-election defeats 
in parallel to the transition process suggested that de Klerk did not have support for the 
process, thereby undermining both his formal legitimacy and public or informal 
legitimacy to broker a deal with the ANC.
De Klerk's leap of faith:
In this chapter I have explored some accounts of why de Klerk employed the referendum 
and sketched the background to his 'leap of faith.' De Klerk did not use a referendum due 
to a deep commitment to democracy. Nor did he use one as part of a deliberate strategy to 
impose a White constitutional veto. Assuming power in 1989, de Klerk 'was aware that the 
greatest risk he could take at the time was to take no risk at all.'146 And a speedy and 
controlled transition was viewed as the best stratagem to ensure the optimal outcome for 
the NP -  a consociational democracy.
The basic ingredients of his blitzkrieg were control through speed, securing the 
moral high ground and undermining the ANC's international legitimacy. To boot, the NP 
assumed that it could steamroller a weakened ANC to accept terms that favoured the NP, 
and also hoped that it could do well in the first post-Apartheid elections. De Klerk was, 
therefore, supremely confident of his ability to control the transition and his interaction 
with the ANC. He was, however, far less confident of his ability to control the White 
right. As leader of the party in the Transvaal from 1982 to 1989, de Klerk had witnessed, 
first hand, the growth of the party. Hence the decision to include a referendum in his 
transition script -  and its central role in the politics of the transition -  is best understood in 
this context. I now turn to the politics of the transition and the role of the referendum from 
1989 to 1992.
145 Hennie Serfontein, Die Vrve Weekblad. 1 June 1990.
146 Roelf Meyer, 'Paradigm Shift1, p. 13.
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Chapter Four.
De Klerk*s finest hour.
It is time to prick the CP’s balloon and the referendum, albeit ethnically 
anarchistic and imperfect, is the instrument with which to perform this 
overdue task.1
The politics of the referendum:
This chapter explores the politics of the referendum, and the numerous pledges to hold a 
referendum. These provide an interesting insight into the internal (White) politics that de 
Klerk had to contend with in the first phase of the transition. I first look at de Klerk’s 
initial blitz and his use of the referendum pledge to placate Whites. I then demonstrate 
how the existing Westminster system and by-elections allowed the Conservative Party 
(CP) to undermine de Klerk’s legitimacy to lead the reform process. The referendum 
pledges were a resource in managing these by-elections and enabled de Klerk to pre-empt 
the demand for a referendum or general elections. I next explore the impact of the 
impending CODES A process on de Klerk’s thinking in regard to the referendum. It is 
argued that the opening of the CODESA deliberations gave further encouragement for de 
Klerk to use a referendum in order to regain the initiative. The Potchefstroom by-election 
defeat was the last straw, and forced de Klerk to call the vote, earlier than planned. 
Finally, this chapter will assess the impact of the referendum on the broader transition 
process and the CODESA talks.
The initial blitz, September 1989 to February 1990:
As suggested, the imperative of blitz tactics was to secure the moral high ground, set the 
pace of the process, shift the balance of the international community’s sympathies in 
favour of de Klerk and pressure the ANC to make concessions, and mistakes. In sharp 
contrast to the Israeli government in the case of the Oslo process, for example, gradualism 
was not viewed as expedient.
Though no doubt dismissed at the time, de Klerk provided early hints that South 
Africa was in need of 'great jumps,' and already as acting State President, in the middle of 
August 1989, he stated his belief that 'history provided a unique opportunity for peaceful 
solutions.'2 Commenting on such statements, Die Burger drew a parallel with Botha’s
1 The Star. 25 February 1992.
2 Die Burger. 16 August 1989.
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famous 'adapt or die speech,'3 made in 1979.4 Speaking in his constituency of Vereneging, 
in mid-August 1989, de Klerk indicated that his party wished to move away from a 
situation where Whites dominate others, yet avoid a situation wherein Whites become the 
oppressed.5
Once Botha had been forced to resign as State President,6 the 'urgency' of reform 
became a central message in the last fortnight of de Klerk’s, previously conservative, 
election campaign. And it was during this period that de Klerk unveiled his 'five year 
plan.' The first reference to this plan was made in a TV interview on Netwerk, 20 August
n
1989, and in a series of public engagements in the ensuing days, the now verligte 
candidate prophesised that what 'will happen in the coming few years in South Africa will
o
shape the coming 50, even one hundred, years.' In one of these speeches de Klerk warned 
voters that if 'we want to secure a safe and prosperous future for our children, then far- 
reaching moves by a strong government are needed.'9 His most explicit exposition of the 
5-year plan was made in the city of Klerksdorp on 24 August, and de Klerk made 5 key 
promises. The first was an undertaking to address fear and misunderstanding, the second 
to promote a great Indaba (negotiations), the third to promote economic growth, the fourth 
to secure a new constitution, and finally de Klerk promised to tackle violence. De Klerk 
again emphasised the need to move swiftly.10 Years of inertia under Botha had obviated 
the path of incremental reforms, and de Klerk had no choice but to seize the initiative and 
transform South Africa as speedily as possible.
Despite NP recognition that the 1989 election result constituted a setback,11 it was
19portrayed as mandate for the 'five year plan' and the promised negotiations. Empowered 
with his 'mandate,' de Klerk set about his blitz, and Mandela’s surprise release was but one 
component. Contrary to popular perception, it did not signal the beginning of de Klerk’s
3 The speech, which was made in July 1979 in town o f Upington, highlighted the need for reform and 
Botha’s determination to introduce reforms. It was prompted by accusations that he was deviating from 
party policy.
4 Die Burger. 16 August 1989.
5 Die Burger. 18 August 1989.
6 P.W. Botha suffered a major (and probably second) stroke in January 1989, forcing his resignation as party 
leader, and paving the way for the election o f  F.W. de Klerk. Upon Botha’s return to office, tensions 
between the nominal party leader and State President significantly increased, leading to the internal putsch 
which saw de Klerk and his allies force Botha to resign.
7 Die Beeld. 21 August 1989, Die Burger. 21 August 1989.
8 Speaking in Port Elizabeth on 21 August 1989 (Die Burger. 22 August), a speech in Cape Town, on 21 
August, (Die Beeld. 22 August 1989) and in a speech in Bloemfontein (Die Beeld. 24 August 1989).
9 Die Burger. 4 September 1989.
10 Die Beeld. 25 August 1989.
11 Die Burger. Leader. 8 September 1989.
12 Die Burger. Leader, 4 September 1989.
78
transition, but rather constitutes one of its most significant signposts. Though few would 
have taken them seriously at the time, some early signs of the coming blitz included an 
iteration of the election campaign promise, that the coming five years would herald 
dramatic change, after the elections,13 reports that Mandela’s release was imminent,14 the 
appointment of Gerrit Viljoen as chief negotiator,15 the elimination of petty Apartheid
1 ( \ 17legislation, the release of 8 senior political prisoners, and hints of a government
151willingness to end the state of emergency. De Klerk touched on many of these themes on 
the occasion of his formal induction as State President on 20 September 1989,19 and these 
early reforms constituted what one analyst described as 'the first holes in our Berlin 
wall.'20
These pre-February 1990 actions were an application of Huntington’s approach of
disaggregating reforms, and were clearly designed to prove the government’s sincerity,
especially to the international community. More importantly, they were designed to place
pressure on the ANC. Following the release of 8 high ranking political prisoners,
including Walter Sisulu, in early October 1989, Die Burger argued that such moves caught
the opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) 'off guard' and placed pressure on the
71ANC to participate in negotiations and forego violence. The release of the 8 was also the 
product of intense international pressure. Margaret Thatcher reportedly pressed de Klerk 
to release Mandela ahead of the 1989 Commonwealth Conference and a reluctant de Klerk
77bought more time by releasing the 8 and delaying Mandela's release to early 1990.
The desire to place pressure on the ANC clearly also underpinned the release of 
Nelson Mandela. Chris Thirion, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff in the Defence 
Force, suggests that de Klerk justified the release to senior security officers by arguing 
that Mandela was an 'icon' all the while he remained in jail. De Klerk reasoned that his
7 ^
release would 'show him up as fallible' and put pressure on the ANC to compromise. 
Once de Klerk’s game for the high ground passed the 2 February threshold, which was by
13 Die Burger. 15 September 1989.
14 Die Burger. Deur Dawie, 9 September 1989, Die Burger. 15, 19 and 26 September 1989.
15 Die Burger. Leader, 18 September 1989.
16 On 16 November 1989, de Klerk scrapped the 'Separate Amenities Act,' (Die Burger. 17 November, 
1989), though hints o f such changes were made in September o f that year (Die Burger. Leader, 21 
September 1989).
17 Die Burger. 12 October 1989.
18 Die Burger. Leader, 21 September 1989.
19 Die Burger. 21 September 1989.
20 Max du Preez, Die Vrve Weekblad. 9 February 1990.
21 Die Burger. Leader, 12, 16, 17,20 October 1989.
22 Sampie Terreblanche, Die Vrve Weekblad. 3 December 1991 to 10 January 1992.
23 Interview (29 November 2001).
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all accounts a dramatic blitz action, there would be no return to the game of Whites only 
electoral politics. De Klerk could no longer afford another general election.
Placating Whites:
As part of the NP’s campaign in the 1989 general elections, it promised Whites that any 
major changes in the constitution would be subjected to a referendum. It is perhaps ironic 
that Gerrit Viljoen made one such pledge in the town of Potchefstroom.24 Such a 
referendum pledge allowed de Klerk maximal ambiguity during and after the 1989 general 
election. As Transvaal leader of the NP, de Klerk had been engaged in a long-running 
battle with the CP. He was, therefore, aware that he was unable to assume complete 
control over conservative resistance. Hence, his immediate priority after 2 February 1990 
was allaying the fears of Whites and trying to limit the right’s growth. This was achieved 
by repeatedly promising Whites a referendum as a final hurdle before introducing the new 
constitution.
In April 1990, for example, de Klerk explained his 'repeated undertakings in 
respect of a referendum or election,' prior to implementing a new constitution, by noting 
that the NP’s 1987 and 1989 electoral mandates were 'linked to an undertaking that the 
same voters would be able to express themselves on the results of negotiations.' 
Interestingly, a 1986 undertaking to stage a referendum on future reforms preceded the 
1987 referendum promise, made in the context of the elections. This pledge was a 
response to deep divisions within Botha’s cabinet, between the reformists and
9/iconservatives, led by F.W. de Klerk over the future of reforms. The pronouncement by
97the verligte Foreign Minister laid bare the gulf between hardliners or 'standpatters,' and
9 0
soft-liners in the cabinet.
Former government officials portray FW de Klerk as an archconservative that 
deliberately spoiled key reform initiatives and Fanie Cloete suggests that he set back
90serious reforms by at least 3 to 4 years by rejecting any power sharing with Blacks. De 
Klerk’s conservative image however proved to be a valuable resource in placating many
24 Die Beeld. 23 August 1989.
25 PV 912, 4/1/1. Extracts from speeches by the State President and the Minster o f  Constitutional 
Development.
26 Dan Prinsloo, Stem Uit die Wilderness, 'n Biographie oor Oud-pres. P.W. Botha (Mosselbaai, 1997), pp. 
216-217,220.
27 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and 
London, 1991), p. 121.
28 The Argus. Leader, 6 February 1986; Tos Wentzel, The Argus. 14 February 1986.
29 Interview (4 December 2002); Marion Edmunds, The Mail and Guardian. 11-17 October 1996.
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Whites, especially conservative NP supporters, during the initial stages of the transition. 
His efforts to thwart the reforms of the 1980s, however, make it hard for people to accept 
his claims of a later conversion to a reformist agenda.
Dave Stewart describes de Klerk’s numerous referendum promises as 'good 
politics,' designed to maintain White support for reform. Such reassurances also 
constituted part of a concerted effort to market the reform process to Whites as a 'fail-safe' 
plan. Spinning the reform process as a fail-safe plan was made both plausible and credible 
by the referendum promise. In his 30 March 1990 address to the Cape Town Press Club, 
de Klerk prefaced his claim that the initiative was in the NP’s hands with a pledge to stage 
a referendum, and noted that a new constitution would only be introduced with the support 
of White voters. He repeated this theme in an address to a NP youth gathering a day later
"X1and in a parliamentary debate on 17 April.
Pre-empting the need for a referendum:
Though a referendum pledge was not part of de Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech, it clearly 
became an integral part of the NP’s transition script in the ensuing months, probably once 
it emerged that the party would face numerous unanticipated by-elections. And, de Klerk, 
like Botha, would over time amend his tactical thinking on the referendum in order to 
address the most immediate threat to his particular process. But in contrast to his 
predecessor, de Klerk deployed a referendum promise from the very outset of his reform 
process. The 1989 election promise to stage a referendum in the event of serious reforms 
provided a convenient justification for the referendum pledge.
Both de Klerk and his chief negotiator Gerrit Viljoen made at least 23 pledges to 
stage a referendum prior to the eventual announcement in February 1992. F.W. de Klerk 
promised a referendum on at least 14 occasions (30 March 1990, 1, 17, 19 April 1990, 12 
June 1990, 9 August 1990, 8 October 1990, 15, 17 February 1991, 4 September 1991, 29 
November 1991, 20 December 1991, 25 December 1991, 24 January 1992) prior to his 
final referendum announcement. Dr. Gerrit Viljoen promised a referendum on at least 9 
occasions (12 May 1990, week one of June and 21 June 1990, 20 November 1990, 24 
October 1991 23, 24, 27,28, January 1992).32 The NP’s Secretary General, Dr. Stoffel van
30 Interview (12 December 2001).
31 Die Burger. 2 and 17 April 1990.
32 PV 912, 4/1/1; Die Burger. 31 March 1990, 2, 18 April 1990, 15 May 1990, 12, 13, 14, 16 June 1990, 16 
February 1991, 26 and 30 November 1991, Hansard. 24 January 1992, Column 36-37; Die Burger. 25 
January 1992; Hansard. 27 January 1992, column 95-98.
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der Merwe, similarly promised a referendum on at least two occasions. It is worth 
pointing out that de Klerk’s numerous pledges to stage a referendum, prior to adopting the 
new constitution, explain the later Afrikaner anger at de Klerk for not doing so.34
Maintaining the NP’s support base:
The bulk of the initial de Klerk and Viljoen referendum pronouncements were 
designed to reassure Whites, especially public sector workers, that they would have the 
final say over the outcome of the negotiations. Steven Friedman highlights the strategic 
importance of maintaining the NP’s traditional support base during the transition, noting 
that it was premised on the fact that 'the ruling party’s power rests on its control of the 
state. A crucial part of its constituency is, therefore, the civil service and the security 
establishment: if it cannot secure their consent for transition, or if they do not have the 
capacity to assist it, its influence wanes.' Friedman adds that an international perception 
that the NP’s participation in the government was a 'condition for stability' would also 
enhance its bargaining power. And, de Klerk indeed sought to reassure White civil 
servants that the NP would defend their interests and secure their pensions. Ken Owen 
corroborates Friedman’s perceptive analysis, noting that de Klerk (like Botha) viewed the 
bureaucracy as a vital resource. Owen points out that de Klerk dedicated an inordinate 
amount of time in trying to secure benefits for civil servants in the negotiations, at the 
expense of key constitutional issues.
Michael Macdonald provides an even more intriguing explanation for de 
Klerk's insistence on the rights of civil servants. He argues that the NP viewed 
bureaucrats 'as a Trojan horse inside the state,'38 who would affect the flow and 
distribution of resources in a way to undermine the ANC and cause splits in the
'XQmovement. Furthermore, he speculated that the NP assumed that the need to
33 Die Vrve Weekblad. 30 August to 5 September 1991, Die Burger. 25 November 1991.
34 In early 1997 F.W. de Klerk reportedly described the transition as a surrender o f  power. Certain de Klerk 
critics (Ebbe Dommisse, Hermann Giliommee and Izak deVilliers) pounced on this alleged use o f the word 
surrender and wrote scathing leaders and op-eds, which triggered a huge debate and a deluge o f  letters to the 
Afrikaans papers. Many o f these were very critical o f the transition and highlighted what they saw as De 
Klerk's deceit in the 1992 referendum.
35 Steven Friedman. The Shapers o f Things to Come? National Party Choices in the South African 
Transition (Johannesburg, The Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report No.22, February 1992), pp. 19- 
20.
36 Die Beeld. 5 March 1991.
37 Interview (10 December 2002).
38 Michael Macdonald, 'Power Politics in the New South Africa', Journal o f Southern African Studies. 22 ,2 , 
June 1996, p. 229.
39 Michael Macdonald, 'The Siren's Song: the Political Logic o f  Power Politics', Journal o f Southern African 
Studies. 18 ,4 , December 1992, p. 229.
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navigate 'unfamiliar, potentially hostile bureaucracies' would compel the ANC to 
share power with i t40
De Klerk’s appreciation of the importance of the bureaucracy in this transition 
sharply contrasts with the approach that Gorbachov took in his managed transition. Jerry 
H. Hough argues that Gorbachov ’distrusted the bureaucracy that would have to manage a 
transition,' and adds that he saw reform, not as 'constructing a new incentive system but of 
overcoming the resistance of those fattening off the old one.'41 This misreading of the 
situation proved disastrous for Gorbachov.
The effort to assuage White fears and transmit the sense that de Klerk and his party 
controlled the process, through a referendum, nonetheless, created a clash with the ANC, 
which opposed the promise of a 'white' veto over the negotiations process and its outcome. 
Such tensions increasingly came to the forefront as the formal constitutional negotiations 
approached. These were, however, delayed for almost two years as the ANC and the NP 
fundamentally differed over who would negotiate the new constitution. The government 
proposed a convention of existing political organisations, including the homeland leaders, 
whilst the ANC preferred an elected constituent assembly to craft a post-Apartheid 
dispensation. The NP was highly fearful of an elected assembly, as it and its allies would 
have less influence, and preferred a forum of non-representative delegates. The eventual 
compromise, which was tabled by the ANC, called for an all-party conference to consider 
the route to a constituent assembly. In the absence of formal negotiations, each by-election 
provided the CP with an opportunity to exploit White uncertainty and fears over the 
future.
By-election blues:
The CP’s response to the NP’s blitz was to charge the government with violating its 
September 1989 mandate, and call for a new general election, which it was confident it 
would win. The numerous by-elections in the early stages of the transition provided the 
CP with ideal opportunities to challenge the government on this score. In the 28 months 
had passed between winning the 1989 elections and calling the 1992 referendum, de Klerk 
had to contend with eight such by-elections, and each of these votes suggested a swing in 
favour of the CP, ranging from five to 27 percent. The most critical of these votes were in
40 Michael Macdonald, 'Power Politics in the New South Africa', p. 230.
41 Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR. 1985-1991 (Washington D.C., 1997), pp. 
491,505.
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1991 and early 1992, when the party lost the Ladybrand, Virginia and Potchefstroom by- 
elections in quick succession.42 The referendum pronouncements were central in coping 
with these by-elections and often corresponded with these votes.
These eight by-elections provided a terrain that favoured the CP and aided its efforts 
to undermine de Klerk’s negotiating mandate. The official opposition party did not have 
the financial resources, the party machine, access to the Naspers/ Perskor media empires 
or control of the state media that the NP enjoyed in national campaigns, especially 
referenda. One commentator rioted that by-elections, 'by their very nature, reflect only a 
small, usually distorted segment of reality. In short, they don’t mean much. All that 
matters is the impression they create of how the governing party is faring.'43 In the case of 
South Africa’s early transition, the CP’s dramatic gains allowed it to undermine de 
Klerk’s negotiating mandate, as the party made these local contests mini-referenda over 
the peace process. De Klerk confirmed his dislike of by-elections in an interview with 
Rapport, after announcing the referendum.
A by-election does not give an accurate picture of what voters believe 
regarding the cardinal issues of the country. A by-election is like a magnifying 
glass, which focuses a whole array of issues at one point. A referendum is also 
a magnifying glass, but it only focuses on one important issue, in this case the 
cardinal question is how and by whom the future of the country must be 
shaped.44
Questioned on by-elections, almost a decade later, de Klerk suggests that voters 
often tend to vote their grievances and are influenced by a variety of motivations during 
by-elections. He believes that referenda allow voters to be confronted with the 
'fundamental issues.'45 In his Rapport interview, de Klerk highlighted the fact that the state 
of the economy, the drought and similar problems determined the outcome of these by- 
elections. It should, though, be added that de Klerk, too, was guilty of trying to use by- 
elections to promote his own standing, and ahead of the early March 1991 by-election in 
Maitland, he informed local voters that the 'support will strengthen my hand in moving 
forward with speed and determination.'46 The Natal leader of the NP, George Bartlett, also
42 November 1989 Ceres and Vasco (Cape), June 1990 Umlazi (Natal), November 1990, Randburg 
(Transvaal), in 1991 three votes were held, Maitland (Cape) in February, Ladybrand (Free State) in May, 
and Virginia (Free State) in 1991. The final by-election was the Potchefstroom by election in February 1992.
43 Phillip van Niekerk, Hie Weekly Mail. 9-15 November 1990.
44 Rapport. 23 February 1992.
45 Interview with F.W. de Klerk (21 November 2001).
46 Michael Morris, The Argus. 5 March 1991.
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called on voters to support the party in Umlazi, in order to strengthen de Klerk.47 
Similarly, Potchefstroom was foolishly turned into a vote of confidence in de Klerk and 
his reforms, after the Virginia defeat,48 and prior to the February vote.49Dze Vrye 
Weekblad editor Max du Preez suggested that the idiocy of making Potchefstroom a test 
(in the midst of a drought and a recession), stemmed from the fact that de Klerk was 
overwhelmed by the euphoria from the international response to his reforms, and by the 
fact that he was encircled by sycophants who did not inform him of what was going on in 
the country.50
As will be established in the ensuing chapters, De Klerk’s thinking on the 
referendum shows a remarkable continuity with a traditional NP fear of making major 
constitutional or symbolic issues the focus of elections. Historically, referenda have 
provided NP elites with a convenient tool to introduce such legislation, yet avoid paying a 
high political cost for changes in elections and by-elections. De Klerk’s involvement in 
the 1982 skeuring51 made him aware of the need for such pre-emptive action, and the use 
of the referendum in navigating this difficult period in the NP’s history, especially in the 
Transvaal, provided de Klerk with invaluable insights into how the referendum could be 
used to demonstrate the limit of support for the CP. This support was distorted by the 
existing electoral system.
The Vasco and Ceres by-elections:
A first indication of the disapproval amongst Whites at the post-September 1989 reforms 
and de Klerk’s reform talk was provided as early as November 1989 in the Vasco and 
Ceres by-elections, shortly after the general elections. Though the NP easily held these 
seats in the traditional NP stronghold of the Cape, the CP gained five percent in Ceres and 
13 percent in Vasco. Commenting on the results, The Argus’s Tos Wentzel suggested that 
they demonstrated that there were 'serious misgivings among White voters who are 
potential National Party supporters about the moves to establish open residential areas and 
to open beaches and the proposed scrapping of the Separate Amenities Act.'52 Die Burger
47 Die Beeld. 6 June 1990.
48 Die Beeld. 30 November 1991.
49 The Sunday Star. 16 February 1992, Die Vrve Weekblad. 21-27 February 1992; Johann van Rooyen., 
Hard Right. The New White Power in South Africa (London. 1994), pp. 147, 149.
50 Die Vrve Weekblad. 21-27 February 1992.
51 The word skeuring literally means split or cleavage and refers to the 1982 split within the party, when 17 
sitting MPs left the NP to form the Conservative Party over reforms to co-opt so-called Coloureds and 
Indians. The skeuring is discussed in some detail in chapter nine.
52 The Argus. 1 December 1989.
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reluctantly acknowledged that the results were a 'disappointment' for the party as these 
were traditional NP strongholds, and suggested that the reforms, the release of security 
prisoners and the Namibian election result were to blame. The Cape Party leader David 
de Villiers, however, found comfort in the fact that turnout in Vasco had been low. 
According to Tos Wentzel, the poor turnout indicated disaffection amongst traditional NP 
supporters.54
These early reforms, however, paled in significance when compared to the 
February 1990 un-banning of the opposition and the release of Mandela and other political 
prisoners. Hence, each of the ensuing by-elections would provide the CP with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its claim that the NP no longer represented the volk and 
pressurise the government to hold elections. Fortunately for the NP, there was a lull in 
these by-elections until June 1990, when the CP was provided with an opportunity raise 
vexing questions about the legitimacy of de Klerk’s reforms. By May 1990 the early 
enthusiasm for reform and optimism was replaced by niggling doubts, as the NP-led 
process lost momentum. And there were growing signs that the CP and its extra- 
parliamentary allies were mobilising increased support against a backdrop of uncertainty 
over the process, a worsening economy and mounting domestic violence. On 26 May 
1990, the CP attracted between 60,000 to 100,000 (probably 70,000) supporters to 
volksgvergadering (peoples rally) in Pretoria.55 Speaking at the rally, Andries Treumicht 
demand a new general election. A similar rally in the middle of February 1990 only 
attracted 30,000 people. This period also marked a phase in which the CP and its allies 
increasingly hinted at political violence in order to thwart the reform process. In June 1990 
there were even media reports of a planned coup (leading to the arrest of 11 suspects), and 
the offices of two NP ministers were bombed.56 And Deur Dawie warned that Treumicht 
was becoming a threat.57
The Umlazi by-election:
The potential electoral threat that the CP posed to the NP and its agenda was made clear in 
the Umlazi by-election of 6 June 1990. And the fact that the CP came close to taking a 
seat in a traditional NP constituency, indicated the extent of public disaffection with the
53 Die Burger. Leader, 1 December 1989.
54 Tos Wentzel, The Argus. 30 November and 1 December 1989
55 Die Burger. 28 May 1990.
56 Gavin Bell, The Times. 25 June 1990.
57 Deur Dawie, Die Burger. 30 May 1990.
86
NP and uncertainty over the process. The NP's majority was trimmed from 2,835 votes in
c o
1989 to 547 votes; representing a 23 percent swing in favour of the CP. It was the largest 
anti-NP swing in any by-election since the party had come to power in 1948.59 And the 
party only secured the seat thanks to support from DP voters who abandoned their 
candidate. What added to the significance of this defeat was the fact that 70 percent of the 
constituents were English speakers.
Despite de Klerk’s claim that by-elections do not reflect a dramatic change in 
public opinion, Die Burger was less sanguine and described the near loss of one of its 
safest seats as a setback for reform.60 Political analysts attributed the near defeat to the 
government’s failure to explain its reforms to Whites and the CP’s concerted effort in the 
by-election. Die Burger also noted that the Natal violence and the socio-economic profile 
of the constituency contributed to the CP’s success.61 Similarly, Die Beeld put a brave face 
on things and suggested that one could not expect a good result in the light of the 
government’s reforms. The paper also highlighted local factors that explained the defeat,
fS)and argued that 'by-elections are often escape valves for anger.'
Commenting on the result, one foreign correspondent warned, 'If the Natal poll 
result were repeated in a general election, President de Klerk's National Party, which has 
ruled since 1948, would be swept from power by the rightwing.' Die Beeld, however, 
suggested that there was no correlation between by-election results and the outcome of 
general elections.64 Nevertheless, the result added new momentum to growing rightwing 
opposition to reform, and gave credence to its claims that de Klerk did not have a 
mandate. The message of the by-election, to both the ANC and the NP, opined Die Vrye 
Weekblad, was that White support for negotiations 'could no longer be taken for granted.'65
Buoyed by the CP’s Umlazi success, Koos van de Merwe challenged President de 
Klerk to call a referendum or a general election in order to secure a mandate to negotiate 
with the ANC and the SACP and the acceptance of the principle that a Black could 
become president. Both, according to van der Merwe, were at variance with his 1989 
mandate. Van der Merwe added that in 'making the reforms irreversible at this early stage,' 
the NP was 'making the role of the referendum irrelevant.' Accordingly, CP backbenchers
58 Die Burger. 8 June 1990.
59 Hennie Serfontein, Die Vrve Weekblad. 8 June 1990.
60 Die Burger. Leader, 8 June 1990.
61 Die Burger. 8 June 1990.
62 Die Beeld. Leader, 8 June 1990.
63 Gavin Bell, The Times. 8 June 1990.
64 Die Beeld. Leader, 8 June 1990.
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Jan Hoon and Koos van der Merwe charged that the proposed referendum was 'a political 
deception.'66 De Klerk denied these charges, noting that a referendum would only be held 
before introducing a new constitution. The CP speakers explicitly pushed for an election, 
no doubt aware that they were less likely to win a referendum.
Commenting on de Klerk’s reassurances that he would honour his undertaking to 
stage a referendum, Die Burger opined that the president had addressed charges that the 
process was a 'done deal, which would be forced upon Whites.' The paper also noted that 
de Klerk’s pledge demonstrated the NP’s 'determination' to negotiate a deal that would be 
acceptable to the majority of Whites. The paper further added that acceptance of the 
referendum would legitimate 'tough actions against individuals and institutions that wish
7to oppose the new constitution by violent means, without any moral basis.' Days later, 
Gerrit Viljoen echoed claimed Klerk’s argument that the referendum would only follow 
the conclusion of negotiations, arguing that a referendum before a draft constitution would 
compromise negotiations. The government contmued to consider it appropriate to stage 
the referendum after a constitution had been negotiated until January 1992, and this was 
how the party perceived the referendum in the initial transition script.
The Umlazi by-election had clearly demonstrated the danger of delays in the 
process for the NP, and, what de Klerk had feared of by-elections. By-elections, over 
which de Klerk had little control, were the one variable that threatened the de Klerk game 
plan and the referendum remained a key tool for the NP to assuage Whites about the road 
ahead. It was also too early to deploy it. To do so would undermine the credibility of the 
NP and would, at a stage where there were not yet formal talks, be of limited political 
value. Besides, there was no guarantee that a referendum, especially if held too early, 
would indeed weaken the CP and provide lasting legitimacy for negotiations. A modicum 
of progress in the transition process was desperately required. And, not for the first time in 
the process, the ANC came to the NP’s rescue in order to strengthen its negotiating partner 
by agreeing to the Pretoria Minute and giving vital momentum to the process.69
65 Die Vrve Weekblad. Leader, 8 June 1990.
66 Hansard. 12 June 1990, Columns 1711,1713 and 1720; Die Burger. 12, 13 June 1990.
67 Die Burger. Leader, 14 June 1990.
68 Die Burger. 22 June 1990; Deur Dawie, Die Burger. 23 June 1990.
69 Hennie van Deventer recounts that Thabo Mbeki informed Prof. Dirk du Toit in early 1991 that it ’is not in 
the interest o f the ANC to weaken his [de Klerk] power base.' Hennie van Deventer, Kroniek van ‘n 
Koerantman (Welgemoed, 1998), p. 150.
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The Pretoria Minute:
Despite assumptions of a swift process, the NP saw precious little progress in negotiations 
or significant rewards for its blitz six months after Mandela’s release. The absence of 
tangible progress and growing uncertainty, in part, explain the CP’s Umlazi success and 
growing opposition to the reform process. One of the key reasons for scant progress, 
largely of de Klerk’s own making, was the NP’s demand that the ANC foreswear 
violence. The Pretoria Minute, which in effect constituted a unilateral suspension of the 
armed struggle, was a ANC gesture designed to strengthen de Klerk, increasing pressure 
from the CP on this issue.70 Besides, Mandela’s gesture, which broke the existing 
deadlock, was also part of a concerted effort by the ANC to seek to regain the initiative 
from de Klerk.71
The Pretoria Minute, like the Groote Schuur Minute, constituted a 'first order 
understanding' or pact72 between the ANC and NP on pre-negotiations.73 Additional pacts 
reached along the way included: the Laboria Minute of 1991 (on labour issues), the 
Record of Understanding of September 1992 on banning the carrying of traditional 
weapons and the power-sharing deal of February 1993. The latter was the most explicit 
elite pact, though limited to power sharing for the first five years only.
Emboldened by the signing of the Pretoria Minute, on 7 August 1990, de Klerk 
sought to reassure the public that the NP had ceased the initiative.74 And he set forth two 
'no’s' that would guide his negotiations. The first 'nay' was to a constitution that does not 
give 'due recognition to the essential rights of Whites -  or any other group.' His second no
nc
was to the introduction of a new constitution without a referendum. Both 'no’s' were 
clearly designed to assuage White public opinion at a time of uncertainty.
Fortuitously the Pretoria Minute was signed just ahead of the NP’s annual 
conference season, allowing de Klerk to set out his party’s agenda to the party faithful 
along with some signs of progress. Buoyed by the ANC’s unilateral gesture, de Klerk 
informed the Cape NP conference that a new constitution would be completed prior to the 
next general election. Noteworthy in this speech was de Klerk’s indication that the NP
70 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f a Miracle. The End o f Apartheid and the Birth o f the New South Africa. 
(New York, London, 1997), pp. 165-166.
71 Ibid. p. 165.
72 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986: 25, 38, 70-71) define a pact as a 'negotiated 
compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilise their capacity to harm each other by extending 
guarantees not threaten each others’ corporate autonomies or vital interest.'
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 160.
74 Die Burger. 9 August 1990.
75 PV 912,4/1/1.
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n f i  •government was 'determined not to waste time,' hinting at the NP’s desire for a speedy 
negotiating process. At that point in time, twenty months had passed since Mandela’s 
release and the two leading protagonists were deadlocked, holding two diametrically 
opposed positions on negotiations and their outcome. Whereas the NP sought a
77commitment to power sharing, the ANC stuck to its commitment to majority rule.
The NP, though, was still convinced that it could control the flow of events. In mid 
November 1990 de Klerk’s then chief negotiator Gerrit Viljoen noted that, as the 
'manager' of the negotiations, the government had the 'right and is even committed to test 
the decisions of the negotiating forum.' Viljoen added that the proposed referendum 
would ensure the 'acceptability and legitimacy, as well as the democratic confirmation and
70
endorsement of the process.' Viljoen’s comments reflect a continued confidence in the 
NP’s ability to command the process, and came only days after the year’s second by- 
election in the Transvaal constituency of Randburg. The Randburg vote, which saw the 
current New National Party (NNP) leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk enter national 
politics, indicated the positive impact of the Pretoria Minute on the NP’s standing, as it 
retained the seat with a comfortable majority. The CP, though more than doubling its vote,
70was soundly defeated, and, unlike Umlazi, this by-election created the impression that
OA
the government was faring well. One indication of de Klerk’s post-Randburg confidence 
was a statement dismissing the right wing, noting that it did not have 'significant growth
o  1
potential.' Randburg was however to be followed by three taxing votes in 1991, of which 
two would see the NP defeated. These votes, in turn, led to mounting pressure on the NP 
from the CP and its extra-parliamentary allies.
The Maitland by-election:
In mid-February 1991 de Klerk twice reiterated his commitment to go to voters on a new 
constitution before its implementation. The implication of a 'no' vote -  deemed unlikely by 
de Klerk -  would be a return to the negotiating process. On this occasion, de Klerk 
expressed his confidence that Whites would support the new constitution, as it would
76 Die Burger. 9 October 1990.
77Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country. The Inside Story o f  South Africa’s Road to Change 
(Chicago, 1996), pp. 128-129.
78 PV 9124/1/1.
79 The CP increased its tally from 755 votes to 1969. The DP, which secured the seat in the 1989 elections, 
did not field a candidate. Die Afrikaner. 14 November 1990.
80 Phillip van Niekerk, The Weekly Mail. 9-15 November 1990.
81 Die Vrve Weekblad. 16 November 1990.
82 Die Burger. 16 February 1991.
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contain 'protection for minority rights.' Though such a statement may be construed as an 
attempt to impose the NP’s bottom line, as O’Meara suggests, it is more indicative of de 
Klerk’s cocksureness.
Certain that it could hold onto the Cape Town constituency of Maitland, the NP 
cast the by-election as a vote of confidence on reforms. De Klerk, the winning candidate, 
Minister Louis Pienaar, as well as provincial leader, Davie de Villiers, all presented the 
vote as a mandate for reform. One indication of the importance that de Klerk attached to 
the by-election was his participation in the campaign. Though the party hung on to the 
seat, the CP increased its votes from 441 in 1989 to 3152. The DP, which secured 4749 
votes in 1989, did not contest the seat, and the decision no doubt explained de Klerk’s pre­
vote bullishness and his decision to convert the by-election into a vote of confidence on 
the reform process. In interpreting the result, which it viewed as an achievement, Die 
Burger suggested the imminent repeal of the Land and Group Areas Acts and the
O f
recession accounted for the CP’s good showing. In its comment on the result, Die Beeld, 
interestingly, reminded leaders that the right had in the past mistakenly used the berge by- 
election (to be discussed in the chapter on the 1983 referendum) results to predict a 'no' 
vote in the 1983 referendum. The paper added that whilst support for reform existed, a
o /
strategy was required to articulate that support. The by-election, had yet again served as 
a 'magnifying glass,' and abetted the CP’s campaign to de-legitimise de Klerk and his 
reforms. Die Burger, regardless, dismissed claims that the vote indicated that the CP 
enjoyed the support for the majority of Whites. But as the ensuing Ladybrand by- 
election demonstrated, the referendum promise had stopped working its magic after a year 
of talks about talks. And the defeat in this Free State seat marked the first of three defeats 
in by-elections.
The Ladybrand setback:
The Ladybrand contest was triggered by the death of the serving MP, P.J. van Rhyn, who
o o
narrowly won the seat in the 1989 general elections. On 22 May 1991, the CP overturned 
the result, with its candidate Chari Hertzog securing 6,276 votes, as opposed to the NP
83 Michael Morris, The Argus. 7 March 1991, Die Burger. 7 March 1991.
84 The Argus. Leader, 5 March 1991, Michael Morris, The Argus. 5 March 1991.
85 Die Burger. Leader, 8 March 1991.
86 Leader, 8 March 1991.
87 Die Burger. 8 March 1991.
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candidate, Callie Smit’s 5,018 votes. The turnout was 81,1 percent, and, as had been the
on
case m the earlier by-elections, the DP refrained from fielding a candidate. This defeat 
came despite efforts to exploit the so-called Koos document, authored by backbencher 
Koos van der Merwe, against the CP. The document spoke of partitioning the Free State in 
an effort to create a Volkstaat, and was premised on van der Merwe’s understanding that 
the party could not win a referendum.90
In its post-election analysis the local Free State daily, Die Volksblad, reassured its 
readers that the President would win a referendum after negotiations were completed, and 
noted that the referendum would prove that the CP was largely irrelevant. The State 
President similarly dismissed the result, and jested that Koos van der Merwe was correct 
when he predicted that the CP could not win a referendum.91 Die Beeld echoed such 
assessments, opining that, 'the reform supporters will comfortably win a referendum, 
despite Ladysmith, as the CP’s Koos van der Merwe himself predicts.'92 These comments 
confirm that the party had all along planned to hold the vote at this point in the transition 
process. Moreover, they suggest that the referendum pledge serve as a resource for 
'damage control,' in order to play down the by-election result and dismiss CP claims that 
the government did not have a mandate.
In an interview with Rapport ahead of the 1992 referendum, de Klerk interestingly 
noted that a referendum would 'strengthen his hands,' and restore 'the situation to what it 
was prior to Ladybrand.'93 This revelation seems to affirm the importance that de Klerk 
attributed to this particular defeat in the context of the transition. With the notable 
exception of this reference to the referendum, very few pronouncements were to follow in 
1991 until the CODESA talks approached. The suspension of ANC-govemment contacts 
during a part of this period, as a result of the third force violence, provides one 
explanation for the absence of references to a referendum. With the prospect of multi­
party constitutional negotiations looming, the referendum assumed a new meaning and 
served a new role for the NP and de Klerk.
88 In the election the NP candidate had received 5,805 votes as against the CP candidate (A.S. van der 
Merwe) who secured 5,735 votes. A Democratic Party candidate (J.P. Hughes) secured 471 votes. The 
turnout was 86,8%. Die Volksblad. 9 May 1991.
89 Die Volksblad. 23 May 1991.
90 Die Volksblad. 1 and 2 May 1991.
91 Leader, Die Volksblad. 23 May 1991.
92 Leader, Die Beeld. 24 May 1991.
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Towards CODES A:
It was indeed only in early September 1991 that de Klerk reiterated his government’s 
commitment to honour its pledge to test opinion on the new constitution. Addressing the 
NP’s Federal Congress in Bloemfontein, he also indicated his certainty that the 
government would win a referendum and prove that the CP did not represent the majority 
that it claimed. De Klerk also rejected CP calls for a new general election.94 Viljoen, 
speaking in late October 1991, reiterated the government’s commitment to only 
implement a constitution once it received a mandate through a referendum.95
In an interview with Die Vrye Weekblad ahead of the conference, the NP’s 
secretary general Stoffel van der Merwe belaboured the Party leadership’s referendum 
pledge and conceded that it could no longer backtrack on its pledge to submit the new 
constitution to the electorate in a referendum.96 As with Botha in 1982, a referendum 
promise.no doubt also served to ensure acceptance of the NP’s negotiations plan at the 
federal and provincial congresses. The NP leadership reduced the salience of the issue, 
thereby neutralising potential resistance to its proposals at the conference, through the 
referendum pledge. And as was the case with the 1983 referendum, there was no escaping 
the referendum after so many pledges had been made.
One critical difference, though, between the two leaders and their reform processes 
was that de Klerk enjoyed a greater modicum of party unity than his predecessor had. The 
Federal Conference held in Bloemfontein, only four months ahead of the opening of 
CODESA, was a key event that allowed the government to present its constitutional 
blueprint to the party faithful. Some of the NP’s key proposals included a three-tier 
government structure, including local, regional and national government. The NP further 
proposed a legislature composed of two houses: a lower house based on proportional 
representation and a second chamber in which the key political parties and the nine 
regions of the proposed federation were to be represented. Regional representation was 
also to be determined on the basis of proportional representation. This second house 
would have effective veto power over the democratically elected lower house. The party 
also proposed a 'collective' executive comprising representatives of the three leading
07parties and further called for a rotatmg presidency.
93 Rapport. 23 February 1992.
94 PV 912,4/1/1.
95 Ibid.
96 Die Vrve Weekblad. 30 August to 5 September 1991.
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The key ingredients of the proposed NP package borrowed heavily from Arend
• QOLijphart’s consociational thinking, and sought to blunt the full impact of democracy. The 
ANC rejected the NP’s package as a 'calculated plan' to undermine the results of an 
election based on one person one vote and render a democratically elected central 
government ineffectual." A subsequent ANC statement described the proposals as 'no less 
than an attempt to disguise an effective minority veto, designed to prevent effective 
government by a majority party.'100 Commenting on these proposals at the time, 
Stellenbosch economist Sampie Terreblanche noted that to 'pretend that the NP plan 
corresponds with the basic ideas of democracy is pure fraud.'101
The Virginia by-election:
The NP’s defeat in the Virginia by-election, just weeks ahead of the opening of the 
CODESA yet again proved the CP’s ability to focus its efforts and limited resources on 
by-elections, and tap into local concerns, in order to send a message to the broader White 
community. The NP’s slender majority of 47 votes from the 1989 elections was easily 
dissolved with the swing of 7,8 percent in favour of the CP. The by-election marked parity 
between the CP and the NP in the conservative Orange Free State, as each party now held 
seven seats. Deur Dawie, who lamented the CP gains in a traditional stronghold, warned 
that the CP was successfully harnessing fears of Black domination and disapproval over 
the ailing economy with 'distressing' success.102 The message from Virginia was that de 
Klerk did not necessarily represent Whites. Die Afrikaner, for example, viewed the result
•  1 mas 'a clear motion of no confidence in the government and its policy.' And going into 
CODESA, the NP’s second consecutive by-election defeat, despite a further referendum 
pledge on an interim constitution,104 weakened de Klerk by raising doubts about his ability 
to deliver. The provincial leader Kobie Coetsee blamed the defeat on local factors, 
especially layoffs at the local mines, local violence, and the poor state of the economy.105 
Die Beeld also highlighted local factors in explaining the defeat.106 Dirk Laurie, a political
98 Marinus Wiechers to Die Vrve Weekblad. 30 August to 5 September 1991; See Michael Macdonald 
(1992) and Michael Macdonald and Wilmot James (1993) for an exposition o f  de Klerk's consociational 
stratagem and the influence o f the work o f Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart on the NP.
99 Die Vrve Weekblad. 30 August to 5 September 1991.
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101 Sampie Terreblanche, Die Vrve Weekblad. 3 December 1991 to 10 January 1992.
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103 Die Afrikaner. Leader, 11 December 1991.
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105 Die Beeld. 30 November 1991: Die Burger. 30 November 1991, Rapport. 1 December 1991.
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analyst interviewed by Die Burger warned that the Virginia result confirmed that the CP
107could secure a majority of 10 -  12 seats in a general election.
Despite the mounting pressure for a referendum or general election, the latter was 
effectively ruled out by the NP’s repeated referendum pledges. And holding a referendum 
ahead of the CODESA talks would be bad timing. According to comments made by the 
NP’s Secretary General, Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe, in December the party had planned to
10Rstage such a vote in the latter half of 1992, following initial progress in the negotiations. 
Interestingly, van der Merwe had earlier noted that a September vote, three years after the 
last general election, was the 'ideal time to yet again test feelings, and the NP would like 
something specific with which to go to the voters.'109 In the parliamentary debate 
following the June 1990 Umlazi by-election de Klerk, similarly, noted that the party 
would stage the referendum once the negotiations had produced a constitution. This 
decision to hold the vote in the second half of 1992 remained unchanged as late as mid- 
January 1992,110 despite the defeat in the Virginia race. This suggests that political elites 
do not call referenda in response to a single development, but only after careful and long 
consideration, although specific political events, like defeat in a by-election, may 
determine its timing.
Rethinking the referendum:
With the CODESA talks approaching, the NP’s existing view of the referendum as a veto 
to placate Whites gradually began to evolve. And the NP now began to hint that the 
outcome of the negotiations should be designed in order to secure a positive result in the 
promised referendum. In other words, the referendum came to be viewed as an instrument 
to constrain the ANC’s demands at the negotiating table. In his address at the opening of 
the CODESA talks de Klerk stated; 'If the proposals in respect of transitional measures are 
fair to all, the response from every section of the population will be an overwhelming 
'Yes."111 A few weeks earlier, de Klerk had similarly noted that a 'yes' result in a 
referendum would be made possible if voters were presented with a package that 
'guaranteed long-term stability, participation for all without the oppression of minorities
107 Die Burger. 30 November 1991.
108 Rapport. 1 December 1991.
109 Die Burger. 25 November 1991.
1,0 Anne Marie Mischke, Rapport. 19 January 1992.
111 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 184, F.W. de Klerk speech on the occasion o f the launch o f the CODESA 
talks, 20 December 1991.
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[Whites].'112 In a similar vein, Gerrit Viljoen hinted in January 1992 that the referendum 
was to be viewed as a 'challenge' to overcome, and not an 'obstacle,' as the ANC claimed. 
Viljoen informed parliament that a 'well marketable product' was required to do so.
Dr. Stoffel van der Merwe’s post-Virginia referendum pronouncement also 
suggests that the NP was adapting its referendum thinking in order to address the new 
challenges it faced in the negotiations process. Van der Merwe, also a graduate of the 
1983 referendum, hinted that the planned referendum could serve to legitimise interim 
measures en-route to a new constitution.114 De Klerk also made this clear in his references 
to the referendum at the opening of CODESA and on the occasion of the opening of 
parliament in early 1992.115 The idea of holding a referendum on a transitional 
government reflected a growing NP interest in such an interim period, premised on a pact 
of sorts. The growing interest in a referendum on an interim dispensation probably also 
reflected the dual understanding that the ANC would not accept a referendum on the final 
deal, effectively giving Whites a veto, and mounting fears that too long a delay until the 
referendum would make a positive outcome less likely.
A referendum for all?
De Klerk’s CODESA statements suggest that the referendum was gradually being viewed 
as a form of leverage in NP-ANC negotiations, and that such pronouncements only served 
to unsettle the ANC, which increasingly came to view the referendum as a hindrance. The 
oft-made pledge to give White South Africans a final say over the new constitution, 
therefore, emerged as a source of tension between the ANC and the government. Taken at 
face value, the previous NP statements on the referendum could hardly have been 
understood as anything else. On the occasion of the opening of the 1992 parliamentary 
session, the leader of the opposition, Andries Treumicht raised a question that many in the 
ANC were raising at the time, namely, how the government would 'justify a White veto' of 
the CODESA talks, guilefully referred to as 'Condemnsa' by Treumicht.116 Responding to 
such criticism, Gerrit Viljoen insisted that a referendum would 'clearly be about the 
acceptability of an already negotiated and agreed-upon draft constitutional change. Voters 
will have to vote yes or no with regard to accepting such a published and publicly debated
112 Die Burger. 26 November 1991.
113 Hansard. 27 January 1992, Column 97.
114 Die Burger. 25 November 1991.
115 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 184; Hansard. 24 January 1992, Column 36-37.
1,6 Hansard. 27 January 1992, Column 82.
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draft constitutional amendment.'117 De Klerk’s failure to honour this pledge would be held 
against him by his post-transition critics.
This tension with the ANC might explain the government’s increasing reference to 
a referendum for other population groups. The first hint of a referendum for all South 
Africans came from Gerrit Viljoen in early June 1990, in an interview granted to Agence 
France Press.118 And as the CODESA talks drew nearer, Viljoen proposed an open 
referendum for all population groups, yet insisted that the support from each particular 
group -  especially Whites -  would be counted separately.119 De Klerk and his chief 
negotiator clearly viewed the idea of a referendum for all as a new means to justify the 
White referendum, reasoning that it blurred the patent racial connotation of the all-White 
referendum. To add credibility to the broader referendum, in which White votes would 
still be counted separately, de Klerk suggested to the CODESA delegates that the 
electorate of the three existing houses -  Coloureds, Indians and Whites would have to 
approve the new constitution. And, in late January 1992, three weeks before calling the 
referendum, de Klerk pointed out that the government was 'honour bound to hold a 
referendum which will offer the electorates of each of the three Houses of Parliament the 
opportunity to express themselves,' on the new constitution. De Klerk went as far as to 
suggest a referendum amongst Blacks on this occasion. According to de Klerk support for 
the new constitution would be counted both horizontally and vertically, per population 
group.120 Gerrit Viljoen made four important statements regarding a referendum in 
January 1992, all of which were intended to deflect ANC claims that the referendum 
constituted a White veto. Viljoen was again at pains to point out that the referendum was 
not an 'obstacle,' but rather a 'challenge.'121 Moreover, the NP suddenly displayed a 
newfound concern with the legitimacy of the future constitution, suggesting that an all- 
South African referendum would furnish such legitimacy. Viljoen was also anxious to 
distinguish between a White referendum, as promised to the White electorate in 1989, and 
a referendum for the rest of the country. In separate comments made at the same time he 
informed the NP’s internal newspaper that it 'goes without saying, of course, that it [the 
constitution] must also have the support of the majority of Blacks. Should even the
117 Hansard. 27 January 1992, Column 97.
118 Dir Burger. 16 June 1990.
119 PV 912,4/1/1.
120 Hansard. 24 January 1992, Columns 37-38.
121 PV 912,4/1/1.
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majority of Zulus be against a proposed new dispensation it would be a bad start -  a recipe 
for failure.'122
De Klerk’s February 1992 decision to stage a Whites only referendum, ahead of
10 lschedule and a final or interim deal, resolved this tension with the ANC. The irony is 
that de Klerk, who had so often remarked that he was 'honour bound' to consult the voters 
of the two other houses, did not do so. When asked to explain why, de Klerk contends that 
the White constituency was the only one that opposed his reforms. 124The ANC’s eventual 
decision to make space for de Klerk to run the all White referendum, despite severe 
misgivings over such a vote, demonstrated its strategic and tactical brilliance and its 
political maturity. For the ANC appreciated a referendum as a 'strategy to defeat -  once 
and for all -  the right wing through the ballot box.'126 More importantly, the ANC
1 77recognised that it was in its interest to deal with a strong negotiating partner. For this
reason, it not only consented to the NP’s war of manoeuvre with the CP, but also had
1^0
hardliner figures like Chris Hani call on Whites to vote yes. And leading White ANC 
and SACP activists, like Jeremy Cronin, voted yes in the referendum.
The referendum and CODESA:
The very nature of the CODESA talks and the later referendum are viewed as being 
consonant with, and the result of, de Klerk’s strong desire to keep the moral 'high ground' 
during the negotiations. Securocrats who worked with P.W. Botha attribute the transparent 
nature of the CODESA talks, which a was marked departure from Botha’s secretive talks, 
to his desire to pander to the international community and maintain the high ground. This 
was in order to apply international pressure on the ANC, in the hope that they would make 
mistakes and moderate their demands. A September 1989 Die Burger leader, which 
opined that transparent negotiations could benefit the government after years of secret 
negotiations, confirms Thirion’s account. The paper noted that transparent talks would
122 Nasionalis/ Nationalist. Volume 11: Number 2 (February 1992).
123 Marina Ottaway, South Africa. The Struggle for a New Order (Washington D.C., 1993), p. 161.
124 Interview with F.W. de Klerk (21 November 2002).
125 Die Vrve Weekblad. 14-20 February 1992.
126 Die Vrve Weekblad. 28 February -  5 March 1992.
127 Interview with Vali Moosa (29 November 2001).
128 Die Vrve Weekblad. 28 February -  5 February 1992. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The 
Autobiography o f Nelson Mandela (London, 1994), p. 590.
129 Interview with Chris Thirion (29 November 2001), Sampie Terreblanche, The Cape Times. 5 February
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serve as a 'stimulus for the entire process,' and ensure that the finger of blame would not 
be pointed at the government if, and when, there were delays in the negotiations.
The government’s blitz offensive did initially unsettle and surprise the ANC, and 
Willie Esterhuyse, who was sent to brief the ANC exiled leadership in London, notes that 
Aziz Pahad’s reaction to the 2 February 1990 speech was that de Klerk had 'pulled the
i - i i
carpet from under the ANC’s feet.' De Klerk did not, though, appreciate the full
1 ^implications of what he set in motion on 2 February 1990, and whilst he managed to 
maintain the high ground until the opening of CODES A on 20 December 1991, the 
transparent nature of the talks was to lay him bare to an ignominious humiliation at the 
hands of Nelson Mandela.
The agreed format of the talks was that Mandela would open the CODESA 
deliberations, whilst de Klerk would conclude proceedings. In his address, de Klerk called 
on the ANC to end its armed struggle and condemned it for failing to disclose arms caches 
and disband its armed wing. 'Regrettably,' de Klerk noted, 'from the Government’s point 
of view, there is one major obstacle in the way of rapid progress within CODESA.'133 De 
Klerk’s robust speech, which was probably designed to placate White fears, however, 
enraged the ANC. A seething Mandela rose to rebuff de Klerk’s charges, retorting that de 
Klerk was the head of'an illegitimate, discredited minority regime.'134
Mandela’s response constituted the most dramatic loss of face that a single 
Afrikaner leader had ever suffered. Die Burger, which described the incident as a 'head on 
collision,' of course, sought to suggest that it was Mandela who destroyed the 'pretence 
that he was a unifying national figure.' And the paper submitted to its readers that de Klerk 
was the better man by not responding to the 'character assassination.' A more candid Pik 
Botha, though, informed the CODESA audience that the Mandela comments hurt the NP 
government. Die Beeld was far brusquer, and in a leader, entitled, 'First Shock,' it
1^7conceded that the incident had undermined de Klerk amongst White voters. 
Commenting on Mandela’s response, Patti Waldmeier notes that the 'aura of power which 
had cloaked Afrikaner leaders for the best part of fifty years began to dissipate that day.
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The balance of power which had weighed so heavily in his [de Klerk’s] favour since 
February 1990, began subtly to shift.'138 In no less dramatic terms, both Tim du Plessis and 
Ken Owen suggest that it was at the opening of CODESA that it dawned upon F.W. de 
Klerk that he could not control events.139 Owen adds that from this point on, de Klerk lost 
his sure touch, deftness, skill and confidence in the transition process. De Klerk was 'on 
the retreat.'140
Both Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche, claim that the referendum was 
in response to this incident at the CODESA opening.141 Esterhuyse argues that the 
referendum allowed de Klerk to re-establish his authority and regain the initiative he had 
lost at CODESA.142 Though de Klerk denies this suggestion,143 his referendum campaign 
would suggest otherwise. For, it was a US-style Presidential campaign and focussed 
heavily on selling de Klerk.144 One possible explanation for this campaign is that the NP 
may have wanted to distil the choice to one between de Klerk, the moderate, and 
Treumicht, the reactionary. Rapport described de Klerk as the NP’s most sellable 
product,145 and the referendum literature recognises the salience of the 'leadership 
effect'146 in campaigns. The nature of the campaign does, however, hint at a longer-term 
agenda, and it seems likely that the NP’s referendum campaign might have also had the 
1994 elections in mind.
Brigadier (Ret.) Bill Sass suggests that in order to maintain the support of the 
international community de Klerk had to produce 'gimmicks’ to sustain the process and 
convince them that he was committed to reform. The referendum, according to Sass, then 
served as one such gimmick, which showed that the public was behind him.147 Support for 
this idea also comes from Tim du Plessis, who suggests that the referendum also served to
138 Patti Waldmeier, Anatomy o f a Miracle, p. 191.
139 Interview (28 November 2001).
140 Interview (10 December 2002).
141 Interview with Willie Esterhuyse (30 October 2001); Die Vrve Weekblad. 28 February -  5 March 1992.
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and Ireland’s 1995 divorce referendum (Adshead: 1996, 141). Robert Worcester (2000: 7, 13) argues that 
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'buy de Klerk time and give him international recognition and goodwill.'148 Tellingly, de 
Klerk noted that there is 'growing international support, specifically for those fundamental 
points of departure which are part of the mandate we obtained in the referendum,' in 
comments made after the vote.149 Ultimately, though, the referendum was primarily used 
to stem the momentum of the CP, which after three by-election victories undermined de 
Klerk’s negotiating ability and his claim to speak for Whites in negotiations. In his 
revealing Rapport interview prior to the referendum, the President added that the CP was 
determined to create the impression that his hand was weakened at the negotiating table, 
and de Klerk argued that 'without a referendum, I believe, this idea will do further 
damage.' De Klerk added that he wished to address the oft-made claim that he did not have 
a mandate.150
'Shock therapy,' de Klerk deploys the referendum:
As already noted, the CP gains in the post-1989 by-elections countered general trends of 
increased liberalisation in White attitudes, instead reflecting White uncertainty over the 
process and disaffection with the poor state of the economy, the crippling drought rising 
crime and violence, as well as particular local concerns. Whilst the NP managed to explain 
the Ladybrand and Virginia defeats, the CP’s third consecutive by-election gain, in 
Potchefstroom on 17 February 1992, was presented as yet further evidence that de Klerk 
did not have a mandate for negotiations. In addition, the result seemed to confirm 
mounting speculation that the CP could quite easily win a general election. For some it 
represented yet another Wakkerstroom, a cue that defeat in a general election was 
likely.151 Wakkerstroom had on two previous occasions provided for historical by- 
elections, prior to the 1924 and 1948 general elections, which on each occasion signalled 
Smuts’s impending defeat.
The significance of the Potchefstroom seat, which had been previously held by 
former Minister of Law and Order and Speaker of the Parliament, Louis Le Grange, lay in 
the fact that it had historically been an NP safe-seat. The importance of Potchefstroom was 
also derived from the fact that it was a major middle class town which was neither
147 Interview (23 November 2001).
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149 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 190. F.W. de Klerk, Budget Vote Debate, 23 April 1992.
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dependent on mining, as had been the case in Virginia, or agriculture, as had been the case 
with Ladybrand. Moreover, the town housed a significant student population, drawn from 
a wide catchment area. Symbolically, the local university was one of the leading Afrikaans 
universities and had been instrumental in the emergence and propagation of Christian 
Nationalism. De Klerk had studied there and served as the University’s rector.
In his own account of the South African transition de Klerk suggests that the defeat
at Potchefstroom brought home the point that 'the National Party and I could not continue
with the negotiations without a democratic endorsement of our policies.'152 De Klerk
1 ^similarly focused on the issue of CP gains in an interview granted to The Sunday Times 
and Rapport154 the weekend after the Potchefstroom by-election. The NP’s internal 
newspaper also indicated that the key objective of the referendum was dispelling CP 
claims that the party did not have a mandate.155
Three by-election defeats in succession forced de Klerk to 'swing Whites behind' 
him,156 and demonstrate his ability to deliver to the ANC.157 Moreover, he was certain that 
Whites supported his reforms,158 and well aware that a referendum was the only 
democratic endorsement he could safely assume.159 A referendum was, as one journalist 
noted, a 'mismatch,'160 which forced the CP to into 'a test of strength on a terrain and at a 
time' of de Klerk’s choosing.161 Even on an 18 percent swing, as was the case in the 
Virginia by-election, the NP would win a referendum. This did not, though, hold true 
for a general election.
Whilst de Klerk informed Rapport and The Star that he had for 'some time 
considered a referendum,' Leon Wessels notes that the NP’s Cape leader Dawie de 
Villiers had warned de Klerk that defeat at Potchefstroom was likely. Wessels suggests 
that it was, in fact, David de Villiers who proposed that the NP administer a dose of'shock
152 F.W. De Klerk, The Last Trek -  A New Beginning. The Autobiography (London, 1998), p. 231.
153 The Sunday Times. 23 February 1992.
154 Rapport. 23 February 1992.
155 Nasionalis/ Nationalist. 11,2, February 1992; De Klerk also addressed the issue o f CP misrepresentation 
in the Parliament on 17, 18 and 20 April. Hansard. 17 April 1992, Column 6526, Die Burger. 17, 21 April
1992.
156 Interview with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002).
157 Interviews with Neil Barnard (5 December 2002) and Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).
158 Interviews with Dave Stewart (12 December 2001) and Max du Preez (27 November 2001).
159 The Star. 21 February 1992; Patrick Laurence, The Sowetan. 3 March 1992.
160 The Sunday Star. 1 March 1992.
161 Patrick Laurence, The Sowetan. 3 March 1992.
162 David Breier, The Star. 23 February 1992.
163 Rapport. 23 February 1992, The Star. 23 February 1992.
102
therapy' by calling a referendum at that point in time. Wessels adds that the Cape leader’s 
role is not adequately recognised.164
The CP 'bogey* laid to rest:
On the morning of 18 February 1992, de Klerk informed the NP caucus that he was going 
to call a referendum and he reportedly presented his caucus with two alternatives to the 
referendum after the Potchefstroom defeat, a general election or sweating it out.165 There 
was very little debate, as the NP caucus traditionally did not make major decisions of this 
nature. There are, nonetheless, suggestions that there were some legislators, in the shocked 
caucus, who had misgivings over the sagacity of calling a referendum, believing the 
government should wait for conditions to improve.166 De Klerk, in fact, believes that that
1A 7the caucus been able to vote on the issue, they would have voted against a referendum. 
The speed of the announcement following the by-election defeat reinforces the 
interpretation that de Klerk had some time to mull over the decision beforehand. Besides, 
the longer de Klerk dithered over deploying the referendum the more support the NP 
would lose.168
The CP’s claims that de Klerk had no mandate for his participation in CODESA -  
reinforced by three by-election defeats -  not only undermined de Klerk’s legitimacy and 
ability to effectively negotiate,169 but also encouraged growing support amongst his
1 7ftopponents for violent resistance to his reforms. And as de Klerk had 'wrong footed' the 
ANC in February 1990, he now caught the CP, who were still celebrating their 
Potchefstroom victory, unawares by calling a snap referendum. By setting the date of the 
vote for less than a month after the Potchefstroom by-election, de Klerk ensured a brief -  
22 day long -  campaign. The date was, to some extent, dictated by the existing political 
timetable, as the NP was anxious to stage the referendum prior to announcing an
171unpopular budget on 18 March. The deft move was made possible by the fact that 
legislation for a referendum, introduced in 1983 by de Klerk, was already in place.
One unanticipated benefit of the referendum for de Klerk was the split within the 
CP over a boycott. Whilst moderates supported participation, hardliners, who constituted
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the majority on the party’s executive, at first, carried a vote for a boycott. The moderates, 
who were more preponderant in the caucus, forced a caucus vote, which reversed the 
executive’s earlier decision. Though this episode is beyond the scope of this study, it 
should be noted that the moderate wing, which favoured participation in negotiations and 
the pursuit of a White volkstaat, viewed the referendum as an opportunity to territorialise 
opposition to CODESA and support for a volkstaat. A 'no' majority in the Free State, for
177example, was viewed in some circles as expedient in promoting claims for a volkstaat. 
The moderate faction also cautioned that the party would be marginalized by a boycott.
I  'T l
Some moderates sincerely believed that the party could win the referendum. These awry 
assessments were based on public opinion in the conservative rural areas they represented 
and these legislators were, in a sense, victims of the Westminster system.
Hardliners, on the other hand, were cognisant that they would lose the vote and 
hoped that a boycott would undermine the legitimacy of de Klerk’s referendum mandate. 
As the hardliners predicted the CP was indeed no match for the NP machine, succoured by 
the DP, the English and Afrikaans media, the international community and the corporate 
sector. The only pending variable was the scale of the victory, 67 percent, which seems to 
have surprised even the NP leadership.174
t 75The overwhelming 'Yes' majority delivered a 'knockout blow' to the CP and 
effectively ended White politics. And as de Klerk anticipated, the referendum exposed the 
right wing’s lack of broad public support, at most 30 percent, and graphically 
demonstrated the distortion that the by-elections and the Westminster (first-past-the-post) 
system had produced. Moreover, the CP’s opposition to reform -  implied by the question - 
exposed the fact that it did not offer an alternative.176 The defeat of the right in the 
referendum ensured that only two alternatives remained open to the defeated right, 
participation in CODESA, in order to secure a volkstaat, or rebellion,177 thus splitting the
1 78right between the so called 'soft right' and the hard right.' And in the aftermath of the 
referendum, the pragmatic wing of the party, under Andries Beyers split to form the 
Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU), which along with Carel Boshoff and Ferdi Hartzenberg of the 
CP joined the Kempton Park negotiations. The marginalization and radicalisation of a tiny
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170element of the right, as some commentators warned, was demonstrated by the 
assassination of SACP leader Chris Hani by a CP supporter at the behest of a CP 
backbencher Clive Derby Lewis.180 This option of a rebellion was finally tested and failed 
at Mmbabatho.181 In contrast to the divided CP, the referendum contributed to NP unity.182
The ANC also deserves substantial credit for its handling of the White right and 
developed several secret tracks of negotiations with its leadership. Spearheaded by 
Afrikaans-speaking Terror Lekotha, the ANC’s outreach effort saw it meet with leaders of
1R'?extra-parliamentary groups on at least three occasions. There were even suggestions 
that the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki and Tito Mboweni met with CP leaders in Europe.184 
Lekotha also engaged with the management and workers of the state rail company, 
Spoor net, the leadership of the Rapportreyers (an Afrikaner Rotary type organisation) and
1 ft^Afrikaans businessmen. The ANC’s efforts were designed to lock the right into 
negotiations and included hints that the party would allow the question of White self- 
determination to be discussed at CODESA. In doing so, the ANC sought to ensure that the 
transition 'chess game' includes a maximal number of players.186 Such initiatives also 
created cracks within the White right.
A strengthened hand:
The referendum, though, not only served to settle what de Klerk viewed as 'unnecessary 
and wasteful' debates over who represents Whites.187 The message of the NP’s campaign 
pointed to an agenda beyond merely rebutting charges that de Klerk did not have a 
mandate. In an interview with Rapport, de Klerk noted that if we 'win the referendum, my 
position at CODESA as government and party, and thus as one of the most important 
actors, will be re-established.' Speaking in Cape Town, during the campaign, de Klerk
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informed his audience that by Voting yes you strengthen the hands of your 
representatives.' De Klerk also argued that a 'landslide will have an electric effect, 
internationally and internally, it will immediately give an impetus to the process on which
1 fiQwe have embarked upon.' Ever reflective of the NP’s thinking, Die Burger hinted to its 
readers that a resounding 'yes' would strengthen the NP’s hand.190 It was indeed a long- 
held NP view that a strong NP was essential in order to secure minority (White) rights.191 
Speaking after the results became known, de Klerk described the referendum result as a 
'new high platform,' which should be used to forge a 'better future for all South 
Africans.'192
De Klerk became even more bullish after the vote and remarks in a key address to 
parliament, on the occasion of the Budget vote in April 1992, provide a startling insight of 
the interpretation that he gave to the result, one that reflected his thinking on the 
referendum at the time. De Klerk portrayed the referendum mandate as proof positive that 
the process was 'irreversible,' and suggested that the vote allowed 'the full focus' to be on 
'the question of how the new dispensation should look.' Moreover, de Klerk viewed the 
referendum result as a 'clear verdict on several fundamental points of departure -  on 
fundamental issues which together form a clear framework for a new constitution as well 
as for a transitional dispensation.' De Klerk also informed the Parliament that there was 
broad 'understanding and growing international support, specifically for those fundamental 
points of departure which are part of the mandate we obtained in the referendum.'193 The 
mandate, as de Klerk understood it, included, power sharing without domination, the 
protection of minority rights, language and culture, etc.
Looking ahead, de Klerk spoke of a new 'political playing field' for South Africa, 
and prophesised that 'in the place of old divisions, new ones will emerge. As in the rest of 
the world, economic policy directions will become the most important factor and politics 
will begin to move mainly in two broad streams.' The implication for his own party was a 
de Klerk prediction that the NP will continue to grow and broaden its support base. 
Adding, 'one does not liquidate a winner,' de Klerk invited others to join the NP as the 
'party political process of the new dispensation has already begun.' De Klerk’s comments 
on the ANC further reinforce this perception. He noted that the 'ANC now has a great
189 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 189, Cape Town Speech, 2 March 1992.
190 Die Burger. 4 March 1992; Deur Dawie, Die Burger. 7 March 1992.
191 Die Burger. Leader, 15 May 1990.
192 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 189.
193 PV 734, File M7/6/1 Vol. 190, F.W. de Klerk, Budget Vote Debate, 23 April 1992
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responsibility to adapt to new circumstances and really begin speaking the language of 
reconciliation.1 To this, the ebullient de Klerk added that the ANC was out of step on two 
issues. The first was its desire to 'ride the hobby horse of Apartheid.' Secondly, de Klerk 
called on the ANC to purge itself of communism. This, then, was de Klerk’s rather 
ambitious interpretation of his mandate. The impact of de Klerk’s exegesis of the vote 
result was to prove disastrous for the negotiating process.
The referendum and CODESA:
Whilst the referendum had positive ramifications within White politics, its impact on the 
broader transition process was less manifest. One of the negative aspects of the 
referendum was that the government became over-confident and intransigent.194 In the 
context of the CODESA process this translated into a 'more aggressive government 
stance.' And NP negotiator Kobie Coetsee, for example, commented to his fellow 
negotiators in Working Group 1 that, 'no one thought that I would be able to deliver a 
‘yes’ vote in the Orange Free State.' Steven Friedman argues, 'In hindsight, that statement 
was read as a signal that the result had given him the power and the right to set the tone in 
working group l. '195 Moreover, the referendum widened the gulf between the two 
principle parties in the negotiations. Whilst the NP dug its heels in after the referendum, 
and started 'playing 'hardball with its opponents,'196 the ANC interpreted the result as a 
White 'endorsement to a settlement on any terms.'197 The New Nation, for example, viewed 
the referendum as a 'blank cheque.'198 The referendum, then, served to embolden the 
positions of the respective parties and served to fortify the NP’s desire to attain the 75 
percent clause, which precipitated the collapse of the CODESA talks in mid May.199 Some 
critics charge that the 1992 referendum served to reinforce ethnic politics in the midst of 
the debate over South Africa’s political dispensation.200 The collapse of CODESA, in turn,
194 Steven. Friedman, The Long Journey. South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg:, 
1993), pp. 40 -  42; Marina Ottaway, South Africa. The Struggle for a New Order, p. 162. Shaun Johnson, 
The Star. 18 March 1992; Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, p. 590.
195 Steven Friedman, The Long Journey, p. 40.
196 Alistair Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, p. 134.
197 Jay Naaidoo, The Sowetan. 28 March 1992; Steven Friedman, The Long Joumev. p. 42.
198 New Nation. 20- 26 March 1992.
199 The CODESA process collapsed as a result o f the NP’s insistence that amendments to ordinary clauses of  
the constitution require a three quarters and not two-thirds majority. The ANC craftily agreed to a 70% 
requirement for amendments -  whilst further consenting to the three quarters caveat for changes to the Bill 
o f Fundamental Human Rights - but suggested that an ordinary referendum settle the constitution in the 
event o f a deadlock o f more than 6 months.
200 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years. The Apartheid State and the Politics o f  the National Party. 1948 - 1994 
(Randburg, 1996), p. 411.
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triggered some of South Africa’s worst political violence, and the period following the 
referendum announcement alone witnessed a 100 percent increase.201
The NP’s obduracy, as a result of their referendum victory, was a small 
disadvantage when measured against its contribution in removing the threat of the right 
wing. After the 17 March 1992 it became clear to all South Africans, and not least to the 
right-wing politicians, that they did not represent a constituency of any significance. 
Furthermore, the referendum also provided the ANC with reassuring evidence that the NP 
could deliver its White constituency. In this regard the referendum also contributed 
stability to the process. And by holding a referendum on the general principal of 
negotiations, De Klerk did not have to return to the electorate with the specifics of the 
final agreement. He was increasingly unsure that he could win a referendum on a detailed 
final agreement, and there were suggestions that he called the early referendum to avoid 
the oft-promised vote on the final deal.202 Some of de Klerk’s White critics charge that his 
considered referendum backfired in two respects. First, he gambled away his trump card 
of the right wing threat. Secondly, he effectively removed his planned 'White veto' on the 
eventual CODESA deal.203
Conclusion:
This chapter has highlighted the role of the referendum in the initial stages of South 
Africa’s transition, and de Klerk’s use of the mechanism for transition her esthetics. In this 
initial phase, the referendum was designed to placate White public opinion and free de 
Klerk’s hand for his planned blitz. Specifically, the referendum pledges were designed to 
hint to Whites that they would have the last say over the negotiations process and 
convince them that the managed transition was a fail-safe process. De Klerk had clearly 
engaged in what historical institutionalists describe as 'social learning,' having gained 
valuable insights from Botha’s incremental reforms. One key lesson was that speed was 
essential. De Klerk was also patently aware that whilst the first-past-the-post system was 
no longer 'NP friendly,' he could, with ease, build a reform coalition -  the same one that 
Botha had constructed in 1983 - of liberals and NP supporters in a referendum. A 
referendum was a loaded dice that favoured him, and articulated the basic public support 
for reforms, support, which the existing political institutions obscured, especially in the
201 Stanley Uys, The Star. 12 March 1992. Sampie Terreblanche, Die Vrve Weekblad. 20-26 March 1992.
202 Peter Fabricus, The Star. 21 February 1992, The Star. 22 February 1992, Gerald Shaw, The Cape Times. 
21 February 1992.
203 The Star. 22 February 1992.
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by-elections. A second key lesson for de Klerk was that he should pre-empt the demand 
for a referendum and pledge one before the CP harnessed it as part of its efforts to 
undermine him.
As we have noted, thinking on the referendum evolved over time. At first serving 
to placate Whites, as time passed, the referendum pledge was designed to remove the 
reform issue from the by-elections. And once the government got as far as the CODESA 
talks it came to view the referendum as a resource in the negotiations and its relations with 
the ANC. This particular use of the referendum is not unique. Some suggest that Israeli 
leaders have used the promise of a referendum to extract concessions from their Arab 
interlocutors, or secure larger aid contributions from the international community.204 More 
recently Austria’s right-wing government used the threat of a referendum on Austrian-EU 
relations as leverage to suspend sanctions by EU member states, after the inclusion of Jorg 
Haider’s Freedom Party in the government. Such thinking became even more pervasive 
once the scale of the victory became known. De Klerk did not, however, enter the 
transition with this in mind. Though the right-wing threat might, in retrospect, have been 
overstated, there was no certainty that this was the case at the time. More importantly, the 
political right, extra-parliamentary factions and the reactionary components in the military 
reinforced one another. The greatest threat to the transition was the CP’s increased success 
in undermining the government’s formal legitimacy -  through the by-elections -  to erode 
de Klerk’s informal legitimacy, and create an atmosphere conducive to violence. The 
referendum exposed the real extent of support for the right and their ideology, and 
effectively 'decertified' it.
This chapter has dealt with the question of: Why the referendum? In the ensuing 
chapters we will try to answer the second key research question, namely: where did de 
Klerk get the idea from? Like Botha, De Klerk, was no intellectual and had no real 
experience of democracy. And, as such, both men would have learnt about the referendum 
from their work in the party. In order to understand de Klerk we need to understand 
Botha’s use of the referendum. Understanding Botha, though, requires that we understand 
Verwoerd’s referendum, in which Botha was intimately involved. But in order to 
understand the 1960 referendum we need to study the historical conflicts within White and 
NP politics that led to the 1960 referendum.
204 Amal Jamal, 'Referenda as Decision-making Mechanisms in Ethno-national States: Israel in a 
Comparative Perspective', (Unpublished paper).
205 Charlemagne, The Economist. 8 July 2000.
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Chapter Five.
The struggle over white South African identity.
Though they [Botha and Smuts] repudiated Hertzog’s 'two-stream' policy, 
they repudiated just as vigorously his fears that the individuality o f the Boer, 
as a race, would be drowned in the ‘one-stream ’ current which they foresaw 
as the right future for the white national blood in South Africa. Where Hertzog 
feared the disappearance o f the identity o f his people, they looked to the 
energetic, vigorous survival o f the Boer as at least an equal, possibly a 
dominant, element in that mingled tide. That was why they were not always 
fretting, as he was, against incidental infraction o f the equal rights o f the 
Dutch-speaking people. Their belief in the ultimate result was firm. They had, 
in fact, a much greater faith in the qualities o f their own people than Hertzog 
had}
The introduction of the referendum in South African politics:
The ensuing chapter examines White South African politics from the institution of the 
Union, in 1910, till the formation of PACT government of 1924. This discussion is 
primarily designed to introduce the key fault line in white politics, between the opposition 
Nationalist Party (NP) and the ruling South African Party (SAP). An appreciation of these 
differences is crucial to our understanding of later politics and the eventual introduction of 
the referendum. The key political issue that divided Whites in the first three decades of the 
Union’s existence was not the racial policy, over which there was remarkable consensus, it 
was rather the Union’s relations with Britain. This question encapsulated the struggle over 
relations between the Afrikaans community and the smaller community of English 
speakers, and the republican issue. It was harnessed by those who placed narrow Afrikaner 
interests over the need for conciliation between the two. For the NP, its support for 
Republicanism was expedient in consolidating its ethnic support base and appeal, 
especially in the rural areas of the former republican Transvaal and Free State. This same 
hobbyhorse, however, served as an impediment in trying to appeal to voters in urban 
areas, and as a result, the NP found it expedient to qualify its support for a republic with a 
provision that it would only be created on the basis of broad popular will, in other words, a 
referendum. At election time, a referendum pledge on this issue would thus allow the 
party to also focus on economic issues, which were at times salient. This tactical use of the 
referendum was also driven by the fact that the party’s leaders themselves, especially the 
influential founder of the party J.B.M. Hertzog, were reluctant republicans, who largely 
embraced republicanism out of opportunist tactical considerations.
1 B.K. Long, In Smuts’s Camp (London, 1945), p. 17.
110
Some other tactical motivations that will be explored, in order to understand the 
embrace of the referendum, include the NP’s support for the failed 1914 rebellion, which 
significantly discredited the non-constitutional path to a republic and the NP's desire to 
appeal to non-republicans in elections, especially after its setback in the 1921 elections, 
and internal divisions within the party over the republican issue. In addition to these 
tactical motivations for the referendum promise, often a tool of opposition parties, I will 
explore where the idea of the referendum came from. A desire to appeal to Wilsonian 
principles after the Great War, and the use of the referendum in Southern Rhodesia in 
1922, are important reasons for its adoption by the NP whilst in opposition.
Post Union political struggles over (White) South African identity:
Louis Botha’s appeal to the white Transvaal electorate, in promoting the Union, was that 
they should not remain 'little Transvaalers,' but instead become 'great South Africans.'2 
What exactly it meant to be a (White) South African and the nature of relations between 
the Union’s English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking communities was the key struggle 
of post-Union politics. And this struggle over identity and symbols provides the backdrop 
to the flag referendum proposal of 1926 and the eventual 1960 referendum on a republic.
Amongst Afrikaners, who constituted well over 50 percent of the White 
population, at least two distinct schools or 'streams'4 of thinking emerged on the question 
of crafting a White national identity. One approach, associated with Louis Botha and Jan 
Christian (J.C.) Smuts, propounded 'nation building by conciliation.'5 Imbued with the 
sprit of the Union’s genesis, Botha and Smuts envisaged the two White population groups 
flowing into one stream, thereby creating a shared South African identity. The original 
proponent of this inclusive notion of Afrikaner identity was the Cape Afrikaner leader, 
Onze Jan Hofineyr, who viewed Switzerland and Canada as possible models for the Cape 
to emulate.6 And until the outbreak of World War One, and the rebellion against South
2 Leonard M. Thompson, The Unification o f South Africa. 1902 -  1910 (London, 1960), p. 314.
3 The 1936 census showed that Afrikaners constitute 56 percent o f the two million large white population. 
The census also, however, demonstrated that the intra-white demographic scales were tilted in favour o f  
Afrikaners, who made up 64 percent o f the youth (Schoeman, 1977,240).
4 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', in William Beinart and Saul Dubow (eds). 
Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa (London:, 1995), pp. 191 -  193; Dunbar T. 
Moodie, The Rise o f Afrikanerdom. Power Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1975), p.75.
5 Frank. A Welsh, History o f South Africa (London, 1998), p. 209; W.K. Hancock. Smuts, The Fields o f  
Force. 1 9 1 9 - 1950 (London, 1968), p 23.
6 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', in Herbert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic 
Power Mobilised: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, 1979), pp. 101 -  102; W.K. Hancock, Smuts. 
The Sanguine Years. 1870 -  1919 (London, 1962), pp. 2 4 - 2 5 .
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Africa’s invasion of German South West Africa (Namibia), this approach enjoyed wide 
support and seemed to be taking root.
In contrast, leaders like James Barry Munnik (J.B.M.) Hertzog and Daniel Francois 
(D.F.) Malan, opposed conciliation. They feared that the 'one stream' philosophy would 
endanger the fledgling Afrikaans language and culture. The proponents of the so-called 
'two-stream' approach were in essence protectionists, and propagated a separation between 
the cultural lives of the two White communities and the equal treatment of the two 
languages. For the Afrikaner nationalist, the 'alienation, anxiety, and insecurity of the new 
order could only be reduced within the womb of ethnic collectivity.'7 And, for Hertzog, 
who distinguished between cultural and political nationality, language equality was a pre-
o
condition for political and constitutional equality.
This dichotomy of 'streams,' though appealing, is insufficiently nuanced. For,
whereas Hertzog rejected the timing of the Smuts-Botha conciliation policy and not the
principle,9 and viewed English and Afrikaans speakers who saw South Africa as their
home as Afrikaners,10 Malan and his supporters simply did not believe that English-
Afrikaner integration was possible.11 Some extremists in the Broederbond, like Henning
1du Plessis, in fact hoped for the assimilation of English speakers in a Republic. The 
proponents of this exclusive approach, encapsulated in the doctrines of Christian 
nationalism, were inspired by Cape nationalist S.J. du Toit and President Kruger, and 
proposed that Afrikaners dominate. Historically, the major catalysts for an exclusive 
identity were immigration, competition over resources, and mounting anti-imperialist and 
British sentiments, fuelled by the two Anglo-Boer Wars and Anglicisation policies.13 
Hertzog, however, recognised that Kruger’s exclusion of Uitlanders had failed as English 
speakers intended to stay.14
7 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', In Herbert Adam and Hermann Giliomee p. 107.
8 W.K. Hancock, Smuts. The Sanguine Years, p. 356; C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog 
(Johannesburg, 1946), pp. 2 ,130.
9 W.K. Hancock, Smuts. The Fields o f Force, pp. 237 -  238.
10 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', in William Beinart and Saul Dubow (eds), p. 196.
11 Newell M. Stultz. The Nationalists in Opposition. 1934 -  1948 (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1974), pp. 36- 
39; Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek. A Study o f the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation (London, 1957), 
p. 104.
12 H. Du Plessis, 'Die Voortrekker Ideale in die modeme wereld', Koers. Deel VI: Nommer 3, December 
1938, p. 9.
13 Hermann Giliomee. The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity, in Herbert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, pp 101 — 
103.
14 A.C. Cilliers, Genl. Hertzog en Hereniging (Stellenbosch, 1941), p. 30; Leonard M. Thompson, The 
Unification o f  South Africa, p. 35.
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Hermann Giliomee attributes these differences between Hertzog and Malan to their 
divergent political strategies. Whilst the former sought to build a 'cross ethnic middle class 
base' for his party, Malan’s political strategy was to 'unify politically the Afrikaners who 
constituted more than 50 percent of the electorate.'15 Botha, Smuts and Hertzog, 
ultimately, embraced a subjective definition of Afrikanerdom. They were, to varying 
degrees, supporters of what Hans Kohn describes as civic or western (white) 
nationalism.16 The likes of Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd, who were not involved in the 
Boer war, pursued an even more exclusive identity, and subscribed to what Kohn 
described as an eastern or organic form of (white) nationalism. Whereas Hertzogism 
catered for a subjective definition of South African identity, the Christian Nationalist 
variant demanded 'objective' criteria for membership.17 For the likes of Malan a South
1 ftAfrican nationality could not be created, a 'nationality is something which must be bom.' 
And, a Republic, outside of the Commonwealth, became the vehicle to build an Afrikaner 
nation, terminating the dual loyalty of English speakers, and facilitating their 
assimilation.19 Tensions between the younger generation of political leaders, described as 
'neo-Fichteans,'20 and the more liberal Hertzog, focused on the issues of republicanism. 
The Hertzogites adopted an incrementalist approach, in which English support 
(demonstrated through a referendum) was viewed as a pre-condition for a republic, The 
neo-Fichtean wing of the party rejected Hertzog’s incremental legacy.
Debates over whether to hold a referendum, who would be eligible to vote, and 
qualified majorities, provide an interesting indication of the type of nationalism in 
question. Ernst Renan, in fact, articulating a western conception of nationhood described 
the nation as an everyday plebiscite,21 So-called 'eastern' or exclusive nationalisms will, on 
the other hand, seek to exclude those not considered part of the volk, And at the high tide 
of neo-Fichtean schools’ influence, after the declaration of war in 1939, Afrikaner 
nationalists did not feel it necessary to seek the support of Uitlanders for a Christian 
National republic. Moreover, eastern national movements seek to denude the influence of
15 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', in Herbert Adam and Hermann Giliomee p. 111.
16 Hans Kohn, The Idea o f Nationalism. A Study in its Origins and Background (New York, 1945), pp. 329- 
332, 352-355.
17 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. Class. Capital and Ideology in the Development o f  Afrikaner 
Nationalism (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 68-70.
18 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. 1924-1939 
(Pretoria, 1979), p. 171.
19 Die Transvaaler. 21 October 1939, 29 December 1938 in Geyser, O. (Editor.), Dr. HF Verwoerd. Die 
Republikein. Hoofartikels uit Die Transvaler 1937 -  1948 (Kaapstad en Johannesburg, 1972), pp. 31 - 34.
20 Dunbar T. Moodie, The Rise o f Afrikanerdom. p. 221.
21 Ernest Renan, 'Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?' in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism 
(Oxford, 1994), p. 17.
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those not considered a part of the volk over the outcome of the referendum. The 1960 
referendum followed the exclusion of the Cape’s Coloured voters, and symbolised full 
ethnic purification of the voters’ roll. In yet another example of how referenda serve to set 
the borders of the demos, Cyprus’s 1950 vote on unification with Greece (Enosis), saw the
99use of Churches as polling booths, thereby excluding the Muslim community. In the 
1999 Israeli debate on a Golan Heights referendum, right-wing politicians called for a 
qualified majority in order to neutralise the influence of Arab voters.
Hertzog breaks with Botha and Smuts:
The spirit of conciliation and the Botha-Smuts 'one stream' approach, encapsulated by the 
South African Party (SAP), initially enjoyed wide support amongst both sections of White 
South Africa. The SAP drew together the leading representatives of the Transvaal’s Het 
Volk Party, the Oranje Unie from the Free State and the Cape’s South African Party. 
These SAP candidates contested the first Union-wide general election as representatives of 
the ruling party, though, it in effect, did not exist and was constructed afterwards. Polity, 
thus, preceded party and the newly formed SAP had to balance the challenges of 
governing with building a party identity.
The September 1910 elections, which were fought shortly after the formation of
9*1
the Union, saw the ruling coalition’s candidates win 66 seats (out of a total of 121), 
whilst the Unionist Party secured 36 seats, primarily in the urban constituencies of the 
Cape and the Transvaal, where the party provided an effective challenge to the governing 
party. The Unionist Party largely represented the interests of the Union’s English speaking 
section. In Natal independent candidates secured 10 of the province’s 12 seats.
From the outset balancing the interests and ideas of Afrikaners and English leaders from 
the various provinces, especially in the cabinet, proved a challenge. The chief fault line lay 
between J.B.M. Hertzog and Botha-Smuts, over 'equal rights' for the Afrikaans 
community. The former claimed that Botha and Smuts failed to defend the rights of 
Afrikaners in order to placate English speakers. And the first serious challenge to unity 
came as early as December 1912, when Hertzog made a series of speeches, which 
infuriated English speakers. The most famous of them was at De Wildt, in the rural 
Transvaal, where Hertzog attacked a prominent member of the Unionist Party, Irish-born 
Sir Thomas Smartt, describing him as a foreign fortune hunter. English speaking South
22 Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus. 1954-1959 (Oxford, 1998), p. 17.
23 The Cape was allocated 51 seats, the Transvaal 36 seats and the Free State and Natal 17 seats each.
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Africans felt that this speech implied that Smartt was an Uitlander, and that it pointed to 
an exclusive (Krugerist) interpretation of South African citizenship.24 The aspect of his 
speech that Afrikaner academics have traditionally highlighted was Hertzog’s reference to 
his 'South Africa first' principle and the conundrum of'dual loyalty.'
Hertzog’s speech was a serious challenge to both the premise and promise of 
conciliation and Botha’s leadership. Relations between the two former generals were not 
all that good to start off with, and Botha sought to exclude Hertzog from his first cabinet 
by offering him a seat on the Appeal Court. Under pressure from English speakers, a 
Natal minister (Colonel G. Leuchars) threatened to resign over the speech, Botha 
demanded that Hertzog resign. When the obstinate Free State leader refused, Botha 
dissolved his cabinet and excluded both Hertzog and Leuchars from his new ministry. 
Within a few months Hertzog and his followers had left the SAP and forged a new party, 
the National Party (NP), in January 1914. A key component of the party’s ideological 
platform was its anti-imperialist, or South Africa first, agitation. This early focus of 
Afrikaner nationalism shares much in common with the early Quebecois nationalism, 
spearheaded by Henri Bourassa. Hertzog closely followed Quebec’s national movement,
77as well as the Irish struggle for independence. And Bourassa’s decision to resign from 
parliament in protest against Canada’s involvement in the Boer War, no doubt, won him 
acclaim in South Africa. According to Dan O’Meara, this served as more than the new 
party’s 'ideological straw man, and reflected the real economic interests of NP
7Rsupporters.' And from 1914 to 1924 the National Party filled the opposition’s benches. 
War and the National Party:
An unanticipated boon for the newly established party was the First World War and the 
Union’s participation in that war, which gave credence to Hertzog’s claim that the SAP 
government placed the interests of the Empire over those of the Union. The Round Table, 
for example, reported that the 'outbreak of war gave definite form to the somewhat vague 
sentiments of dissatisfaction with the British connection on which the Nationalist Party 
first took form.' In addition, rebellion gave 'definite shape' to the differences between the
24 B.K. Long, In Smuts’s Camp, pp. 6-7.
25 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation. A History o f the Union o f  South Africa. 1910-1960 
(Johannesburg, 1969), pp. 65-66; C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 148.
26 Arthur Barlow. Almost in Confidence (Cape Town, 1952), p. 135.
27 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 183.
28 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. p. 35.
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two parties.29 As was to be the case with World War Two, where Malan’s Purified 
National Party benefited from South Africa’s decision to participate in the war, the 
attempt at nation building through conciliation was shattered.
Whereas English speakers supported the Union’s participation in the Imperial war 
effort, Afrikaners were less enthusiastic, and many bitterly opposed it. Indicative of the 
Afrikaner public’s sentiments against war, was the armed rebellion against the Union’s 
occupation of German South West Africa, at the behest of London. And though the 
rebellion was suppressed with relative ease, the death of prominent Boer generals and the 
execution of an army officer, Jopie Fourie, in December 1914, for his role in the rebellion, 
provided an electoral boost for the NP, one year before the general election. The NP and 
its leadership also played a leading role in campaigning for the amnesty and release of the 
rebels. The NP also sought to make political capital out of Fourie’s execution. Smuts and
“j  I
Botha (who opposed the execution) had little choice but to assert the newly forged 
state’s monopoly over the means of violence and viewed Fourie’s execution as an 
appropriate example to dissuade others from considering armed rebellion in the future.32 
But, whereas Smuts and Botha imposed the state’ s monopoly over the means of violence, 
the rebellion gave impetus to the development of a 'definite [Afrikaner] national 
consciousness.'33 Moreover, the government lost the Dutch Reformed Church, which 
refused to censure the rebels, to the National Party on the issue of the rebellion.34
In the second Union-wide elections of 20 October 1915, Hertzog’s party secured 
27 of the 130 seats contested. The party’s early dominance in the Free State was 
demonstrated by the fact that his new party secured of 16 of the province’s 17 seats. The 
NP, however, only won four of the Transvaal’s 37 seats, where Botha and Smuts still 
enjoyed significant support. In the Cape it only won seven of the province’s 51 seats. The 
share of the vote, which the NP secured, ranged from 46,5 percent in the Free State to 28,2 
percent in the Cape and 27,5 percent in the Transvaal. The SAP, on the other hand, 
secured 37 percent of the votes in the Cape and 33,1 percent in the Transvaal and 26,7
29 The Republican Movement in South Africa1, Round Table. No. 27 (1919).
30 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager. The Rise o f Afrikaner Nationalism (London, 1965), p. 46.
31 Daniel Waley, A Liberal Life. Sidney. Earl Buxton. 1853-1934. Statesman. Governor General o f  South 
Africa (Newtimber, Hassocks, 1999), p. 268.
32 H.C. Armstrong, Grev Steel. J.C. Smuts. A Study in Arrogance (London, 1937), p. 247; F.S. Crafford. 
Jan Smuts. A Biography (Cape Town, 1945), p. 113.
33 Herman Giliomee, 'Constructing Afrikaner Nationalism', Journal o f  Asian and African Studies XVIII, 1-2, 
1983, p. 95; William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager, p.46; T.R. H. Davenport, 'The South African 
Rebellion, 1914', in Denys Hay (ed.). The English Historical Review (Volume LXXVIII: 1963), p. 94.
34 Hermann Giliomee, 'Western Cape Farmers and Beginnings o f Afrikaner Nationalism', Journal o f  South 
African Studies. 14, 1, October 1987, p. 60.
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percent in the Free State. In total the NP secured 78,184 votes (29,9 percent), as opposed 
to the 93, 484 of Botha’s SAP (35,8 percent).35 Politically, Afrikaners were divided and 
the NP was an established force.
The Rebellion, republicanism and constitutionalism:
In another parallel with World War Two, which will be explored in chapter eight, some 
republicans viewed the Empire’s European woes and the anticipation of German victory 
as an opportunity to reinstate the former Boer republics through non-constitutional means. 
Defeat of the armed rebellion, in the name of republicanism, however, had far reaching 
implications both for the republican movement, which was a ’total failure' at the time, 
and for the newly formed NP. Though the party did not formally embrace the armed 
rebellion, it failed to distance itself from the rebels, and did not seek to dissuade them
7^ *"from their course of action. Moreover, one of the leading protagonists in the rebellion, 
General Koos de la Rey, was a leading NP Senator. There are suggestions that Hertzog 
encouraged the Commandant-General of the Union’s Defence Force, General Beyers, to 
resign in order to split the army, in the hope that such a crisis would see him assume 
power. One officer, a Captain Louw, even claimed that Hertzog was directly involved, 
but there is little evidence to confirm such accusations. The innuendo that the NP leader 
was somehow involved in the rebellion was further bolstered by the fact that the majority 
of rebels came from the Free State.39 One contemporary British commentator, sympathetic 
to Botha, notes that many of the rebels joined the rebellion out of fealty to their 
commanders and less so as a result of a commitment to the ideas they stood for.40 
Moreover, the party actively condemned the South West Africa expedition at its first 
conference in August 1915.41 As a result of Hertzog’s tacit support for the rebels and the 
fact that many of the rebels were 'undoubtedly adherents of the National Party,' his party 
'became identified with the rebellion.'42
35 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkisings in Suid Afrika. 1910-1976 (Pretoria, 1977), p. 49.
36 M.C.E. van Schoor, 'Die Herlewing van die Republikeinse Ideaal, 1902 -  1961', in F.A. van Jaarsveld en 
G.D. Scholtz (eds). Die Renubliek van Suid Afrika. Aetergrond. Onstaan en Toekoms (Johannesburg, 
1966), pp 152- 153.
37 B.K. Long, In Smuts’s Camp, p. 9; G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans (London, 1941), pp. 99, 
101.
38 H.C. Armstrong, Grev Steel, p. 232.
39 T.R. H. Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion', pp. 74-88.
40 Earl Buxton, General Botha (London, 1924), p. 73.
41 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation, p. 83.
42 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 179.
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Given the high levels of opposition to the war amongst the Dutch speaking section, 
the party was no doubt tempted to capitalise on the crisis,43 which encouraged Afrikaners 
to rally around Hertzog and his party.44 Politically the rebellion had discredited the non­
constitutional path to secession and a republic,45 as well as the party, which was identified 
with it. The failed rebellion, therefore, underscored the need for a gradualist and 
constitutional approach to secession, and pressed the NP to de-couple the questions of 
secession and republicanism.46
The NP’s difficult relationship with Republicanism:
Support for Republicanism, though tacitly given, was the subject of a highly charged 
parliamentary debate on 19 June 1917, after John X. Merriman submitted a motion against 
republican propaganda, which he claimed, was 'directly at variance with the Constitution 
of the country.'47 The incident followed the publication by the NP’s Transvaal leader, 
Tielman Roos, of a pamphlet calling for the reconstitution of the former Boer republics as 
independent entities. In his address Merriman pointed out that a Nationalist (Zirk Bens du 
Toit) had admitted that the exercise served as a 'trick on the part of our [NP] leaders for 
the elections.' Responding to the government’s charges Dr. C.F. Steyn noted that the NP 
only wished to achieve a republic along constitutional lines. What also emerged from the 
debate, and probably served as the catalyst for Merriman’s resolution, was the fact that 
Die Burger (then De Burger) was promoting a 'census' on independence.48
Responding to these charges, Hertzog who professed to be a republican, in theory, 
acknowledged 'they could only hope to make a success of the republic when all the 
sections could unanimously go to the British government and say, ‘Give us our 
independence.” Hertzog added that now was not the right time for a republic.49 He, 
however, refused to condemn Roos and his pamphlet. The objective of the debate was to 
put an end to the NP’s use of the republican issue to mobilise support, and a desire to 
divide the Cape nationalists from their Transvaal and Free State counterparts. The
43 Letter from H.I. Bergh to John X. Merriman (dated 9 September 1914), and from John X. Merriman to 
former Free State President M.T. Steyn (dated 27 September 1914). Phyllis Lewsen (Editor), Selections 
From the Correspondence o f John X. Merriman. 1905-1925 (Cape Town, 1969), pp. 261,266.
44 Bill Nasson, 'War Opinion in South Africa, 1914', The Journal o f  Imperial and Commonwealth History. 
23, 2, May 1995, p. 263.
45 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager, p. 46.
46 Jan J. van Rooyen, Die Nasionale Party. Sv Qpkoms en Oorwinning -  Kaapland se Aandeel (Kaapstad, 
1956), pp. 279,282.
47 The Cape Times. June 20,1917.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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Merriman resolution was also a considered attempt to highlight the fact that the NP 
viewed republicanism as a tactical ploy for mobilisation. Further evidence of the tactical 
value of supporting republicanism was demonstrated by the NP’s decision to send a 
delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, in order to request the restoration of the republics. An 
act at variance with Hertzog’s reply to Merriman.
The limitations of Republicanism:
Whilst the party succeeded in consolidating its ethnic base as a result of the rebellion, it 
needed to expand its appeal well beyond its ethnic and provincial base and appeal to a 
wider constituency if it wished to secure power. This was highlighted by the 1915 
elections. Despite the fact that the party secured an impressive 78,184 votes, this only 
constituted 29,9 percent of the total vote. The SAP and Unionist Party, on the other hand, 
secured 54,2 percent of the vote. The Free State was the only province where the party 
managed to secure over 40 percent of the vote.50
In order to expand its support, as well as rehabilitate its image, the NP now tied its 
mast to constitutionalism. This was done at a July 1917 meeting of the NP’s Federal 
Council, which de-coupled secession and republicanism. This tactical distinction between 
secession and republicanism was made possible by the claim that the majority would, at a 
future point in time, decide the republican issue.51 The Federal Council also noted the 
party’s opposition to the use of violence in order to change the status of the Union, and 
emphasised that the ’status of the Union rested on the solid foundation of popular will.' 
The Federal Council's document also recognised that the time is not yet ripe for a 
republic. These principles, which were to be the guiding principles of the NP on the 
question of secession and a republic until the 1960 referendum, were undoubtedly a 
response to the failed rebellion and reflected an attempt to re-fashion the party’s image.
This policy decision implied that the party was not formally a republican party,54 
and laid bare some of the deeper tensions, between the republicans and the leaders (Malan, 
Roos and Hertzog), who embraced republicanism for tactical purposes.55 These
50 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. p. 67.
51 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 187.
52 Jan J. van Rooyen, Die Nasionale Party, pp. 286-287; C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 
186.
53 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/560. 'Manifest van die Federaale Raad van de Nationale Partij in zake de 
Kwestie van Onafhankelikheid', 16 July 1917.
54 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VI. 1910-1924 (Pretoria, 
1979), p. 258.
55 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. pp. 357-358.
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deliberations also exposed the divide between the Cape, which sought to distance the party 
from republicanism, and the Free State and Transvaal.56 Though the tension was, to some 
extent, resolved by the modicum of constructive ambiguity provided by this formulation, 
tensions persisted, and Roos sought to establish a republican movement outside of the 
party. These differences would potently emerge after the 1926 Balfour Declaration and 
Hertzog’s attempt to distance the party from republicanism.
The age of Wilsonian nationalism:
Yet a further influence on the Party’s embrace of the constitutional path and popular
en
sovereignty was the influence of Woodrow Wilson’s thinking on self-determination. 
G.H. Calpin claims that President Wilson 'became Hertzog’s hope. The principle of self- 
determination, which had formed the hinge of all its proposals, was placed in the forefront
C O
of the national creed.' Evidence of this influence can be seen in speeches made by 
Malan59 and Hertzog,60 as well as in a De Burger’s leader,61 at the time. Besides, the NP’s 
Central Committee wrote to President Wilson expressing satisfaction at, the 'recognition 
of the inalienable right of every civilised people to be free.'62 Afrikaner Nationalism -  in 
the form of republicanism - only really took shape after the end of the war and the 
rebellion. G.D. Scholtz argues that the British, French and Russian governments were the 
cause of the republican movement’s emergence in 1917. Though Hertzog was forced to 
follow, he insisted that the republic be pursued by constitutional means and with the
f kXconsent of English speakers and non-republicans.
The NP leadership, on the initiative of Tielman Roos in fact dispatched a 
delegation to Paris to request the Union’s independence. The Mission to Versailles was 
designed to gain votes by showing up the 'sanctimonious British aggression and 
imperialists for what they were.'64 The delegation’s presence in Paris probably gave them
56 Ibid. pp. 266-267.
57 'The Republican Movement in South Africa', Round Table. No. 27 (1919); 'The Nationalists and the Peace 
Conference', Round Table. No. 35. 1919; G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die 
Afrikaner. Peel VI. pp. 270 -2 7 1 .
58 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 107.
59 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/574, Speech at Malmesbury, 31 August 1918.; S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u 
volk. Dr. D.F. Malan as Redenaar. 1908 -  1954 (Kaanstad. 1964), pp. 19-36.
60 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/587, J.B.M. Hertzog’s opening address on the occasion o f the Union wide 
NP conference, 16 January 1919.
61 De Burger. Leader, 24, December 1917.
62 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/581 (Cover letter to the Earl o f Athlone, 7 December 1918) and File 
1/1/582 (Cover letter to G.H. Murphy, US Consul General, regarding memo submitted to President Wilson. 
7 December 1918).
63 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VI. pp. 258-264, 349.
64 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts, p. 181.
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a sense of the new discourse on popular sovereignty after World War One. By pledging a 
referendum, the party leaders ensured that they were 'isomorphic' with other national 
movements and the norms set out by Wilson. Moreover, De Burger closely followed 
Australia’s two controversial votes (1916, 1917),65 on conscription. In a leader after the 
1917 vote, De Berger, noted that this was 'undoubtedly the most direct and pure 
mechanism through which to get the volk’s verdict. In a general election it is much 
harder.'66
The period from 1916 to 1921 witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of 
ethno-national referenda, and De Burger reported on many of these in its foreign news 
section. In 1916 the sale of the Virgin Islands (Danish West Indies) was subjected to a 
popular vote, both in the territory and in Denmark. In 1918, Denmark provided the people 
of Iceland with a generous degree of autonomy, which they voted on in a referendum. One 
commentator suggests that the Danish motivation for a referendum was driven by both 
the popularity of self-determination at the time, as well as Denmark’s effort to reclaim 
Schleswig.67 In 1919 two informal votes, one in the Aaland Islands (subject of a Finnish- 
Swedish dispute) and the Voraalberg (a province of Austria whose residents voted to join 
Switzerland), demonstrated the use of such votes to articulate popular sentiment on ethno- 
national issues. In that same year (4 May 1919), the people of Luxembourg also voted on 
the questions of the Dynasty, as opposed to a Republic, and chose economic union with 
France over union with Belgium.68 De Burger reported on this vote.69
The years 1920 and 1921 witnessed the execution of numerous votes designed to
7fldetermine national borders redrawn at Versailles and settle the long-running Danish-
71German dispute over Schleswig-Holstein. De Burger reported on many of these votes in 
its overseas news section, and also covered the unofficial Tyrol (Austria)72 vote in favour 
of joining Germany in informal referenda. In 1922 paper also reported on New Zealand’s
65 De Burger. 28 August, 1 September, 4 & 11 November 1916,25 & 27 December 1917.
66 28 December 1917.
67 Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland’s 1 100 Years. A History o f a Marginal Society (London, 2000), pp. 283-284.
68 A.H. Cooper-Prichard, History o f the Grand Duchv o f Luxembourg (Luxembourg, 1950), pp. 207-213.
69 2 October 1919.
70 These included votes in Allenstein, Upper Silesia and Marienwerder (German-Polish border), the 
Klagenfurt basin (Austria-Yugoslavia border), the Sopron region (Austria-Hungary border), and the Saar 
basin (France-Germany).
71 Schleswig-Holstein, on 17 May 1919, 14, 16 February 1920 and 22 March 1920, on the Klagenfurt Basin 
on 27 October 1920 and Upper Silesia on 22 November 1921.
72 De Burger. 29 April 1921.
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prohibition vote,73 the Greek vote to reinstate Emperor Constantin,74 and the vote to indict
*]C
Bulgaria’s war leaders.
Adopting the 'constitutional' path to secession was certainly consonant with 
developments in Europe, where national movements subscribed to popular sovereignty in 
response to a high-tide of referendum issue, and allowed the National Party to be 
isomorphic with Wilson and Lenin's support for popular sovereignty and the principle of 
self-determination. As already noted, both leaders supported popular sovereignty in order 
to coax national movements to support them and fight imperial Austria, Tsarist Russia and 
Germany.
The 1920 elections and its lessons:
Following the rebellion and the NP's failure to secure wider support from the electorate 
(from 1915 to 1920 the NP only won 4 of the 7 by-elections it contested against the SAP), 
the party appeared to abandon its republican bent as the 1920 general elections 
approached. As the official opposition, Hertzog and the NP were highly critical of Smuts’s 
claim that the Dominions were free and equal in status to the United Kingdom after 
1919, and insisted on an open acknowledgement of this right to secession as evidence of
77the higher status of the Dominions. This was granted after World War One.
7 0
At that point in time secession did not, however, imply the creation of a republic. 
Hertzog and the NP insisted that the theoretical right to secession was coupled with the
70caveat that this right only be exercised on the basis of bree volkswil -  broad popular will. 
Moreover, Hertzog insisted that this broad 'popular will' could only be demonstrated 
through a special mandate from the people -  a referendum or special elections - on this 
question. In December 1920 and July 1922 the NP’s Transvaal leader Tielman Roos 
proposed that the Party consider deploying a referendum on the question of secession.80 
Covering these developments at the time, The Round Table’s correspondent wrote that the
7314 December 1920.
74 De Burger. 14 December 1920.
75 Die Burger. 24 November 1922.
76 The Dominions were South Africa, Ireland (The Irish Free State), New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.
77 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation, p. 113.
78 Die Burger. Leader, 3 and 8 November 1922.
79 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/646, Statement by the Federal Committee o f the National Party o f South 
Africa regarding constitutional relations between the Union and the United Kingdom. Published in The 
Diamond Fields Advertiser. 10 December 1920.
80 Die Burger. 15 December 1920 and 18 July 1922.
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opposition had also argued that a change in the country’s constitutional status required a 
special majority.81
By the 1920 general election the NP stratagem of playing down the republican 
issue had paid dividends, and the party had eclipsed the SAP as the largest party, taking 44 
seats as opposed to the SAP’s 41 seats. In total a 134 seats were up for grabs in the third 
Union-wide elections. The Unionist Party’s vote representation shrunk from 40 to 25 seats 
-  as its share of the vote fell to 13,7 percent. In 1915 it secured 18,4 percent of the vote. 
The real beneficiary at the polls was the Labour Party whose share of the vote rose from 
9,8 percent to 14 percent. In seats, this translated into an increase from 4 to 21 
representatives in the Union’s parliament.82 The Labour Party’s success served as 
evidence that economic issues were a key influence on these elections. Neither the SAP, 
nor the NP enjoyed a plurality of seats and for a few months Smuts tried to govern with a 
slender coalition. In order to break the deadlock, he approached Hertzog to unify the two 
parties. The basis of the proposed unity was that secession would be subject to an 
expression of broad popular will. The unity talks of 1920, however, floundered over the 
relationship between South Africa and the Empire and propelled Smuts into the hands of 
the Unionists, who were absorbed into the SAP. The assimilation process does not, 
however, appear to have served to alienate a significant number of Afrikaans speaking 
SAP supporters, and the ensuing 1921 elections saw Smuts’s SAP returned with 79 seats. 
This represented 10 more seats than the combined 66 seats that the Unionists (25) and the 
SAP (41) secured a year prior. The NP, on the other hand, lost a single seat, falling from 
44 to 43 seats. The fortified SAP secured 49,5 percent of the popular vote in these 
elections. This too represented an increase from the SAP’s 32,4 percent and the Unionist’s 
13,7 percent in 1920. The NP’s growth in its share of the vote, in contrast, was marginal, 
rising from 35,2 percent to 37,5 percent. The growth reflected an increase in Afrikaans
fid.support and the party now represented 65 percent of the Afrikaner vote. The Labour 
Party bore the brunt of the move as its share of the vote fell from 14 percent to 10,6
f i f
percent and its parliamentary representation shrank from 21 to 9 seats.
Smuts astutely called on voters to 'push Labour aside so he could smash the 
Republicans (Nationalists),'86 and made the secession issue the focus of the 1921 general
81 'The Nationalists and the Peace Conference'. Round Table. No. 35 (1919).
82 B.M. Schoeman. Parlementere Verkisings in Suid Afrika. 67, 95.
83 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation, p. 115.
84 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, p. 113.
85 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 95, 124.
86 Arthur Barlow. Almost in Confidence, p. 166.
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election. This, despite a concerted effort by the NP to reassure the public that the party 
does 'not wish to bring the matter to a vote at the next elections.'88 The Round Table's 
correspondent noted that despite General Herzog's best efforts to 'withdraw the secession 
issue from the electors,' his 'humbler followers seem determined to make it the issue as 
between themselves and the South African Party.' The correspondent added that even the
OQ
pledge of a referendum on secession has 'left things very much as they were.' And, in his 
famous meeting with Eamon de Valera, as an emissary of the Imperial government, Smuts 
described the February 1921 elections as a ballot on becoming a republic.90
The Cape leadership astutely recognised the potential harm to the NP of allowing 
these elections to focus on the republican issue. And some in the Cape reportedly 'resented 
the line taken by their leaders,' as they believed that identification with republicanism and 
secession weakened the position of Nationalists 'as guardians of a small people with its 
own traditions and a developing culture.'91 This was especially the case at a time when the 
worsening economic issue emerged as the most salient question. Commenting on the 
NP's predicament ahead of the elections, Round Table noted.
The tendency on the part of the Nationalist leaders to run away from their own 
secession policy seems to show that the policy, now that it has assumed a more 
definite and less ambiguous form, has excited considerable alarm among the 
more sober-minded of their followers, who realise that, whatever its political 
and sentimental advantages, its active pursuit is bound to involve constant 
disturbance and unrest, which will be disastrous as far as the material interests 
of the country are concerned.93
And after the elections, Round Table noted that the elections made party aware that 
for urban voters economic issues are more important than political ones.94 As will be 
described in chapter seven and eight, the Cape Nationalists viewed a republican drive as 
being counterproductive in urban constituencies the party was hoping to capture in the 
1948 elections.
The new SAP's gains, however, primarily resulted from the removal of additional 
candidates, avoiding three way contests in many constituencies. The incorporation of the
87 'Secession: Aye or No'. Round Table. No. 41 (1920); 'The General Election', Round Table. No. 43 (1921).
88 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/646.
89 'Secession: Aye or No', Round Table. No. 41 (1920).
90 Jean van der Poel, Selections From the Smuts Papers. Volume V (Cambridge, 1973), p. 97.
91 'The General Election', Round Table. No. 43. (1921).
92 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VI. p. 350.
93 'Secession: Aye or No', Round Table. No. 41 (1920).
94 'The General Election', Round Table. No. 43. (1921).
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Unionists was a hollow victory, as it spelt Smuts’s long-term decline.95 Ultimate NP 
electoral success, within the constraints of the existing electoral system, required that the 
NP either become the hegemonic political voice of white Afrikaners or forge an alliance 
with the Labour Party, whose share of the vote had grown significantly, in parallel to 
broadening its appeal to attract SAP voters. Given the traditional allegiance of a 
significant proportion of the Afrikaner community to Smuts, and the apparent absence of 
support for republicanism, the former strategy was not viable at that point. Hence 
cooperation between the Labour and National Parties was essential in order to unseat 
Smuts. The eventual election victory of the PACT (to be discussed in the next chapter) in 
the 1924 elections was made possible, despite the fact that the NP’s vote slightly shrank 
(though the Labour Party’s share rose). The secret lay in avoiding three way contests in 
marginal constituencies and playing down the republican/ secession issue. And from 
October 1921 Nationalist leaders and their newspapers sought to distance the party from 
the republican enthusiasm that Wilson had sparked.96
Hertzog the reluctant republican?
The pledge to hold a referendum on a republic also, in part, reflected Hertzog’s 
ambivalence towards a republic. The referendum literature largely ignores the influence of 
a particular leader’s level of commitment to a specific issue or policy on their decision to 
employ a referendum. Hertzog’s detractors viewed this stipulation of a referendum prior to 
secession as proof positive that he was not a republican. Some nationalist opponents, like
07C.R. Swart, claim he never pleaded for a republic in his personal capacity. His adherents, 
on the other hand, suggest that his commitment to a republic stretched back to the
QO
founding of the National Party, and argue that whilst Article 4 was not explicitly 
republican, a republic was implicit.99 Others claim that his support for a republic was 
conditional upon on White unity. Accordingly, Hertzog believed that a republic was not
95 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts, pp. 199,208.
96 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VI. pp. 351-353.
97 J.H. Le Roux, P.W. Coetzer, P.W. and A.H. Marais (eds). Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog. Sv strewe en strvd. 
Volume 1 (Johannesburg, 1987), pp. 320 - 327.
98 Article Four called for the avoidance o f any 'act whereby the political liberty o f the people o f  the Union 
might be curtailed or restricted or whereby any o f  the liberties o f the country or its Government might be 
withdrawn from the immediate supervision o f the people o f the Union' (Kruger, 1969, 69-70).
99 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. pp. 183, 192.
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'practical politics' until the majority of both population groups desired it. Hence his 
support for, and insistence on, a referendum.100
As already mentioned, Hertzog dismissed the timing of the SAP’s conciliation 
agenda, not the principle of conciliation, and it does appear that he sincerely believed that 
English speakers could and should be educated towards embracing a republic, convinced 
that their support was the best guarantee for retaining such a republic. The referendum 
pledge was then consonant with his inclusive vision of identity, and signalled that he 
would not impose a republic on English speaking Afrikaners. Convinced that a republic 
should follow unity, and primarily committed to advancing the Afrikaans language and the 
Afrikaans worker, through protectionist policies like bilingualism and racial legislation, a 
pragmatist like Hertzog was quite happy to place the republic on the back burner. He 
demonstrated this pragmatism (and reluctance towards republicanism) in forging his pact 
with the Labour Party. And as an astute tactician in electoral politics Hertzog viewed an 
NP quest for a republic as somewhat of a folly at a time when there was little support for 
recreating the republics amongst Afrikaners,101 and great antagonism amongst English 
speakers.
The Colonial Office exports the referendum to Southern Africa:
The value of the referendum in the politics of opposition was also demonstrated by the 
demand for a referendum in opposition to J.C. Smut’s quest to incorporate Southern 
Rhodesia. Smuts’s desire to incorporate the territory resulted from his expansionist dream 
of a South Africa that spanned from the Cape to the Zambezi, and his wish to secure a rail 
link to the copper rich Katanga belt.102 Politically, incorporating the territory and its 
30,000 English-speaking whites would ensure continued SAP hegemony by adding 6 safe 
seats. Smuts’s interests dovetailed with those of the Chartered Company and the Colonial 
Office, and the subsequent referendum on the inclusion of the territory into the Union was 
a pre-condition set by the then Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill.103
The decision to stage the referendum on the territory’s future is, in and of itself, a 
fascinating story of how colonial officials -  in this case Earl Buxton - sought to shape the 
destiny of territories that formed part of the vast British Empire. For, as Earl Buxton’s
100 G.H.L. Le May, The Afrikaners. An Historical Interpretation (Oxford, 1995), pp. 188, 190; M.C.E. van 
Schoor, 'Die Herlewing van die Republikeinse Ideaal', p. 155.
101 M.C.E. van Schoor, 'Die Herlewing van die Republikeinse Ideaal', pp. 152 - 153.
102 'The Rhodesian Referendum Campaign', The Round Table. No. 49 (1922).
103 'The Rhodesian Question', Round Table. No. 45. (1921).
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biographer demonstrates, the former governor to South Africa did much to ensure that the 
territory stayed outside of the Union.104 Buxton did so in defiance of Smuts, as he was 
concerned over the fate of the territory’s Black population, which enjoyed greater liberty 
than South Africa’s Black majority.
The Chartered Company’s license to administer the territory was set to expire in 
1924 and Imperial officials were confronted with three options regarding the territory’s 
future. The first was prolonging the company charter (Milner’s preferred option in 1919), 
whilst the second option was granting the territory and its subjects’ representative or 
responsible government, making the territory a separate colony with full colonial status. 
The push for this option was led by the then High Commissioner, H.J. Stanley, who 
sought to ensure that the High Commissioner exercise control over Native affairs. Stanley 
further believed that incorporation, though the best solution, from the Imperial 
perspective, was impractical due to local resistance. Besides, Stanley surmised that 
responsible government was financially feasible.105 By 1920 Lord Milner favoured a third 
option, the territory’s incorporation into South Africa, insisting, however, that it be done 
with the consent of the (White) Rhodesians.106 Milner’s approach did not, however, 
necessarily imply a referendum, and there are indications that he was quite happy to see
1 fl7the issue settled by the local assembly after a round of general elections. The 
referendum was very much the handiwork of Buxton, who originally favouring the first 
option, came to be a leading proponent for Responsible Government.
The Buxton Commission:
Faced with growing pressure from the interested parties, Milner’s successor, Winston
10RChurchill appointed the Buxton Commission, to consider the colony’s future. The 
committee’s brief was to consider the viability of Responsible Government, and Buxton, 
wittingly, proposed a referendum on the question of Responsible Government and the 
future constitution. In effect then, the choice that he suggested be submitted to voters was 
between responsible government and the status quo, i.e. extending the Company’s charter. 
Jan Smuts strongly opposed the committee’s recommendations informing Winston
104 Daniel Waley, A Liberal Life, p. 9.
105 Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law o f  Southern Rhodesia. 1888-1965. with Special 
Reference to Imperial Control (Oxford. 1966), p.209.
106 Ibid. pp. 327-329.
107 Drummond Chaplin to Smuts (30 October 1922), Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers. 
Volume V. p.145.
108 Claire Palley, The Constitutional History, p. 208.
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Churchill that the 'report on responsible government for Rhodesia will prejudice a proper
decision.'109 Instead, Smuts proposed that Churchill agree to a referendum in which the
territory’s Whites consider two options: responsible government or incorporation. The
High Commissioner in Salisbury, H.J. Stanley, also now supported this position,110 and
Churchill instructed Rhodesian representatives to meet with Smuts and negotiate terms of
incorporation. Two rounds of talks ensued, in November 1921 and April 1922, leading to
the generous South African terms of inclusion in the Smuts-Malcolm Agreement.
This use of a referendum by the Colonial Office to settle the fate of territories it
controlled, despite the fact that the referendum was not part of British political culture,
was not unique to Southern Rhodesia. During the partition of India the future of two
principalities (Sylhet and the Northwest Province) was settled by popular votes. Though
Lord Mountbatten proposed such a vote for the Kashmir, it was not held.111 From a
Pakistani perspective, Mountbatten colluded with India in ensuring that plebiscites were
110held in provinces where there were Hindu majorities and Muslim rulers. Later British
de-colonisation efforts also produced attempts to create three federations out of former
British colonies. The first was the Far Eastern Federation, which incorporated Malaysia,
Singapore the Territories of North Borneo (Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah). Similar
federations were attempted in the West Indies and in Central Africa. The West Indies
Federation, which was largely conceived by London as 'a way of reducing the cost of
governing its possessions in the Caribbean and of making a viable state out of scattered 
11
islands,' was split asunder by a Jamaican referendum, in which voters rejected 
Federation on the question. Whilst the attempt to amalgamate Nyasaland (Malawi), 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), was approved by a 
referendum in Southern Rhodesia in 1953, opposition by Black political leaders in the 
other two colonies led to the scrapping of the initiative.
Resisting Smut’s attempt to incorporate Southern Rhodesia:
Fear of the implications of this attempt at SAP gerrymandering was perhaps the single 
most important factor that fuelled NP opposition to the incorporation of Southern 
Rhodesia.114 And Oswald Pirow claims that Rhodesian incorporation was a response to the
109 Public Records Office, DO 119/959, Smuts to Churchill, 11 November 1921.
110 Public Records Office, DO 119/959, Stanley to Churchill. 13 November 1921.
111 Phillip Goodhart, Full Hearted Consent (London, 1976), pp. 134 -  146.
112 G.W. Choudhury. Pakistan’s Relations with India. 1947-1966 (Meerut, 1971), pp. 54, 66-71, 74.
113 Samuel J. Hurwitz and Edith F. Hurwitz, Jamaica. A Historical Portrait (London, 1971), p. 209.
114 Die Burger. 1 August 1922.
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emerging political pact between the National and Labour parties.115 Though the discourse 
of opposition was centred on questions of process and the terms of the territory’s 
incorporation,116 the NP denounced the SAP for 'criminally' by-passing both the people 
and parliament on this issue and accused Smuts of conducting a constitutional coup
117d'etat. Moreover, the NP charged that the SAP was setting a precedent whereby matters
liftof importance to the volk were dealt with in this manner. The NP’s mouthpiece Die 
Burger had a field day on the issue and published at least 11 editorials dealing with the 
Rhodesian question from July 1922, when the Smuts-Malcolm agreement was made 
public, until the vote.119 These invariably either highlighted the economic burden that the 
package implies, or condemned Smuts for failing to inform and consult the country’s 
elected representatives and the volk.
The opposition was especially critical of the publication of the agreement and its 
terms after parliament was in recess, though this may have been 'unavoidable owing to the
17Hcomplexity of the negotiations.' Smuts’s NP critics charged that he deliberately avoided 
publishing the terms and any details of his negotiations in order to avoid a critical debate
171that might startle the Rhodesians voters.
Smuts’s failure to consult the people or the country’s legislature was a particularly 
popular charge. In an interview granted to the Bloemfontein daily Die Volksblad, Hertzog 
contrasted the SAP’s handling of the Rhodesian question with his own party’s approach to 
the question of secession and republic. Hertzog noted that the NP would not move ahead
177without receiving a mandate from the people through an election or a referendum. 
Expanding on this theme in an address to a Smithfield (Hertzog’s constituency) audience 
in early December, Hertzog asked the audience if they could imagine a Steyn or Brand 
(former Republican presidents) incorporating territory without consulting the people. 
Smuts, Hertzog submitted to his audience, cared as little for the volk as Jameson or 
Rhodes.123 Die Burger, which described the agreement as a coup d'etat, similarly insisted 
that the volk be allowed to express their opinion on the territory’s incorporation.124 
Elsewhere, the NP’s Transvaal leader Tielman Roos built on such contrasts in promising a
115 Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog. (Cape Town, 1957), p. 97.
116 Die Burger. 24 July 1922.
117 Die Burger. 26 October 1922.
118 Die Burger. 13 October 1922.
119 Die Burger. 19 ,24,25 July 1922, 7, 8 ,1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2 , 15 and 27 August 1922, 29 October 1922,
120 Round Table. No. 49. (1922). 201.
121 Die Burger. 10 August 1922.
122 Die Burger. 2 September 1922; C.M. Van den Heever. General J.B.M. Hertzog. pp. 203 -  204.
123 Die Burger. 4 December 1922.
124 Die Burger. Leader, 12 August 1922.
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referendum on secession at a speech in Pretoria. Roos further promised that the NP would 
not actively pursue secession in its first term of office. Such a pledge was consonant 
with the outlines of an electoral pact being discussed by the Labour and National parties at
the time. It is worth noting that the Labour Party leader, Colonel Creswell’s strong
•  •  •  1criticism of the agreement received prominent coverage in Die Burger, reflecting the
growing cooperation between the two parties and a desire to prepare NP opinion for the 
electoral PACT.
The Rhodesian question, therefore, served the NP’s effort to both portray Smuts
and the SAP of not serving the interests of the volk, and the Party clearly viewed the issue
as an opportunity to mobilise its supporters. In a memo to regional secretaries, dated 16
August 1922, the Cape NP chief organiser, C.W. Malan called on party functionaries and
activists to do so. An attachment to the memo argued, amongst other things, that it was
unacceptable that whilst the people of Southern Rhodesia were being consulted by
referendum, the 'Volk! of the Union were being 'ignored.'127 In his earlier campaign against
the Naval Bill (1909), Henri Bourassa similarly demanded a referendum, in an effort to
108suggest that Wilfred Laurier was not serving the interests of the people. The upshot of 
this opposition to Southern Rhodesia’s opposition was that the party further linked the 
country’s constitutional future to a consultation of the volk. It was, however, only with the 
flag referendum that this link was cemented.
Independently of the Union’s domestic politics, the people of Southern Rhodesia 
rejected incorporation, despite Smuts’s attractive offer to the territory’s political leaders. 
Smuts viewed the vote as a 'great [personal] blow' and an even greater blow to
1OQRhodesia. Earl Buxton had thus thwarted Smut’s plan, by taking the decision out of the 
hands of colonial officials and local politicians, proving its value as a conservative device. 
Beyond settling the fate of Rhodesia, Earl Buxton facilitated the application of Woodrow 
Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty in Southern Africa. The referendum institution had 
been successfully exported to the region.
125 Die Burger. 4 December 1922.
126 Die Burger. 7 February 1922.
127 INCH Pamphlet Collection, File Number P5.51.
128 Casey Murrow, Henri Bourassa and French -  Canadian Nationalism. Opposition to Empire (Montreal, 
1968), pp. 65-66.
129 Smuts to Churchill, 22 November 1922, Jean van der Poel. Selections From the Smuts Papers. Volume 
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Hertzog’s referendum legacy:
Hertzog, who enjoyed unchallenged authority as the leader of the NP for almost two 
decades, set a condition for pursuing the republican debate whose historical legacy, in 
part, explains the 1960 referendum. This policy proposal enjoyed unquestioned 
endorsement in the NP’s manifestos, even after Fusion and the creation of the Purified NP, 
until the outbreak of World War Two. This adoption of the referendum by the NP from 
1914 onwards was influenced by particular historical developments. These include, the 
party’s need to re-cast itself after it was identified with the botched 1914 rebellion, the 
salience of Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty, and the desire of the NP leaders to tap 
into this new fashion. It is no coincidence that the NP’s embrace of the referendum 
corresponded with the high tide of modem nationalism and a marked increase in 
referendum use. For good measure, the fashion spread to Southern Africa with the 
Southern Rhodesia vote. Moreover, a referendum pledge was viewed as a resource that 
allowed the party to differentiate itself from the ruling SAP and appeal to its ethnic core, 
by embracing secession/ republicanism, yet appeal to a wider constituency by re-assuring 
non-republican voters that the party would not abuse their votes to change the constitution.
Hertzog’s formula provided the only sound tactical basis on which the NP could
realistically gain power, and emerge as a successful middle class party. Despite its initial
success in 1915, the path to electoral success lay in more popular policies (like racial
legislation in the labour market). Embracing a narrow republican agenda would certainly
have doomed the NP. Key components of the middle class, like commercial farmers, no
doubt viewed the trade and economic implications of secession with trepidation.
Moreover, there was no republican tradition in the Cape. It should be noted that the Cape
and rural constituencies representing farmers enjoyed disproportionate representation in
the post-Union South African parliament. The latter was a legacy from the Boer republics,
110which viewed the farmers as the 'true burghers, the back bone of the country.' By giving
greater weight to rural constituencies, the Transvaal republic was able to reduce the 
political influence of the swelling uitlander population in Johannesburg. And, at a time of 
rapid urbanisation, poor urban Afrikaners were more pre-occupied with ensuring job 
security through discrimination in the labour market. Talk of secession would not gamer 
their votes.
Faced with criticism over the party’s republican propaganda (as seen in the 1917 
debate), and claims that such propaganda was unconstitutional, a referendum implied that
130 Sheilagh Patterson, The Last Trek, pp. 80 -  81.
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the party was committed to constitutionalism. In some respects, it also served to make the
republican propaganda seem innocuous. On another level, the referendum was also
consonant with Hertzog's two-stream approach. G.H. Calpin notes that the difference
between Malan and Hertzog after Fusion on the republican question reminded him of the
debate within the British Labour Party over Socialism. In this debate there were
essentially two schools, the 'Socialism in our time' approach and, the 'Socialism some 
• 1^1time' approach. The referendum pledge was proof positive of Hertzog’s commitment to
the 'Republicanism some time' approach.
Furthermore, the referendum pledge allowed the party a large measure of
constructive ambiguity on the republican issue. This ambiguity, in turn, ensured a
modicum of party unity, over a question that divided the Free State and the Transvaal and 
1 ^Cape. In 1917 Hertzog sided with Cape leader D.F. Malan, who campaigned against 
efforts to make the party republican in the build-up to the Party’s conference. At that 
point in time (and until 1937) the Cape was electorally the most significant province, 
having being allocated 51 of the 130 seats in the parliament. The Transvaal had 45 seats 
and, the Free State and Natal 17 each.
131 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, p. 296.
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Chapter Six,
The flag referendum.
The Bill, according to the decision of the government, so far as it concerns the flag, 
shall not, when passed by parliament, come into operation unless and until it has 
been clearly ascertained by a proper referendum to the registered voters of the 
country, that such is the will of the people. I  sincerely hope, and think that I  have 
the right to believe, that in view o f this announcement, the existing feeling o f  
acrimony in connection with the question o f the 'Flag,' will cease, and that all 
party or sectional strife will be converted into a more patriotic contest imbued 
by national sprit.1
The National Party embraces the referendum as the ruling party.
In the ensuing chapter I explore the NP’s use of the referendum as a ruling party. The 
promise to stage a referendum (which was later cancelled) was a product of deep divisions 
within the ruling coalition, especially within the Labour Party over the design of a new 
Union flag. Given that the NP’s electoral PACT with the Labour Party was premised on a 
pledge not to promote secession and republicanism, the flag issue became a metaphor and 
indeed substitute for republicanism, and leading Nationalists viewed securing a flag as a 
symbolic victory. The flag issue was the single most salient issue of the government’s 
incumbency.
Not only would the referendum over a flag serve to accommodate the divided 
Labour Party and ameliorate divisions over the flag issue within the National Party, it also 
served to 'take the wind' out of the opposition SAP’s sails. Having lost the 1924 elections 
on account of the poor economy, and Smuts’s brutal repression of a miners’ strike on the 
Rand in 1922, the SAP saw in the flag issue a way to regain power in the 1929 elections. 
Moreover, the SAP was fully aware that NP (with only 63 seats out of a total of 135) 
would be unable to rule without the Labour Party (with 18 seats). Hence it hoped to 
exploit the flag issue to split the coalition asunder. On the other hand, by promising a 
referendum on the issue, J.B.M. Hertzog in turn hoped to keep it off the agenda of the 
1929 general election. It will also be argued that Hertzog’s willingness to acquiesce to 
holding a referendum reflected his own ambivalence to the flag, and his deep desire to 
ensconce NPs rule. The chapter ends with an analysis of some of the later tensions that 
emerged within the party over the republican issue.
1 A 32. J.B.M. Hertzog Collection. File 24.
133
The PACT government and the use of tactical voting:
The introduction of a Westminster, first-past-the-post, system in 1910, in a polity made up 
of two almost equally sized language groups, implied that the party that managed to secure 
support from significant proportions of both communities, or dominate the rural areas 
(which were over-represented) and capture the hearts and minds of the majority of 
Afrikaners, could maintain power. The SAP enjoyed support from both communities -  
especially after absorbing the Unionists -  as well as support in the rural Transvaal. Hence 
defeating the SAP required tactical cooperation between the English speaking and 
Afrikaans opposition. Whereas the Labour Party was most effective in the country’s cities, 
the NP enjoyed an advantage in certain rural Afrikaans areas. Here the party benefited 
especially from the skewed representation that rural constituencies enjoyed. Despite this 
advantage, the NP could only muster 44 seats in the 1920 general elections (the SAP 
garnered 41 seats, whilst the Unionist Party and Labour Party secured 25 and 21 seats 
respectively) and Tielman Roos, Transvaal leader of the NP, understood the absolute 
need for cooperation between the two opposition parties. As a result, he emerged as the 
midwife of the later electoral pact premised on tactical voting, especially in urban 
constituencies where the Labour Party could capture disaffected swing voters.
In the 1921 general elections the Labour Party, South African Party and the 
National Party fought each other in three way ties in seven urban constituencies, with the 
SAP benefiting in all seven as a result. Roos no doubt also took heart from the fact that 
the Labour Party defeated the SAP in four of the six by-elections that the two parties 
contested ahead of the 1924 elections. As these votes indicated, Smuts’s suppression of 
miners’ strike in 1922 proved extremely costly for the SAP. A precedent for cooperation 
between the two parties had been set in the Transvaal, where the NP under Tielman Roos 
had successfully cooperated with the Labour Party in provincial and local politics. And the 
Labour Party-NP electoral PACT was very much an outcome of politics in the 
industrialising Witwatersrand. Rising Afrikaner urbanisation and growing competition in 
the workplace between White and non-White workers further facilitated such cooperation 
against the SAP, which was seen to represent the interests of capital. At that stage the NP 
had neglected the urban Afrikaner, and trade unionism was largely the province of English 
speakers. It is also worth noting that the two parties and their leaders, Colonel F.H.P.
2 Arthur Barlow. Almost in Confidence (Cape Town, 1952), p. 174.
3 Boksburg, Denver, Drie Rivier, Fordsburg, Germiston, Krugersdorp and Springs.
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Creswell and General J.B.M. Hertzog both viewed capitalism with grave misgivings.4 
Roos and a Free State Labourite, Arthur Barlow, facilitated a meeting between the two 
leaders and a resultant exchange of letters set out the basis for an electoral pact and a 
Labour-NP government, which ruled until the 1929 elections and afterwards, though the 
Labour party by then had split into two factions.
Dan O’Meara argues that Roos viewed the PACT as a way to compete with the 
Labour Party through collaboration. Accordingly, the PACT 'stole much of the political 
thunder and deeply divided Labourites.'5 The Cape leadership, however, opposed the 
PACT, fearing that it would dilute the party’s principles,6 and D.F. Malan required 
permission from the NP’s provincial Head Committee before accepting a position in the 
PACT government.7 Even more outspoken in his opposition to the PACT was an 
unknown, yet aspiring politician, J.G. Strijdom, who in a letter submitted to Ons 
Vaderland argued that the party’s role was ensuring the continued existence of the 
Afrikaner volk and language, and cautioned that short term tactical gains would
o
compromise the party’s ability to fulfil its role.
Making a PACT possible:
Such tactical cooperation was, moreover, hampered by the two parties’ platforms. On the 
one hand, Article Four of the NP’s platform and its secessionist tones were a bugbear as 
far as the Labour Party’s Jingoist voters and potential voters were concerned. On the other 
hand, the Labour Party’s socialist principles were viewed with misgiving by the NP’s rural 
support base. This despite the fact that the party leadership had a strong anti-capitalist 
bent. In order to facilitate this political cooperation, the former softened its socialist 
image, whilst the NP started to 'push Republicanism and secession into the background.'9 
Specifically, the NP pledged that none of its candidates would deploy their vote to alter 
the country’s constitutional status once in power.10 Convincing the NP leadership was 
somewhat made easier by the knowledge that the party’s poor performance in the 1921 
general elections was attributed to its focus on secession, and not the economy. As noted
4 C.M. van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog (Johannesburg, 1946), p. 156.
5 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. Class. Capital and Ideology in the Development o f Afrikaner Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1983), p. 32.
6 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager. The Rise o f Afrikaner Nationalism (London, 1965), p. 51.
7 Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog (Cape Town, 1957), p. 98.
8 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VI. 1910-1924 (Pretoria, 
1979), pp. 352-353.
9 'The Position o f Parties', Round Table. No. 50 (1923), p. 424.
10 A3, Creswell Collection, File 3/ 4, Letter from Colonel Creswell to J.B.M. Hertzog, 12 April 1923.
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in the previous chapter, the NP’s Cape leadership recognised the damage that the party’s 
strong identification with Republicanism had caused in the previous elections, and feared 
that the republican issue would split the party.11 Republican elements were upset by the
19decision to fudge the republican issue.
Hertzog appears to have had little problem in further de-coupling the party from 
republicanism and, in fact, denied that his party was republican. The climb down was, in 
part, made possible, by claims that the party had always pre-conditioned secession to a 
referendum. In a key interview to Die Volksblad, the NP’s Free State mouthpiece, Hertzog 
added that referendum on something like secession was 'consistent with the policy of the 
party.' And Hertzog pointed to the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia in justifying his 
argument.13 The 1924 election, thus, marked the introduction of the referendum in the 
NP’s electoral her esthetics. Hertzog’s critics argued that this initiative to forge the PACT 
spelt the beginning of his opposition to republicanism.14 Ultimately, the leadership’s 
willingness to drop the republican issue spoke volumes for its pragmatism, and 
underscored its shallow commitment to secession. And the relative ease with which it did 
so further demonstrates that a republic had not yet gained widespread support in the party..
As a result of this concerted effort to reassure the public that the government 
would not move ahead on the question of secession without broad popular support,15 and 
disaffection with the SAP government over its handling of the 1922 strike, the Labour 
Party gained 9 seats in the 1924 elections. Moreover, the party narrowly failed to win a 
further seven seats by less than 150 votes. The National Party gained 20 seats despite the 
fact that its share of the vote actually dropped from 37,5 percent in 1921 to 34,9 percent. 
The Labour Party’s share rose from 10,6 percent in 1921 to 13,4 percent, whilst the SAP’s 
share of the vote only fell by 3 percent. Thus tactical voting and a higher turnout, 79,4 
percent, as opposed to 72,2 percent in 1921, made a significant difference,16 and the 
PACT government enjoyed a majority of 81 seats, as opposed to the SAP’s 52 seats, in the 
135 strong parliament. Amongst the defeated SAP candidates was J.C. Smuts. In the 1948 
elections, D.F. Malan successfully emulated the formula of downplaying the republican
11 DJJ Coetzee, 'Die Onaafhanklikheids Strewe van die Nasionale Party', in Geyser, O. en Marais A.H (eds),. 
Die Nasionale Party Peel 1. Aetergrond. Stigting en Konsolidasie (Kaapstad, 1975), pp. 326 -  329.
12 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer, Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. Die Eerste Bewindsiare. 1924 -  1934 
(Kaapstad, 1975), p. 137.
13 C.M. van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. pp. 203-204.
14 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. 1888-1940 (Johannesburg, 1943), p. 72.
15 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer. Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. pp. 124, 127; C.E.M. O’Dowd, 'The General 
Election o f 1924', South African Historical Journal. 2, 1970, p. 65.
,6B.M. Schoeman. Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. 1910-1976 (Pretoria. 1977), pp. 124,145.
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issue in order to tap into popular economic disaffection. In both elections racial legislation 
had greater appeal than the promise of republic.
A flag for a republic:
17Until the controversy over adopting a 'clean' or neutral flag for the Union, it seemed that 
the PACT arrangement, whereby social legislation was gained in exchange for nationalist
1 ftlegislation, was working and that the country’s two White 'streams' were indeed flowing 
side by side, in relative harmony. Why then did the government court controversy and 
press ahead with legislation to introduce a new flag?
One reason was that some in the NP searched for a way to provide their core 
supporters, alienated by the election ploy of minimising the republican issue, with some 
tangible and symbolic expression of NP dominance.19 Replacing the Union Jack as the 
Union’s flag with a new and neutral flag was certainly a powerful symbolic display of 
newfound NP hegemony. Others saw a national flag as a 'logical, essential and urgent step
7flin the future program of the Hertzog government,' whilst Tielman Roos viewed the
71adoption of a new flag as the basis for the NP’s abandonment of Article 4. More 
importantly, adopting a flag without the Union Jack had been a longstanding objective of
D.F. Malan since 1918. Appointed as Minister of the Interior, Malan had the power to 
pursue his dream.
Malan, whose insistence on a new flag was to earn him the notoriety in imperial
77London as the 'Mahomet of Nationalism,' long believed it would nurture 'strong South 
Africa love for the fatherland,' and bring about an end the struggle between nationalism
77and imperialism. Malan was convinced that the promotion of the flag bill, if approached 
'calmly and decisively,' would lead to 'the last gasp of Jingoism.'24 This argument would 
be echoed in the context of the republican debate. As examples of societies where a 'clean 
flag' had contributed to racial harmony and national unity, Malan cited Switzerland,
17 By a clean flag I refer to a flag that did not include symbols, the Union Jack or the old Republican flags, 
which alienated a particular language group.
18 The Economist. 21 January 1928. Thomas Boydell, Mv Luck’s Still In (Cape Town, 1959), p. 41.
19 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer, Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. p. 137.
20 J.H. Le Roux, P.W. Coetzer, P.W. and A.H. Marais (eds), Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog. Sv strewe en strvd. 
Volume 1 (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 331.
21 The Argus. 28 September 1926.
22 The Economist. 21 January 1928.
23D.F. Malan Collection, File, 1/1/574, Malan speech at Malmesbury, 31 August 1918.; S.W. Pienaar, Glo in 
u volk. Dr. D.F. Malan as Redenaar. 1908 -  1954 (Kaapstad. 1964), pp. 19-36.
24 PV 4, Eric Louw Collection, File 1, Letter to Eric Louw from D.F. Malan on 25 June 1926.
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Canada and Belgium.25 And, despite later claims that a new flag was both a 'duty and an 
honour,1 Malan also believed that the flag issue served to cast Smuts in a bad light.
The demand for a new flag was not only limited to the NP and Malan. The 
Johannesburg based English language newspaper, The Sunday Times, conducted a national 
competition for a new flag as early as 1910. Indeed, Harry Saker suggests that the positive 
response to this contest and the clean design selected may have created the impression that
7 Jlthere would be broad support amongst English speakers for a new flag. It is therefore 
entirely plausible to suggest that The PACT government was 'taken by surprise at the
70storm which the proposal to exclude the Union Jack had aroused.' Malan’s failure to 
fully grasp the sensitivity of English-speaking opinion on this issue was also partly thanks 
to the weight he gave to Creswell’s opinion. Creswell, fervently supported Malan on this
'y |
issue, and shared his belief that a clean flag would serve as a symbol of unity.
Smuts exploits the flag bill:
The submission of the flag bill on 20 May 1925, after the government and opposition 
failed to reach a compromise, sparked a festering conflict. The ever-astute General Smuts,
-J7
who had previously supported a 'clean' flag for the Union, spotted the political 
opportunity of proffering a clean flag as a de-facto act of secession, and, in doing so, 
topple the PACT government.33 The proposed flag legislation deeply offended the 
sensibilities of the Union’s English-speakers, and the 'flag controversy' became an 
allegory for the struggle between the 'jingoist' sentiments of English speakers and the 
republican sentiments of Afrikaans nationalists. In Natal, where the White community was 
predominantly English-speaking, the flag bill was viewed as part of a policy of 'getting rid 
of everything British.'34 And, for the Labour Party, which represented an English-speaking 
constituency, the political costs of the flag bill soon became apparent. The flag bill
25 D.F. Malan Collection. File, 1/1/588, Malan's speech at the NP's 1919 conference, dated 16 January 1919.
26 D.F. Malan, Afrikaner Volkseenheid en mv Ervarings on die Pad Daarheen (Kaapstad, 1961), p. 102.
27 PV 4, File 1, Letter to Eric Louw from D.F. Malan on 25 June 1926.
28 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy (Cape Town, 1980), p. 10.
29 'What is Known as the Flag Issue', Round Table. No. 64 (1926).
30 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer, Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. p. 292. Writing to Eric Louw on 25 June 
1926, Malan seemed confident o f Labour Party support and spoke o f passing the flag bill in the New Year. 
PV 4, File 1.
31 Margaret Creswell, An Epoch o f the Political History o f  South Africa in the Life o f  Frederic Hugh Page 
Creswell (Cape Town, 1956), pp. 116-117.
32 Ons Vaderland. 7 September 1926.
33 Arthur Barlow, Almost in Confidence, pp. 195 - 196.
34 G. Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in Mv Time (London, 1961), p. 178.
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exacerbated existing ideological and institutional tensions within the Party. The most 
significant of these was the dissension between the party machine (the Councilites under 
Barlow-Kentridge) and the ministers (Creswell-Boydell).36
Both Tielman Roos and Hertzog recognised that the Labour Party was the 
government’s Achilles heel, and were deeply concerned that this legislation would 
undermine the coalition. Moreover, the architects of the PACT were reluctant to provide 
Smuts with an issue with which to erode support for the government. Over time, Smuts’s 
SAP managed to mobilise increasing support on this issue. It is also worth emphasising 
that Hertzog was not deeply enamoured with the flag legislation, as he favoured an
'xnemphasis on racial legislation. And, as one commentator noted, two years 'of actual 
experience of government [may] have tempered the exuberant enthusiasm of opposition 
days for spectacular vindications of a formal 'independence.'38 In response to mounting 
opposition, from within his coalition and without, Hertzog agreed to a Flag Commission, 
to be headed by Sir William Campbell.39 According to Saker, Malan proposed the 
commission in response to Campbell’s support for a clean flag.40 Sixteen months after the 
bill’s introduction, Hertzog promised a referendum to settle the issue.
Salvaging the PACT through a referendum:
The conventional explanation for the proposed flag referendum is that Campbell 
preconditioned his acceptance of the chairmanship of the Flag Commission on a 
referendum to approve the final design selected by the committee.41 Yet, Saker suggests 
that the Labour Party’s leadership demanded the referendum, as they feared a backlash 
from their constituency.42 To boot, existing divisions in the Party were exacerbated, and 
on 8 July 1926 George Hay, one of the party’s serving MPs, dropped a political
35 Ideologically, the party was divided between three groups, which The Star newspaper classified as the 
Creswellian or right-wing element, the left section (which according The Star's correspondent is said to have 
represented the best sentiments o f the party') and a center group o f so-called 'true Labourites. Though the 
later were the strongest o f the three, The Star suggested that they were eclipsed by the two other elements. 
The Star. 16 July 1926.
36 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, p. 257.
37 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer, Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. p. 147, Harold Saker, The South African Flag 
Controversy, pp. 48, 59.
38 'What is Known as the Flag Issue', Round Table. No. 64 (1926), p. 859.
39 Sir William Campbell had served as the Dominion Chairman o f the British Empire Service League 
(B.E.S.L.) and previously supported a clean flag to be flown along with the Union Jack. His support for 
Malan’s proposals in June 1926 led to his resignation from the leadership o f the B.E.S.L.
40 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, pp. 48, 60.
41 Ibid. p. 61.
42 Ibid. p. 79.
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'bombshell' by informing a public meeting that the Flag Bill amounted to secession,43 
adding credence to Smuts’s charges. Three days later the Party’s Troyville branch passed 
a resolution calling on the National Council to drop the flag bill as it was 'breaking up the 
party.' Though only a branch meeting, the party’s National Chairman, B. Jenkins, and its 
Transvaal organiser were present at the meeting. The Star submitted that the Hay speech 
and the 'Troyville SOS' was an 'unmistakable sign that Labour followers are becoming 
distinctly restive, not to say rebellious, under the irritating and humiliating yoke of the 
PACT.'44 The paper also intimated that the 'Party leaders were heartily glad when the 
Council, at their Johannesburg meeting discovered a formula upon which the flag question 
might, for the moment be regarded as a closed chapter.'45 There is no archival evidence46 
that The Star’s correspondent was referring to a referendum, though this seems likely.
By mid-August there were rumours that Creswell was to be replaced as party 
leader and his critics charged that he had 'made a political mistake of the first magnitude' 
by agreeing to the flag bill without consulting the Party.47 Whilst Creswell became 
increasingly obdurate, affiliates of the party, like the Typographical Union, threatened to 
leave the Party over the issue.48 The proximity of the referendum announcement of 17 
September 1926 to the Labour Party’s Transvaal provincial conference held in 
Johannesburg in early September reinforces the argument that the referendum was in 
response to the difficulties of the Labour Party. Following the conference, Hertzog met 
with a delegation of the Party’s 'malcontents,'49 and gave them assurances that he would 
not move ahead on the issue without having secured a broad popular mandate for the 
flag.50 Saker recounts that at a public meeting in May 1927, Hay claimed that the party 
had asked for a referendum.51 Saker’s argument, that the referendum pledge primarily 
served to save the coalition is substantiated by the memoirs of Labour Party
M  C 'l
parliamentarians, and Pamela Maud’s study of the PACT government. It is worth
43 The Star. 9.12 July 1926.
44 The Star. 12 July 1926.
45 The Star. 1 2 ,13 ,14 ,15  July 1926.
46 The holdings for the Labour Party collection, which are held in Johannesburg City Library, only begin 
from 1927 and there is no reference to this proposal in the Creswell Collection, which is held in the National 
Archives in Pretoria.
47 The Star. 13 August 1926.
48 The Star. 20,21 August 1926.
49 The Rand Daily Mail. 4 September 1926.
50 The Argus. 6 September 1926; The Rand Daily Mail. 4 September 1926; Die Burger. 31 January 1957, 
J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos -  Political Prophet or Opportunist (Pretoria, 1987), p. 139.
51 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, p. 79.
52 Morris Kentridge, I Recall. Memoirs o f Morris Kentridge (Johannesburg, 1959), p. 153; Leslie Blackwell, 
African Occasions: Reminiscences o f Thirty Years o f  Bar. Beach, and Politics in South Africa (Westport, 
1970), pp. 139-140.
140
noting that this was not the first time that the demand for a referendum united Labour 
Party and NP leaders. In February 1909, Tielman Roos and others drew up a petition 
demanding a referendum or new elections on the question of the Union. Both Creswell 
and Sampson of the Labour Party supported his demand.54
The Labour Party’s Thomas Boydell welcomed the eventual decision to stage a 
referendum and spoke of the need for a 'people’s flag.'55 The referendum announcement, 
however, came too late for the embroiled Labour Party and the entire incident proved to 
be an unmitigated electoral disaster. In the 1929 elections its parliamentary representation 
fell from 18 to 8 and the party lost all its seats in the Cape and Natal. In the 1927 
provincial elections the party lost half its seats.56 More importantly, the referendum pledge 
did not avert the later party split and the two factions, the Cresswellites and the 
Councilites, fought each other in the 1929 elections. In 11 constituencies candidates of the 
two factions of the Labour Party entered three way ties involving the SAP, with the SAP 
winning 6 of these. Despite the fact that the Creswell faction again benefited from tactical 
cooperation with the NP, the combined share of the vote for Labour candidates dropped 
off to 9,7 percent, from the 1924 high of 13,4 percent.57
Taking the wind out of Smuts’s sails:
Saker further suggests that the NP themselves 'probably felt that they had much to gain 
from a referendum.'58 Perhaps the most important reason was the NP’s desire to refute 
criticism that it had no mandate for such a policy and evade the charge that it was 'forcing' 
a flag upon an unwilling people,59 by means of its parliamentary majority. This was a 
charge that Jan Smuts made on a national speaking tour at that time.60 In the 1924 election 
the party only secured 34,9 percent of the national vote, and some NP leaders no doubt 
recognised that relying on a parliamentary majority alone would undermine the legitimacy 
of the new flag. The fact that the Westminster system technically allows a party to capture
53 Pamela M. Maud, The Labour Party and the PACT Government: 1924 -  1929', (MA Thesis; University o f  
Natal; Durban, 1978), p. 203.
54 J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos. -  Political Prophet or Opportunist, pp. 21-23; J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos. Sv Rol 
in die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek. 1907-1935 (Pretoria, 1979), pp.26-28.
55 Die Burger. 18 September 1926, The Cape Times. 20 September 1926; Thomas Boydell, Mv Luck’s Still 
In (Cape Town, 1959), p. 69.
56 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, pp. 256-257.
57 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 145,173.
58 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, pp. 61,136.
59 James G. McQuade, 'How South Africa got its National Flag1, in Hjalmar Reitz and Harm Oost (eds). Die 
Nasionale Boek (Johannesburg, 1931), p. 181.
60Smuts in Port Elizabeth. Die Burger. 2 September 1926.
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power with less than 50 percent of the popular vote is an important factor to take into 
consideration.
Smuts, in fact, demanded a referendum on the flag during the tour,61 only days 
before Hertzog announced the referendum. Hertzog viewed the flag bill as a costly 
political exercise, and three weeks prior to calling the referendum, warned the NP that the 
SAP saw the Union Jack issue as a 'soft carpet on the way to victory' in the forthcoming 
elections.62 This was an assessment shared by the Transvaal leader Tielman Roos.63 In 
early September 1926, Hertzog lamented that 'political wire pullers' have kept the issue on 
the boil for political purposes and argued that 'the time has come when the flag shall be 
taken out of their hands [the party politicians] and placed there, where it shall no longer be 
within their reach to be abused for petty party purposes.'64 When announcing the 
referendum, Hertzog emphasised that 'this question should be considered as a national and 
not as a party issue.'65
Hertzog’s decision to promise the referendum thus served to not only address the 
woes of his Labour Party allies, but also ensure that the issue not cloud a future round of 
general elections. Ons Vaderland editor, Gustav Preller, opined that in declaring a 
referendum, Hertzog had managed to 'totally take the wind out of Smuts’s sails.'66 Preller, 
whose supported Roos on the flag issue, pointed out that only days before the 
announcement, Smuts had demanded a referendum in Kuruman, and argued that the fact 
that Smuts’s now opposed the referendum announcement proved that he needed to use the 
flag issue in order to fight the government.67 Die Burger confirmed this assertion and 
added that the NP did not want to impose a flag on the country against the will of the 
people.68
Supporting his Prime Minister in an interview with Die Burger, at the time, Malan 
argued that an ordinary parliamentary majority was insufficient and further argued that the 
decision showed that Hertzog was a democrat. Malan also charged that Smuts wanted the 
flag issue to be an election issue.69
61 The Argus. 12 September1926.
62 A 32, File 24, J.B.M. Hertzog address to the National Party Chief Executive, 31 August 1926.
63 J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos. Sv Rol in die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek. pp. 275,279-280.
64 A 32, File 24, Hertzog address in Cape Town, 6 September 1926. J.
65 A 32, File 24, Hertzog’s referendum announcement, 17 September 1926.
66 Ons Vaderland. 21 September 1926.
67 Ons Vaderland. 21 September 1926.
68 Die Burger. 18 September 1926.
69 Die Burger. 20 September 1926.
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Reflecting on Malan’s 'democratic gloss,' Harry Saker later argued, 'Concern for 
the ‘will of the people’ appears in Malan’s account to have been seen more as a
70compensation of the concession than a reason for it.' The Cape Times also suggested that 
the referendum provided a means to bypass an important institutional and constitutional 
obstacle, the opposition-dominated Senate.71 Thus Saker concludes that the adoption of 
the referendum became an 'act of political necessity.'72 The referendum was, thus, 
designed to serve as a 'lightening rod' and ensure the survival of a tenuous coalition.
Smuts’s SAP, which had demanded a referendum prior to the announcement, now 
came out against a referendum, accusing the government of 'ducking' an issue of great 
national importance. The SAP press echoed these criticisms. The Argus described it as a 
bogus referendum, quoting Smuts’s line (taken from Paul Kruger) that the referendum was 
a 'Splendid funeral after the hanging.'73 The Cape Times echoed this assertion and 
demanded a 2/3 majority and the withdrawal of the flag bill.74 The paper also dismissed 
Malan’s claims that the announcement reflected the party’s democratic nature and mused 
that the spirit behind the call was 'more nationalist than national.'75 J.H. Le Roux and P.W. 
Coetzer suggest that the SAP's opposition to the referendum further strengthened the NP’s
7desire to stage the referendum.
NP divisions over the flag:
Hertzog’s willingness to risk a referendum also spoke volumes for his actual commitment 
to a clean flag. His biographers argue that he reluctantly supported a new flag and believed 
it would alienate many English speakers. Moreover, they contend that he believed that in
77some cases one had to 'sacrifice personal ideals for the sake of national unity.' Hence, 
Hertzog viewed Malan’s flag as a personal crusade and not as a priority for the party. As 
with the republican issue, Hertzog the gradualist called for the NP to give English
7 0
speakers more time to realise they were South Africans. There are also indications that
70 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, p. 61.
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73 The Argus. 18 September 1926.
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70the NP itself was divided on the issue, and the NP’s Transvaal conference displayed less
OA
than enthusiastic support for the flag. Given the level of animosity between Roos and 
Malan, the Transvaal and Cape leaders, such provincial support for, or opposition to the 
flag, is not surprising. The flag controversy also exacerbated tensions between Hertzog 
and the Republican wing of his party,81 which demanded a clean flag. Scholtz suggests 
that the first inklings of the split, which was to follow with Fusion in 1933, were on view
O A
over the flag issue. In general, however, Afrikaners were, at best, docile in regard to the
OA
flag and the agitation against it came primarily from English speakers.
The flag settlement and the cancellation of the referendum:
Responding to the announcement of a referendum, The Rand Daily Mail prophetically 
warned, 'Extremists on both sides will regard the referendum as a tussle in which victory 
must be achieved at all costs.'84 And mounting tensions over the exclusion of the Union 
Jack led to increasing speculation of a civil war. The notorious Bloemhof riot of 30 
September 1927 added credibility to such conjecture.85 Local NP supporters violently 
disrupted the annual SAP fete in the village of Bloemhof, which hosted Smuts as the guest 
of honour. In response to the escalating tension, Smuts and Hertzog, through the 
intercession of the Governor-General, negotiated a flag design in late October 1927, 
thereby obviating the need for a referendum. A substantial parliamentary majority 
supported their flag design, and the 'Flag Settlement' was widely welcomed in the White 
community. The Argus, for example, described it as a return to the spirit of the National 
Convention of 1910.86
Smuts submitted to the House that this was the last of the racial questions and 
suggested that this was more than a flag settlement. This was indeed true, for the 
settlement, in part, paved the way for the creation of the United Party under Smuts and 
Hertzog in 1933.87 Malan, who was later to leave the NP after Fusion, opposed the 
cancellation of the referendum and the Smuts-Hertzog deal. Years later, he blamed
79 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. pp. 55-56, 70-71; J.H. Le Roux, P.W. Coetzer and 
A.H. Marais, Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 335
80 The Rand Daily Mail. 4 September 1926.
81 At van Wyk, Die Keeromstraat Kliek. Die Burger en die Politiek van Koalisie en Saamesmelting, 1932- 
1934 (Kaapstad. 1983), p. 19.
82 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. pp. 169-170.
83 PV 18, C.R. Swart Collection, File 3/1/7. In a letter to Blackie Swart, A.J. Werth (dated 26 July 1926) 
bemoaned the fact that Afrikaners were so quiet on the issue.
84 The Rand Daily Mail. 18 September 1926.
85 Harold Saker, The South African Flag Controversy, p. 206.
86 The Argus. 26 October 1927.
87 J.H. Le Roux en P.W. Coetzer, Die Nasionale Party Peel 2. p. 296.
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Tielman Roos and the Anti-Creswell (National Council) of the Labour Party.88 According
OQ
to Roos’s biographer, the Transvaal leader feared defeat in a referendum.
Though no referendum was held, the flag controversy further contributed towards 
the emergence of the referendum mechanism as a key instrument in negotiating English- 
Affikaans relations. Moreover, the flag struggle also underscored the limitations of a 
simple parliamentary majority in determining the symbols and constitutional status of a 
divided society, especially where a Westminster system does not give relative 
representative weight to each community. The flag controversy, therefore, abetted the 
NP’s adoption of the referendum highlighted the evolution of the referendum mechanism 
from being a tactical ploy, deployed in opposition, to a tool for maintaining political 
power. The argument that a referendum places an issue above party politics, which 
became a central motif of the NP’s discourse on referenda, first emerged here. It was a 
theme that Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, Botha and de Klerk would return to.
The Balfour Declaration and republicanism:
As already noted the flag question served as an allegory for an internal NP struggle 
between the republican wing of the party and the Hertzogites. At a time when the PACT 
agreement limited the promotion of secession/ republicanism, the republican wing viewed 
the flag issue as a substitute for a republic. The republican wing’s support for Malan’s 
positions on the flag issue, in part, explains his later cooperation with the group of the 
party at the time of Fusion (to be discussed in the next chapter).
The announcement of the flag referendum preceded Hertzog’s departure to the 
1926 Imperial Conference in London. The conference, and the resultant Balfour 
Declaration, soon emerged as a central locus of internal party conflict. Hertzog played a 
leading role in the conference and securing the Declaration, which set out to clarify the 
relationship between Britain and her Dominions. G.D. Scholtz suggests that Hertzog 
might have pledged the referendum in order to remove the issue from the public agenda, 
as division at home would weaken him at the Imperial Conference. Hertzog viewed 
attaining clarity on the Union’s constitutional position as an absolute priority.90 In effect, 
the Balfour Declaration recognised that Britain and the Dominions were equal in stature,
88 From 29 January to 5 February 1957 D.F. Malan re-told his version o f  events surrounding the flag struggle 
in Die Burger.
89 J.P. Brits* Tielman Roos -  Political Prophet or Opportunist, p. 159; J.P. Brits, Tielman Roos. Sv Rol in 
die Suid Afrikaanse Politiek. p. 289.
90 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. pp. 162, 168.
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implying that the Union was, in theory, able to claim the right to secession. G.H. Calpin 
describes the Declaration as a 'masterpiece of ambiguity,' which penned the 'feeling of the 
Empire in words which leave the foreigner guessing at the meaning of the Commonwealth 
of nations and provide the rebel Dominion with subjects for interminable debate.'91
Hertzog, who returned to the Union, triumphantly, claimed that South Africa 
gained a level of independence within the British Empire that obviated secession and, by
M
definition, republicanism. His position deeply upset the Republican wing of his party, 
and these tensions were exacerbated when Hertzog sought to amend Article 4 of the NP’s 
constitution. The amended article, adopted in 1927, now read,
'The National Party accepts the declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926 
and agrees that it amounts to the attainment of Sovereign Independence and of 
the power to exercise our state functions according to our own wishes. The 
opinion is further expressed that the party is strongly against any attempt, in 
action or policy, which might restrict this freedom or existing rights. Any such 
attempt will be strenuously opposed.'93
Republican resistance to Hertzog emerges:
Hertzog’s decision to amend Article 4 was, to some extent, influenced by the approaching 
1929 general election,94 and no doubt served to sustain the PACT arrangement. The 
argument that secession or independence did not imply republicanism was certainly 
consistent with his pre-PACT position,95 and his desire to broaden the appeal of the party. 
Hertzog no doubt feared that the ebbing economic situation would leave the party 
vulnerable to the SAP on the republican issue in these elections, and the longer the party 
had been in power, the less inclined its leadership was to raise the republican banner.96 
The fact that the NP’s share of the vote increased, despite this change, certainly vindicates 
Hertzog’s gambit. Hertzog could hardly afford not to alter Article 4, as a failure to do so 
would in fact deny the great achievement he claimed. With the Balfour Declaration 
Hertzog, in fact, lost the secession issue as a tool for mobilisation.97 And, accordingly, he
QQ
held that the 'further step to a Republic must rest on the broad basis of national will.'
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98 Ibid. p. 220.
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The Republican wing of the party vehemently opposed the amendment of Article 
Four. In addition, D.F Malan and De Burger also opposed the change to Article 4, in part, 
out of fear of having to confront the republicans." The cardinal difference between the 
positions of Malan and Hertzog, on the amendment of Article Four, was that the former 
viewed Republicanism as a danger to harmony between the two White communities, while 
Malan regarded Republicanism as a danger to the party.100 The republicans were, 
however, reluctant to break from the NP at this stage.101 The fact that there was little
109opposition to the amendment in the eventual votes within the party structures suggests 
that there was probably little popular support for republicanism. The fear of splitting from 
the party over Article Four was also driven by a deeper fear that the formation of a 
republican party would undermine republicanism. Republican leaders like N.J. van der 
Merwe seem to have realised that, asked to choose between the Republican idea and 
loyalty to Hertzog, the NP faithful would support their leader.1W
The referendum’s acceptance:
As demonstrated in this chapter, the referendum handily served the NP in navigating its 
first major crisis as the ruling party. In dealing with the flag issue, Hertzog had set a 
precedent according to which referenda were deployed to settle issues that divided Whites, 
and a script for negotiating major symbolic questions and divisions within the party over 
these issues had been developed. Hertzog was ultimately pressed to call a referendum in 
order to resolve tensions within his party (between the Cape and Transvaal leaders) and 
within the coalition over a salient issue, and deny the SAP any space within which to 
mobilise opposition to his government in the 1929 general elections. Besides, Hertzog was 
not that deeply committed to Malan’s flag.
The promise to stage a flag referendum, however, failed to address the inherent 
tensions within ruling party and its junior ally. Whilst the latter eventually split, the ruling 
party entered into a long-running battle between the radical republican (organic/ eastern) 
elements and the moderate (civic) wings. This clash was to be the defining clash within 
South African politics in the 1930 and would ultimately see the NP split after Fusion and 
led to Hertzog’s defeat.
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100 H.B. Thom (Edited M.C.E. van Schoor), Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalisie (Kaapstad, 1988), pp. 39-40.
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Hertzog’s opponents in the Republikeinsbond [Republican League], identified with 
the Broederbond, repudiated Hertzog’s moderate nationalism, and embraced 
republicanism.104 According to Dan O’Meara, the developments after the Balfour 
Declaration encouraged the Broederbond to assume the Vanguard mantle of Afrikaner 
nationalism.'105 Hertzog feared that the group sought to depose him,106 and tensions 
between the two increased, reaching the peak when Hertzog and Smuts formed a coalition 
government in response to the worsening economic crisis. The Balfour Declaration and 
the amendment of Article Four paved the way to the political fusion that followed from
I  A*7
this coalition. The final catalyst for the welding together of Smuts and Hertzog was the 
global economic crisis of the early 1930’s. And it is to the story of Fusion and its 
consequences that we turn in the ensuing chapter.
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Chapter Seven.
From Fusion to war: The radicalisation of Afrikaner nationalism.
Parliament had decided many things: that South Africa should have two 
official languages that it should have two anthems, two flags and two capitals; 
and that, in essentials, and non essentials, there should be equality o f status 
and opportunity, a fifty-fifty ratio, and a sort o f national charity in all things.
But there was now a case which could not be divided into equal parts or 
settled by the South African genius o f duality. You might have two flags, two 
songs, two languages, but you could not have two conditions o f war and 
peace. The decision about war must be an outright decision. There was no 
escape from it, no alternative.1
The referendum contested:
The 1930s witnessed the growing radicalisation of Afrikaner nationalist politics and the 
adoption of republicanism. This process was more pronounced after J.B.M. Hertzog and 
J.C. Smuts captured the middle ground by combining their two parties to form the United 
Party (UP). In the process, both parties jettisoned their more radical wings, and Hertzog’s 
National Party in the Cape and Nationalists elsewhere opted to pursue and independent 
path. In order to distinguish itself from the UP, its new leader D.F. Malan allowed the 
Gesuiwerde or Purified National Party (GNP) to become more aggressive in its pursuit of 
a republic. Further radicalisation was to follow, as European political fashions were 
imported to South Africa, and many in the party embraced an organic definition of 
citizenship and Anti-Semitism. The full force of these ideas was unleashed after the 
country’s decision to enter the war on Britain’s side after a controversial parliamentary 
vote. This chapter examines this period and its impact on the referendum debate.
It is important to do because it was during this period that the now purified NP’s 
commitment to a referendum on a republic was contested by impatient republicans, who 
held increased sway. Their challenge was initially seen off by Malan and the Cape 
leadership, but was revitalised by the war vote. Their challenge formed part of a wider 
onslaught against representative (Westminster) democracy, which had purportedly failed 
the Afrikaner in the war vote, and reflected the growing appeal of fascism and National 
Socialism -  which eschewed party democracy. The challenge to the acceptability of a 
referendum also reflected the rejection of Hertzog, his civic white nationalism and his 
incremental approach. For many the constitutional path to a republic, which was a central
1 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans (London, 1941), p. 248.
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feature of Hertzogism, was obviated by the prospect of a German victory and the 
restoration of independence after Britain’s defeat.
Unable to outbid the radical fascist groups, Malan abandoned his initial stratagem 
of breaking right, and now sought to steer his party back to constitutional politics. 
Rejecting both imperialism and Nazism, at a time when German victory seemed 
increasingly elusive, Malan embraced a return to Boer democracy. The US’s entry into the 
War and the German setbacks on the Eastern Front confirmed that the constitutional path 
was the only game in town and required that the party improve its electoral prospects. A 
republic was simply not appealing enough in order to win elections and the 1943 elections 
confirmed this. The road to power lay in playing down the republican issue, and the party 
returned to its traditional use of the referendum pledge as part of its electoral heresthetics. 
The politics of the referendum from Fusion to the end of the War, especially challenges to 
the referendum pledge on a republic, provides important insights into the role of the 
referendum in NP political thinking.
The genesis of Fusion:
The resolution of the flag issue and South Africa’s worsening economic situation, 
following the world economic depression of the early 1930s, paved the way for the 
unification of the NP and SAP. The two amalgamated to form the United South African 
National Party or United Party (UP) in early December 1934, signalling a renewed attempt 
by Smuts and Hertzog to pursue conciliation.2 The basis for this political marriage, widely 
referred to as Fusion, was Hertzog’s abandonment of a republican platform, in exchange
'i
for Smuts’s acquiescence in the removal of Cape Africans from the common voters role. 
Hertzog was increasingly confident that the majority of his compatriots now embraced the 
principle of 'South Africa first,' and, having fulfilled many of the NP’s stated objectives, 
prior to 1924, surmised that cultural segregation was no longer necessary. Having served 
as Prime Minister since 1924, Hertzog could hardly assent that full equality between 
English and Afrikaners did not exist.4 To do otherwise would constitute an admission of 
failure.
2 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, The 
Rise and Crisis o f Afrikaner Power (Cape Town, 1979), p. 104.
3 Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika. The Impact o f the Radical Right on the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (Hanover and London, 1991), p. 35.
4 B.K. Long, In Smuts’s Camp (London, 1945), p. 35.
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No less an important motivation for Hertzog was his very real concern that the NP 
would be defeated in the 1934 elections.5 The economic crisis and his government’s 
insistence on remaining linked to the Gold Standard, as a demonstration of the country’s 
independence in monetary policy, had made the government highly unpopular. Fusion, 
then, was 'essentially the child of depression.'6 One ardent Malan supporter 
impressionistically claims that Hertzog, influenced by German philosopher Oswald
n
Spengler, was disillusioned with democracy and wished to do away with party politics. 
Yet another reason why Hertzog desired a coalition and later Fusion was his inability to 
secure a sufficient majority in order to introduce the racial legislation he was anxious to
D
promote. Finally, there was widespread public support for such political cooperation and 
Fusion, especially as a result of the economic crisis.
According to F.S. Crafford, Smuts pursued Fusion with an eye to the impending 
war with the intention of breaking the neutrality party. Crafford adds that it was his 'most 
amazing experiment in holism.'9 This assertion, however, seems questionable as Adolph 
Hitler did not pose a threat to world peace at the time of Fusion, and both Hertzog and 
Smuts had hoped that the question of neutrality, in the advent of war, would never have to 
be answered. Alan Paton, who authored the biography of Smuts's brilliant deputy, Jan 
Hofmeyer, argues that Smuts only became convinced that Hitler was a threat in 1938. 
Paton adds that it was rather the threat of Hitler which explains why Smuts was prepared 
to keep the UP united.10 Sampie Terreblanche contends that for Smuts Fusion was 
designed to abet the efforts of gold mining companies, long-standing allies, to avoid the 
taxation of the gold bonanza, after the country left the Gold Standard.11 A far more 
unelaborated explanation might be that Smuts, attentive as he was to public opinion, did
19not want to stand in the way of the clamour for unity at a time of severe economic crisis.
5 David Welsh, ’The Politics o f White Supremacy', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds). Change 
in Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 56; D.W. Kruger, South African Parties 
and Policies. 1910 -  1960. A Select Source Book (Cape Town, 1960), p. 81; Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in 
die Politiek (Johannesburg, 1978), p. 20.
6 William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager. The Rise o f Afrikaner Nationalism (London, 1965), p. 54; Dan 
O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. Class. Capital and Ideology in the Development o f  Afrikaner Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1983), p. 56.
7 H.B. Thom (Edited M.C.E. van Schoor), Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalisie (Kaapstad, 1988), pp. 17, 97.
8 Ibid. pp. 24,30.
9 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts. A Biography (Cape Town, 1945), pp. 270,275.
10 Alan Paton, Hofrnever. Abridged Edition (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 172, 201,248, 
255.
11 Sampie Terreblanche, A History o f Inequality in South Africa. 1652-2002 (Pietermaritzburg, 2003), p. 
275.
12 Alan Paton, Hofrnever. p. 144.
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Purifying nationalism:
Whilst Hertzog indeed 'carried with him into the United Party practically all the great
1
principles of Nationalism,' he failed to convince 'all the nationalists' to join him. The 
most important of these was the Party’s Cape leader, D.F. Malan, who opposed this 
political union and eventually broke with Hertzog along with several sitting MPs, almost 
all from the Cape. Malan and his followers formed the Purified National (Gesuiwerde 
Nasionale) Party or GNP.
Malan and his supporters opposed Fusion for several reasons.14 One reason was 
their conviction that Afrikaners had not sufficiently asserted themselves in the cultural and 
economic spheres.15 But, beyond misgivings over the timing of Fusion, many of Malan’s 
supporters, who embraced an exclusivist definition of citizenship, dismissed the very 
prospect of white unity.16 The Malanites, no doubt, also feared that the interests of English
17mining and Jewish capital would drive the new party’s agenda. There was also a fear 
that the party’s key ideological pillars would be sacrificed in the Fusion process. Eric 
Louw, for example, cited the precedent of British Liberal Party, which gradually lost out
151to the Labour Party after the wartime national government. On a personal level, there 
were Nationalists who realised that Fusion would relegate them to lesser importance and 
dilute their influence.19 Hertzog’s biographer claims that the personal disappointment of 
legislators, not rewarded with office, drove the tensions between Hertzog and the
7fiRepublican wing of the party. Some Malan supporters argue that Malan, in contrast to 
Hertzog, was a committed democrat, suggesting that he opposed Fusion in support of 
democracy.21 The argument that Malan was a committed democrat is also said to explain
77his later opposition to the Ossewa Brandwag and The New Order. Such claims are,
13 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation. A History o f the Union o f South Africa. 1910 -  1961 
(Johannesburg, 1969), p. 173; Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism and the Rise o f  the Afrikaner 
Broederbond. In South Africa 1918-1948. Edited by Saul Dubow (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1990), pp. 84- 
85.
14 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity1, pp. 109 -  111; Michael Roberts and A.E.G. 
Trollip, The South African Opposition 1939-1945. An Essay in Contemporary History (Cape Town, 1947), 
pp. 8-13.
1 Die Burger. Leader, 8 November 1934.
16 Newell M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition. 1934 -  1948 (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1974), pp. 36- 
39, Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek. A Study o f the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation (London, 1957), 
p. 104.
17 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. 1888-1940 (Johannesburg, 1943), pp. 236-237, Die 
Burger. Leader, 8 & 15 November 1933.
18 H.B. Thom, Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalisie. p. 113.
19 Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog (Cape Town, 1957), pp. 154,182.
20 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog (Johannesburg, 1946), p. 222.
21 H.B. Thom, Dr. D.F. Malan en Koalisie. p. 98.
22 H.B. Thom. D.F. Malan (Kaapstad, 1980), p. 17.
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however, highly suspect, for as will shortly be demonstrated, Malan was quite happy to 
abandon the democratic path from 1939 to the middle of 1941. It was only after it became 
clear to Malan that America's entry into the war would preclude a Nazi victory that he 
resumed his unambiguous support for democracy. The Malanites additionally feared that 
Fusion and partnership with Smuts, of whom they were deeply suspicious, would involve 
stronger ties with Britain. The materialist explanation for the Cape’s opposition to Fusion 
is that Cape wool farmers feared that they would lose access to the German market.
Malan breaks with Hertzog.
Malan and Hertzog’s public disagreements, on matters of principle, centred on two inter­
related issues. These were the question of South Africa’s sovereign independence and 
relations with the Commonwealth,24 and differing interpretations of the Balfour 
Declaration. Hertzog held that the Declaration and the derivative 1931 Statute of 
Westminster25 had provided for the country’s constitutional independence. Malan, who 
had previously refrained from confronting Hertzog on his interpretation of the Balfour 
Declaration, presciently highlighted South Africa’s theoretical right to neutrality in a war 
that involved Britain. Significantly though, Malan and Hertzog agreed, with the consent of 
Smuts, that members the prospective UP could advocate a republic. The fact that Smuts 
accepted the traditional NP position on this issue reflected somewhat of a victory for 
Hertzog. It is further worth adding that the new party’s final programme of principles 
indeed allowed for this, despite Malan’s decision not to support Fusion.
Ultimately, however, Hertzog was unwilling to accede to Malan’s new demand 
that republicanism become a test of party membership for the proposed United Party.26 
Hertzog’s biographers suggest that he had long concluded that transforming the NP into a 
purely republican party would spell the party’s 'destruction' and lead to the 'demise of the 
Afrikaner.'27 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip suggest that the discord is explained by 
Malan’s conclusion that national unity would be secured by a republic. In contrast, 
Hertzog believed that a republic should be preceded by unity.
23 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. pp. 46,49-50.
24 Newell. M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition, p. 34.
25 The Westminster Statute repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act o f 1865 and enshrined the legislative 
sovereignty o f the parliaments of the Dominions.
26 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 9.
27 J.H. Le Roux, P.W. Coetzer, P.W. and A.H. Marais (eds), Generaal J.B.M. Hertzog. Sv strewe en Stryd. 
Volume 1 (Johannesburg. 1987), p. 321.
28 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 16; William Henry Vatcher Jr., 
White Laager, p. 54.
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Given that the National Party did not demand a commitment to republicanism of 
its members on the eve of Fusion, it seems likely that this demand was a rather transparent 
obstacle introduced by Malan in order to scupper Fusion. Malan’s sudden fervent support 
for republicanism is indeed strange when considering that he had been a sceptical 
republican.29 Moreover, the Purified NP (GNP) only made support for republicanism a 
condition for party membership in 1936, and Malan initially staved off efforts to radicalise 
the party’s republican position.
H.B. Thom defends Malan’s republican track record and claims that his decision to 
play down the republican issue, at certain times, was driven by tactical considerations.30 
By the same logic, one could argue that Malan at other times articulated a republican 
position for the self-same tactical considerations. Interestingly, Malan’s party perpetuated 
Hertzog’s pledge that a change in the country’s constitutional status be preceded by an 
expression of broad popular will, i.e. a referendum.
The salience of ideological issues and the republican issue in explaining Malan’s 
opposition to Fusion, therefore, seems debatable. Moreover, Die Burger, which was 
closely linked to Malan, did not actively support the Republican wing of the National
-j I
Party, in their struggle with Hertzog from 1926-1933. Besides, At van Wyk 
demonstrates how Die Burger editor, Dr. A.L. Geyer, prodded a reluctant Malan to split 
from Hertzog. Geyer viewed coalition and Fusion as an SAP trap. Similar pressure was 
brought to bear by the Broederbond.33
Support for, or opposition to, Fusion was often a function of personal fealty. 
Whereas former Boer Generals Smuts and Hertzog carried their supporters in the 
Transvaal and, less so, in the Free State,34 Malan’s support came almost exclusively from 
the Cape, which had no republican tradition. In the Cape rural district of Beuafort West,
'X Kfor example, only 3 NP members reportedly joined the UP after Fusion. O’Meara 
accounts for the lack of republican fervour in the Cape because its farmers feared of losing 
access to lucrative imperial export markets. Why then did Malan indulge republicanism?
29 At van Wyk, Die Keeromstraat Kliek. Die Burger en die Politiek van Koalisie en Saamesmelting. 1932- 
1934 (Kaapstad, 1983), p. 131; P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux, Die Nasionale Party. Peel 4. Die 
“Gesuiwerde” Nasionale Party. 1934-1940 (Bloemfontein. 1986), pp. 142, 184.
30 H.B. Thom, D.F. Malan. pp. 14, 18-20.
31 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. p. 201.
32 At van Wyk, Die Keeromstraat Kliek. pp. 19, 74 -  79, 87, 116-118,136-145, 153.
33 J.H.P. Serfontein, Brotherhood o f Power (London., 1979), p. 40.
34 According to O’Meara, the rural farmers in the Transvaal and Free State and Cape supported Fusion, 
leaving only the petty bourgeoisie to support the purified NP. Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. pp. 50-51.
35 D.F. Malan Collection. File 1/1/2307, Letter from Eric Louw to D.F. Malan, 16 July 1947.
36 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. pp. 46,49-52.
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As will be suggested shortly, he did so in order to set the HNP apart from the UP and 
accommodate the northern nationalists.
An analysis of the 1938 elections shows that whilst the HNP garnered 29,6 percent 
of the vote, nationally, its Cape support was 35,6 percent, and its Free State support an 
impressive 46,8 percent. In the supposedly Republican Transvaal, the party received only 
23,7 percent of the vote. There are three possible explanations for the GNP's success in 
the Cape, despite the absence of a republican tradition in the province. The first is Malan's 
personal stature, and the second his control of Naspers and Die Burger. The GNP's control 
of the paper ensured that it held together its 'imagined community,' and its relatively high 
support in the Free State, despite Hertzog's standing, must also be attributed to the 
Volksblad's support for the GNP. In contrast, the party did not do that well in the 
republican Transvaal, where it had no newspaper until October 1937. Thirdly, the party 
broke with many sitting MPs in the Cape and largely maintained its structures. The fact 
that only a few sitting MPs outside of the Cape joined Malan undermined its ability to 
make significant inroads elsewhere. The weak parliamentary representation in the Free 
State and the Transvaal, which continued until 1943, paved the way for extra- 
parliamentary groups, like the Broederbond, to set the agenda, and lead the 'ideological 
transformation' of the Purified NP in these provinces.
Fusion and Republicanism:
Fusion also had far reaching consequences for republicanism, as it increased the influence 
of republican elements and the Afrikaner Broederbond*9 within the party, and facilitated 
its transformation into a republican party.40 J.G. Strijdom, a little known front-bencher and 
republican only elected in 1929, was suddenly promoted to Transvaal leader of the new 
party by virtue of being the sole sitting Transvaal MP who broke with Hertzog. Under the 
influence of the Broederbond,41 Strijdom is said to have played a significant role in 
encouraging Malan, to embrace republicanism.42 Similarly, the Free State leadership 
included principled republican activists like N.J. van der Merwe who lobbied Malan on
37 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. 1910-1976 (Pretoria, 1977), p. 237.
38 Dan O’Meara. Volkskapitalisme. pp. 51, 64, 120.
39 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism, p. 47.
40 Die Transvaler. Leader, 11 October 1937, 1 June 1943. In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. Die 
Republikein. Hoofartikles uit Die Transvaler 1937 -  1948 (Kaapstad en Johannesburg, 1972), pp. 9, 83-85; 
David Welsh, 'The Politics o f White Supremacy', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds). Change in 
Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 57.
41 J.H.P. Serfontein, Brotherhood o f Power, p. 40.
42 D.W. Kruger, The Making o f a Nation, pp. 188,287-288,312.
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this issue.43 A leading Broederbond activist, A.C. van Rooy, in fact claimed that the 
organisation created the GNP in order to serve as an instrument for Republicanism,44 and 
the organisation called upon its members to join the party.45
Malan, though a reluctant republican, had several reasons to embrace a republican 
agenda. As already noted, his strategy for winning political power was through securing a 
monopoly of Afrikaans support as the basis for political power. Afrikaner nationalism, 
which was essentially a modem and urban phenomenon,46 found its marshalling project in 
the republican drive. This was especially so in the Transvaal.47 As editor of Die 
Transvaler, H.F. Verwoerd argued 'when a people has clarity over its goal, much is 
already gained.'48 D.F. Malan undoubtedly recognised the tactical value of the republican 
banner for mobilising support for his party. But the Cape leadership was more cautious. 
The real extent of support for Republicanism until the outbreak of World War Two, 
however, remains unclear. In the first post-Fusion general elections the GNP secured just 
under a third of voters nationally, which represents over 50 percent of the Afrikaans 
voters. The ease with which Tielman Roos abandoned Republicanism in 1932,49 along 
with Thom’s explanation of Malan’s inconsistent republican track record, suggests that it 
primarily served as a tactical ploy for opposition politicians.
According to N.J. van der Merwe’s biographer, a switch to a republican agenda 
was essential in securing the support of the republicans for the GNP.50 Patrick Furlong 
also suggests that had Malan refused to embrace the agenda of his northern colleagues, 
they may well have forced him to abandon the Nationalist cause.51 And the threat of a 
republican party, outflanking the GNP on the right, particularly in the north, also 
encouraged Malan to agree to the party becoming republican. A third reason to embrace 
republicanism was that it legitimised the break with Hertzog and served to differentiate the
43 Piet Meiring, Fvvtig Jaar op die Voorblad (Johannesburg, 1979), p. 50.
44 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism. pp. 89, 91,94.
45 At van Wyk. Die Keeromstraat Kliek. p. 166.
46 Andre du Toit, 'Ideological Change, Afrikaner Nationalism, and Pragmatic Racial Domination in South 
Africa', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds). Change in Contemporary South Africa, p. 32; David 
Welsh, Urbanization and the Solidarity o f Afrikaner Nationalism', The Journal o f Modem African Studies. 
7, 2 ,1969, pp. 265-276; Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. p. 72.
47 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1148, Mrs. M. Jansen to D.F. Malan, 12 September 1935.
48 Die Transvaler. Leader, 6 August 1941. In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 71.
49 Piet Meiring, Fvvtig Jaar op die Voorblad. p. 43.
50 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. p. 298; P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux, Die 
Nasionale Party. Peel 4 . p. 21.
51 Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 115.
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GNP from the UP, and allowed it to appeal to Afrikaners.52 Ahead of the 1938 elections, 
for example, the GNP sought to argue that the United Party 'stood for precisely those 
things that the [jingoist] Dominion Party stood for, only differing in method.'53 In a 
fascinating letter to A.L. Geyer in 1933, a Free State GNP leader A.J. Werth warned that a 
new national movement could not be formed on tactic alone. Werth argued that the 'harder 
the fight (without kid gloves) and the greater the number of casualties left lying on the 
battlefield, the faster we can shock the people’s conscience and reach our goal.'54
The UP’s success in capturing the political centre, therefore, forced the Purified 
NP to adopt 'even more narrow, isolationist and reactionary attitudes.'55 The GNP’s 
embrace of anti-Semitism after Fusion is yet another example of this post-Fusion 
radicalisation.56 Furthermore, adopting a fiery republican posture also abetted the GNP 
stratagem of laying bare and aggravating prevailing tensions within the UP on the issues 
of neutrality and secession. Malan thus embraced republicanism in order to ensure his 
political survival and that of his new party.
The republic and bree volkswil:
The GNP’s fervent embrace of republicanism was, however, accompanied by the 
preservation of the existing principle that a republic could only come into being on the 
'broad basis of the people’s will, [and] on the basis of racial and language equality.'57 This 
move by Malan to maintain the formulation that had served Hertzog’s party, however, 
sparked an acrimonious struggle within the party, as the Free State and Transvaal resisted 
the formula. Their resistance provides a fascinating insight into the patently tactical role of 
the referendum, as seen from a Republican perspective. Malan and the Cape finally won 
the day. And the continued use of the referendum for tactical purposes- whilst in 
opposition - cast a long shadow, and explains its eventual use in 1960 over the issue of a 
republic.
The Cape leadership, though willing to indulge greater identification with the 
republican quest, also wished to appeal to non-republican voters, especially at election
52 Newell. M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition, p. 48; G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die 
Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. 1924-1939 (Pretoria, 1979), p. 569; Die Transvaler. 1 October 
1937.
53 Die Burger. Leader, 13 May 1938.
54 A.L. Geyer Collection. Volume 1, A.J. Werth to A.L. Geyer. 18 December 1933.
55 Newell. M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition, p. 44.
56 It is worth mentioning that Hertzog’s NP fielded a Jewish candidate (H.J. Schlosberg) in the high profile 
Germiston by-election o f late November 1932. In 1936 the party denied Jews party membership.
57 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1110, Federal Committee debate on the party’s Republican position in 1935.
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time. The Cape leadership and Malan, in fact, feared that the party’s strong republican
ro
bent would alienate many voters in the Cape, and elsewhere, especially in urban areas. 
One example of a leading Hertzog supporter, and later leader of the National Party in the 
Transvaal, who was not a republican at the time of Fusion, is Ben Schoeman, who served 
as an NP minister from 1948 to 1974.59 H.F. Verwoerd’s long-serving aide, Fred Barnard, 
also notes that at the time of the formation of the GNP there were many nationalists who 
were 'fiery opponents of the republic.'60 Explaining his approach to the republican issue in 
September 1935, to the Party’s Federal Council, Malan warned,
If the nation gets the impression that we go about the republican issue in an 
irresponsible manner then both republicanism and the GNP will be doomed.
The possibility of realising the ideal depends on our ability to carry moderate 
elements with us. If we do not do this we will not attain our objective. It is for 
this reason that the Federal Committee [of the GNP] wishes, in the first place, 
to clarify that we only want to attain a republic through constitutional means.
This we only want, when through referendum [or] in a general election called 
for this purpose.... Ensuring that this is the will of the nation... It would be 
foolhardy if we leave any doubt on this issue and even more destructive if we 
pursue revolutionary methods.61
In defending this position, Malan also noted that the only alternative to attaining a 
republic through constitutional means, on the basis of broad popular will was through 
violence. This, he noted, had disastrous consequences in the 1914 rebellion. 
Confirmation of the party’s desire to appeal to non-republicans is provided by the GNP’s 
1938-election campaign. Malan noted that the republican issue should not be dragged into 
the general election and submitted that that it should be kept 'above party politics,' and be 
a product of volkswil. Malan further added that a referendum would allow voters to 
support the GNP’s racial and anti-Jewish policies, comfortable in the knowledge that their 
vote would not be 'abused' for the purpose of creating a republic.63 Speaking at a Heilbron 
(Orange Free State), Malan noted that the GNP would not use a simple majority to bring 
about a republic.64 Days ahead of the vote, Die Burger presented a list of nine issues it 
defined as being seminal to the vote. Interestingly, the republic was not featured in this
58 P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux, Die Nasionale Party. Peel 4 . p. 17.
59 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek. p. 26
60 Fred Barnard, 13 Jaar in die Skadu van Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (Johannesburg, 1967), p. 116.
61 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. p. 302 - 303.
62 P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux. Die Nasionale Party. Peel 4 . p. 17; G.D. Scholtz. Dr. Nicolaas Johannes 
van der Merwe. pp. 302 - 303.
63 Die Burger. 30 April 1938; P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux. Die Nasionale Party. Peel 4 . pp. 142-143.
64 Die Burger. 3 May 1938.
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list. Instead, the paper highlighted racial policies, the UP’s support for mining interests 
and Fusion.65 Despite its radicalisation, the party and its Cape dominated leadership, 
continued to view the referendum pledge as a vital instrument in its electoral heresthetics.
One further reason why Malan may not have wished to overemphasise the 
republican issue in the campaign was that his own republican credentials were in question. 
The UP’s mouthpiece Die Suiderstem published a stinging leader in November 1937, 
which took Malan to task for his indifference to republicanism. The paper supplemented 
this leader with an array of quotes from Malan’s long political career that gave credence to 
this claim.66 In his Dordrecht speaking engagement on the campaign trail, Malan was in 
fact questioned on the Party’s republican commitment.67
Transvaal resistance:
/Q
From the Transvaal and Free State perspective, the .Malan led Federal Council 
formulation implied that there was little difference between the UP and the GNP. And the 
Transvaal party sought to defy Malan and the Federal Committee’s formulation on the 
republican issue, by adopting their own formula, which made no reference to a 
referendum. The Transvaal party program was hastily adopted ahead of the acceptance of 
the Federal manifesto, and the hardliners introduced a clause, which could only be 
changed by a two-thirds majority. In contrast to the Cape’s moderation, the Transvaal and 
Free State parties not only demanded that the party explicitly adopt the creation of a 
republic as its goal and sought to remove the party’s commitment to a referendum, but the 
Transvaal leadership also called for Afrikaans to be the only official language.69 The 
Transvaal party was particularly assertive on this issue, as it was deeply concerned that it
7 fiwould be unable to maintain the support of urban Afrikaners without such an objective. 
Explaining the decision to adopt the more radical position to Malan, Strijdom noted that it 
was 'increasingly clear' to him that it was highly unlikely that the Federal formulation 
would be accepted in the Transvaal. Interestingly, Strijdom informed Malan that the 
stream of urbanisation to the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg area) made the area the focus
65 Die Burger. Leader, 4 May 1938.
66 Die Suiderstem. Leader, 8 November 1937.
67 Die Burger. 7 Mav 1938.
68 There was also disaffection with the Cape's reluctance on the republican issue in Natal, as demonstrated 
by H.T.W. Tromp, who insisted that the Cape fall in line with the other three provinces, which were declared 
republican parties. D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1149, Letter from H.T.W. Tromp to D.F. Malan, 16 
September.
69 J.L. Basson, J.G. Strijdom. Sv Politieke Loopbaan van 1929 tot 1948 (Pretoria, 1980).pp. 94-110.
70 Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 19.
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of politics and long-term survival of the volk.71 Some leading Transvaal activists even 
proposed the formation of a Republican Party, though J.G. Strijdom prudently opposed 
this suggestion as well as the later call to rename the Purified NP as the Republican Party.
77He recognised that such a move would limit its appeal.
The Transvaal Party’s draft platform was obviously at variance with the
n'xformulation of the Federal Council, where Malan’s position was dominant, and 
prompted a major Cape -  Transvaal crisis between July 1935 and September 1936.74 
Malan, though expressing his willingness to make every effort to ensure party and volk 
unity, warned Strijdom that the Transvaal’s provincialism was destructive, and added that 
divisions over the issue would play into the hands of the party’s opponents. Malan also 
emphasised that the 'the Federal Council wishes to openly and clearly follow a 
constitutional path towards republic through the use of our sovereign independence rights.' 
The party leader cautioned that the Transvaal’s formulation implied that the party 
embraced the path of revolution towards a republic and constituted a rejection of the NP’s
nc
policies of the past twenty years.
Angered by the party’s prudence on creating a republic, several members of the 
provincial executive resigned weeks before provincial elections in 1936. The group, 
opposed to the idea of bree volkswil, in effect demanded that the GNP commit itself to 
securing a republic in its first term in office.76 The radicals controlled the party’s 
provincial mouthpiece Die Republikein [The Republican] and refused to support the 
party’s adulterated republican position. The Transvaal republicans warned Malan that a 
failure to embrace the Transvaal’s formulation would limit the new party’s appeal 
amongst the youth and play into the hands of those who sought to argue that there was no 
substantive difference between the supporters of Fusion and the Purified NP. Moreover, 
the group believed that it was incumbent upon Malan and Die Burger to swing the Cape 
party behind the Transvaal formulation. Indicative of the intolerance towards moderates, 
the Transvaal republicans stated that to date far to much consideration had been given to 
'persons that we cannot today rely upon as good nationalists.'77 In later correspondence,
71 D.F. Malan Collection. File 1/1/1145, Letter from J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan, 2 September 1935..
72 J.L. Basson, J.G. Strijdom. pp. 79-81, 86.
73 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. p. 457.
74 G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes van der Merwe. pp. 299 - 303.
75 D.F. Malan Collection. File 1/1/1146, Letter from D.F. Malan to J.G. Strijdom, 8 September 1935.
76 A 2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, File 53, Letter from Mrs. MM Jansen and Adv. J.G. Strijdom to Editor of 
Die Republikein, 27 June 1936.
77 D.F. Malan Collection. File 1/1/1141, Die Republikein to D.F. Malan, dated 6 August 1935.
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the hardliners candidly stated their fears that the combined power of English capital and
7ftthe media would defeat a referendum on a republic.
In an open letter to Malan, the directors of the Transvaalse Pers, which published 
Die Republikein, set Malan a two-week ultimatum, at the end of which he would have to 
commit himself to establishing a republic in his first term in office. Failure to comply with 
their deadline would lead to the suspension of the newspaper's support for Malan. The 
authors noted that a referendum allowed the GNP to indefinitely postpone a decision on 
the republic until the 'time was ripe.' Hence the need for clarity on the party’s commitment 
to a republic in its first term. Interestingly, the authors of the ultimatum noted that the 
longer the party was in power the less likely it was to break the constitutional ties with the
70Empire. As evidence, they cited Hertzog’s behaviour from 1926 onwards.
Strijdom concedes to Malan:
Malan refused to budge on the question of the party’s Federal republican formulation, and 
forced the Transvaal leadership to amend the party’s Provincial platform, leading Die 
Republikein to eventually establish its own party, the National Republican Unity Front, in 
January 1937. Strijdom’s biographer notes that the radical group, possibly influenced by
OA
Hitler, was a backlash against party politics and the Westminster system. This suggests 
that the pressure for a break with democracy preceded the war declaration of 1939. 
Ironically, Strijdom, who was to counter Malan on these grounds a decade later, opposed 
the group, warning the hardliners that if introduced by a simple parliamentary majority, a 
parliamentary majority could also rescind a republic. Hence, Strijdom justified his support 
for a referendum.81 A year later, Strijdom similarly warned that a republic not based on
ft7'broad popular will' would be a 'hopeless failure,' thus recognising the essence of the 
Westminster conundrum, i.e. that the system skewed support for the NP. As it would 
emerge years later, this position was, however, a temporary tactical concession (shaped by 
his relative weakness at the time). Strijdom’s fellow provincial leader, Mabel Jansen, 
conceded to Malan that the 'Transvaal fully understands that it could achieve little without 
the Cape.'83
78 J.L. Basson, J.G. Striidom. pp. 98,116-123.
79 A 2, File 53, Letter to D.F. Malan from Directors o f Transvaalse Pers, 23 June 1936.
80 J.L. Basson. J.G. Striidom. pp. 127-129.
81 A 2, File 53, Letter from Mrs. M.M. Jansen and Adv. J.G. Strijdom to Editor o f Die Republikein, 27 June 
1936.
82 A 2, File 53, Letter from Adv J.G. Strijdom to J.J. van Rooyen, 23 April 1937.
83 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1148, Mrs. M. Jansen to D.F. Malan, 12 September 1935.
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In the aftermath of the disastrous 1938 elections Die Burger conceded that the 
party had failed in the Transvaal in general as well as in urban areas. Interestingly, the 
paper noted how the Westminster, first-past-the-post system had favoured the UP, which 
had gained 27 seats with 75,000 votes, whilst the GNP gained no seats, despite securing
45,000 votes. It was with this in mind that Verwoerd also supported a referendum in 
March 1939. The editor Die Transvaler, Verwoerd, suggested that whilst voters were 
disaffected with the UP, the party managed to keep their support 'by instilling fear on the
Of
issue of constitutional changes.' The leader was written in support of a similar statement 
made by Malan on the referendum. In January 1940, Verwoerd also argued that the pledge 
to stage a referendum would placate voters supporting the GNP on its racial and other 
policies who would thus be assured that the party would not use their vote for major 
constitutional change -  the republic.86 The referendum pledge, therefore, remained a tool 
of electoral her esthetics and reflected political realism and tactical acumen.
The ultimate acceptance of the Cape’s approach reflected the dominance of the 
Cape, which provided the party’s founding institutional and political base, had access to 
the capital of Cape Afrikaners, controlled Naspers and was the only province with a 
political machine that was wholly intact after the formation of the GNP. A further factor 
explaining the Transvaal and Free State’s acquiescence was a strong desire to avoid a split 
within the opponents of Fusion.87 A further reason why some hard-line elements of the 
party might have accepted the referendum was its association with Hitler. Die Burger gave 
much prominence to the November 1933 vote (on Germany's leaving the League of 
Nations)88 and the March 1936 vote in which Germans supported the Fuhrer’s foreign
on
policy -  including the re-occupation of the Rhineland. A leader supporting the German 
approach and position in fact supplemented this coverage.
Malan’s victory was, however, a temporary one, and much of the radicalism that 
was to emerge after the declaration of war was already evident in the Transvaal after 
Fusion. The controversial declaration of war of 1939 emboldened the radical and anti­
democratic elements in Afrikaner nationalism and forced Malan to forsake his 
commitment to a republic by constitutional means.
84 Die Burger. Leader, 30 May 1938.
85 Die Transvaler. Leader, 21 March 1939 In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 38.
86 Die Transvaler, Leader, 5 January 1940. In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 49.
87 G.D. Scholtz, Die Ontwikkeling van die Politieke Denke van die Afrikaner. Peel VII. p. 457
88 Die Burger. 14 November 1933.
89 Die Burger. 30 March 1936.
162
A contentious war declaration:
In its first general election in 1938 the Purified NP only managed to secure seven 
additional seats, increasing its representation in parliament to 27. Initially, the party made 
scant gains in the supposedly republican Transvaal. This may, in part, be explained by the 
fact that the party only established a newspaper, Die Transvaler, in October 1937. Die 
Vaderland, which maintained its loyalty to Hertzog, was the predominant Afrikaans 
newspaper in the province. By the 1943 elections the party had adopted a decidedly more 
republican direction and increased its representation to 43 seats, and by 1948 it won 70 
seats. In this time its overall support grew from 29,6 percent in 1938, to 36,6 percent in 
1943 and 37,2 percent in 1948.90 This remarkable progress, especially the seven percent 
increase in support between 1938 and 1943, was as a result of disillusionment with Fusion 
after Parliament rejected neutrality in September 1939.91 The 'marriage of convenience,'92 
Fusion, was brought to an abrupt end, and yet again the conciliation project was 
undermined by an external development over which the country’s protagonists had little
Q1
control. In 1914, the newly formed NP, similarly, benefited from South Africa’s 
involvement in Europe’s war and the anticipation of German victory. For Malan the 
declaration of war heralded vindication of his opposition to Fusion and his party was well 
placed to benefit from the unprecedented support for republicanism. As Hermann 
Giliomee has noted, the war declaration, thus, re-kindled 'all the old anti-British and anti­
imperialist sentiments and was ultimately decisive in persuading the majority of 
Afrikaners to go it alone politically.' 94 Dan O’Meara, in part, ascribes opposition to the 
war declaration to the interests of farmers, who lost access to the German market. Though 
somewhat reductionist, he correctly notes that the event 'destroyed for ever the Hertzogist 
conceptions of cooperation with Imperialism.'95
Disillusionment with democracy:
The nature of the declaration of war also triggered widespread disillusionment with the 
Westminster system and increased the idealisation of the former republican institutions 
and fascism, spurring on a further radicalisation of the GNP’s policies. Nationalists
90 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 236,270, 301.
91 In a parliamentary vote Smuts and his supporters defeated a neutrality motion submitted by Hertzog by 80 
votes to 67. Hertzog tendered his resignation following the vote and called on the Governor General, Patrick 
Duncan, to call a general election on the war issue.
92 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts, p. 269.
93 Newell. M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition, pp. 5, 63, 65.
94 Hermann Giliomee, 'The Growth o f Afrikaner Identity', p. 114.
95 Dan O’ Meara. Volkskapitalisme p. 121.
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charged that the Westminster system distorted the national will and Malan lamented that 
the Union was 'dragged into the war by the votes of Jews, the Coloured representatives 
and MPs who betrayed their voters.'96 In his 1940 New Year's address, Malan accused 
Smuts of creating a 'Jewish-Imperialist war machine' without a mandate from the volk?1 
As a result of the declaration of war, GNP leaders increasingly referred to the Westminster
QO
system as a 'British-Jewish democracy' and a 'Skyndemokrasie' (pseudo-democracy). In 
contrast, the party had portrayed the old Boer republics as true democracies already prior 
to the 1938 Trek commemoration.99 As intended, the centennial commemoration of the 
Great Trek, orchestrated by the Broederbond,100 provided a receptive audience for such 
claims. The Broederbond viewed the Trek Centennial as an opportunity to stem the de­
nationalisation of the Afrikaner,101 and successfully hijacked it, in order to promote 
republicanism and Afrikaner unity. Journalist Schalk Pienaar, who covered the trek as Die 
Burger's correspondent argues that this event laid the foundations for victory in the 1948 
elections.102
Afrikaner anger was increased by the Governor General Patrick Duncan’s refusal 
to acquiesce to Hertzog’s demand for fresh elections after the war declaration. Duncan 
was a former SAP and UP leader, and it seems reasonable to assume that such elections 
may well have produced a Nationalist anti-war majority, as there was popular sympathy 
for Germany amongst Afrikaners. In two by-elections called in rural constituencies after 
the war vote, the Purified NP emerged victorious with handsome majorities. Kuruman, 
which was won by the UP with a 56,2 percent majority in the 1938 general elections, was 
taken by the GNP with 56,5 percent of the vote on 7 February 1940. The GNP maintained 
the Winburg seat, contested on 8 January 1941, with an eleven percent bigger majority 
than in 1938.104
96 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1573, D.F. Malan’s address to the NP Conference in Pretoria, 26 
September 1939.
97 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/1630, D.F. Malan’s New Years message, 1 January 1940.
98 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/2012, J.G. Strijdom address to National Juegbond conference, 1942.
99 Die Transvaler. Leader, 11 October 1937, 26 March 1941, 29 April 1941, 12 May 1941. In O. Geyser 
(Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. pp. 51, 56 - 59.
100 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism. pp, 117-122; Ivor Wilkens and Hans Strydom, The Super 
Afrikaners (Johannesburg, 1978), pp. 97-107; J.H.P. Serfontein, Brotherhood o f Power, p. 42.
101 H. du Plessis, 'Die Voortrekker Ideale in die Modeme Wereld', Koers. Deel VI: Nommer 3 (December 
1938), p. 9.
102 Schalk Pienaar, Getuie van Groot Tve (Kaapstad, 1977), pp. 12,16.
103 Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog. p. 249.
104B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 225, 235,251.
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This apparent distortion of the popular will triggered a wide-scale abandonment of 
democracy by many Afrikaners, like future Prime Minister John Vorster.105 The 
declaration of war affected procedural debates on the route to a republic. For Hertzog and 
his followers, it reinforced the moral and political imperative of basing a future republic 
on a referendum. For radical republicans like Strydom,106 on the other hand, Smuts’s 
behaviour justified the use of a simple parliamentary majority to impose a republic and 
even Malan supported this approach for a while.107 Besides, the prospect of German 
victory made Hertzog’s gradualism irrelevant and in July 1940 Strijdom, for example, 
suggested that whilst attaining a republic on the basis of broad will was a sound tactic in
1 AQnormal times, these were not normal times. In a Transvaler editorial, on 16 July 1940, 
Dr. Verwoerd echoed such sentiments.
If Germany wins and the opportunity suddenly arrives to choose between 
becoming a German or Italian colony or to establish a free republic, and action 
has to be taken at once to decide, then the ‘special and definite instruction of 
the people’ and ‘the broad will of the people’ cannot be obtained through a 
plebiscite, which would first have to be satisfactorily arranged. This would be 
slavery to the letter of the constitution and perhaps cost the Union its 
freedom.'109
Even Malan began to articulate the Transvaal’s sentiments. Speaking in the Free 
State town of Fuaresmith, in March 1941, he noted.
We are not going to give up our national ideal for the sake of co-operation. As 
regards the obtaining of a republic, Mr. Havenga interprets this as the ‘broad 
will of the people.’ So a majority will have to be obtained among the English
and a majority among the Jews I do not agree that in our country we are
going to grant the right of veto to decide about a republic to any section which 
is not imbued with the real Afrikaner spirit.110
Such comments were echoed in Cradock, Stellenbosch and Cape Town by Malan 
in early 1941111 and as late as 1942.112 Afrikaner disillusionment with Westminster
105 HO Terblanche. John Vorster -  OB-Generaal en Afrikaner Veeter. (Roodepoort, 1983) 112, 121-122.
106 J.L. Basson. J.G. Striidom. p. 283.
107 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 49; G.H.L. Le May, The 
Afrikaners. An Historical Interpretation (Oxford, 1995), p. 190.
108 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, pp. 39-40.
109 Die Transvaler, 16 July 1940. Quoted in Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
1967), p. 169.
110 The Star. 28 September 1946.
111 Die Burger. 25 March 1941.
112 The Star. 5 July 1942.
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democracy, the hope of Nazi victory and the radicalisation of Afrikaners explain the 
GNP’s abandonment of Hertzog’s legacy of constitutionalism and a referendum as the 
basis of a republic. If elections were no longer relevant, then the referendum no longer had 
any merit as a tool of heresthetics. The move also, however, symbolised the GNP’s 
rejection of Hertzogism and Hertzog.
The rejection of Hertzogism:
Following Hertzog's defeat on the neutrality issue, he and Malan sought to ensure 
Afrikaner political unity. Both leaders were patently aware of the clamour for Afrikaner 
political amalgamation, and Malan certainly welcomed the prospect of a 'healthier party 
division in politics,'113 i.e. Afrikaner political unity. But, despite the fact that Hertzog and 
Malan initially agreed on guiding principles for Hereneging (unification), under Hertzog’s 
leadership, Afrikaner accord proved elusive and the Reconstructed National (Herstigte 
Nasionale Party - HNP) or Volks Party would not count the NP’s founder amongst its 
ranks. The 'neo-Krugerist wing'114 of the party which represented the younger leaders in 
control of the party machine,115 spurred on by the Broederbond\ue were determined not to
t 1 7'tolerate any watering-down of their principles,' and were bitterly opposed to Hertzog’s 
return. Biding their time, the hard-liners successfully scuppered the unity effort and 
jettisoned Hertzog.
Opposition to Hertzog stemmed from his obstinate adherence to his two-stream 
principle and his inclusive definition of citizenship. Hertzog’s opponents were equally 
irked by the fact that he remained committed to a republic by consent, despite the war 
vote.118 This difference of approach and opinion also laid bare the fact that the likes of 
Strijdom viewed a referendum as a tactical concession, whilst Hertzog viewed it as a 
derivative of his principle of conciliation. Whereas Hertzog increasingly believed that an 
independent republic forced upon English speakers would 'prevent English speakers from 
becoming good Afrikaners [South Africans],'119 the Broederbond desired the assimilation
113 D.F. Malan Collection. 1/1/1573, D.F. Malan’s address to the NP Conference in Pretoria, 26 September 
1939.
114 Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek, p. 77.
115 A.C. Cilliers, Genl. Hertzog en Hereniging (Stellenbosch, 1941), p. 35; G.H. Calpin, There are no South 
Africans, pp. 296-297.
116 Charles Bloomberg. Christian-Nationalism. pp. 158-161.
117 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 22; Die Transvaler. Leader, 8 
November 1939. In .Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 45.
118 C.M. Van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. p. 288; G.H. Calpin. There are no South Africans, p. 392.
119 A.C. Cilliers, Genl. Hertzog en Hereniging. p. 32.
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of English speakers.120 Like Henri Bourassa, who spent his last years increasingly 'in 
disagreement with the forces he had set in motion,'121 Hertzog no longer found common 
ground with the forces of nationalism he had unleashed.
A further reason for enmity towards Hertzog was his demand that the new party
1 O')opens its ranks to non-republicans. No doubt an anathema for purists, unwilling and 
unable to exonerate those who had 'strayed from the path' at the time of Fusion. Despite 
claims that Hertzog’s opposition to the HNP becoming a Republican party led to his 
resignation, the struggle was in essence over the very meaning of volkswil and white 
South African identity. For Purified Nationalists, volkswil was now viewed as the 'will of 
Nationalist Afrikanerdom, expressed through its parliamentary party.'124 For Hertzog and 
Hertzogism a referendum remained the only expression of volkswil.
Yet a further source of opposition to Hertzog was his support for a republic within 
the Commonwealth. For fervent nationalists a republic was a means to effect a radical 
transmutation of the social, economic, cultural and political foundations of the Union and 
wean the country from its British influence. The concern that a soft-pedalling of the 
HNP’s republican principles would lead youth to desert the party was a further reason to
10Aoppose union with the Hertzogites. This fear was vindicated by the subsequent appeal 
of extra-parliamentary Fascist groups. Hans Strijdom’s biographer adds that he feared the
1 *77emergence of the Christian Republican Party, which could appeal to HNP supporters. In 
a Westminster, first-past-the-post, system, such a development could have spelt disaster 
for the party.
The failure of unity, like Malan’s earlier rejection of Fusion, was however tainted 
by far less wholesome considerations. For both the Broederbond and the Purists, often 
interchangeable, had long standing scores to settle with Hertzog - the former, for his 1935
120 H. du Plessis, 'Die Voortrekker Ideale in die Modeme Wereld', Koers. Deel VI: Nommer 3 (December 
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attack on the organisation,129 reportedly prompted by N.C. Havenga,130 and the latter, for
1 ' l  1
the vituperations they had endured whilst sitting on the opposition benches after Fusion.
And, as was the case with Fusion, certain Gesuiwerdes may well have viewed the return of
Hertzog’s supporters to the party as a threat to their personal careers and standing.
According to Ben Schoeman, the highly popular Oswald Pirow was especially viewed as a 
1threat. An ancillary consideration was the fact that whereas Malan had yet to establish 
his authority and a strong national following, Hertzog was an established and popular 
leader. Malan was, therefore, far more malleable from the perspective of the hardliners. 
Moreover, Malan without Hertzog would be more dependent upon them.
1 ^In November 1940 Hertzog’s determined detractors, led by C.R. Swart, 
humiliated him at the Free State unity conference, when delegates rejected the principle of 
equality between English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites. Malan, who had on several 
occasions noted his readiness to. subscribe to Hertzog’s civic definition of Afrikanerdom, 
now collaborated with the exclusivist school.134 In targeting the issue of English-Afrikaner 
relations, the extremists had manufactured a crisis through which to hound Hertzog out of 
the party and politics, yet craftily refraining from rebuffing the terms of unity. Ben 
Schoeman notes that these determined Purified NP leaders would have driven him out 'one 
way or another.'135
The HNP had been purified, Hertzogism exorcised, and the high tide of exclusivist 
Christian-Nationalist republicanism had arrived. Indicative of the party’s abandonment of 
Hertzogism was the formal decision by the Transvaal Congress of the HNP in early 
December 1940 to expunge the pledge to inaugurate a republic on the basis of broad 
popular will from its constitution. Hertzog’s departure yet again left Malan at the mercy of 
the republican wing. The weakening of the HNP’s constitutional commitment is probably 
best understood as a response to the controversy surrounding the declaration of war. A
129 Delivering his annual address to his constituents, in Smithfield, on November 7 1935, Hertzog carried out 
a scathing attack on the Broederbond. This was the first time that a politician had done so, and the Prime 
Minister divulged many intimate details o f the organization and its workings. Hertzog charged that the 
movement was political and pointed out its links to the Purified National Party (Wilkens and Strydom: 1978. 
56-72).
130 Charles Bloomberg. Christian-Nationalism. pp. 108-112.
131 Ben Schoeman, Mv lewe in die politiek. pp. 47.
132 Ibid. 49.
133 Swart had recently succeeded the long-serving Free State leader N.J. van der Merwe. Van der Merwe had 
fervently supported unity between Malan and Hertzog and accepted the original basis for unity, and he 
originally carried the Free State in favour o f Hereniging and marginalized Swart (Schoeman, 1978: 66).
134 Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog. pp. 165,257.
135 Ben Schoeman, Mv lewe in die politiek. p 88.
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second factor was the anticipation that a Nazi military victory would lead to a republic in 
South Africa.
Afrikaner disunion:
On 30 January 1941 Hertzog’s followers announced the establishment of the Afrikaner
Party (AP). Hertzog, to the relief of the hardliners, declined leadership of the party.
'Hertzogism without Hertzog' had limited appeal and saved the HNP from the threat of a
1far-reaching Afrikaner political split. The weakness of the Party without its leaders was 
demonstrated in the Fauresmith and Smithfield by-elections, after Havenga and Hertzog 
resigned their seats. HNP candidates soundly beat both AP candidates in March 1941.
The extremist victory over Hertzogism was, however, to prove spurious. The flip 
side of growing support for a republic, combined with the fall-out of failed Hertzog-Malan 
unity efforts and the allure of Nazi victory, was a debilitating split within the Christian-. 
Nationalist Afrikaner camp over the kind of republic they desired and the method of
117attaining that republic. On the former count, a struggle emerged over the role of
National Socialism in the proposed republic. On the latter count, even within the NP,
differences emerged between those who championed constitutionalism and those who
propagated extra-parliamentary and violent actions in order to secure a republic.
The debate over the legitimacy and relevance of constitutional means - which also
played out in the Broederbond -  undermined the relevance of party politics, in general,
and the Hereenigde Nasionale Party in particular. Whilst the HNP’s response to the
declaration of war was the abandonment of its traditional commitment to changing the
status of the Union through a referendum, disgust with the events following 6 September
1939 elicited an even more extreme response, the rejection of representative democracy
and party politics. Two groups effectively mobilised support for a single party state, The
1^0
New Order Study Group and the Ossewa Brandwag (OB), or Ox Wagon Sentinel.
The OB, which was created in order to nurture the spirit of the Great Trek 
following the 1938 commemorations, provided an appealing extra-parliamentary 
alternative at a time of division and disillusionment with party politics. And it threatened 
to eclipse the HNP. The organisation was viewed as the 'most powerful organisation in the
136 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 55.
137 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism. pp. Xxv, 156-157.
138 Oswald Pirow, who was joined by sixteen former Hertzogites that did not join the Afrikaner Party, led the 
New Order group. This group functioned as a faction within the HNP, and called for the establishment o f  a 
Nationalist Socialist republic.
169
history of Afrikanerdom,'139 and for many provided the 'Highest Factor of 
Afrikanerdom.'140 Explaining the appeal of the movement, Piet Meiring notes that the 'OB 
and its storm troopers were so much more lively and attractive than the Party and its 
bazaars and gatherings.'141 Dan O’Meara suggests that the proclivity towards extra- 
parliamentary activities in the north had its roots in Fusion and the fact that so few 
Transvaal and Free State MP’s broke with Malan.142 This not only denied people a stake 
in the political system, but also ensured that the Broederbond emerged as more central 
than the party in these areas. G.H. Calpin, on the other hand, suggests that the OB's 
popularity reflects a revolt against 'fissiparous [Afrikaner] political tendencies,' a reliance 
on persons and not ideas in Afrikaner politics and British rule.143 In a memo to D.F. 
Malan, drafted in March 1941, the Broederbond's Piet Meyer informed Malan that 'many 
leading Afrikaners in the activist and cultural groups only ‘tolerated’ the party as a 
necessary organisation, but expect. no salvation from it.'144 Instead, they sought 
deliverance in the OB.
The OB as a threat to the party:
The OB was initially viewed as a potential resource for the party.145 According to Alan 
Paton, Malan, who was politically weakened by the formation of the New Order and the 
Afrikaner Party, viewed the movement as a weapon with which to startle Smuts.146 Malan, 
thus, initially sought to curry favour with the organization and cooperate with it.147 Such 
assessments were, however, later altered as the movement threatened to eclipse the party. 
The OB’s membership almost doubled from 200,000 in November 1940 to well over
350,000 in February 1941 and many of its key activists were drawn from the party and 
began to lose interest in HNP activities. Some opponents of parliamentary democracy 
sought to argue that political parties were not a feature of the Boer republics, a claim 
rejected by Free State National Party leader N.J. van der Merwe.148 The appointment of
139 Ben Schoeman, Mv lewe in die politiek. p. 78.
140 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 74.
141 Piet Meiring, F w tig  Jaar op die Voorblad. p. 87.
142 Dan O’Meara, 'The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927-1948: Class vanguard o f Afrikaner nationalism', 
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143 G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 286-287,302.
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Dr. Hans van Rensburg,149 an effectual and charismatic leader with well-known Nazi
sympathies, as the OB’s leader in January 1941 dramatically strengthened the
organisation’s Nazi bent, organisational efficacy and public appeal. In his memoirs, Ben
Schoeman recounts that the deputy leader of the OB, J.A. Smith received a rousing
welcome at the NP’s Unial conference in June 1941 and notes that his reception surpassed
that for D.F. Malan.150 The party leadership thus realised that it stood to lose from its
stratagem of cooperation with the more radical groups.
In addition to campaigning for a one-party state, both the OB and Pirow’s New
Order promoted a Nationalist-Socialist republic. Pirow, at the very least, sought to
emulate the model promoted by Portugal’s Salazar.151 Their efforts were abetted by a
string of initial Nazi successes on the battlefields of Europe in 1940, which raised
expectations that a Nazi victory in Europe would lead to a republic in South Africa. The
eschewal of parliamentary politics and constitutionalism by these two groups further
1eroded support for the parliamentary system, and undermined the HNP’s electoral 
prospects by encouraging the boycott of elections. The HNP was, for example, weakened 
by an OB inspired boycott in a Johannesburg City Council (Northmead) by-election.153 
More importantly, significant numbers of Afrikaners boycotted the 1943 general election, 
to the detriment of the HNP. Whereas the participation rate in 1938 was 81,6 percent, it 
dropped to 78,4 percent in 1943.154 Ben Schoeman claims that he lost his seat in the 1943 
election as a result of an OB sponsored boycott.155 His UP opponent secured the seat by a 
slender majority of 232 votes and he further contends that the OB all but 'destroyed' the 
NP in Natal.156 Beyond an ideological aversion to the institutions of representative 
democracy, many believed that the interests of the OB were served by a boycott. In 
addition to the boycott, several 'unity candidates,' identified with the OB and New Order 
contested the 1943 elections. Strijdom himself faced one such candidate, and these 
candidates are said to have cost the party the Soutpansberg, Middleburg, Pretoria District 
and Heidelberg constituencies. In the latter constituency the UP held the seat with a
149 Dr. Hans van Rensburg resigned his post as Administrator o f the Orange Free State and galvanized the 
movement into an effective force. Van Rensburg, a Hertzog appointee and supporter, was a charismatic and 
effective leader. He was one o f an increasing number o f Afrikaners who had studied in or visited Nazi 
Germany, and in fact met with the Fuhrer during his visit.
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slender majority of 57 votes after the unity candidate, who had withdrawn from the race, 
still polled 79 votes.157 The relative ease with which Strijdom dealt with the third 
candidate (who secured 810 votes) in the 1943 vote, might account for his opposition to a 
later pact with Havenga. From the middle of 1941 the OB and the Party were engaged in 
an acrimonious struggle for political predominance. Though key OB activists were loathe 
to vote for Smuts, a vote for Malan would strengthen him in his efforts to marginalise the
1 SftOB. Hence the movement’s leaders toyed with the idea of a boycott.
This was not the only threat that the OB posed. Van Rensburg’s growing appeal 
threatened Malan’s status as the political leader of the Afrikaners, and there were even 
suggestions that the Germans viewed van Rensburg, and not Malan, as their leader 
designate.159 Van Rensburg complicated matters by suggesting that the OB alone could 
bring about a republic. Patrick Furlong also suggests that Malan may have feared that the 
OB’s extremism might 'force the hand of the government' against his own party.160 It 
should be noted that Hertzog’s dramatic announcement to the Head Committee of the 
Afrikaner Party that he supported fascism in October 1941,161 though denied and played
1 A7down by his supporters, could only have served to strengthen the resolve of the HNP to 
eliminate the threat posed by the OB. The combination of van Rensburg and Pirow (both 
Hertzog loyalists), and Hertzog provided a potentially grave threat at a precarious time for 
the party.
National Party radicalism:
The HNP’s initial response to the OB, and New Order, was to further radicalise its 
positions, as the party was swept along by public sentiment, and to seek cooperation with 
the neo-Fascist organisations. The HNP absorbed the New Order supporters, allowing 
them to operate as a separate faction within the fold of the party. The shift to the right was 
not only tactical, based on a recognition that the OB was a 'political power in its own 
right,'163 but also reflected the influence of proto-fascists within the party and the 
Broederbond. As a result of the influence of the radical right, there was indeed little to set
157 J.L. Basson, J.G. Striidom. pp. 445-449.
158 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 146.
159 Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 190.
160 Ibid. p. 158.
161 C.M. van den Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog. pp. 294-297; Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik 
Hertzog. pp. 259-261.
162 A.M. van Schoor, Notes from mv Diary (Pretoria, 1979), pp. 97-99.
163 Christoph Marx, 'The Ossewabrandwag as a Mass Movement, 1939-1941', The Journal o f Southern 
African Studies. 20, 2 ,1994, p. 205.
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the OB and HNP apart on constitutional ideas between 1939 and 1941,164 and Christoph 
Marx suggests that the 'principle that caused the conflict between the HNP and the OB 
was parliamentary democracy -  not as an end in itself, though, but as a principle -  or 
means -  in the sense of gaining power.'165
Patrick Furlong notes that pro-Nationalist historians have tended to exaggerate
differences between the OB and HNP in order to demonstrate that the party was
unaffected by the rise of fascism.166 Hermann Giliomee has recently sought to renew
efforts to underplay these links, and suggests it is 'far fetched to describe the NP as Fascist
or proto-Fascist.' Similarly, Louise Vincent argues that this perception is fuelled by
Communists, like Union leader Solly Sacks, who confused shirt movements with
1 ^ 8Afrikaner nationalism. Vincent holds that the NP was anti-fascist. Though Giliomee's 
claims serve to revise Afrikaner history and demonstrate that the NP was not in any 
significant way influenced by the far right in forging racial policy, he far to easily 
dismisses Bloomberg, Furlong and Marx. Whilst Giliomee is correct in highlighting that 
the declaration of war was a critical development that shaped the nature of Afrikaner 
nationalism during this period, the roots of Afrikaner radicalism lay in the growing appeal 
of cultural or organic nationalism, which preceded the war, and were propelled by 
Afrikaner urbanization and poor whitism. It was, in turn, this radicalization that made 
Afrikaner nationalism receptive to fascist ideas.169 Though counterfactual speculation, 
continued Nazi success in the war effort would have encouraged continued support for 
fascism and further undermined the NP's commitment to democracy.
The HNP's draft constitution:
As part of the wider struggle for the hearts and minds of Afrikaners, the party developed 
its own draft constitution. The task was delegated to the Broederbond, but at the time of 
publication in January 1942 the political context (specifically assessments regarding the 
war) was already changing, and the Cape leadership -  notably Die Burger - opposed the 
draft. Explaining the decision to publish the draft, the pro-government Star suggested
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that the publication was part of a 'desperate attempt to outbid the Ossewa Brandwag' The
1 71paper also hinted that Malan had done so against the wishes of Die Burger. Whereas 
this neo-Fichtean document proposed that Afrikaans serve as the sole language in the 
proposed republic, Malan supported a more tolerant and inclusive approach towards 
English-speaking white South Africans.172 Notwithstanding these differences, the 
preparation of the draft and its publication corresponded with the party’s decision to make 
the Republican issue the focus of the opening debate of the 1942 parliamentary session. 
According to Die Burger, the decision to highlight the republic, served to 'underscore the 
tremendous gulf between Nationalist Afrikanerdom as represented by the HNP, and the
171imperialists under Field Marshall Smuts.'
The key difference between its draft constitution and that of the OB, published in 
1941, was the HNP’s support for a multi-party system. As already suggested the OB’s 
demand for a one-party state undermined the legitimacy of the HNP and its constitutional 
role. Of interest was the fact that the draft provided for the use of referenda under certain 
circumstances. Earlier, L.J. du Plessis had argued that the president should have the power 
to call referenda to get support for legislation in certain cases.174 Patrick Furlong suggests 
that this support for the referendum was consonant with the Bonapartist and Kruger
t 75tradition, and links it to the later use of referenda.
As the war drew to its end, this exclusivist and authoritarian constitution became 
an embarrassment to the HNP. But, in spite of the fact that Malan may have paid a certain 
price for this in the 1943 elections, his stratagem was essential in his effort to 
consolidate his ethnic base and ensure the HNP’s leading role at the time. Having attained 
this objective, Malan now sought to make the HNP electable and broaden its appeal in 
order to tap into post-War disaffection. Addressing the Union wide conference of the HNP 
in September 1942, he noted that after 'every war -  this was always the experience -  
comes the political setback [for the incumbent] as sure as night follows day.'177 A memo 
cabled to London by the British High Commission underscored the NP’s acceptance of an 
Allied victory, noting that the NP opposition found 'their chief interest during the [1943]
171 The Star. 23 January 1942.
172 S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u volk. Dr. D.F. Malan as Redenaar. 1908 -  1954 (Kaapstad, 1964), pp. 40, 50; D.F. 
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session in preparing the way, by judicious propaganda, for their election appeal to the 
country. Dr. Malan, forsaking the familiar ground of political and constitutional questions, 
introduced a long motion setting out the Nationalist Party’s policy on economic and social 
matters.'178
The HNP embraces Boer democracy:
Ironically, the threat from the far right would best be addressed not by trying to outflank 
them from the right, but by presenting the HNP as an indigenous 'third way,' drawing on 
Boer traditions. In doing so, the party rejected both the OB’s Nazism and the HP’s 
imperialism. It should be noted that the shift towards fascism was not unopposed, and
1 <7Q
prominent Broederbond and HNP figures like H.F. Verwoerd, though accepting 
authoritarianism, believed that the basic tenets of Fascism clashed with basic Calvinist and
t finKuyperian doctrines. And as early as 1939, N.J. van der Merwe warned that there are 
certain ideals -  like parliamentary democracy - that are more important than unity of the 
volk.m
When the OB distributed 100,000 copies of its draft constitution in July 1941, 
Malan decided to move against the organisation and 'decertify' it. The act constituted a
150violation of the Broederbond sponsored Cradock Agreement, of 29 October 1940, and
1 filprovided a casus belli for an HNP attack on the OB. And from August 1941 the party 
publicly denounced the OB and the New Order. Malan, for example, informed the Unial 
congress of the HNP on 3 June 1941 that he refused to identify with Nazism, arguing that 
the Afrikaner’s tradition was anti-dictatorial.184 The party also deployed its influential 
newspapers to discredit Nazism as a foreign import and 'decertify' the OB and the New 
Order. Similarly, intellectuals began to articulate a unique Afrikaner democratic theory. 
The shift in thinking is perhaps best demonstrated by two articles published in the
• i o cinfluential journal Koers, one in the early stages of the war and the second after the war.
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Writing in February 1941, J. Albert Coetzee186 argued that the Boer tradition was 
not democratic in the modem or 'heathenish' sense. Coetzee argued that democracy in the 
modem heathen sense was only applicable to 'mongrel nations.' In South Africa, for 
example, the 'demos -  the 'volK of the democracy -  made up of English speakers, Jews, 
some Afrikaners, Hotnots [Coloureds],' have dictated to the Boerevolk, the 'real volk of the 
land,' what they may or may not do. Hence in the past there was a pure democracy because 
the volk was not so mixed. Coetzee noted that the Bible, and not the volk, had the final say 
in Paul Kruger’s polity. This approach, according to him, was consonant with the 
principles of Calvinism. Coetzee even suggested that to claim that the Afrikaner tradition 
was democratic, or that Paul Kruger was a democrat, was to brand them as heathen. 
According to Coetzee, all forms of organic nationalism, including the German, Italian, 
Spanish and the Boer form rejected democracy.
1 87Whereas G.F. de Vos Hugo (1946) similarly argued that God is sovereign, and
agreed with Coetzee that the government’s law should be consonant with God’s law, he
was critical of Nazism. According to de Vos Hugo, elections serve to judge whether the
government in its previous term ruled in accordance with God’s law. In the event that the
ruling party failed to do so, the volk repudiates it by electing the opposition. De Vos Hugo
cited Kruger’s four electoral victories as an example of a leader who was rewarded for
ruling in line with God's law. De Vos Hugo noted that voting was integral to the Protestant
ethic and suggested that the hardships that the German people were enduring were divine
punishment for being untrue to their Protestant freedom. Similarly, H du Plessis rejected
188Fascism, National Socialism or any other 'ism' as the basis for Afrikaner unity in 1947. 
The difference between the Coetzee and Hugo, no doubt, reflect the changing strategic 
context in Europe and evolving political realities in South Africa. Coetzee wrote in 1941, 
at a time of HNP-OB cooperation, whereas de vos Hugo’s contribution came after the war 
and the OB-HNP struggle.
appeared in this journal provide a helpfiil insight into the constitutional thinking o f the Broederbond and the 
Republican movement.
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Why the return to democracy?
The embrace of the Boer tradition and the party’s growing aversion to Nazism are
explained by several factors. One was the growing concern that identification with Hitler
1 80would paint the organisation as a Nazi fifth column and invite state repression. 
Moreover, the party’s association with the New Order and the OB may increasingly have 
served the government’s efforts to discredit the party. Secondly, Malan may indeed have 
had an aversion to Nazism, especially in light of the benefits that the OB gained from its 
identification with the movement. According to Dan O’Meara the appeal of groups like 
the OB was limited to urban areas, where the party had traditionally been weak, as farmers 
were startled by their anti-capitalist rhetoric in support of National Socialism. And GNP 
politicians are said to have understood that electoral success required an allegiance with 
farming capital in the Transvaal.190 Thirdly, the party feared an alliance between van 
Rensburg, Pirow and Hertzog. Fourthly, in the absence of a concerted insistence that 
democracy was relevant, the party would concede to its own irrelevance. Addressing the 
Unial conference of the GNP in early June 1941, Malan warned against those who 
believed that the party was no longer necessary and predicted that the time would arrive 
when the party would be vital to navigate the constitutional crisis.191 Addressing the 
party’s national conference a year later, in mid-September 1942, Malan reiterated his 
argument that the route to the republic is via the ballot box, no matter what the outcome of 
the war.192 Finally, the change in Malan’s posture can only be understood in the context of 
changing war fortunes and the fact that the party now viewed the OB as its single largest 
competitor. A Dominion Intelligence report drafted in 1943 notes,
Gradually it became apparent to Dr. Malan that a parliamentary party which 
relied largely upon the support of the Dutch Reformed Church and claimed to 
be the sole exponent of the 'Afrikaner tradition' was no match for his rivals 
when it came to demonstrating his passion for the Nationalist Socialist ideal. 
Moreover, Britain was not dead after all, and indeed showed a disturbingt Q'icapacity of resiliency; and American help was beginning to be effective.
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It has been suggested that Malan’s recollections of the 1914 rebellion and the 
damage it did to the fledgling HNP, at the time, informed his thinking at the time.194 
Hence, Malan not only applied the logic of appropriateness, but he had also learnt 
valuable lessons from his previous experience.
The return to electoral politics:
In many respects this chapter is the most important of all, as the very struggle over the 
path towards a republic and over a referendum highlights the NP’s understanding of the 
role of the referendum mechanism. Die Republikein’s harsh criticism of Malan and his 
defence of the referendum mechanism, after Fusion, laid bare the Party’s tactical 
considerations -  electoral heresthetics - in supporting the mechanism. And despite the 
break with Hertzog, the party machine, which continued to be controlled by the Cape and 
men like P.W. Botha, did not amend its tactical appreciation of the referendum. Forced to 
articulate radical positions, in response to the UP capturing the middle ground, the 
Purified NP machine did not lose sight of the value of the referendum in order to appeal to 
non-republican voters, especially at election time. This was certainly the case in the 1938 
elections and Malan’s campaign speeches, and again in the 1943 elections once the folly 
of assuming a Nazi victory had become clear to all. It is also worth re-emphasising the fact 
that the Cape was uniquely able to 'hold the line' and get it’s way on the referendum issue 
for the simple reason that it was the only province in which the HNP made an almost clean 
break after Fusion.
It was only after the controversial war declaration of 1939 and the phenomenal 
growth of the fascist right that Malan surrendered to the Northern party on the referendum 
and the party’s commitment to the constitutional path towards a republic. The rejection of 
Hertzogism, gradualism and representative democracy can only be understood in the 
context of a massive Afrikaner rejection of the Westminster system after September 1939. 
And given early German successes in the battleffont, the public mood and the popularity 
of pro-Nazi groups, Malan seems to have had little choice in amending his tactics.
Once it became apparent that this approach merely served to further weaken the 
party and make it irrelevant, and once the prospect of a Nazi victory became slim, Malan 
returned to the centre and embraced democracy. Malan’s approach was now calibrated by 
the party’s embrace of its own 'Third Way,' a return to Boer democracy, which continued
194 P.W. Coetzer and J.H. Le Roux, Die Nasionale Party. Deel 4 . p. 17; G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicolaas Johannes 
van der Merwe. pp. 302 - 303.
178
to reject the imperialism that Smuts represented, but also repudiated Nazism and Fascism 
as foreign imports. The Party’s strong republican bent, from 1939 until the 1943 elections, 
was a carry over from these internal struggles for the hearts and minds of Afrikaners. 
During this period Malan was pre-occupied with consolidating the party’s ethnic base, and 
did so around the republican issue. The 1943 election signalled the culmination of the 
battle over the interpretation of Christian Nationalism in favour of the HNP and Malan.195 
Malan had 'isolated his right-wing opponents as exponents of foreign ideologies, or as 
extremists with no sense of gratitude for what the party had done for Afrikanerdom.'196 
The end of this battle was not only the restoration of the HNP’s monopoly as the sole 
political representative of the Afrikaners. It also, ultimately, empowered the moderates in 
the party. They seized upon the party’s failure in the 1943 elections as positive proof that 
the party could only win the 1948 elections by moderating its stance. The hardliners had 
overplayed their hand, and adapting parts of the Hertzog programme, especially a return to 
the pledge of a referendum on a republic, was required if the NP was to gain power.
195 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, p. 193.
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Chapter Eight.
The 1960 referendum and the realisation of the republican dream.
When the Nationalists finally converted South Africa into a Republic in 1961, 
the wheel o f history had turned full circle. At a single stroke the jubilant 
Afrikaners had liquidated the consequences o f the 1902 Treaty ofVereeneging 
and the constitutional legacy o f defeat. A dynamic, united and supremely 
confident Afrikanerdom ruled over the whole o f South Africa and all but 
eliminated the last traces o f British influence in the Union. Dr. Verwoerd’s 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth in that year finally severed South 
Africa's 150-year link with Great Britain. The Boer martyrs had been 
avenged.1
The introduction of the referendum:
This chapter describes the period leading up to the first referendum in 1960 and the vote. 
This referendum, it will be argued, cannot be viewed in isolation from the NP’s historical 
use of the referendum pledge in order to navigate the 1948 election campaign. The 
referendum again served as an instrument of electoral her esthetics that allowed the NP to 
play down its republican focus, in order to appeal to non-republican (especially urban) 
voters. Throughout, the referendum pledge also offered the party ample constructive 
ambiguity, signaling its commitment to a republic to its support base, yet demonstrating 
moderation and caution to the wider community.
Once in power, the NP leadership, particularly D.F. Malan and N.C. Havenga, 
were preoccupied with consolidating the party's tenuous hold on power. This required 
caution on many issues, and the republican question in particular. The numerous 
referendum pledges, and the caution of the two elder leaders, incensed the more radical 
nationalists of the Transvaal. So numerous were these pledges that Malan’s critics, J.G. 
Strijdom and H.F. Verwoerd, who were also his successors, were unable to retreat from a 
referendum. Though it would have been easier for the party to use its growing 
parliamentary majority, which was skewed by the Westminster system, Malan’s promises 
cast a long shadow over the party’s behavior in regard to a republic.
Having embraced the referendum, the party now sought the most effective path to 
that republic and a referendum victory, at a time when the NP did not enjoy the support of 
half of the white voters. It will be argued that the Cape, which had basically imposed the 
referendum on the North, believed that a referendum victory would only be possible if the
1 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism and the Rise o f the Afrikaner Broederbond in South Africa 
1918-1948 Edited by Saul Dubow (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1990), p. xxi.
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proposed republic involved as few symbolic and constitutional changes as possible. This 
logic, correctly, recognized that the NP needed to limit the scope for the UP to mobilize an 
anti-republican majority. The most significant of these changes would be an alteration in 
South Africa’s relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. And from 1949 onwards 
Malan argued that a republic could, and would, remain a member of the Commonwealth. 
This issue quickly became the new fault line between the North and South.
After the 1958 election, when the NP managed to gamer over 50 percent of the 
popular vote, the referendum became 'practical' politics. In other words, victory was 
possible. Strijdom was, however, still unable to secure a wide endorsement for a republic, 
as the party had committed itself to a special majority. The one variable of the traditional 
Malan referendum package that the Transvaal leadership was in a position to change was 
the size of the majority. Verwoerd, who conceded that his hand was tied by past promises 
on the referendum, broke with the long-standing pledge to a qualified majority. In the 
analysis of the 1960 vote I will, briefly, dwell on the impact of economic arguments on 
ethno-national referenda. I argue that that economic arguments are of limited value on 
ethno-national questions.
Laying the groundwork for Nationalist victory:
As argued in the previous chapter, Nazi defeat spelt an acceptance of a return to 
parliamentary politics and D.F. Malan set about recommitting the HNP to changing the 
country’s constitutional status by legal means. Malan also accepted that unseating Smuts 
would, at the very least, require Afrikaner political unity, through a pact with Havenga’s 
followers, and playing down the republican issue. In doing so, he sought to emulate 
Hertzog’s conduct in 1924. Though the Afrikaner Party fared dismally in the 1943 
elections, obtaining a meagre 1,6 percent of the national vote, it represented significant 
Afrikaner opinion, especially in the Free State, which was loyal to J.B.M. Hertzog’s 
legacy. In the Free State the party secured 11,4 percent of the popular vote in the 1943 
elections. Besides, in Afrikaner Party strongholds and marginal constituencies, the HNP 
was faced with the prospect that Smuts would benefit from a three-way struggle. Mindful 
of this danger, Malan forged a pact with the Afrikaner Party ahead of the 1948 elections,
2 Patrick Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika. The Impact o f  the Radical Right on the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (Hanover and London. 1991), p. 157.
3 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. 1910-1976 (Pretoria, 1977), p. 271.
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allowing it to contest certain seats unopposed.4 Moreover, Malan realised that Havenga 
was more palatable to English speakers due to his moderate image and his long 
association with Hertzog.5
As part of this deal Havenga insisted, at the very least, on his mentor’s promise of 
a referendum on the republican question as an intrinsic principle of the post-1948 
coalition. Malan who supported this approach adroitly agreed, and in its 1948 election 
manifesto the party noted that the coming elections 'will not be fought over the endeavor 
for the creation of a republic.'6 A further incentive for the pact, from Malan’s perspective, 
was that an allegiance with Havenga would counterbalance those elements in the HNP 
who were propagating a republic in the immediate future, in spite of the NP's slender 
parliamentary majority. A coalition with Havenga, in fact, made Malan’s referendum 
pledge more credible. The referendum pledge was essential in order to counter United 
Party (UP) propaganda that the HNP would create a republic, if they won the election, and 
removed this issue from the electoral agenda. In the 1953 election campaign Malan and 
the NP similarly defended its incumbency by focussing on racial issues and its Apartheid 
policies, and not the republic.
Elements in the Republican Transvaal HNP leadership vehemently opposed 
cooperation with the diminutive Afrikaner Party,7 although moderate HNP leaders like
o
Ben Schoeman, backed the pact. Ideological issues, a republic and bree volkswil did not, 
however, play a central role in the Transvaal’s opposition to this pact.9 The 
correspondence between Malan and Strijdom,10 and between Malan and Havenga,11 
indicates that the source of the dispute was a fear that the AP was being taken over by its 
bitter enemy, the Ossewa Brandwag.
4 H.B. Thom, D.F. Malan (Kaapstad, 1980), p. 162; Arthur G. Barlow, Almost in Confidence (Cape Town, 
1952), p. 320.
5 P.W. Coetzer, 'Die Afrikaner Party en die 1948 Verkiesing', The Journal for Contemporary History. 17, 1, 
June 1992, p. 114.
6 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2390, HNP se Verkiesings Manifes. Dr. Malan in die Paarl, 21 April 1948..
7 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years. The Apartheid State and the Politics o f  the National Party. 1948 - 1994 
(Randburg, 1996), pp. 85 -  86; P.W. Coetzer, 'Die Afrikaner Party en die 1948 Verkiesing', pp. 1 1 4 -1 1 7 .
8 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek (Johannesburg, 1978), p. 128.
9 H.B. Thom, 'Politieke Driehoek, 1947-1948. Malan, Strijdom, Havenga', Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog- 
gedenklesing, Stellenbosch, 26 April 1976, p. 26
0 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1//2326, J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan. 24 September 1947; D.F. Malan 
Collection. File 1/1//2314, J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan. 31 July 1947; D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1//2324, 
J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan. 9 September 1947.
11 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2308, D.F. Malan to N.C. Havenga, 21 July 1947; D.F. Malan Collection, 
File 1/1/2345, D.F. Malan to N.C. Havenga, 22 November 1947.
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Another cause of disaffection was the decision to allocate a quota of safe seats, 
especially in the Free State and Transvaal, to the party.12 Hans Strijdom, in fact, 
threatened to leave the party over the issue, as he believed that the HNP was paying too 
heavy a price. To add insult to injury, the AP set about opening branches in areas where 
they had never been active before. Often known OB supporters led these initiatives. Given 
the small, yet not insignificant, boycott of the 1943 elections and the acrimony between 
the party and the OB, Malan clearly saw the AP as a vehicle through which to launder 
non-HNP Afrikaner votes in order to topple Smuts. Opponents of the pact, however, 
warned Malan that floating votes might be lost due to a link between the HNP and the OB, 
through the AP, which increasingly became identified with the OB.13
Though Strijdom preferred to absorb the AP, Malan was mindful of the fact that it 
would have been very difficult at that point in time,14 due to past animosities. Again, the 
dimension of personal enmity towards Havenga cannot be dismissed. So strongly 
identified with Hertzog, and condemned as the 'beskermheer' (protector) of anti­
republicans,15 Havenga also threatened Strijdom’s prospects of succeeding Malan.
Malan stood his ground and his stratagem paid off handsomely. The AP won 9 of 
the 10 seats it contested.16 More importantly, the pact allowed the HNP to concentrate its 
efforts and limited resources more effectively. Of the 92 seats the party contested, it won 
70. In the 1943 elections the party contested 99 seats and only won 43 of these. This 
dramatic increase in seats happened despite the fact that the party’s share of the vote only 
rose by 1,4 percent to 37,2 percent. The AP’s share rose to 3,9 percent, whilst the HP’s 
share fell from 48,7 percent to 47,9 percent.17 Smuts, who lost his own seat, led a party 
with only 65 seats in parliament. The Westminster system, therefore, demonstrated how a 
party or coalition without a plurality of votes (41,1 percent) could come to power. The 
challenge for the party was thus to consolidate its power and widen its support base during 
its first term in power.
12 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2370, D.F. Malan to C.R. (Blackie) Swart, Free State NP leader, 21 
February 1948.
13 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2307, Letter from Eric Louw to D.F. Malan, 16 July 1947.
14 H.B. Thom, 'Politieke Driehoek', p. 8.
15P ie Transvaler. 28 November 1939, In O. Geyser (ed.), Dr. HF Verwoerd. Die Republikein. Hoofartikles 
uit Die Transvaler 1937 -  1948 (Kaapstad en Johannesburg, 1972), p. 46.
16 Bethal-Middleburg, Uitenhage, Vryburg, Kliprivier, Ladybrand, Lydenburg and Pretoria District, 
Potchefstroom, Roodepoort (the only seat the party lost) and Vryheid.
17 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesines in Suid Afrika. pp. 270,271, 301-302.
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Placing Apartheid ahead of the republic:
Malan sought to shift the focus of the HNP campaign from the republican question to 
social-economic and racial issues, in order to appeal to non-republicans, especially in
1 Qurban areas. Addressing the HNP’s 1946 Cape provincial conference, Malan noted that 
the party needed to secure the support of its voters who were flocking to the cities.19 
Dwelling on this challenge, Die Burger noted that the party 'would have no hope of
•  oncoming to power' if it failed to make progress amidst urban voters. In its ensuing leader, 
Die Burger added that in addition to pursuing a republic, the party also had another task to 
fulfil, namely, addressing the economic plight of the volk. The paper further observed that 
the party represented the interests of both republicans and non-republicans. A referendum 
on the republican question, according to Die Burger, meant that the party did not have to 
choose between the republican issue, and the economic question. For this reason, the 
paper remarked, Malan had chosen not to make the republican issue the focus of the next 
election, adding that it was only appropriate to call a vote when there was a majority for 
such a republic. To do otherwise, it conceded, would harm the republican cause.21 Malan 
repeated this theme at the 1946 conference of the Transvaal party.22 Commenting on 
Malan’s referendum pledge, The Star suggested that it provided 'a clear indication that the 
Herstigte Nasionale Party is preparing to follow a policy of expediency for the next 
general election.'23
In the build up to the election Malan24 and other senior party leaders, like Eric 
Louw, continued to highlight the party’s pledge to submit the republican issue to a 
referendum. Dr. E.G. Jansen, for example, informed a Greytown audience 'that there is no 
truth in the United Party allegations that that the Nationalists have a threatening plan to 
impose a republic upon South Africa.'26 As Die Oosterlig noted in 1947, a vote for the
77National Party was not, therefore, a vote for a republic.
18 Newell M. Stultz, The Nationalists in Opposition. 1934 -  1948 (Cape Town and Pretoria, 1974), pp. 
95,113.
19 Die Burger. 24 September 1946.
20 Die Burger. Leader, 24 September 1946.
21 Die Burger. Leader, 25 September 1946.
22 Stephen Fouche, "n Vergelyking tussen die menings in redaksioneele Hoofartikels van Die Oosterlig end 
dir Eastern Province Herald ten opsigte van enkele sosio-politieke twispunte van 1948 tot 1961 uitgespreek', 
(MA Thesis Dissertation, Port Elizabeth: University o f  Port Elizabeth, 1989), p. 55.
23 The Star. 28 September 1946.
24 W.K. Hancock, Smuts. The Fields o f Force. 1919 -  1950 (London, 1968), pp. 499 -  500; William Henry 
Vatcher Jr.. White Laager. The Rise o f Afrikaner Nationalism (London. 1965), p. 169.
25 D.F. Malan Collection. File 1/1/2241, Article written by Eric Louw for Major Crisp o f the Chicago 
Tribune and London Daily Express.
26 Reported in Die Oosterlig. 19 July 1947, Stephen Fouche, 'n Vergelyking', p. 58.
27 Die Oosterlig. Leader, 18 July 1947. Ibid. p. 56.
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Apartheid and the economy, and not the republic, were thus viewed as the rallying 
cry that would draw Afrikaners from Smuts to the HNP. In the words of journalist and 
politician Arthur Barlow, 'Malan now placed his vaunted cry for a republic in the deep 
freezer and cried out to the high heaven that the nation was in danger of being swamped 
by the big Black of Africa.'29 Writing days ahead of the vote, The Star noted.
Never in the political history of our country, noted sometimes for its strife and 
always for its liveliness, has a general election been contested in such a placid 
atmosphere. Here lies the danger. The lines of cleavage may be temporarily 
obscured; they have not been wiped out. Clever platform policy at Nationalist 
meetings has quietly evaded the controversial subjects of republicanism and 
isolationism. Apartheid has been presented in most plausible generalizations, 
but no Nationalist candidate has demarcated the areas into which the native'y a
people will be segregated.
As part of this electoral heresthetics, the party pledged not to tinker with the
country’s constitutional status in it’s first term in its 1948 manifesto, and such
1reassurances were repeated after the elections. In doing so, the HNP emulated the 
PACT’s success of 1924, pressing home facial and economic issues, like the poor maize 
price, which undermined support from farmers, disaffection amongst returning soldiers 
over de-mobilization, and the UP’s failure to deal with African urbanization and provide 
job security for whites. The promise of a referendum on the republican question, 
therefore, played a vital role in enabling the HNP to accentuate its Apartheid agenda34 as 
well as the poor state of the post-war economy and assuage conservative and non­
republican voters that their votes would not be used to create a republic.
28 David Welsh,. 'The Politics o f White Supremacy', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds). Change 
in Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 61.
29 Arthur G. Barlow, Almost in Confidence, p. 315.
30 The Star. Leader, 22 May 1948.
31 Die Burger. 13 May 1949.
32 Jeremy Lawrence, Harry Lawrence (Cape Town, 1978), p. 219.
33 Sampie Terreblanche, A History o f Inequality in South Africa. 1652-2002 (Pietermaritzburg, 2003), pp. 
278-279, 300.
34 Both Hermann Giliomee (2003, 481) and the journalist Schalk Pienanr (1977, 12, 16), dismiss claims that 
the 1948 victory is attributable to the appeal o f Apartheid. The latter in fact suggests that the foundations for 
the 1948 victory were laid in the 1938 Trek commemorations and that nationalism peaked in 1948. 
According to Alan Paton (1971, 382-383, 388), Jan Hofrneyer and his critics in the party (like deposed MP 
David Jackson) attributed the defeat to the race issue. Hofrneyer did also, however, recognize the salience o f  
the 'irritation vote' in the defeat. B.M. Schoeman (1977, 272, 274) is perhaps correct in attributing the 
sensational victory to an amalgam o f factors, and not a single factor. These included, the poor post-war 
economy, white fears o f  black urbanization and competition in the labor market and the threat o f  economic 
competition from Indians. Besides, Schoeman notes that the pre-election Smuts government was particularly 
weak. Deborah Posel (1987, 131) does, however, note that Apartheid was important in securing the support 
o f  farmers who were anxious to ensure a supply o f labour.
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Charles Bloomberg argues that it was the Broederbond, which effected this change 
of focus. But despite Bloomberg’s claims, there was significant resistance to these 
efforts to moderate the party’s image. Malan, for example, had to resist efforts by the 
Transvaal leadership to rename the party the Republican National Party, cautioning that 
such a move would limit the ITS appeal. Besides, The Star noted that the Transvaler 
received Malan’s 1946 referendum pledge 'frigidly' and 'buried the report in a back 
page.'37
From political ascendancy to a republic:
Once in power, deep internal divisions on issues related to a republic surfaced to plague 
the HNP. The Cape leadership, which was pre-occupied with consolidating the HNP’s 
hold on power and the pursuit of the Apartheid agenda, wished to defer a referendum. 
Differences* also surfaced on the issue of Commonwealth membership. As already noted, 
supporters of a 'republic now' approach favoured terminating Commonwealth 
membership, in order to enhance white unity and ensure the support of conservative 
English-speaking whites for the HNP’s Apartheid agenda. Both Strijdom and Verwoerd 
viewed white division over the republican issue as a handicap in the 'greatest struggle, the 
struggle for self maintenance.'
The fact that the UP began to hint that it would support a republic inside the 
Commonwealth after the 1943 elections, in order to placate restless republican UP 
supporters, encouraged some in the HNP to highlight the break with the Commonwealth. 
Malan’s supporters, on the other hand, feared that a republican spat would exacerbate 
English-Afrikaans tensions between, and undermine efforts to institutionalise Apartheid. 
And tactically, the Cape leadership were deeply concerned that fighting a referendum on a 
republic outside the Commonwealth would spell defeat. Moreover, the acceptance of a 
republic within the Commonwealth also reflected the Cape’s ambivalence towards 
republicanism, certainly the exclusivist brand propounded by their northern colleagues.40
A third fault line in the party emerged on the question over what constituted a 
sufficient majority for securing a republic. The Cape leadership had adopted Hertzog’s
35 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism. p. 200.
36 Dirk en Johanna De Villiers, Paul Sauer (Kaapstad, 1977), pp. 143-144.
37 The Star. 28 September 1946.
38 Verwoerd to the Natal National Party Conference, The Natal Mercury. 7 November 1958; The Cape 
Times. 7 November 1958; Verwoerd to the special Unial conference o f the NP, Die Transvaaler. 30 August 
1960. Also see Die Transvaler. Leader, 24 February 1960.
39 Die Transvaler. 21 December 1943. In O. Geyser (ed.), Dr. HF Verwoerd. pp. 86-89.
40 Jaapie Basson, Pretoria News. 24 June 1959.
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position on the need to secure a broad majority.41 In contrast, the Transvaal leadership 
pressed for the creation of a republic through a simple parliamentary majority. Dan 
O’Meara’s structuralist account explains the Cape-Transvaal split on the republican issue 
in terms of the markedly different 'social base and content' of Afrikaner nationalism in the 
two provinces.42
The intensity of the Cape-Transvaal rift on the republican issue, especially the 
question of Commonwealth membership after 1949 led, at one stage, to a suspension of 
caucus meetings, and Strijdom considered tendering his resignation as a minister. The 
compromise reached on this matter was that the attainment of a republic and 
Commonwealth membership were to be treated as two separate issues, and that the 
Commonwealth question also be subjected to a later referendum.43 By July 1953 this 
compromise became the government’s official policy.44
Apartheid before a republic:
The seasoned and astute D.F. Malan, serving as Prime Minister at the age of 74, feared 
that pursuing a republic would detract from what he viewed as the HNP’s most important 
and electorally rewarding project, sweeping Apartheid legislation.45 Moreover, Malan was 
patently aware that the 1948 victory was not a mandate for a republic, and he was pre­
occupied with securing the HNP’s hold on power. Its narrow margin of victory in 194846 
provided ample evidence of the exigency for caution. Commenting after the fall of the UP 
government, The Star noted that it 'is certain that Dr. Malan cannot afford to revive 
republicanism at this stage.'47 The NP’s loss of Paarl in the 1949 provincial elections
41 Dunbar T. Moodie, The Rise o f Afrikanerdom. Power Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 140; S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u Volk. Dr. D.F. Malan as Redenaar. 1908 -  
1954 (Kaapstad, 1964), p. 101.
42 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 55.
43 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. pp. 304-305; Jan J. van Rooyen, Ons Politiek
van Nabv (Kaapstad, 1971), p. 121; B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd (Kaapstad, 1973), p. 14. 
^S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u volk. pp. 82-83.
45 D.W. Kruger (ed.), South African Parties and Policies. 1910 -  1960. A Select Source Book (Cape Town, 
1960), pp. 264-265.
46 The NP secured 70 seats, as opposed to the UP’s 65. The Afrikaner Party held nine seats and the Labour 
Party 6. In absolute terms, more voters voted for the UP and the NP’s victory was made possible thanks to 
the relative weight that the rural constituencies enjoyed. The HNP only represented 37,2 percent o f  the 
popular vote, as opposed to the 47,9 percent o f the UP.
47 The Star. Leader, 28 May 1948.
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highlighted the tenuous nature of the NP’s victory,48 and a referendum on the republic 
issue was again pledged in parliament in 1951 49
In that same year, Malan urged the caucus to play down the republican issue, 
warning that it would undermine the party’s electoral prospects,50 and allow the UP to 
destroy the Apartheid policy.51 And, in the build-up to the 1953 campaign the NP made 
scant reference to the republican issue. Instead, it again highlighted racial issues and the 
threat of communism. As was the case in 1948, NP strategists sought to make inroads in 
urban constituencies. Explaining the strategic imperative, Die Burger noted that the 'main 
challenge is no longer in the rural areas but rather in the urban constituencies.' And, in a 
campaign speech in Port Elizabeth, Theo Donges, informed his audience that the UP 'tries 
to scare voters by perpetually assuming what the party will do [on a republic] once it wins 
the elections.' Donges added that this question would be decided at the right time.54 The 
challenge for the party in 1953, therefore, continued to be penetrating the urban areas, 
without forsaking its rural base and dividing the party. The pledge of a referendum on a 
future republic allowed this.
Even after the 1953 elections, Malan continued to warn that fighting a general 
election over the republic would serve the interests of the United Party. Malan also 
candidly acknowledged that many of those who voted for the HNP in the 1948 elections 
were anti-republicans, and did so in support for the party’s Apartheid policy. Malan 
reminded Party activists that these votes were secured on the premise that they would not 
be used to change the country’s constitutional status, which was to be settled by a 
referendum.55 This position mirrored Hertzog’s 1926 reticence regarding a clean flag, and 
Malan, who had previously disagreed with Hertzog, arguing 'it was unrealistic to wait for 
National unity before establishing a republic,'56 was now guided by the same caution. The 
Cape Nationalists now firmly held the Hertzog line that national unity was a precursor to a 
republic.57 Malan’s outlook -  like Hertzog’s in the case of the flag - may well have been
48 Nic Olivier, 'The Head o f  Government and the Party, in Robert Schrire (ed.), Malan to de Klerk. 
Leadership in the Apartheid State (London, 1994), p. 82.
49 Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1967), p. 173.
50 A2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, File 53, Notes ofN P caucus meeting, 13/3/1951,20/3/1951..
51 B.M. Schoeman. Van Malan tot Verwoerd. p. 15.
52 Malan’s speech in Stellenbosch (Die Burger. 1 April 1953) and his pre-election radio address (Die Burger. 
14 April 1953) as well as Die Burger. Leader, 7, 11 April 1953.
53 Die Burger. 15 April 1953.
54 Die Burger. 23 March 1953.
55 S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u Volk, p. 101.
56 John Fisher, The Afrikaners (London, 1969), p. 280.
57 Louis Louw (ed.). Dawie 1946-1964. 'n Bloemlesing uit die Geskrifte van Die Burger se Politieke 
Kommentator Saamgestel deur Louis Louw (Kaapstad, 1965), p. 75.
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tempered by the responsibility and realism that comes with being Prime Minister. Besides, 
Malan may well have had the benefit of his experience from the flag struggle. Having 
'played the game before' he was well aware of the potentially devastating impact of 
promoting such controversial legislation in his first term.
North-South Tensions:
The Transvaal leadership’s penchant for the speedy creation of a republic bordered on 
oppositional behaviour, and the fact that Strijdom received a relatively junior ministry,
CO
Lands, nettled his supporters. Charles Bloomberg contends that the decision reflected 
Malan’s desire to 'not be a prisoner of the militant northerners.'59 According to Ben 
Schoeman, the position was of Strijdom’s choosing, as he hoped to build the base of the 
Transvaal party.60 A letter from Strijdom to Malan in 1950, however, reinforces the 
former account, and confirms that Malan did not consult the Transvaal leader on many 
cardinal policy issues.61 To add insult to injury, Malan appointed seven Cape ministers, as 
opposed to only three from the Transvaal in his first cabinet. In 1948 the Transvaal 
supplied the largest numbers of MPs, 32, as opposed to the Cape’s 26.
The referendum pledge, however, continued to provide the party with maximal 
ambiguity on the republican issue. For a party obsessed with unity, it served to ensure 
that the HNP would mean different things to different Afrikaners, drawn from different 
traditions. In a cable to London, drafted in 1954, the High Commissioner quipped that 
'spokespersons of the NP in the four provinces of the Transvaal, the Free State, the Cape 
and Natal, whose spokesman, if asked respectively when the republic should be 
established, would no doubt reply: "This year," "Next year," "Sometime," "Never".'63 The 
referendum, therefore, provided a modicum of unity through ambiguity for the disparate 
provincial structures on the republican question. Moreover, the pledge to stage a 
referendum limited the scope for the Transvalers to attack the Malan-Havenga axis within 
the party and in public, as it confirmed their principle support for the republic, yet 
allowing them to be cautious in practice.
58 H.B. Thom, Politieke Driehoek. p, 5; B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd. p. 13.
59 Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism. p, 206.
60 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek. p. 148.
61 D.F. Malan Collection, File 1/1/2543, J.G. Strijdom to D.F. Malan, 10 January 1950.
62 David Welsh, 'The Politics o f  White Supremacy', in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds), Change 
in Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 64.
63 Public Records Office, DO 35/ 5358, Draft Intel, Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom, composed by the United 
Kingdom High Commission in South Africa.
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Havenga and Malan’s caution:
It is also important to note that the Malan-Havenga axis was far more cautious in 
implementing the Apartheid agenda,64 and Havenga resisted efforts to remove coloured 
voters from the Cape voter’s role. This caution by the party’s two elder leaders not only 
reflected deep divisions over Apartheid within the party,65 but was also clearly driven by 
their strong desire to safeguard the party’s tenuous hold on power in the 1953 elections. 
Havenga, who is unfortunately a much under-researched Afrikaner leader, had a 
tremendous influence on Malan’s cautious approach towards a republic. True to his 
mentor’s legacy, Havenga continued to insist on Hertzog’s demand for broad support for a 
republic. The slender 1948 majority provided Havenga with the requisite leverage to 
ensure that Malan honoured his commitment.66 In addition to ideological differences 
between Malan and Strijdom, Malan personally disliked Strijdom, and went out of his way 
to ensure that Havenga would succeed him. Given that Malan viewed Havenga as his 
successor, the republican issue provided a useful rallying point for opposition to Havenga.
Despite claims by Havenga that the cabinet supported the position that a republic 
would only be created after a referendum, the 1953 parliament session laid bare 
Transvaal-Cape tensions on the republican question. In a debate in early July 1953, 
Malan’s assurance on a republican referendum and continued Commonwealth 
membership triggered an angry response from Strijdom. The Transvaal leader described 
this statement as 'the deed of an assassin who hides a dagger behind his cloak in order to 
administer a fatal stab.' The High Commission’s interpretation of Strijdom’s outburst was 
that the Transvaal leader would use a simple parliamentary majority to introduce a 
republic.69 The Star, which welcomed Malan’s speech, called on Strijdom, Eric Louw and 
C.R. Swart to resign from the party and form a Republican party.70 Ultimately though, the 
imperative of party unity compelled Strijdom to back down. The premium placed on unity
64 Nic Olivier, 'The Head o f Government and the Party', p. 82.
65 Deborah Posel's research highlights the varying interpretations o f Apartheid within the Nationalist 
movement and she attributes these diverging blue-prints o f Apartheid to the varying blue prints for the 
economy (1987,133).
66 Dunbar T. Moodie, The Rise o f Afrikanerdom. p. 281.
67 Ben Schoeman. Mv Lewe in die Politiek. p. 183; Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, pp. 86-87.
68 Public Records Office, PREM 11/539, Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for Commonwealth 
Relations. 12 June 1953. Relations with South Africa. C. (53) 169.
69 Public Records Office, PREM 11/539, United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa to Secretary o f  
State for Commonwealth Relations. 6 August 1953. South Africa: Membership o f the Commonwealth. 
C.R.O. Ref: COM 68/4/2.
70 Leader, 9 July 1953.
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-  a feature of the NP until 1982 and the right wing’s break under Andries Treumicht- was 
informed by the deep divisions of the early 1940’s.71
Malan’s reluctance:
Malan’s insistence on a referendum prior to introducing a republic also reflected his
77personal equivocacy towards a republic, certainly one as envisaged by the northern NP. 
A fascinating parallel with Hertzog's behaviour in the 1926 Flag Bill. For in agreeing to a 
referendum, Malan handicapped the NP’s republican drive. Given that the NP’s majority 
was only made possible by the relative weight that rural constituencies enjoyed, a 
referendum favoured the opponents of a republic. Besides, Malan realized that a 
referendum pledge would deprive the UP of one of its key arguments against a republic,
7^i.e. that the NP majority in parliament did not represent a majority of the voting public. 
The precarious majority that the Party enjoyed during its first term may have reinforced 
arguments that a referendum and its 'sufficient majority' was a guarantee for the retention 
of a republic.74
Moreover, the Cape Nationalists also recognized that there were republicans -  like 
Sakkies Fourie and Louis Steenkamp - in the United Party. Thus a referendum was
7c
designed to allow them to support the Republic without breaking with the party. Die 
Burger claimed that the republican issue exposed differences between the UP’s leadership
7 /
and membership, and party members outside of Natal were less opposed to a republic. 
Capturing the sentiment of many in the party, The Rand Daily Mail’s editor, Laurence 
Gandar, warned that the party’s blanket rejection of a republic 'does not truly reflect the 
state of feeling in the country.' Gandar also cautioned that the UP’s demurral would limit
77its ability to influence the institutions of the coming republic. Having entrenched the 
referendum pledge, Cape Nats and supporters of the 'republic later' school effectively 
gained control over the timing of the vote. Moreover, the insistence on a referendum 
strengthened Malan’s hand in the debate on Commonwealth membership, as it was 
possible to argue that this specific demand would undermine the greater goal.
71 Hermann Giliome,. 'The Leader and the Citizenry', in Robert Schrire (ed.), Malan to de Klerk, p. 105.
72 D.W. Kruger (Editor), South African Parties and Policies, pp. 287-288.
73 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie 1946-1964. pp. 75, 83; Fred Barnard, 13 Jaar in die Skadu van Dr. H.F. 
Verwoerd (Johannesburg, 1967), p. 118.
74 Die Nasionale Partvnuus Number 9(1954).
75 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie 1946-1964. pp. 151-152.
76 Die Burger. 30 May 1958.
77 Laurence Gandar, The Rand Daily Mail. 29 January 1960.
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South Africa and the Commonwealth:
For ardent republicans, attaining an independent republic was part of a process of cutting 
the Gordian knot with Britain and ending British cultural and trade influence over South 
Africa. Verwoerd, for example, viewed the attainment of a republic as a means to address 
the poor white problem, and end the country’s trade dependency. It was also to be the 
final reversal of Vereeniging and the defeat of 1902. In a letter to an NP supporter, J.G. 
Strijdom articulated the importance for the Transvaal republicans in breaking the ties with 
the Commonwealth. Strijdom noted that the Scottish, the Welsh, part of the Irish and the 
urban Afrikaners are all examples of communities that had surrendered to the 'British 
connection' and Anglicisation. Ending the ties with the Commonwealth and the Empire
70was, thus, viewed as a pre-condition for preserving the Afrikaner volk.
On the other hand, Malan, who favoured breaking with the British connection
OA
during the war, now viewed South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth as being
contrary to the country’s interests, and argued that attaining republican status need not
spell the end of South Africa’s membership. After the 1949 Commonwealth Conference,
Malan returned to South Africa claiming that India’s precedent for continued membership
as an independent nation-state ended the long-standing tension between republican status
01
and Commonwealth membership. Addressing parliament, upon his return, Malan 
reiterated his party’s commitment to only create a republic on the basis of broad popular 
will, so as not to 'confuse the issue of establishing a republic with other issues facing the 
people.' Malan also submitted that the party had in 1948 committed itself not to promote 
the republic in this term of office. He noted that party made this commitment, as it was 
aware that there were 'hundreds and thousands,' who though opposed to the republic, 
supported the NP’s racial policies.82 In the same debate, Havenga added that there are 
'larger issues that require our attention and it is desirable that the republican question' not 
be allowed to divide us.
78 O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. p. 3; Die Transvaler editorial, 26 March 1941, 25 March 1938, 15 
September 1938, 14 March 1939, and 30 July 1945; In O. Geyser (Editor), Dr. HF Verwoerd. pp. 24, 28, 35- 
37,50 ,89-91 .
79 A 2, J.G. Strijdom Collection, File 53, Letter from Adv J.G. Strijdom to J.J. van Rooyen, 23 April 1937..
80 S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u volk. pp. 47, 62.
81 Die Transvaler. 28 April and 12 May 1949; The Star. 28 April 1949. Die Burger expressed similar 
sentiments. Die Burger. 13 May 1949; S.W. Pienaar, Glo in u Volk, p. 68.
82 Die Burger. 13 May 1949.
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This announcement was a severe setback for the Transvaal leadership and Malan’s 
stand threatened his position as party leader and infuriated the Broederbond. Ireland, 
which had left the Commonwealth on becoming a republic, was cast as the example that 
Transvaal Republicans sought to emulate,85 and party insiders feared a split over the
OiT
Commonwealth issue. For Malan, deferring the republicanissue was clearly designed to 
bolster the party’s chance of winning the 1953 elections and in 1950 he argued it would 
remove 'any stigma of anti-British feeling, which some have thought to be inseparable 
from it [republicanism].' He noted, yet again, that the republic would not be 'forced upon 
the country, but can and will only come about if it is broadly based on the people’s will.'87 
A year later, he reiterated such assurances, highlighting the argument that republicanism
go
was a 'political principle and not a racial matter.' The Prime Minister (who was also 
Foreign Minister), also feared that breaking ties with the Commonwealth might spell not 
only greater isolation, but further expose the Union to greater UN pressure and sanctions
O Q
over its Apartheid agenda. Interestingly, Malan saw the Commonwealth as a 'foothold' in 
Africa, and believed that a republic outside the Commonwealth would undermine relations 
with Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the white communities in Kenya and 
Tanganyika.90 Forced to choose between Russian and American imperialism, the 
Commonwealth 'provided the safest harbourage for a small nation in distress.'91 A further 
consideration in the Cape’s support for continued Commonwealth membership was the 
desire to maintain access to lucrative export markets for farmers.92
Strategically the proponents in the debate had different views on positions on the 
impact of severing Commonwealth ties on relations between the two white communities. 
Those who favoured severing ties with the Commonwealth believed that such a step 
would make English speakers more loyal to South Africa and more supportive of the 
party’s Apartheid agenda. In contrast, the Cape leadership feared that suspending
84 Die Suiderstem. 14 May 1949.
85 A 2, File 53, Letter from S. du Toit to D.F. Malan, dated 2 May 1949,.
86 Ben Schoeman, Mv Lewe in die Politiek. p. 165.
87 D.F. Malan collection 1/1/2577, D.F. Malan speech in Durban, 19 September 1950.
88 D.F. Malan collection 1/1/2702, D.F. Malan speech at Ladysmith, 11 October 1951.
89 B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd. pp. 12,18.
90 A 2, File 53, Notes o f NP caucus meeting, 13 and 20 March 1951
91 Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition 1939-1945. An Essay in 
Contemporary History (Cape Town, 1947), pp. 194 - 195.
92 Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 105.
93 Eric Louw, 1 November 1951, quoted in Die Nasionale Partvnuus. Number 9 (1954); J.H. Abraham, 'Hans 
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Commonwealth membership would polarise differences between the two white 
communities, to the detriment of the Apartheid agenda.
A painless republic:
Above all, however, the Cape leadership feared that it would be impossible to win a 
referendum in which voters were asked to support a republic outside of the 
Commonwealth. The Cape leadership had long argued that attaining a republic was only 
practical if it involved minimal changes for the sceptics.94 The example that the Cape 
Nationalists invoked was Ireland’s route to a republic,95 and the 'painless republic' 
approach, thus, sought to ensure that the vote focus on the general idea of a republic and 
not its attributes.96 Detaching the question of Commonwealth membership,97 and the
QO
earlier removal of issues like a single flag and anthem from the republican debate, 
therefore, served to minimise the number of issues around which the opposition could 
mobilise resistance to a republic. Cape Nationalists also believed that incremental 
changes, like the national anthem and flag, would 'pave the way for the Republic.'99
The Cape’s sensitivity towards the need for such an approach reflected the 
province’s demographics (the English and Afrikaans speaking communities were almost 
equal in size) and the absence of a deep hankering for a republic. Moreover, Cape fruit and 
wine farmers were fearful of losing access to British and Dominion markets.100 The 
United Party, in fact, made the economic costs and the export markets a central focus of 
their anti-republican propaganda. Nasionale Pers’s senior management,101 and later 
Verwoerd, recognized this potential Achilles heel in the NP’s case for a republic. In a 
memo to NP legislators, Verwoerd instructed them not to make any reference whatsoever
t O')to the issue of the boycott of SA products in order to quash the debate. Havenga, who 
served as the Minister of Finance, was acutely aware of the costs of disengaging from the 
Commonwealth, and no doubt influenced Malan’s thinking in this regard. Strijdom, who
t f t lhad earlier supported a gradual loosening of ties with the Commonwealth, vociferously
94 Die Burger. 16 ,22 ,25  May 1958.
95 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. pp. 125, 158.
96 PV 28, M.C.G.J. (Basie) van Rensburg Collection, File 532, Extract from Hansard, 27 January 1959.
97 Die Burger. 22 May 1958.
98 In May 1958 the NP, through its Transvaal leader in the Provincial Council, F.H. Odendaal, clarified that 
the Republican (Transvaal) flag would not become the Republic’s flag. Die Burger. 16 May 1958.
99 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. p. 152.
100 Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. pp. 51 -  52.
101 P.J. Cillie Collection. 220. K 60 (25), Jan de la Roux du Toit to P.J. Cillie, dated 15 June 1960.
102 PV 93, Verwoerd Collection, File 1/30/1/5. Items 3-5, Memo dated 21 August 1959.
103 A 2, File 53, Letter from Adv J.G. Strijdom to J.J. van Rooyen, 23 April 1937.
194
opposed the formula after 1949. These tensions continued until 1954 and were 
exacerbated after 1958. But by 1960 Verwoerd had been forced to accept the Cape’s 
position,104 despite the fact that the party no longer controlled the NP’s federal structures.
Transvaal ascendancy, Cape contention:
In 1954 the balance of power shifted towards the Transvaal, when J.G. Strijdom was 
elected as NP leader, despite the fact that Malan had publicly supported Havenga’s 
candidacy as his successor. The English press viewed Strijdom’s appointment as a victory 
for the extremists,105 and a rejection of Malan.106 Perceptively, The Rand Daily Mail noted 
that the party under Malan and Havenga was not moving fast enough on key policy issues
1 (\Hand added that the two were 'obsolete relics of Hertzogism.1 Havenga, who confidently 
informed British officials in mid-1953 that the republic was not an issue at that time, 
confirmed that the Malan-Havenga combination indeed stalled on the republican issue. 
Havenga confidently predicted that there would not be a republic in his lifetime and
i nftemphasized that he and Malan had support for this position in the cabinet.
The Cape Times aptly captured the full implications of the changing of the guard 
by noting that whereas the likes of Hertzog, Smuts, Malan and Havenga were 
conservatives, 'Mr. Strijdom is a younger man and a newer man. He is a product of 
Nationalist politics, not a creator like Malan and Hertzog.'109
Defiantly, Die Burger continued to campaign for a moderate republic within the 
Commonwealth. The paper did so by running its own 'referendum' on the issue among its 
readers. In a referendum newspaper referendum in June 1958, 78,1 percent of the 
participants stated their preference for a republic within the Commonwealth.110 The 
referendum was ostensibly designed to allow the paper’s readers to have their say on how 
the republic should look, but it also served the Cape in its struggle with the Transvaal NP 
leadership on the republican debate.111 The newspaper’s 'referendum' is said to have
104 B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd. p. 183; Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 105.
105 The Natal Mercury. 1 December 1954 and The Friend. 1 December 1954.
106 The Pretoria News. 1 December 1954 and The Star. 1 December 1954.
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108 Public Records Office. PREM 11/539, Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for Commonwealth 
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Swinton the former hardly raised the issue at all. Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for 
Commonwealth Relations. 5 June 1953. Relations with South Africa. C. (53) 165. Public Records Office. 
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109 The Cape Times. 1 December 1954.
1.0 P.J. Cillie, 'Die Burger en die Republiek,' in P.J. Scanell (ed.), Keerom Straat 30 (Cape Town, 1965), pp. 
231-239.
1.1 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. pp. 147,171.
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119forced Verwoerd’s hand in calling his referendum in 1960, and had a major influence 
on the internal NP debate on the republic, and Commonwealth Membership in 
particular.113 In parallel, the new Cape leader of the NP Dr. T.E. (Theo) Donges carried on 
fighting for a republic within the Commonwealth. One contemporary commentator 
suggested that the 'Donges-Burger republican axis' and its campaign for a painless 
republic was motivated by a desire to 'regain lost political influence.'114
Verwoerd, who had traditionally preferred a 'true' republic outside the 
Commonwealth,115 knew that to push ahead on this would split the NP,116 and was obliged 
to back down. He justified his about-face by claiming that it was out of respect for the 
sentiments of the English speaking South Africans and in recognition of the imperative of 
white unity.117 The theme of white unity through a republic was articulated in Verwoerd’s
11 A
first speech to the public as Strijdom’s successor, and was to become a hallmark of his 
speeches on the republic. Alexander Hepple perceptively notes that the shift in discourse 
towards 'white unity,' was designed to reframe the republican debate, which until then had 
come to be associated with anti-British sentiments.119 This effort to woo English speakers
19ftwas bolstered by increased use of English in Verwoerd’s speeches.
In justifying Commonwealth membership, Verwoerd further suggested that nations
191tended 'to group together.' Moreover, Verwoerd recognised that this was the only way 
to secure a yes majority,122 and conceded as much to Harold McMillan in their 1960 
meetings.123 Verwoerd never quite forgave Die Burger for its campaign to de-couple the 
issues and Die Burger’s editors were concerned that Verwoerd would try and wrest 
control of the Cape National Party and the newspaper. There were even rumours that
112 Laurence Gandar, The Rand Daily Mail. 29 January 1960.
113 Louis Louw (Editor), Dawie. p. 171; J.D. du P.Basson, 'Die Suid Afrikaanse Republiek-wording en 
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111.
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89.
116 S.J. Marais Steyn in The Cape Argus. 29 January 1960; The Pretoria News. 20 February 1960.
117The Cane Argus. 29 October 1958 and Die Burger. 29 October 1958.
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certain northern Nationalists were about to establish a competing paper in the province.124 
The Cape’s determination to separate the issues was, however, vindicated by the final 
result in that province, for the yes vote in the Cape secured a tenuous majority of less than
2,000 out of the 540,000 voters in that province. The Rand Daily Mail’s editor, Laurence 
Gander provided further vindication for Die Burger’s strategy. In correspondence with 
N.J. Olivier, Gander indicated that his paper would call upon the public to give 'earnest 
consideration to the question of a republic without endeavouring to influence it one way or 
another,' in the event that the government would agree to a republic as proposed by Die 
Burger}25
A Republic becomes 'practical politics.'
Although the balance of power within the party tilted towards the Transvaal after 1954, 
Strijdom did not aggressively pursue the republican issue. This reticence reflected his 
concern that the referendum, from which there was by now no bilking, would not be won. 
In the 1953 elections the NP still lagged behind the UP by 70,000 votes in overall support,
10Aand it became clear that the republicans required support from English voters. It was 
only until after the 1958 general election, when the NP had enhanced its political power,
107that the goal of a Republic became 'practical politics.'
The 1958 vote marked the first time that the NP represented over 50 percent of the 
absolute vote, as the party secured the support of 55,2 percent of the white electorate’s 
support. In these elections the NP’s tally of seats rose from 95 in 1953 to 103, whilst the
17ftUP shrunk from 57 seats to 53. In other words, theoretically a referendum could be 
won. The party now held two-thirds of the seats in the legislature, but its numerous 
referendum pledges made a retreat politically impossible. Moreover, NP strategists 
continued to believe that a referendum would ensure greater support for a republic than the
170existing support for the party.
Though Nationalists sought to portray the 1958 result as a mandate for a republic, 
the 1958 success was, like the 1948 and 1953 elections, made possible by the party’s 
ability to play down the republican issue and focus on whites fears of losing hegemony. 
But the 1958 claim that a republic was now 'practical politics' also served to 'persuade the
124 P.J. Cillie Collection. 220.K60 (59), P.J. Cillie to P.A. Weber, dated 13,21 & 22 December 1960.
125 P.J. Cillie Collection. 220. K 60 (23), Letter from L.O.V. Gander to N.J. Olivier, dated 19 May 1960.
126 B.M. Schoeman, B.M. Van Malan tot Verwoerd. p. 186.
127 J.H. Abraham, Hans Strijdom', p. 86.
128 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. p. 365.
129 Die Burger. 22 May 1958.
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110anti-republican section of the people that a republic is inevitable.' This effort were
bolstered by claims that defeat in a referendum would not spell the end of the republican
dream, but merely serve as a temporary setback.131 Verwoerd even went as far as hinting
that the party 'was fighting through soft means .... But if we do not win, I am afraid that
the struggle will be harder and more bitter.... We will have to fight with methods that
might demand that we might have to go further than we were in the past prepared to 
1 ^
promise.' Verwoerd also hinted that a 'no' result would simply mean that the party
111would deploy its parliamentary majority in order to secure a republic.
One important step taken by Strijdom in order to promote the Republican cause 
was lowering the voting age from 21 to 18. Demographically, Afrikaners made up a larger 
percentage of the young voters, as they had a higher birth rate. An NP parliamentarian, 
Marais Viljoen, in fact predicted that this move added 150,000 new voters, of which
95,000 were Afrikaans speakers.134 Moreover, the NP recognised that younger English- 
speaking voters would be less attached to Britain and the Commonwealth. In lowering the 
age of voters, the NP chose the path of least confrontation in preparing the way for a 
republic. In 1954 British officials assessed that Strijdom would either pursue this 
stratagem, or force 'to a head outstanding issues with the United Kingdom (e.g. the 
transfer of High Commission Territories).' In choosing 'to turn the numerical scales in 
favour of republicanism,' the High Commission suggested that Strijdom demonstrated
l i e
caution and moderation.
Strijdom did not, however, live to see the fulfilment of his republican dream. His 
hesitancy is said to have been the product of opposition to a republic within the party at 
that time and the deliberations over what would constitute a sufficient majority for a
I
republic. Strijdom not only supported a referendum, but also championed a qualified 
majority of 50,000.137 The task of creating a republic was, instead, left to his successor 
Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd. In securing a republic, Verwoerd harnessed the support of the 
Broederbond, which had since 1954 channelled its energies into a campaign for a republic. 
So central was the role of the Broederbond that Verwoerd strategised with the
130 The Argus. 12 May 1958.
131 Die Burger. 25 February 1960. Die Transvaler. 25 March 1960.
132 Die Transvaler. 17 March 1960.
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1-10
organisation on the referendum long before he did with the party caucus. Strijdom had 
tenaciously opposed the organization’s involvement in the referendum, believing it should 
focus on economic issues.139
Verwoerd’s redefinition of the majority:
As already suggested, Verwoerd was unable to break with the numerous referendum 
promises of his predecessors and, addressing the cabinet on the issue of the republican 
referendum, he conceded that the 'leaders of the National Party had placed the Party in a 
difficult position regarding a referendum.' To the promise of respecting the commitments 
of his predecessors, he added that he did not want political parties and candidates to 
mediate on the issue.140 According to the journalist Beaumont Schoeman, Verwoerd also 
noted that whilst the NP had a parliamentary majority, it wanted to be certain that it had 
the public’s support on the republican issue. Schoeman adds that there were legislators 
within the faction who feared defeat in a referendum.141 Explaining his decision to use a 
referendum to parliament, Verwoerd noted that in elections the personalities of candidates 
also played a role and that an election regarding the republic could be turned into a vote of 
confidence in the government.142 Earlier in his career as editor of the influential Die 
Transvaler, Verwoerd had argued that elections were about a variety of policy issues and 
warned that 'all sorts of socio economic questions impact on' ordinary elections.143 As 
already witnessed, De Klerk echoed such claims in explaining his support for a 
referendum from 1990 to 1992.
Straitjacketed by the promises of his predecessors, stretching back almost three 
decades, Verwoerd, who was anxious to expedite the referendum, made one major break 
with his predecessors. For they had insisted that a referendum reflect bree volkswil. 
Speaking in 1954, D.F. Malan spoke of a 'substantial majority' in favour of a republic.144 
Even Strijdom supported a qualified majority of 50,000.145 Honouring this pledge, which 
was understood by many to imply a two-thirds majority,146 might rule out a referendum
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Super Afrikaners (Johannesburg. 1979), p. 137.
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for many years, if not decades. Verwoerd now argued that a simple majority of one would 
settle the issue. His justification for this was disingenuous, but simple. He claimed that the 
opposition’s 'false propaganda,' like claims that the NP wanted a totalitarian republic,147 
was 'misleading' voters. Accordingly, size of the majority, which the government would 
determine, was made a function of its subjective assessment of the 'honesty of the 
republican struggle.' The opposition press described the NP’s about-face as a 'breach of 
faith.'149
Ensuring a majority of one:
A government-sponsored poll at the end of 1959 suggested that even in the event of a 90 
percent turnout, the referendum would be lost by some 60 to 70 thousand votes.150 
Winning a referendum by the rules imposed by Hertzog, Havenga and Malan was, 
therefore, impractical. Verwoerd’s remorseless move away from a simple majority was 
followed by two complementary, yet controversial, measures to ensure that majority. The 
first was the removal of the coloured vote and the second was the decision to allow 
Namibians to vote in the referendum. By removing the country’s 50,000 coloured voters 
and adding some 32,000 Namibian voters, the bulk of whom (58,25 percent) supported the 
NP in the 1958 elections, the government ensured victory.
The coloured community’s exclusion also had far reaching implications in 
reinforcing Apartheid, so that symbolically the referendum represented the first ever all 
white election. Naturally, the English press was critical of the NP decision to exclude 
coloured voters.151 In contrast, Die Burger justified the community’s exclusion by 
submitting that the republican question had historically divided whites - and counselled 
that their participation would have a negative impact on race relations. 'What if the 30,000
1 Ocoloureds ensure a majority of 20,000?' it asked. Similarly, Die Volksblad suggested 
that allowing coloureds to participate would make them a political football.153 Similar 
claims would be submitted in the 1983 referendum when the PFP involved the Inkatha
147 The Cape Argus, for example, asked its readers, 'will final achievement o f racial peace and happiness be 
left to the last step, that authoritarian State where there will be no dissenting opinion to be glibly dismissed 
as racial prejudice because the only opinions which will be permissible are defined by the politicians in 
power?' The Argus. Leader, 12 May 1958.
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Freedom Party in its 'no’ campaign. And in the debate over an Israeli referendum on 
territorial concessions, Jewish right-wing politicians argued that Arab voters should also 
be excluded on similar grounds.154
The person charged with removing the coloured voters from the referendum in 
April 1960 was P.W. Botha,155 who would later seek to co-opt the community in the 
1980s. Moreover, P.W. Botha, serving as the deputy minister for Internal Affairs was 
charged with guiding the requisite referendum legislation through parliament. His insights 
into the referendum process would prove vital just over two decades later when he broke 
with Verwoerd’s model.
Anxious to avoid a confrontation with the international community, Verwoerd 
originally decided to exclude Namibia’s 30,000 voters.156 In doing so, he claimed that 
Namibia was not a fifth province and added that the relationship between South West 
Africa and the Union would not change if it became a republic.157 By May 1960 
Verwoerd, however, reversed his decision. One reason he cited was his 'surprise' that the 
UP was unopposed to their inclusion. The second reason was the demand by the local 
white community and the local party that they be included. Commenting on the U-turn,. 
The Rand Daily Mail noted that Verwoerd had given in to 'pressure from groups within the 
party who have few scruples and fewer principles.'159 The South West Africa UP leader, 
J.P. Niehaus intimated that Verwoerd had never consulted the local NP party before his 20 
January announcement that the local voters would be excluded.160 In the final tally the 
'yes' vote of 19,938 as opposed to a 'no' vote of 12,017, constituted 10 percent of the yes 
majority.
A referendum becomes a political necessity:
Verwoerd’s insistence on paring down the majority indeed reflected a deeper sense of 
urgency to expedite the referendum and settle the republican issue. Having been in power 
for just over a decade, the same caution that had allowed Malan to consolidate the party’s 
hold on power now threatened the party’s unity. And, it became increasingly costly to
154 Yedioth Ahronot. [Hebrew] 10 December 1999.
155 Sakkie van der Merwe, ’Die Totstandkoming van die Republiek van Suid Afrika', in .F.A. van Jaarsveld 
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156 B.M. Schoeman, Parlementere Verkiesings in Suid Afrika. p. 370; B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot 
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drag out the issue, as many supporters became restive over the perceived dithering of the 
NP leadership161 Verwoerd had four further reasons to push ahead with the referendum, 
which he announced in January 1960. The first was the need to consolidate his leadership, 
having just won a close race for the premiership.162 The second was Verwoerd’s fear that 
dithering on the republican issue would enable the anti-republican camp to sow seeds of
1 fSXdoubt in the minds of voters, especially regarding the economic wisdom of a republic. 
The third reason was mounting disaffection within the party over his separate 
development policy,164 and the fourth reason according to the United Party leader, Sir de 
Villiers Graaf, was to deflect attention from domestic crises.165 Hence political 
commentator Stanley Uys suggested that referendum was a 'masterly stroke of self -  
preservation.' Uys noted that Verwoerd would not have risked a referendum if he were not 
going to win.166 This interpretation is, however, disputed by those who note that Verwoerd
1 7was a headstrong leader. Alexander Hepple, for example, notes 'Where previous 
Nationalist leaders had toiled with agonizing caution to surmount the numerous obstacles 
in the way of declaring a republic, Verwoerd rushed forward confidently, to seize the 
republic with ease.'168
The vote:
In January 1960, days ahead of the arrival of British P.M. Harold McMillan, Verwoerd 
announced his decision to hold the referendum later that year. Symbolically, the vote 
would take place fifty years after the Union had been forged. Non-Nationalists were 
shocked at the announcement and did not believe that the NP 'would force the issue.'169 
The fact that the NP chose to hold the vote in the Jubilee year nettled the English press. 
The Cape Argus, for example, suggested that South Africans 'will feel like a couple giving 
dinner to celebrate their golden wedding while in the next room the lawyers are busy
1 7(1drawing up a deed of judicial separation.'
161 Fred Barnard, 13 Jaar in die skadu van Dr. H.F. Verwoerd. p. 119.
162 The Star. 2 October 1960.
163 B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd. pp. 182, 185.
164 The Star. 21 January 1960; The Sunday Times 24 January 1960; Joanna Strangwayes-Booth, A Cricket in 
the Thom Tree. Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party (Johannesburg, 1976), p. 176
165 S.L. Barnard and A.H. Marais, Die Verenigde Party. Die Groot Eksperiment (Durban/ Pretoria:, 1982), p. 
138.
166 The Sunday Times. 24 January 1960.
167 Interview with Colin Eglin (11 December 2001).
168 Alexander Hepple, Verwoerd. p. 165.
169 Joanna Strangwayes-Booth, A Cricket in the Thom Tree, p. 176.
170 The Cape Argus. Leader, 30 January 1960.
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171Despite NP suggestions that it would be a close race, the party was confident of 
victory at the time it announced the voting date. After the referendum Die Volksblad's 
political columnist Willem confessed that NP strategists had called the referendum after 
calculating that they had a slender lead of 20,000 votes.172 It should also be noted that the 
vote came months after the Progressive Party (PP)173 split from the United Party. 
Verwoerd thus took advantage of the disarray in the opposition. The UP refused to 
cooperate with the PP in the referendum campaign, and blamed the PP for the defeat.174
The 1960 result produced a slender majority of 70,000 votes in favour of a 
republic. The victory, which required the support of English speaking whites, was made 
possible by astute tactics, especially campaigning that played on white fears of black rule. 
The year 1960, fortuitously for the NP, produced numerous events to exploit in this
1 7 5regard. These included the expulsion of colonial settlers from the Belgian Congo, white 
anxiety after Harold Macmillan’s 'Winds of Change' speech, the Sharpeville massacre, the
17 (\Langa nots, and concern over developments in neighbouring Rhodesia. Inevitably, the 
removal of Coloured voters from the voter’s roll and the lowering of the voting age also 
paid dividends.177 A further factor, which explains the NP’s success in the referendum, 
was Verwoerd’s miraculous survival of an assassination attempt in April 1960, at the 
hands of David Pratt.
The referendum result had a devastating effect on the United Party, already divided 
on the issue and out of power for over a decade. The yes result led to the loss of its 
Afrikaner support. The party’s opposition to a republic outside the Commonwealth had
1 7ftserved as the glue that held it together, and the party no longer seemed to have an 
agenda after 1960. After the vote, the UP leader, Sir de Villiers Graaf, conceded that the 
Party had underestimated the strength of republican sentiment and feared that the 
platteland (rural areas) was 'running away' from it. Moreover, the party was
171 Die Volksblad. 21, 22, 27 January 1960.
172 Die Volksblad. October 7, 1960.
173 In August 1959 12 parliamentarians, representing the more liberal wing o f the party, left the United Party, 
to form the Progressive Party (P.P.) under the leadership o f the Cape U.P. leader Dr. Jan Steytler. The split 
was the outcome o f a longer running battle over the liberal wing o f the party’s support for greater economic 
and political integration o f blacks.
174 S.L. Barnard and A.H. Marais, Die Verenigde Party, p. 144.
175 G.H.L. Le May, The Afrikaners. An Historical Interpretation (Oxford, 1995), p. 222; John Fisher, The
Afrikaners, p. 343; David Harrison, The White Tribe o f Africa, pp. 161 -  165.
176 The Rand Daily Mail. 2 October 1960.
177 The Star. 7 October 1960.
178.S.L. Barnard and A.H. Marais, Die Verenigde Party, pp. 140, 147.
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demoralised. The demise of the UP, in turn, saw the NP strengthen its hold on power 
and mobilize increasing white support for its Apartheid policies. The declaration of the 
republic did indeed generate the white unity that Verwoerd had anticipated.
The folly of the economic argument:
The UP campaign relied on rational economic arguments, like the loss of Commonwealth
1ROtrade markets. As is so often the case in ethno-national referenda, such arguments, 
ultimately, carried little weight, and this particular aspect deserves some closer attention. 
The Rhodesian referendum of 1922 provides one of the most startling examples of how 
seemingly rational economic arguments can be swept aside by scare-mongering tactics. 
Commenting on the defeat at the time, The Round Table’s correspondent noted.
The Unionists are bad psychologists. They have overdriven the argument of 
material gain to such an extent that Rhodesians are becoming bored with it.
The leader of the ’’Responsible " has even moved to observe -  and he has good1 o |
scriptural authority behind him -  that men have souls as well as bodies.
The Responsibles182 effectively undermined the Unionist’s economic arguments in favour
of incorporation by preying on the fears of the consequences of integration, exhorting
voters that the colony’s strict immigration policies would be swept aside, allowing for an
1invasion of poor Afrikaners. Besides, Rhodesian voters found the Smuts-Hertzog spat
1 fiidistasteful and were concerned by the NP’s republican agitation. The ’no’ camp also
raised the spectre of increased taxation, the confiscation of weapons, and warned that
Rhodesian women would lose their right to vote in the event of incorporation, as South
African women were not yet on the voters’ roll. Writing to Jan Smuts after the vote,
Drummond Chaplin [Administrator in Rhodesia] noted that the trade unions believed that
1they would have more power under responsible government.
179 PV 71, Catherine Taylor Collection, File 1/7/1/1/2 Vol. 2, Minutes o f the United Party Central Executive 
Committee. 7-8 October 1960.
180 p v  pile 1/7/1/1/3 Vol. 1 and File 1/7/1/1/4 Vol. 5, Speeches made by Catherine Taylor.
181 'The Rhodesian Referendum Campaign', Round Table. No. 49. (1922).
182The so-called Responsibles campaigned for Responsible Government and opposed the option of  
incorporation into South Africa.
183 F.S. Crafford, Jan Smuts. A Biography (Cape Town, 1945), p. 227.
184 'The Rhodesian Question', Round Table. No. 45. (1921).
185 The Bulawayo Chronicle. 16, 30 September 1922.
186 Drummond Chaplin to Smuts, 30 October 1922. In Jean van der Poel, Selections From the Smuts Papers. 
Volume V (Cambridge. 1973), p. 145.
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Eighty years later the Danish 'no' camp defeated an impressive coalition of the 
established political parties, the media and big business on the question of the Euro. 
Again, economic arguments proved insufficient in an essentially emotional issue, as the 
'no' camp 'preyed on fears that 1,000 years of Viking history were about to be bulldozed 
by Brussels.'187 Commenting on the defeat, Mark Leonard suggested, 'Denmark shows that
•  1 9 6it’s politics, stupid,' whilst a Danish pollster, Hans Jorgen Nielsen, similarly endorsed 
the claim that 'economics aren’t enough.'189 In the case of Aruba, voters supported 
independence in a 1977 vote, despite lingering doubts as to the financial viability of 
independence outside of the Netherlands Antilles.190
Having studied the Norway (1994) and Switzerland (1992) referenda, Pascal 
Sciarini and Ola Listhaug suggest that cultural and political factors are more salient in 
cases where the economic arguments for surrendering sovereignty are not compelling.191 
The wisdom of highlighting economic arguments in referenda where national sovereignty 
and national symbols are been disputed, therefore, seems questionable, at least, when 
these economic dividends are not obvious to voters. In the case of Norway, oil wealth has
109made economic arguments for entering the EU less salient. As Drummond Chaplin 
noted in regard to the 1922 Rhodesian referendum, the Unionists failed in their campaign, 
as their 'method of putting the case seemed to be based on the assumption that the electors 
were reasonable and reasoning people. The support of such people they did as a rule 
secure, but unfortunately these are only a minority of the electorate.'193 Whilst the 
economic arguments seemed rational for Chaplin and Smuts, they were far from 
compelling for the reasoning White Rhodesian mine workers, civil servants and farmers.
Conclusion:
This chapter has charted the role of the referendum in the NP’s last years of opposition 
and in its first decade in power. The promise to stage a referendum was instrumental in 
playing down the salience of the republican issue and allowing the party to broaden its
187 Eben Black, Tony Allen-Mills and David Smith, The Sunday Times. 1 October 2000.
188Paul Waugh, The Independent. 30 September 2000.
189 Ian Black, Larry Elliot and Michael White, The Guardian. 30 September 2000.
190 Robertico Croes and Lucita Moenir Alam, 'Decolonisation o f Aruba within the Netherlands Antilles', in 
Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg (ed.), The Dutch Caribbean. Prospects for Democracy (New York, 1990), pp. 81-87.
191 Pascal Sciarini and Ola Listhaug, 'Single Cases or a Unique Pair? The Swiss and Norwegian ‘N o’ to 
Europe', Journal o f Common Market Studies. 35, 3, September 1997, pp. 424,428-432.
192 Detlef Jahn and Anne-Sofie Storsved, 'Legitimacy through Referendum? The Nearly Successful Domino 
Strategy o f the EU-Referendums in Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway', West European Politics. 18, 4, 
1995, p. 33.
193 Drummond Chaplin to Smuts, 30 October 1922. Jean van der Poel, Selections From the Smuts Papers. 
Volume V. p. 145.
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appeal in successive elections. It had, therefore, become an integral part of the NP’s 
election campaigns and this use of the referendum in electoral heresthetics was largely 
based on a Cape perception that it needed to appeal to urban Afrikaans voters. The 
referendum pledges also allowed for maximal unity in a party divided over the republican 
issue. But the fact that the party had persistently committed to itself to a referendum meant 
that the leadership was unable to backtrack from this commitment, once it had established 
its hold on power. The referendum was, in fact, an inefficient mechanism through which 
to gain a republic in a Westminster system that allowed the NP a majority of seats in 
parliament, despite the fact that it barely enjoyed more than 50 percent of the vote in 1958. 
Unable to extricate itself from these pledges, the party sought conditions under which a 
referendum on a republic could be won. Hence the party promoted its strategy of a 
'painless' republic that involved minimal changes. The decision to support South Africa's 
continued membership of the Commonwealth, after becoming a republic, was a direct 
result of this approach. This decision, yet again, laid bare the tensions between the North 
and South, but the Cape NP’s domination from 1948 to 1954 (despite the fact that it had 
less MPs than the Transvaal) allowed it to continue impose its will on the North in policy 
formation. The only variable that Verwoerd could change after the North had taken control 
of the party leadership was the size of the majority needed, which he reduced to a simple 
majority. Moreover, the referendum had formally arrived and it had proven to party 
officials that the NP could get voters to break with their sectional and party loyalties in a 
referendum. Its success ensured that future NP elites would view it favourably. This 
referendum also proved that it was a helpful resource in negotiating symbolic issues that 
affected whites. Ultimately, the 1960 vote set a precedent by which key constitutional 
matters were resolved by a referendum, and a script for navigating them was created. Once 
in existence the script would evolve incrementally, and within less than two decades 
Verwoerd’s successor would embrace the referendum in extricating South Africa from 
South West Africa. It was, however, under P.W. Botha that the referendum was most 
effectively put to use in order to both navigate party tensions and promote reforms.
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Chapter Nine,
The 1983 referendum: P, W, Botha taps into Verwoerd’s legacy.
The present constitutional debate in South Africa will probably be regarded by 
historians one day as o f monumental significance in shaping the destiny o f our 
country and its peoples.1
South Africa’s second referendum:
In this chapter I discuss the country’s second referendum and analyse the variables that 
explain P.W. Botha’s use of the vote. It will be demonstrated that Botha in fact got the 
idea from Verwoerd, under whom he had served as a deputy Minister in 1960. One of the 
key lessons that Botha had learnt from the 1960 referendum is that White South Africans 
do indeed break with sectional loyalties -  their party -  in referenda. What also clearly 
emerges from this chapter is the extent to which the role of the referendum evolved 
dynamically over time, in response to developments in White politics. A similar evolution 
emerged from the analysis of the 1992 referendum.
The politics of the 1983 referendum suggests that it was initially introduced as a 
result of deep divisions within the party over how to adapt Apartheid, in order to maintain 
White hegemony. The first pledge to stage a referendum, made in late 1980 was clearly 
designed to help Botha to navigate the growing resistance to his proposal to co-opt 
Coloureds and Indians, thereby breaking with the Verwoerdian model. The referendum 
returned to the forefront of NP politics in early 1982, when the split in the NP was a fait 
accompli. Hereafter the referendum served as a tool of damage control, and to stem the 
growth of the party of malcontents. The party leader had by then made so many pledges to 
stage a referendum on the new constitution that backtracking would have been politically 
impossible. And it was eventually confirmed that a referendum would be held after the 
party had to face three contentious by-elections in the Transvaal. These votes threatened to 
allow the Conservative Party to undermine the NP’s legitimacy to continue with reforms 
and demonstrate White opposition to Botha’s reforms. The referendum pledge proved 
instrumental in navigating this particular challenge. Finally, the party used the actual 
referendum to reframe White politics and re-brand the party.
One central feature of this chapter is its demonstration that F.W. de Klerk was 
involved in the 1983 referendum as leader of the party in the Transvaal. And there are 
several seminal lessons that de Klerk would have garnered from this experience. These 
include the benefit of a referendum in limiting the negative impact of by-elections on
1 PV 895, C.J. (Chris) Heunis Collection, File 1/11/1/2 vol. 2, Briefing to foreign correspondents.
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reform processes, and the understanding that the referendum allowed the NP to forge a 
reform coalition of its supporters and those of the PFP. The NP did so by portraying its 
reforms as a 'step in the right direction,' to the latter, whilst reassuring the traditional NP 
supporters that the party would control the process and defend White interests. It was to 
this formula and coalition, of roughly two thirds of the pragmatic White electorate, that de 
Klerk would return in 1983. The 1983 vote, therefore not only further institutionalised the 
referendum, ensconcing it in the NP political toolbox, but also provided its leadership with 
a script for implementing reform in the face of a conservative backlash.
The 1983 Referendum - A Spiritual Trek:2
By the mid 1970s the glaring shortcomings of grand Apartheid had become increasingly 
evident. The homeland policy had proved a failure and the heavy hand of the government 
failed to stem -  let alone reverse -  the influx of Blacks to urban centres. In addition, 
Apartheid in the workplace had become an economic burden, depriving the economy of 
requisite human resources, and maintaining the facade of separate institutions for each 
population group became unsustainable. Simply stated, Afrikaners and Whites did not 
'have enough people to go it alone any longer.'4 Moreover, the traumatic Soweto riots of 
16 June 1976 had signalled to Whites that the era of Black passivity was over.5 Regional 
developments, like the end of White rule in Rhodesian in 1980 and the termination of 
Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola, further undermined White self- 
confidence. In response to these developments, the NP sought to broaden its support base 
through greater collaboration with English capital and English speakers, as well as efforts 
to co-opt the so-called Coloured and Indian communities. The emergent paradigm for 
White politics was the politics of survival, a paradigm in which economic growth, and not 
separate development, became the NP’s key objective.6
The politics of survival required a break with the Verwoerdian paradigm and
n
triggered an intensified struggle between enlightened or verligte Afrikaners, who
2 Speaking in Bloemfontein during the campaign, P.W. Botha described the referendum as a spiritual trek. 
Die Burger. 8 September 1983.
3 Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building (Cape Town, 1989), pp. 
1 1 4 -4 9 .
4 The Sunday Times. 7 December 1980.
5 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f the Wavs. South African Politics 1976 - 82 (Cape Town, 1982), p. 6.
6 F. van Zyl Slabbert, 'Afrikaner Nationalism, White Politics, and Political Change in South Africa', in 
Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds). Change in Contemporary South Africa (Berkley and Los 
Angeles, 1975), p. 16. Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f the Wavs, pp. 1 4 -2 3 .
7 F. van Zyl Slabbert (1975, 1 3 -  14) defines a verligte as an 'individual who experiences a conflict between 
the parochial demands o f the particular organization within which he finds himself and the more universal 
demands o f  his occupation.'
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advocated a 'less blatant form of Apartheid,'* and conservatives or verkramptes. Whether
one ascribes this strain to diverging class interests,9 symbolic and status issues,10 the
personal frustrations of backbenchers overlooked for promotion,11 or even anger at
1cooperation with English speakers, the 1983 referendum was a direct result of P.W. 
Botha’s efforts to navigate the verligte-verkrampte tensions. The initial referendum 
promise failed in its role of averting a split in the NP. And having promised a referendum, 
Botha deployed it for other reasons, at first to navigate a contentious set of by-elections 
after the Conservative Party (CP) was formed, and then later to weaken the Progressive 
Federal Party (PFP) in order to compensate for the loss of support to the CP. This 
particular case study provides clear evidence that elite objectives in considering a 
referendum are often evolving and dynamic. Moreover, the 1983 referendum demonstrates 
the process of social learning -  or politics as learning in referenda use.
Minimal inclusion for maximal exclusion -  Tri-Cameralism:
P.W. Botha’s predecessor B.J. Vorster had already set in motion a process to scrap some 
of the public manifestations of Apartheid by allowing for mixed sporting events. Yet the 
most important reform process he inaugurated was the creation of a cabinet committee to 
address the status of the Coloureds. The findings of the Theron Commission, submitted in 
1976, proposed a radical break with the Verwoerdian model by recommending that Whites 
share power with Coloureds and Indians. These proposals were incorporated in the 1977 
election manifesto of the NP, which P.W. Botha inherited after succeeding Vorster in 
1979, and were the genesis of the Tri-Cameral constitutional reform process. This 
emerged as the central feature of P.W. Botha’s 'reform Apartheid' In practice the reforms 
proposed the creation of a Coloured House of Representatives with 92 legislators and an 
Indian House of Delegates comprising 46 members. These two additional houses, along 
with the White parliament made up of 185 members, would legislate on so-called 'own' or 
racial affairs. These 'own affairs' included culture, education, social welfare, etc. In 
tandem, the constitution created a President’s Council to deal with 'general' affairs. The
8 Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building, p. 120.
9 Craig Chamey, 'The Politics o f Changing Partners -  Control and Co-option in the New South African 
Constitution', Review o f  African Political Economy. 11, 29, 1984, p. 124; Dan O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme. 
Class. Capital and Ideology in the Development o f Afrikaner Nationalism (Cambridge, 1983), p. 251.
10 Hermann Giliomee, 'Broedertwis: Intra Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid 1969 -  1991', 
in Etherington, Norman (ed.), Peace. Politics and Violence in the New South Africa (London, 1992), p. 169.
11 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Leierstrvd. Die Dramas Rondom die Uitreede van Pres. P.W. Botha (Cape 
Town, 1989), p. 17.
12 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis. Die Verhaal van die 1982 Skeuring in die Nasionale Party 
(Cape Town, 1982), pp. 61-62; Hermann Giliomee, 'Survival in Justice: An Afrikaner Debate over 
Apartheid', Comparative Studies in Society and History. 35, 3,1994, p. 539.
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composition of the President’s Council was based on a 4:2:1 key, thereby ensuring that the 
NP and Whites would dominate it. Reform Apartheid, therefore, represented a strategy of 
'sharing power' without losing control or surrendering White hegemony.13 Despite 
insinuations that this reform constituted part of a broader reform process, it was, as 
Frederik van Zyl Slabbert warned, clear that 'Black exclusion is a pre-condition for 
Coloured and Asian inclusion.'14
The prospect of tinkering with the hegemonic Verwoerdian model had long been a 
source of tension between verligtes and verkramptes. Minor reforms during Vorster’s 
tenure precipitated the departure of a group of purists -  under the leadership of J.B.M 
Hertzog’s son Albert. Vorster did not use a referendum to navigate this particular crisis, 
though he did employ one on the Tumhalle process.15 Although the NP managed to 
contain the impact of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) split from the party in October 
1969, thanks to swift action by the Broederbohd,16 support for the NP amongst Afrikaners 
declined, from 85 percent in the 1977 general elections to 60 percent in the 1981 general 
elections.17
This trend underscored the danger of an institutionalised political verkrampte 
alternative, especially in the conservative Transvaal. Beyond the threat that such a split 
would pose to the NP in its rural strongholds, the emergence of a credible conservative 
Afrikaans party in urban constituencies could split the Afrikaner vote, favouring the PFP, 
now led by a charismatic liberal Afrikaner. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert was appointed 
leader of the PFP in 1979.
Since coming to power in 1948, the goal of maintaining unity was the 'only clear 
priority' that transcended whatever internal differences might exist amongst Afrikaner
• 1ftinstitutions. But whereas Vorster chose NP unity over meaningful reform, P.W. Botha 
understood that he would have to choose between survival and unity.19 Though a product
13 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial President. P.W. Botha and the First 10 Years (Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 69, 
137,235.
14 Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The System and the Struggle. Reform. Revolt and Reaction in South Africa 
Edited by Dene Smuts. (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 62; F. Van Zyl Slabbert, The Last White Parliament. 
(Johannesburg, 1985), p. 106; Andre du Toit, The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983; Allen Boesak, N o  
positive side to Apartheid', South African Outlook. 113,1348, October 1983, p. 156.
5 The Tumhalle Conference, which was launched in 1976, brought together Namibia’s Bantustan leaders 
and representatives o f  the local White community in an effort to create an interim constitution, premised on 
a confederation o f  eleven separate ethnic states, though guaranteeing White political and economic 
domination. There were fears that the Pretoria planned to use the emerging Democratic Tumhalle Alliance 
(D.T.A.) for a future unilateral declaration o f independence (Wellmer, 1988: 505).
16 Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners. (Johannesburg, 1979), pp. 187-190.
17 The Rand Daily Mail. 17 February 1982.
18 Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, 'Afrikaner Nationalism', p. 9.
19 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f  the Wavs, p. 111.
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of the party machine and committed to maintaining unity, and despite being a reluctant 
reformer,20 Botha largely moved ahead under the influence of the South African Defence 
Forces (SADF),21 and certain elements within the Broederbond.22 The Broederbond itself 
was divided on the question of the tri-cameral reforms, and the later split in the party was 
mirrored within the organisation. As Minister of Defence under both Verwoerd and 
Vorster, since 1966, Botha developed an intimate relationship with the SADF, which had 
articulated and propagated the notion of'total war' paradigm in response to the spectre of a 
'total onslaught,' against the country and its institutions. The two ideological pillars 
underpinning this strategy were provided by the writings of Samuel Huntington and a 
French counter-insurgency theorist Andre Beaufre. The latter argued that wars are won in 
the minds of men, implying that reform could remove the grievances that drive the 
'onslaught.'23 Seeking to balance the inherent contradiction between the old Verwoerdian 
paradigm and the new politics of survival, and to ensure party unity, Botha tapped into 
Verwoerd’s legacy by promising a referendum.
The politics of the referendum promise:
Botha’s first pledge to stage a referendum was made on 31 November 1980, in a public 
address in Ladysmith, Natal. The Prime Minister informed his audience that he would 'call 
a referendum to let the nation give its verdict' on the new constitution if there was a 
discrepancy between the proposals made by the President’s Council and the party’s 1977 
platform.24 This platform included reference to the proposed reforms. In making the 
promise Botha sought to attain several objectives.
The first was securing maximal support within the party for his reforms in the face 
of mounting verkrampte opposition.25 In early November 1980 the NP’s Transvaal leader, 
Dr. Andries Treumicht, who emerged as leader of the verkrampte wing, informed the 
Party’s provincial executive that he opposed the representation of other colour groups in 
parliament. Tensions between the camps were rising and in mid 1979 Botha threw down 
the gauntlet to his conservative critics in his Upington speech by warning them that the
20 Ibid. p. 128.
21 Joseph Leyveld, The Star. 31 October 1983.
22 The Rand Daily Mail. 2 November 1983.
23 Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips, 'Reform, Security and White Power: Re-thinking State Strategies in the 
1980s', Paper Delivered to the Annual Conference o f the Association o f Sociology o f  Southern Africa, 
University o f Durban-Westville, July 1988.
24 PV 203, P.W. Botha Collection, File PS 12/23/1, Ladysmith speech on 30 November 1980; The Citizen. 1 
December 1980.
25 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial President, p. 61.
26 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis. p 94; Die Afrikaner. 5 December 1980.
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party needed to 'adapt or die.'27 In his speech Botha made an important distinction between 
principle and policy, and conceded that certain principles could not be successfully 
implemented as policies. Furthermore, Botha indicated that he recognised that, though a 
White leader, he had to take responsibility for all South Africans. These long standing 
tensions dated back to June 1976, when the Minister of Cooperation and Development, 
Dr. Piet Koomhof, had informed an American audience in Palm Springs that Apartheid 
was dead. Andries Treumicht was highly captious of Koomhof s speech, and the critical
Oftmedia already warned of an impending party split at that time. A further source of
tension was the government’s willingness to surrender SWA/ Namibia and consent to a
multi-racial constitution. These divisions within the local Namibian and Federal structures 
00of the party, led to the referendum. A further incentive for promising the vote was a 
Windhoek by-election in 1976.30
In his Ladysmith address Botha explicitly stated that a referendum was a means 
both to measure opposition to reform within the party and legitimate change. In this regard 
the referendum pledge signalled that Botha was committed to pressing ahead with the
“X1constitution. Botha also made it quite clear that individuals within the party would not 
dictate the pace and scope of reforms to him. The ultra-conservative HNP’s mouthpiece, 
Die Afrikaner, viewed the Ladysmith speech as nothing less than a declaration of war 
against the anti-Botha faction in the NP, whilst The Argus speculated that it might 
provoke a split by serving as the last straw for the conservatives. Veteran journalist Dnes 
van Heerden notes that the conservative elements in the NP would have preferred to 
remain within the party and slow reforms down from within. Van Heerden, therefore, 
suggests that a referendum would force them to take a stand on the issue. Furthermore, he 
suggests that Botha reasoned that if the conservative elements would have remained in the 
party they would have been obliged to campaign for a 'yes' vote, thereby tying themselves 
to his reforms.34 A Cape Times editorial, republished in Die Burger in December 1980,
27 The 'famous adapt or die' speech, made in Upington on 27 July 1979 was designed to answer Botha’s 
critics in Namibia (Rapport. 29 July 1976) and those in the party, like Andries Treumicht (Die Afrikaner. 3 
August 1979).
28 Die Afrikaner. 29 June 1979.
29 Die Afrikaner. 30 July 1976, 3 September 1976, 5 November 1976, Interview with Dries van Heerden, 3 
December 2002, At van Wyk, Dirk Mudee. Reenmaker van die Namib (Pretoria, 1999), p. 65.
30 The party’s Namibia leader A.H. du Plessis had in early 1976 promised Whites a final say in Tumhalle 
decisions, just prior to a crucial by-election on 28 May 1976 (Die Afrikaner. 10 September 1976).
31 Premier oor Referendum. Nuwe era kan kom. NAT80’s. 1, 7, December 1980.
32 Die Afrikaner. 5 December 1980.
33 The Argus. Leader, 1 December 1980.
34 Interview (3 December 2002).
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intimated that Botha had hoped to ’ease out Dr. Treumicht without precipitating a serious
'X Ssplit in the party,' supporting van Heerden’s interpretation.
A third reason for promising the referendum was Botha’s desire to smooth the 
acceptance of the new constitution in the provincial and federal NP conferences, which 
ultimately needed to approve it. Each of the party’s provincial conferences had a de- 
facto veto over policy change, enabling the conservative Transvaal conference and 
Treumicht to stymie reforms. The referendum pledge was thus designed to remove the 
constitutional debate from the party structures, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the 
reforms in these conferences, by reassuring the party faithful that the onus of the 
constitution’s acceptance did not depend solely on them. In this way, Botha sought to go 
'over the heads of verkramptes' in the party and appeal directly to the country. One 
verligte NP parliamentarian in fact hinted to the paper that Botha was in effect ignoring 
the party on a major policy issue.39
Besides all this, a referendum represented a much safer option than an election for 
the new reformist leader. An opinion poll conducted in early December 1980 indicated 
that White opinion was far more liberal than the verkrampte leadership, with three-quarter 
(85 percent amongst English speakers and 62. percent amongst Afrikaners) of Whites 
accepting Coloureds in the White parliament.40 The Westminster system would not give 
expression to such support, and the 1960 referendum had demonstrated that referenda 
allowed opposition (English) voters to break with party loyalty and support the 
government. The HNP was, therefore, correct when it charged that Botha was planning to 
use forces outside of the NP, specifically PFP and the National Republican Party (NRP) 
voters,41 to defeat his opponents within the party.42 Thus a referendum allowed the NP to 
assemble a reform coalition made up of its loyal supporters and English speakers, 
representing at least 60 percent of the population.
A fifth reason for promising a referendum was that it enabled Botha to proceed 
with the planned 1981 general elections, without having the new constitution dominating 
the election agenda. These early elections were designed to thwart any plans that his
35 Die Burger. 22 November 1980.
36 Interview with Chris Heunis (13 December 2001); Die Afrikaner. 5 December 1980.
37 Brain Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 61.
38 The Argus. Leader, 1 December 1980.
39 The Argus. 1 December 1980.
40 The Sunday Times. 7 December 1980.
41 The NRP was a remnant o f the former United Party, with its stronghold in Natal.
42 Die Afrikaner. 5 December 1980.
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verkrampte opponents might have had to leave the party.43 The elections were also 
designed to reconsolidate the NP’s ethnic base,44 and fortify Botha’s leadership. This was 
his first general election after he succeeded Vorster following the Information Scandal in 
1979, and Botha could hardly afford to have power-sharing as the focus of the election. 
And, in his Ladysmith speech, Botha noted that there was no need for the country to be 
pre-occupied with concerns over drastic changes, as he would subject them to a 
referendum.45 P.W. Botha was a machine politician whose first and only job from 1936, 
until he entered parliament in 1948, was as a paid party organiser in the Cape. Working 
with Malan, Botha observed intently how the NP leader kept the republican issue off the 
electoral agenda and maintained internal cohesion. A further motivation for calling an 
early general election was to avoid a series of looming by-elections.46
A sixth motivation for promising a referendum was Botha’s need to counter 
perceptions that he, and his President’s Council, which was drafting the constitution, were 
not democratic. The 55-member President's Council, created in February 1981 to replace 
the Senate, enjoyed increasing command over policy making, at the expense of the caucus 
and cabinet, thus, leading to disaffection within the party 47 In describing the Council, 
Jannie Gagiano suggested that the party lias been supplanted by the state itself.'48
Eight days before Botha promised the referendum, The Rand Daily Mail led with a 
massive expose claiming that he had personally amended the contents of the Erasmus 
Commission’s report.49 The Commission had been appointed to explore the Information 
Scandal, which had unseated Botha’s predecessor, John Vorster. The paper viewed his 
behaviour regarding the report as a show of arrogance, and he dedicated 3 of the 15 pages 
of his Ladysmith speech to dismissing these insinuations and attacking the left-wing 
media for cooperating with his right-wing opponents.50 The December edition of the 
party’s federal newsletter was at pains to point out that the referendum announcement 
disproved the 'gossip stories that Botha had manipulated the NP in a direction than ran 
counter to the wishes of the majority.'51
43 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis pp. 95 -  96; Leon Wessels, Die Einde van 'n era (Kaapstad:, 
1994), pp. 27-28.
44 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f  the Wavs, p. 155.
45 PV 203, File PS 12/23/1, Ladysmith speech.
46 Dan Prinsloo. Stem Uit die Wilderness, 'n Bioeraphie oor Oud-pres. P.W. Botha (Mosselbaai, 1997), p. 
123.
47 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f the Wavs, p. 27.
48 Jannie Gagiano, ’The Scope o f Regime Support: A Case Study', in Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence 
Schlemmer (eds), Negotiating South Africa’s Future. (Johannesburg, 1989), p. 53.
49 The Rand Daily Mail. 24-36 November 1980 and Die Burger. 25 November 1980.
50 PV 203, File PS 12/23/1.
51 'Premier oor Referendum. Nuwe era kan kom', NAT80’s. 1, 7, December 1980.
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The end of the NP’s monopoly over Afrikaner opinion:
Far from dissipating tensions over the new constitution, the referendum pledge 
exacerbated them, and verkramptes viewed it as an attempt to override the party caucus 
and institutions. The Rand Daily Mail, which had initially hailed the referendum as a 
'brilliant move' to 'to neutralise his right wing,'52 soon questioned the NP’s assumption that 
it would secure the opposition’s support, and warned that the referendum would alienate 
his right.53
The referendum pledge was largely forgotten and only reiterated in the midst of the 
split -  or skeuring - of the National Party in early 1982. The catalyst for the split was an 
article penned by the party’s new information secretary and editor of the party’s Nat80 
newspaper, Jan Groblaar. In early 1982, Groblaar, a member of the verligte camp, set out 
his support for 'healthy power-sharing' in the paper. The article was, in all likelihood, the 
opening shot of a campaign to sell the tri-cameral package to the Party faithful. With the 
1981 elections behind the Party, it may also be that the article was designed to bring to a 
head the long anticipated showdown with the verkramptes. Certain elements in the verligte 
camp of the party had desired a split, probably assuming that it could be successfully 
managed, just as the earlier HNP break had been.
The article elicited an outcry from verkrampte elements and led to a showdown 
between the two camps in the caucus on 24 February 1982. Despite a second promise 
during this debate to hold a referendum, designed to reduce opposition to reforms within 
the faction,54 the debate was forced into a showdown by Treumicht’s supporters. In the 
ensuing vote 22 MPs supported Treumicht: 17 of these eventually left the NP to create the 
aptly named Conservative Party (CP) on 20 March 1982 under Treumicht’s leadership. 
The final split followed an attempt by Treumicht to engineer the secession of the 
Transvaal NP at a meeting of the provincial executive on 27 February 1982. Treumicht 
and his supporters sought to emulate D.F. Malan, who in 1934 succeeded in capturing the 
Cape NP structure after 'Fusion.' Interestingly, Treumicht, like Malan, was a preacher, 
turned journalist, turned politician. Botha and his supporters, however, prevailed when the 
members of the Provincial Executive comprehensively defeated Treumicht’s followers by 
172 votes to 36.
Despite the fact that Botha averted a break by the Transvaal NP, Treumicht’s 
departure, with so many sitting Transvaal MPs, represented the NP’s worst crisis since
52 The Rand Daily Mail. 1 December 1980.
53 The Rand Daily Mail. 2, 3 December 1980.
54 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis. p. 119; Brain Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 14; Die 
Afrikaner. 10 February 1982.
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coming to power.55 The Transvaal was, electorally, the most important of the provinces. 
As its new provincial leader, the party elected a candidate with proven centrist tendencies, 
F.W. de Klerk, in order to stem the tide of support for the CP.
Damage limitation by referendum:
The referendum pledge failed to heal the deep divisions in the party in February 1982, and 
shortly after the split Botha, for the third time, promised a referendum in a parliamentary 
debate on 15 April 1982. In the period from April to May of 1982, Botha committed 
himself to a referendum on at least four occasions.56 These promises served to suggest to 
the public that ideological issues were not that important in explaining the split. They also 
served to take the 'wind out of the sails' of the newly formed CP. Barend du Plessis 
suggests that the party made a cardinal error in not letting Treumicht and his supporters 
split away from the party on the earlier controversy surrounding the question of 'mixed 
sport' in the Craven Week rugby competition.57 Ironically, FW de Klerk was responsible 
for preventing this split. A party, suggests, Barend du Plessis, could not have been formed 
over 'one Coloured kid playing rugby.'58 A viable party could, on the other hand, be 
formed on the basis of a significant break with Verwoerdian principle. This sense that split 
was inevitable serves to explain why the referendum pledge failed to avert the partition. 
Moreover, referenda often exacerbate the very tensions that generate them and Vemon 
Bogdanor suggests that 'in Scandinavia, referendums have revealed cleavages that the 
party system has hidden, and this has been a potent force in breaking up seemingly united 
parties.'59
Tapping into Verwoerd’s legacy:
By the middle of 1982 the Botha government had set about approving a referendum bill, 
which passed through its second reading on 27 May 1982 and 1 June 1982.60 Introducing 
the bill, Chris Heunis informed the House that in his view 'the most important reasons for
55 The Rand Daily Mail. 25 February 1982; A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Broedertwis. p. 133.
56PV 203, File 4/2/100, Speech at Pretoria, 25 March 1982; PV 203, File 4/2/101, Speech at Oudtshoom, 17 
April 1982; PV 203, File 4/2/102 Speech at Lichtenburg, 26 May 1982; PV 203, File 4/2/102, Speech at 
Springbok, 15 May 1982.
5 The Craven Week is an annual Rugby competition that draws together the country’s leading young rugby 
players who represent a variety o f provinces and regions. The Transvaal Teachers Union lead a campaign 
against the participation o f non-White players and the incident almost split the NP (A lf Ries and Ebbe 
Dommisse, 1982: 85-88).
58 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
59 Vemon Bogdanor, 'Western Europe1, in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the 
World: The Growing Use o f Direct Democracy (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1994), pp. 41, 74-75.
60 Hansard. Thursday 27-28 May, Columns 7900-7914, Tuesday 1 June 1982, Columns 8021 -  8042.
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the holding of a referendum under specific circumstances is therefore that it is an 
instrument to test people’s opinions.'61 He also sought to link the proposed referendum to 
the 1960 referendum. In linking this second referendum to the NP leader who represented 
the high tide of unity, the NP leadership, no doubt, sought to signal the gravity of the issue 
and need for unity.
P.W. Botha was far more explicit in linking his referendum to that of Verwoerd. In 
a speech, only five days after the formation of the CP, he informed an audience of key 
party activists, at a meeting chaired by F.W. de Klerk, that he was following Verwoerd’s 
example by calling a referendum. Having asked his audience where he got his 'referendum 
example' from, Botha noted.
I got my example from the late Dr. Verwoerd. Because when he created a 
republic, he deviated in policy of his predecessors Malan and Strijdom. They 
had said that a republic must be created with a two-thirds majority, and 
Verwoerd said with a simple majority. He then used a referendum to consult 
the people after he consulted the conferences. In other words, the path that I 
want to take is the path that my great predecessor H.F. Verwoerd took, in 
order to get to the people’s will.6
Fanie Cloete, who served in the Prime Minister’s Office, confirms that Botha took 
his cue from Verwoerd and gained his understanding of the referendum from his long 
involvement in the party as a paid organiser. Though Botha stretched the historical 
context somewhat, he clearly applied the 'logic of appropriateness,' by suggesting that 
major disputes and policy departures require a referendum.
Implicit in his statement was, after all, a recognition that his proposals deviated 
from the 1977 program. Moreover, the pledge and its Verwoerdian gloss served to enforce 
a message of continuity. At a time when the CP charged the NP and Botha of deviating 
from NP orthodoxy, the referendum undertaking signalled Botha’s desire to identify 
himself with Verwoerd. The referendum assurance was also aimed to take the wind out of 
the sails of the renegades, and trivialise their decision to leave. The referendum promise 
also served to buttress NP claims that those who left the party were disaffected MP’s 
overlooked for positions.64
But, beyond tactical considerations for invoking the Verwoerdian precedent, Botha 
viewed his constitutional change as being as important creating a republic, if not more. In
61 Hansard. Thursday 27-28 May, column 7901.
62 PV 203, File 4/2/100, Speech at Pretoria, 25 March 1982.
63 Interview (4 December 2002).
64 A lf Ries and Ebbe Dommisse, Leierstrvd. p. 17.
217
an address in May 1982, Botha presented the new constitution as being a natural extension 
of the establishment of a republic. Botha submitted that whereas the creation of a republic 
settled the 'most important differences between English and Afrikaans-speaking South 
Africans' since 1910, his new constitution represented a concerted effort to improve 
relations with Coloureds and Indians.65 If the tri-cameral reforms were as salient as the 
establishment of a republic, then a referendum was appropriate.
The NP’s referendum conundrum:
By August 1982 the referendum was embraced with a new purpose in mind, namely 
selling the constitution to the NP structures. Despite the departure of Treumicht’s 
supporters, party activists continued to treat the new constitution with suspicion. Botha’s 
constitutional supremo, Chris Heunis, who was charged with selling the new constitution 
to the Party’s federal and provincial congresses in the latter half of 1982, notes that this 
was the first time that 'the party saw where we were going.' According to Heunis there was 
resistance at the Federal Party’s conclave, and the party had to 'do something about it.'66 
On this score the referendum proved far more fruitful, and Die Burger highlighted the
7referendum as one of the three key outcomes of that conference.
The post-skeuring referendum pledges soon turned out to be a poisoned chalice,, 
however. The CP now craftily portrayed the promised referendum as proof positive that 
Botha’s proposed constitution had indeed departed from the 1977 guidelines. Moreover, 
the 1977 elections could not be viewed as a mandate for these guidelines, as that Botha 
and his strategists in effect ran an anti-Jimmy Carter, US intervention, campaign. Botha 
now, briefly, sought to wriggle out of the referendum as the 'growth of the right stifled 
verligte rhetoric.'69 And in September 1982 he informed the NP’s annual Free State 
conference that the government had a two-thirds majority and that there was no need for a 
referendum. He reasoned that the proposed constitution did not radically differ from the 
1977 proposals.70
One explanation for this about-face might have been the results of a by-election in 
the constituency of Germiston, where the combined vote of the CP and the HNP was 
significantly larger than that of the NP. The HNP’s mouthpiece, Die Afrikaner, viewed the
65 PV 203, File 4/2/102, Speech at RAU, 27 May 1982.
66 Interview with Chris Heunis (13 December 2001).
67 Die Burger. 2 August 1982.
68 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial Presidency, pp. 98-99.
69 The Sunday Tribune. 3 April 1983.
70 Die Volksblad. 2 September 1982.
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result as evidence that Botha did not have the necessary support for his new constitution in 
the Transvaal, Orange Free State, the Northern Cape and Northern Natal.71 The paper also 
accused Botha of using the referendum pledge to merely to steamroller his new 
constitution through his party structures. Yet this manoeuvre also backfired and the CP 
now adapted its tack. The CP responded to the about-turn by accusing the NP of forcing 
the constitution upon the volk. The attempted retreat from the referendum did indeed 
prove damaging and threatened to abet the CP in mobilising growing support in a spate of 
forthcoming by-elections (to be discussed shortly).
Fanie Cloete notes that Botha did not want to go through with the referendum, and
noargues that he 'had painted himself into a comer.' Unable to back off from his (at least) 
seven earlier referendum pledges, and concerned by the threat of CP gains, Botha now 
sought to provide supplementary legitimisation for the referendum prior to announcing it. 
As already described, F.W. de Klerk would find himself in a similar situation almost a 
decade later. A rationale that de-coupled the referendum from the earlier link between the 
President’s Council constitutional draft and the 1977 proposals was essential.
One new reason for the referendum, according to Botha, was that the new 
constitution would involve far reaching changes to the Westminster system. Botha also 
returned to the Verwoerd argument that general elections were about many issues, hence a 
referendum would give the clearest indication of public support for the new constitution. 
As already noted, this argument was a central one that de Klerk employed. Accordingly, 
Botha suggested that government wanted to place the constitution above party politics. 
Yet again tapping into the NP’s past, Botha also submitted that previous major 
constitutional changes -  the establishment of a republic -  had been submitted to a 
referendum. In addition, Botha quoted Carl Friederich’s argument that the 'will of the 
people' is the ultimate 'basis for legitimacy.' Botha further added that a referendum would 
provide for stability.73
Botha calls the referendum:
The eventual announcement of the referendum was made on 30 March 1983, in 
parliament. Though viewed by some as a 'political bombshell,'74 it was unavoidable after
71 Die Afrikaner. Leader, 25 August 1982.
72 Interview (4 December 2002).
73 PV 203, File 4/2/110, Undated notes for a talk, possibly to the cabinet or caucus, made in late March 
1983. [File 4/2/100 corresponds with March 1982 and File 4/2/108 with October 1982, accordingly File 
4/2/110 corresponds with material dated January to March 1983].
74 The Rand Daily Mail. 31 March 1983.
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the Party leadership had pledged a referendum in December 1980, during and immediately
7^after the skeuring and at the provincial and Federal conferences of 1982. At the time, the 
English and conservative Afrikaans press attributed the timing of the announcement to a 
desire to remove the constitutional issue from the approaching by-elections in 
Soutpansberg, Waterberg and Carletonville on 10 May 1983.76 Die Afrikaner noted that 
the referendum served to allow disgruntled NP voters to support the NP in the by- 
elections. The paper added that NP officials hinted to voters that the referendum would be 
the time and the place to express their views on the new constitution.77 In the build up to 
the by-elections, known as the Battle of the Berge, the CP charged that the NP was 
avoiding a referendum on the constitution and forcing it upon the volk. The referendum, 
thus, served yet again to take wind out of the opposition’s sails.
Though the timing of the formal referendum announcement was linked to the
70impending by-elections, Botha also wished to check the growth of the CP through a 
referendum. Broederbond leader Prof. J.P. de Lange suggests that Broeder Botha viewed 
the referendum as a way to demonstrate that the CP was making noise beyond their
fiA
numbers. Ironically, the Westminster system, which had for so long served the NP, 
allowed the CP to do so. The HNP daily reported that the rather 'sudden referendum 
announcement' followed pressure from the new Transvaal leader, F.W. de Klerk, who was 
alarmed by the extent of opposition to the new constitution in this province. The Transvaal
ft 1was indeed viewed by many as the key battleground. Die Afrikaner also suggested that 
de Klerk feared that a delay in the vote would allow the PFP leadership to convince its
R7followers to vote against the new constitution.
De Klerk’s apparently central role in the referendum process was clearly a function 
of the pressure he was under in the Transvaal at the time. The use of the referendum to 
check the growth of the CP was similarly a central motif in de Klerk’s 1992 referendum, 
and herein lie the origins of de Klerk’s 'logic of appropriateness.' Thus, interestingly, 
Fanie Cloete suggests that de Klerk used a referendum pledge to pacify his conservative
75 Die Transvaler. 31 March 1983.
76 The Sunday Tribune. 3 April 1983; Peter Mann, The Sunday Tribune. 3 April 1983; Die Afrikaner. 13 
April 1983.
77 Die Afrikaner. 20 April 1983.
78 These by-elections were precipitated by a moment o f folly in which Minister Fanie Botha challenged 
Treumicht to resign and contest his Waterberg seat if  he resigned to contest his Soutpansberg seat. As a 
result o f this challenge, Tom Langley resigned his Waterkloof seat to challenge Fanie Botha, thus 
engineering three by-elections.
79 J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001) and Tim du Plessis (28 November 2001) also recognise that these by- 
elections did feature, though not centrally, in the NP’s thinking at the time.
80 Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001).
81 The Star. 25 August 1983 and The Argus. 1 November 1983.
82 Die Afrikaner. 25 May 1983.
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supporters, providing them with a sort of safeguard. But he also adds that he supported a 
referendum for far less wholesome reasons. According to Cloete, the resolutely 
conservative de Klerk saw a referendum as a vehicle by which voters could send a 
message to PW Botha to slow down the pace of reforms. This, he intimates, explains the 
conservative nature of the campaign in the Transvaal. Cloete further suggests that de 
Klerk believed that he could blame Botha in the event of a failure.
Botha calls the referendum:
In an internal NP discussion, one day prior to announcing the referendum, Botha candidly
Oi
listed twelve reasons for calling the referendum. Significantly, he not only repeated his 
previous parallel with the republican referendum, but also alleged afresh that this issue 
was even more important. In a patent application of the 'logic of appropriateness,' Botha 
informed the caucus that 'Every NP leader has, when confronted with a major decision, 
called upon the volk.' Botha clearly tapped into the Verwoerd legacy. But he further 
submitted that this was the greatest decision that the country had had to deal with so far, 
and he warned his colleagues not to underestimate resistance to the new constitution. 
Botha also argued that introducing the new constitution posed a risk to the party and 
warned of the dangers of being held accountable by the people if it failed. Botha further 
warned that without a referendum, the new constitution would be associated with a 
handful of people.
Commenting on the announcement Die Volksblad noted that the referendum
Of
placed the issue above party considerations. Botha, therefore, sought to limit the party’s 
identification with the constitution, and from Botha’s hand-written notes from this 
meeting, one gets a sense of a certain degree of ambivalence on his part. The referendum 
may thus have contributed to what David Butler and Austin Ranney warn is a 'political 
culture in which politicians are inhibited, for good or ill, from acting as representatives.'
At this stage, the NP and Botha clearly had Afrikaners and the CP in mind. In all 
of the discussions, until then, there was no reference to the PFP. The referendum was seen 
as an essential risk-management exercise, serving to placate NP supporters and address the 
growth of the CP.87 Elections only represented uncertainty for the NP and provided the CP
83 Interview (4 December 2002).
84 PV 203, File PS 12/23/2.
85 Die Volksblad. 31 March 1983.
86 David Butler and Austin Ranney, 'Conclusion', in David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds). Referendums 
Around the World, p. 260.
87 Interviews with Wynand Malan (26 November 2001), Jannie Gagiano (19 October, 2001) Hennie Clerck 
(23 November 2001), J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001) and Koos van der Merwe (26 October 2001).
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with a platform to make further gains and build on its seventeen seats. A referendum
no
substituted for an election. Naspers journalist Tim du Plessis notes the NP assumed the 
support of English speakers in a vote for the constitution. Moreover, he adds that that the
OQ
NP knew that 'you cannot lose power if you have lost a referendum.' The subsequent 
claim by Botha’s official biographers90 that the referendum was a high-risk decision, is, at 
best, exaggerated. As with the 1992 referendum, the party was confident of victory all 
along.91 Interestingly, Botha’s biographer reports that there was 'little enthusiasm' in the 
cabinet for a referendum.92
Other reasons for the referendum cited by Botha in the pre-announcement meeting 
were the claim that that a 'yes' majority would be viewed as a 'national movement of 
goodwill' and a guarantee of stability. Botha reiterated the reference to Carl Friederich. 
Interestingly, neither the by-elections nor the PFP explicitly feature in Botha’s notes. 
More important for Botha and the NP was stemming the long-term growth of the CP and 
placing a ceiling on their public support. A leading newspaper editor at the time notes that 
the party leadership 'did not want the impression to be created that the CP was rising,' and 
calculated that the PFP’s voters could be used for this purpose. One of the Ministers 
present in these discussions was F.W. de Klerk.
Despite P.W. Botha’s insistence that he had called a referendum in order to allow 
Whites to express their views, and his vehement claim that a referendum did not mean that 
the proposals drastically deviated from the 1977 guidelines,94 his conservative opponents 
viewed the announcement as a vindication of the claim that it new constitution in fact 
diverged from the 1977 proposals.95 The CP’s Koos van der Merwe interpreted the 
proclamation as a political 'triumph' and argued that it proved that the NP did not have a 
mandate for the new constitution. For van der Merwe the announcement was also viewed 
as evidence of the CP’s strength.96 All that now remained was for the NP to determine the 
date of the vote. Conveniently the country’s drought was used to justify a delay. The real
88 Interview with Koot Jonker (29 November 2001); Die Afrikaner. 06 April 1983.
89 Interview with Tim du Plessis (29 November 2001).
90 Dirk De Villiers and Joanna de Villiers, P.W. (Kaapstad, 1984), p. 210.
91 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
92 Dan Prinsloo, Stem Uit die Wilderness, p. 103.
93 Interview with Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).
94 Die Vaderland. 31 March 1983.
95 Louis Stofberg, Secretary General o f the HNP in Die Transvaaler. 19 April 1983; Koos van der Merwe in 
Die Transvaaler. 20 April 1983.
96 Die Transvaaler. 20 April 1983.
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reason for the delay in the vote was more probably the difficult time the party had endured 
in the earlier by elections.97
Referendum campaign objectives:
The skewing sped up the NP’s transformation into a bourgeois party,98 heightening its 
need to solicit the support of English voters. This was because the CP threat was greatest 
in rural Afrikaans constituencies, especially after Botha had ended generous state 
subsidies to maize farmers in 1981." The NP could, therefore, only grow in urban and 
English constituencies at the expense of the PFP.
Internal NP polling, conducted in June 1983 demonstrated that, nationally, 48 
percent of the public was moderate, whilst 26 percent was either conservative or liberal.100 
The PFP, under the leadership of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, threatened to attract 
increasing numbers of verligte' voters.101 In his profile of Slabbert, Paul Cassar notes that 
he 'regularly drew larger audiences than PW Botha,' and adds that he was feared by the 
conservative wing of the NP for his potential to draw less conservative supporters from 
the party.102
The real extent of the threat posed by the PFP under Slabbert was demonstrated by 
a deeper internal analysis of the NP’s polling in urban constituencies. In urban areas, 
defined as 'right of centre,' the research showed that NP candidates were incapable of 
defeating a conservative candidate [assuming CP and Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) 
cooperation] if the PFP fielded a candidate. Post skewing politics thus made the PFP no 
less of a long-term strategic threat to the NP than the CP.
The referendum campaign, which was launched in August 1983, provided a unique 
opportunity for the NP to discredit its opposition, the CP and PFP, and re-brand the ruling 
party as the guarantor of stability. The NP thus refined and broadened its previous 
referendum objective, from limiting the expansion of the CP to weakening the PFP, in 
order to ensure the support of the moderates (48 percent), and scaring English voters to 
throw their lot in with the NP. Skewing had irreparably undermined Malan’s stratagem,
97 Die Afrikaner. 4 May 1983.
98 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting o f the Wavs, pp. 14 - 23.
99 Hermann Giliomee, 'Broedertwis: Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', African 
Affairs. 91, 1992, pp. 350,351; Interview with Sampie Terreblanche (29 October 2001).
100 PV 895, File 4/2. Vol 15, Memo from Dr. G. (Org) Marais to Chris Heunis.
101 Interviews with Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001), A lf Ries (30 October 2001) and Barend du Plessis 
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which was premised on Afrikaner political unity, and forced the NP to return to 
Hertzogism.
In order to portray the NP as 'the only alternative to chaos seen elsewhere in 
Africa,'104 the NP employed the referendum to discredit the CP and PFP as extremists and 
portray the party as the voice of moderation and stability. Days prior to the vote P.W. 
Botha warned a Johannesburg audience that 'no' voters were in league with ANC.105 
Confirmation that this was an NP objective is provided by a letter addressed to P.W. Botha 
by Dr. Jan Groblaar, the Party’s Chief Information Officer, who noted that the 'referendum 
has again proven that you are the middle point of the total political spectrum in South 
Africa, and indeed Southern Africa.'106
The brunt of the NP referendum campaign was to destroy the credibility of the
107opposition party leaders and to undermine their voters’ confidence in them. Ultimately, 
the nature and extent of the threat posed by each of the two opposition parties to the NP 
was specific to each province. In the Free State and Transvaal, especially rural areas, the 
CP was the primary threat. In the Cape, Natal and urban Transvaal constituencies the PFP 
posed the major threat. The local campaigns were, accordingly, calibrated.
Re-branding the NP:
This tactic of portraying the NP as a force of moderation, uniting all moderates against CP
10ftand PFP extremism, is ascribed to the party’s 'political Commissar,' Ebe Dommisse who 
penned the influential Deur Dawie column at Die Burger. Despite emphatic denials,109 
Dommisse led a concerted campaign to paint all opposition to the new constitution with 
the same brush and to pose a 'yes' vote as a choice for peace over chaos.110 Dommisse, for 
example, warned of an 'Unholy Alliance' that spanned the United Democratic Front 
(U.D.F.), on the left to the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) on the 
right.111 As will be discussed shortly, the most effective way of doing this was to attack 
the PFP and its leadership. This tack served to present the new constitution as a moderate 
'third way.'
104 PV 203, File 4/2/108, Speech at George, 23 October 1982.
105 The Rand Daily Mail. 1 November 1983.
106 PV 203, File C3/19/13, Letter dated 8 November 1983.
107 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
108 Interview with Tim du Plessis (29 November 2001).
109 Interview with Ebbe Dommisse (23 October 2001).
110 Die Burger. 14 September 1983.
111 Die Burger. 23 August 1983 and Die Burger. Deur Dawie, 24 August 1983.
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Furthermore, the NP machine and its leadership explicitly spoke of a new political 
map in which English and Afrikaans speakers would move beyond 'sectional loyalties.' In 
a campaign speech at Sedgefield, for example, P.W. Botha pointed out that the referendum 
was an opportunity to demonstrate English and Afrikaner unity and a 'a new spirit for 
South Africa.'112 It is worth pointing out that the theme echoed Botha’s campaign speeches
i n
in the build-up to the Republican referendum, and provides further evidence that Botha 
had gained many of his referendum insights from his involvement in the previous vote. 
During the campaign Deur Dawie also argued that politics would never be the same after 
the referendum,114 which suggest that the party indeed sought to re-brand the NP through 
the referendum. The response to the eventual referendum result, a two-thirds 'yes' 
majority, is similarly instructive in this regard. Die Burger opined that thanks to the 
referendum an 'unparalleled breakthrough was made across the boundaries of language 
and party affiliation.' P.W. Botha, similarly, described the referendum as 'a platform for 
national unity and evolutionary reform.'115
Tackling the PFP:
According to Barend du Plessis, P.W. Botha viewed the 1983 referendum as a strategic 
opportunity to tap into the PFP’s support base by scaring the 'Prog' voters with the threat 
of the right,116 because, passing the constitution depended on the support of PFP voters 
and the NP needed to get PFP voters to break with their existing party loyalties. However, 
whilst many of the PFP’s voters and some of its more conservative legislators, like Harry 
Schwartz and Jaapie Basson, were inclined to support the constitution, its leader van Zyl 
Slabbert opposed it on grounds of principle.117 Slabbert, in fact, threatened to resign as
liftleader of the party if the faction supported a 'yes' vote. Moreover, once he had 
convinced the faction, a special party conference was called to convince party activists. 
From the NP’s perspective, this tension, which was reminiscent of tensions within the 
United Party in 1960, was an unintended, though welcome, consequence of the 
referendum. Die Burger revelled in this intrigue and portrayed the PFP as divided.119
112 Die Burger. 1 October 1983.
113 Die Burger. 9 May 1958.
114 Die Burger. 3 September 1983; Die Burger. Deur Dawie, 10 September 1983.
115 Die Burger. 4 November 1983; Die Burger. Deur Dawie, 5 November 1983.
1,6 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
117 Interview with Peter Gastrow (24 October 2001).
118 Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).
119 Die Burger. 5, 20 September & October 8, 1983. There were also intermittent reports o f party members 
leaving the party. The reported resignation o f Errol Musk, the PFP candidate for Sunnyside (Pretoria) 
election the 1981 elections was made a front-page story. Die Burger. 4 October 1983.
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The referendum campaign focused much energy on discrediting the PFP leadership 
and driving a wedge between it and its voters. One way of doing this was by linking its 
leaders to communism and the ANC with information supplied by the US based Freedom
i onFoundation. Deur Dawie derided the PFP for administering a campaign that encouraged
a vote for leaders and the party, and not the constitution. When the PFP did focus on the
constitution’s flaws, especially the danger of excluding Blacks, and candidly stated that
1 0 0Black majority rule was inevitable, the NP portrayed it as a radical party.
The referendum may also have been viewed as an opportunity to drive Slabbert out
100of politics. Die Burger, for example, called on him to resign in the event of defeat. In 
February 1986 Slabbert stunned South Africa by resigning from party politics to establish 
a non-governmental organisation called the Institute for a Democratic Alternative to South 
Africa (IDASA). Veteran PFP leader Colin Eglin, who was active in politics during all 
three referenda, notes that the 1983 referendum, eventually, drove Slabbert out of politics. 
According to Eglin, it was the 'beginning of the end,' as the business community, who 
abandoned him on a crunch issue, offended him.124
The NP’s effort to undermine the PFP’s opposition to the referendum was 
bolstered by the support of regional and national English newspapers. Six daily and
19^weekly papers supported the government, whilst ten supported the opposition. The Star
1
called on Whites to boycott the vote. And Helen Suzman suggests that the PFP
197campaign was undermined by the support of important newspapers for the constitution. 
Furthermore, the business community widely endorsed the new constitution, despite their 
misgivings. The support from segments of the English media reflected the growing
I 9 0
cooperation between English speaking business interests and the NP. Deur Dawie, of 
course, submitted that the support of these papers reflected the sentiments of their readers,
190who opposed the PFP’s 'boycott politics' and their association with the extreme right.
120 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
121 Die Burger. 21 September 1983.
122 Die Burger. 26 August 1983.
123 Die Burger. 13 September 1983, 8 October 1983.
124 Interview with Colin Eglin (11 December 2001).
125 The papers that supported a 'yes* vote were, The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Times, The Natal 
Mercury, Hie Friend, Hie Citizen, and The Financial Mail. Those that remained loyal to the PFP and called 
for a No' vote were, The Diamond Fields Advertiser, The Argus, The Pretoria News, Daily News, The 
Sunday Tribune, The Cape Times, The Rand Daily Mail, The Evening Post, The Eastern Province Herald, 
and the Natal Witness.
126 The Star. 28 October 1983.
127 Helen Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms. Memoirs (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 239.
128 E McKenzie, 'An Unholy Trinity? Big Business, the Regressive Federal Party and the English Press 
During the 1983 Referendum', Journal for Contemporary History. 15, 3, December 1990, p. 58.
129 Die Burger. 3 and 10 September 1983.
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The support of significant elements in the English press, the NP’s control over the 
Afrikaans press (which denied the opposition advertising space), and its flagrant abuse of
1 Tfistate controlled electronic media all hampered the 'no' campaign,. To top this, the NP
1 T1outspent the PFP by 10-1, eventually spending more on the referendum than Margaret 
Thatcher had in the British elections of 1983.132
'A step in the right direction.'
PFP claims that the reforms did not go far enough were bolstered when Inkatha leader, 
Gatsha Buthelezi, stated his opposition to the reforms on 20 August 1983. Buthelezi, who 
had for a long time been trumpeted by the NP as a moderate alternative to the ANC, 
warned he would end his regime-friendly opposition to sanctions if the constitution were 
adopted. Buthelezi further cautioned that the proposed constitution would heighten Black 
alienation.133
Criticism from a pliant Black leader underscored the failings of the constitution and 
potentially enabled Slabbert to force a debate on the constitution. Slabbert was well aware 
of the NP’s effort to focus the debate on the costs of a 'no' vote and not on the 
constitution’s merits.134 To the chagrin of the NP, the PFP also actively cooperated with 
Buthelezi’s Inkatha in calling for a 'no' vote in Natal. In response, the NP and its press 
rehashed arguments from the 1960 referendum campaign, warning that this cooperation 
would make Blacks a 'political football.'135 The NP’s Minister for Constitutional 
Development and key strategist, Chris Heunis, attacked the PFP for involving Buthelezi, 
and also questioned the right of 'Blacks with their own [homeland] parliaments' to 
'interfere in a debate on the rights of Coloureds and Indians.' Similarly, Die Burger 
accused the PFP of shifting the focus of the referendum away from the Coloureds and 
Indians (who have no political rights) to the Blacks (who have). Criticising Slabbert’s 
supposed 'abuse of Blacks,' by noting Inkatha's opposition to the reforms, Deur Dawie 
sniped that that the PFP could bear it that a plan that did not involve them would succeed,
130 The Argus. 15 September 1983.
131 The Rand Daily Mail. 1 September 1983.
132 The Sunday Express. 4 September 1989.
133 Raymond Louw, The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983
134 The Argus. 17 September 1983.
135 Die Burger. 27 August 1983; Die Burger. 21 ,22, 27,28 September 1983.
136 Die Burger. 22 September 1983.
137 Die Burger. 7 October 1983.
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and also charged that Slabbert had never made the transition from being an academic to 
being a politician.138
In order to counter the PFP’s cutting critique , the NP portrayed the constitution as a 
'step in the right direction,' hinting that Black inclusion would be an inevitable outcome of
# 170its adoption. Chris Heunis, who is accredited with the 'step in the right direction' 
argument,140 reassured White business leaders that the 'government accepts that further 
reform and adjustment is also required in this area as well.'141 And, on at least one 
occasion he cynically converted a 'no' vote into a vote for racism.142 In the NP’s 
propaganda, the process was now made more important than the outcome.143 Sampie 
Terreblanche, one of the most articulate proponents of the 'step in the right direction' 
argument and a government supporter at the time, claimed.
It is unrealistic to think that we can tackle the problem of Black participation 
in the decision making process without, firstly, accommodating Coloured 
representation in a satisfactory way and secondly, without building a strong 
middle-ground consensus on the process and methods of gradual and 
incremental constitutional reform between Afrikaans and English speakers.144
In effect, the tactic of building support for the process, and not the constitution, 
amounted to recognition that the constitution was flawed. Constitutional expert Marinus 
Wiechers commented that the new constitution was not a constitution. Instead, he 
described it as a 'tortuously constructed compromise, which a particular political party has 
reached with itself to consolidate its own political strength for the purpose of limited 
power-sharing with Coloureds and Indians.'145 Slabbert suggests that leading NP figures, 
including F.W. de Klerk, unabashedly admitted to him that the constitution was 
unworkable.146
138 Die Burger September 24,1983.
139 P.W. Botha at Randfontein (Die Burger. 14 October 1983). Similarly, Dr. Piet Koomhoff promised a Fish 
Hoek audience that the Government would address the aspirations o f  urban Blacks after the referendum (The 
Rand Daily Mail. 26 September 1983) as did the Cape Administrator Lappa Munnik, speaking in East 
London (The Daily Despatch. 17 September 1983).
140 Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).
141 PV 895, File 1/11/1/2, vol. 24, Address to ASSACOM National Congress, 20 October 1983; PV 895, File 
1/11/1/2, vol. 22. Briefing by Chris Heunis to foreign correspondents.
142 PV 895, File 1/11/1/2 vol. 24, Speech by Chris Heunis, 1 September 1983.
143 Interview with Wynand Malan (26 November 2001).
144 Sampie Terreblanche, 'How the Coloureds Can Unite the Whites', in Fleur de Villiers (ed). Bridge or 
Barricade? The Constitution. A First Appraisal (Johannesburg, 1983), p. 91.
145 Marinus Wiechers, 'The New Constitution: Can it Be Salvaged?', in Fleur de Villiers (ed.). Bridge or 
Barricade? p. 55.
146 Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (30 October 2001).
228
The 'step in the right direction' argument proved to be a highly convincing, and 
explains the English press’s abandonment of the PFP. In retrospect, Slabbert notes, 'now 
who is against a step in the right direction? Only mad dogs.'147 Fortuitously, the NP’s 'step 
in the right direction' claim also exacerbated fissures within the PFP over the new 
constitution. More importantly, it resonated with the PFP’s constituency and, after the 
referendum, Die Burger gleefully noted that one third of its supporters defied the PFP 
leadership. The paper speculated that the outcome would exacerbate internal PFP 
tensions.148 To the carrot of a 'step in the right direction,' the NP added the threat that a 'no' 
vote would spell the end of reform,149 and the demise of the verligtes.150 Barend du Plessis 
confesses that the gambit was to convince voters that a 'no' vote was 'too ghastly to 
contemplate,' and it was 'made clear that a ‘no’ vote would create a crisis in government 
and lead to elections.'151 Research on the 1995 sovereignty referendum in Quebec suggests 
that voters who are reluctant to take risks, such as voting for independence, tend to focus 
worst case scenarios and catastrophic predictions in considering their vote. If these are
1 Omade credible, they are likely to play an important role in the vote. In both the 1983 and 
the 1992 vote the NP masterfully played up the potentially calamitous consequences of 
voting no. Fear proved to be their best resource.
The conservative campaign, addressing the CP’s challenge:
In order to counter the CP, the NP hoped to discredit its leaders and, at the same time, 
allay the fears of White Afrikaners. This required a message that ran counter to the 'step in 
the right direction' argument in conservative strongholds. Politicians, academics and 
journalists based in the conservative Transvaal note that the campaign here focused on the
1 STCP. And seen from the CP perspective, Koos van der Merwe notes that the NP was 
'definitely not pre-occupied with the PFP,' and argues that the CP was the focus of the 
government’s concerns.154 The ability of the party to calibrate a double message was made 
possible by the fact that Naspers had a different newspaper for each area.
147 Ibid.
148 Die Burger. 5, 7 November 1983.
149 P.W. Botha speaking in Pietermaritzburg. The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983.
150 Andre du Toit, 'Perspectives on the Constitution1, South African Outlook. 113, 1348, October 1983, p. 
161.
151 Interview with Barend du Plessis (29 November 2001).
152Richard Nadeau, Pierre Martin and Andre Blais, 'Attitude Towards Risk Taking and Individual Choice in 
the Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty', British Journal o f Political Science. 29, 3, 1999, pp. 536-537.
153 Interviews with Wynand Malan (26 November, 2001), Boy Geldenhuys (25 October 2001), Hennie van 
Deventer (30 October 2001), J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001), Tim du Plessis (28 November 2001) and 
Hennie Clerk (23 November 2001).
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Discrediting the CP’s leaders, however, proved much more difficult as there 
simply was not sufficient material to smear them with.155 The single opportunity to attack 
the CP leader was provided by his Kruger Day address when he suggested that Christians 
could not vote yes in the referendum.156 As part of its effort to reassure its traditional 
support base, the NP presented the reforms as a minimal set of changes that would 
perpetuate White rule. In the conservative Free State, the NP’s provincial leader, Kobie
1 ^ 7Coetsee, argued that constitutional change would allow Whites to prolong their future. 
The reforms were further justified as an essential response to the 'total onslaught' on the 
country. Botha often informed his audiences that the country’s security forces and military 
industries depended on Coloureds and Indians, and pointed out that the fight against 
Communism could no longer afford the exclusion of these two communities. On one 
occasion Botha argued that Afrikaner nationalism, which had fought for the freedom of 
Afrikaners, could not deny others their freedoms.159
Far more convincing, however, was the NP’s attack on the PFP and its agenda. 
Accused by the CP of moving left, the NP responded by attacking the left. Tim du Plessis 
argues that Ebbe Dommisse suggested this stratagem, in which the NP engaged in a form 
of 'shadow boxing' with the PFP. According to du Plessis, Dommisse recognised that in 
reviling the PFP, the 'yes' campaign could convince the core NP supporters that the Party 
was true to its ideals.160 Attacking Slabbert, therefore, not only addressed the threat that he 
posed to the party, but also had propaganda value in the conservative north.161 The NP’s 
preoccupation with the PFP and van Zyl Slabbert, in particular, was most telling in the 
party’s Cape mouthpiece, Die Burger, which relentlessly sought to paint Slabbert as a 
radical and linked the emergence of the U.D.F. to the PFP’s opposition to the 
constitution.162 From August 24 to October 7 the paper attacked the PFP and Slabbert on 
at least fourteen occasions.163 Given Dommisse’s proximity to the NP leadership and his
155 Interview with Eldad Louw (6 December 2001).
156 Die Burger. October 11 -  13 & 20 1983; The Rand Daily Mail. 1 November 1983.
157 Die Volksblad. 19 October 1983.
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Speech at Springbok, 15 May 1982 and Speech at Lichtenburg, 26 May 1982; PV 203, File 4/2/104, Address 
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involvement in the Broederbond,m  his approach undoubtedly reflected the NP’s 
referendum strategy.
Yet a further incentive to attack Slabbert was the fact that he challenged the NP’s 
working assumption that they could defeat the CP with the votes of English-speaking 
Whites. Slabbert, in fact, posed the greatest threat to Botha’s designs of building a reform 
coalition, of traditional (moderate) NP supporters and the PFP’s support base, against the 
CP. Capturing the latter required discrediting Slabbert, while delivering the former 
required a conservative and cautious campaign -  especially in the Transvaal and Free 
State. Where propaganda failed to assuage the NP faithful, the NP added incentives that 
bordered on flagrant bribery ahead of the vote. These included a 12 percent pay increase 
for the country’s one million civil servants,165 and promises of 15,000 new public houses 
for Whites.166 For good measure, the government cut fuel prices by almost seven 
percent.167
The NP captures a new constituency:
1 AftThe two-thirds 'yes' majority on 3 November 1983 exceeded the expectations of the NP, 
and the result was indeed a major setback for the PFP, whose voters defied the party. 
There was consensus that the NP had made major inroads into the English vote.169 The 
Rand Daily Mail, for example, opined that P.W. Botha had changed his constituency, 
leaving behind the right. The paper also warned that the NP could not afford to disillusion
1 7  ftEnglish voters. Commenting on the result, Hermann Giliomee argued that the vote
171demolished 'the historical myth that Afrikaners are solely responsible for Apartheid.' 
And continued NP rule was indeed made possible by English-speaking Whites. On the 
other hand, this transformation also fundamentally changed the leadership of the party, 
which in turn made its abandonment of Apartheid possible.
From Die Vaderland's perspective the result enabled the NP to move ahead with 
his reforms, without 'having to look over its shoulder' to Mayfair and Waterberg (by- 
elections). This confirms claims that the referendum served to by-pass these by-elections.
164 Interview with J.P. de Lange (22 November 2001).
165 The Rand Daily Mail. 7, 8 September 1983.
166 Die Burger. 27 September 1983.
167 The Rand Daily Mail. 11 August 1983.
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Interestingly the paper now called for dialogue with Blacks.172 Botha, however, dithered. 
In doing so, he ultimately alienated his English-speaking supporters as well as verligtes, 
prompting the emergence of the Democratic Party (DP).
In contrast to the PFP, the CP viewed the 700,000 'no' voters as evidence of its
17^strength, noting that many PFP supporters voted yes. The NP, however, viewed the 'no' 
vote as evidence of a ceiling of its conservative opposition, despite the CP’s impressive 
growth; the result quantified the absolute support for the right and undermined 'the right 
wing bogey.'174 F.W. de Klerk was no doubt alert to this when he called the 1992 
referendum. And, as a master tactician, he had come to appreciate the fact that scare 
tactics, coupled with the support of English voters made the referendum an excellent last 
resort for the NP in times of political difficulty. Nine years later, de Klerk would finally 
bury his conservative nemesis in the third all-White referendum, employing the legislation 
that he had passed in 1983 as Minister of the Interior.175
Interestingly, one commentator welcomed the 'no' camp's relatively good showing, 
hinting that it would give legitimacy to the process and demonstrate that it was not 
cosmetic.176 In Puerto Rico’s 1951 vote on Commonwealth Status, Munoz Marin also 
noted his satisfaction with a substantial minority 'no' vote (23,5 percent), as it strengthened 
'the favorable decision by showing that [the] opposition was fully and freely represented 
and [the] people made their own choice.'177 Prudence in referendum victories is at times, 
thus, viewed as an asset.
Partisanship and cues:
What the 1983 vote clearly demonstrated is the extent to which PFP voters took their cues 
from non-party elites (business leaders, academics, diplomats178 and editors) and defied 
their party. This not only highlights the importance of cue-givers in referenda,179 but also 
raises questions about the role of partisanship in referendum outcomes. The referendum 
literature, by and large, suggests that partisanship is an important factor in determining
172 Die Vaderland. 4 November 1983.
173 PV 873, Andries Treumicht Collection, File 3/2/21, Press statement, 3 November 1983.
174 Herman Giliomee, The Rand Daily Mail. 5 November 1983.
175 Hansard. Thursday 1 September 1983, column 12966.
176 Johann S. Liebenberg, Die Vaderland. 19 September 1983.
177 Surendra Bhana, The United States and the Development o f the Puerto Rican Status Question. 1936-1968 
(Lawrence, Manhattan, Wichita, 1975), p. 143.
178 The government drafted in its Washington, Bonn and London Ambassadors to convince the public o f  the 
need to vote yes. The Argus. 28 October 1983.
179 Mads H. Qvortrup, 'How to Lose a Referendum. Lessons from Denmark', The Political Quarterly. 72, 2, 
April-June 2001, p. 195.
232
referendum results,180 especially if parties are united.181 Simon Hug and Pascal Sciarini, 
who suggest that the objectives behind the use of the referendum determine the salience of 
partisanship, provide a more refined explanation. Specifically, they argue that if voters 
view the referendum as ’essentially political,' and not as a vote on a policy issue, they will 
tend to behave in a partisan manner. Hence, they are more inclined to punish governments 
in controlled votes.182 Similarly, Denis Balsom and Ian McAllister argue that Scottish and 
Welsh devolution proposals were defeated in 1975 because they were viewed as the 
product of one party. They note that this encouraged Conservatives supporters to put party 
loyalty first.183 In all three of South Africa’s referenda partisanship was a negligible factor, 
especially for the liberal White voter, and the NP successfully managed to tap into its 
opponent’s support base, despite the fact that these were all political votes. This suggests 
that the NP successfully presented all three political votes as policy votes, playing down 
the party political aspects. Moreover, the party managed to* raise the revenant of a 'no' 
vote.
The dynamic of the referendum:
It is also worth adding that the 1983 referendum demonstrated the dynamic evolution of 
its role in the party’s thinking. Initially, Botha used it in response to internal divisions, and 
to remove the constitution from debates within the party structures. The initial pledge was 
also designed to serve as a tool of electoral heresthetics, removing the proposed 
constitution from the 1981 elections. This move was primarily aimed at the HNP, which at 
the time stood to benefit from conservative disaffection. During the skewing Botha, 
however, sought to use the referendum in order to prevent the split. And once the skewing 
had taken place, Botha viewed the referendum as a tool to limit the fall-out from the split.
Once the partition was final and the CP a political fact, Botha viewed the 
referendum as a tool to address further resistance within the party (navigating the federal 
and provincial conferences) and as a mechanism to stunt the growth of the CP, especially
180 Support in favour o f partisanship comes from Italy (Marradi, 1976: 131), Norway (Pettersen, Jenssen and 
Listhaug, 1996: 279 and Sciarini and Listhaug, 1997: 431), votes on European integration (Franklin, van der 
Eijk and Marsh, 1995: 101-117) and Switzerland (Linder, 1998: 112). Contrary evidence is brought form 
Denmark (Karen Siune, 1993: 103 and Palle Svenson, 1994: 79-80), Switzerland (Trechsel and Sciarani, 
1998: 116-119) as well as Norway (Nilson and Bjorklund, 1986: 276,277).
181 Roy Pierce, Henry Valen and Ola Listhaug, 'Referendum Voting Behavior: The Norwegian and British 
Referenda on Membership in the European Community', The American Journal o f Political Science. 27, 1, 
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Matter?', European Journal of Political Research. 33 ,1 ,1998 , p. 111.
182 Simon Hug and Pascal Sciarini, 'Referendums on European Integration. Do Institutions matter in the 
voters decision?' Comparative Political Studies. 33 ,1 , February 2000, pp. 9 ,1 1 ,2 6 ,3 2 .
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Change and Popular Choice', Parliamentary Affairs. 32 ,4 ,1979 , pp. 403,407.
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by removing the constitutional issue from the Berge by-elections, set for 1983. The 
referendum thus served as a tool of reform her esthetics, in the face of a conservative 
backlash and un-planned for by-elections. The referendum further served as a mechanism 
to de-link the constitution from the party. Moreover, Botha, aware that he could secure the 
support of English voters, as had been the case in 1960, used the PFP’s voters to fight the 
CP. This was especially the case where the question was rather ambiguous and allowed 
the party leader to seek a wide mandate. This is perhaps the single most important lesson 
that de Klerk would take forward to 1992.184 The decision to deploy the referendum also 
reflected his increasing self-doubt about the reforms. Once the referendum date had been 
set, the party used the vote to re-align the party system and compensate for the loss of the 
CP. The PFP was set to foot the bill.
The evolution of elite objectives and motivations in referendum use, which is 
demonstrated in the 1983 and 1992 votes, is ignored in the referendum literature. The 
basis for the referendum was, however, rooted in Verwoerd’s 1960 precedent, which 
provided an important template for Botha. He, in turn, provided a template for de Klerk. 
As already argued in chapter two, F.W. de Klerk owes a huge debt to this predecessor. 
Botha undid many of the ideological underpinnings of Apartheid, through his reform by 
stealth. He also provided de Klerk with a recipe for dealing with White resistance to 
reform.
184 Interview with Harold Pakendorf (9 December 2002).
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Conclusion.
Today we have closed the book on Apartheid and that chapter is finally closed.
There were those who objected, somehow or another, to the fact that this was 
an all White referendum. I  think that it sounds an element o f justice that we 
who started this long chapter in our history were called upon to close the book 
on Apartheid.1
Referendum roots and early NP incumbency struggles:
The history of the referendum in White South Africa neatly corresponds with the broader 
citizenship debate following the establishment of the Union in 1910, and the later 
evolution and demise of Apartheid. Historically, the referendum primarily served the NP 
in its incumbency struggles, as a resource of heresthetics, initially, as an opposition party 
(1914-1924), and later in holding the PACT government (1924-1929) together. The 
motivations for embracing the referendum were clearly driven by consequential 
considerations, and reflected the interests of the more dominant actors in the party, 
especially Hertzog and the Cape NP, who were less committed to republicanism. As 
demonstrated, the motivations to adopt the referendum in the first decade of the party’s 
existence included its desire to rehabilitate its tarnished image after the 1914 rebellion, the 
aspiration to be 'isomorphic' with Wilsonian principles, the influence of the referendum 
Zeitgeist at the time, and the need to forge unity between the different provincial branches 
of the party.
The referendum pledge was also essential if the party wished to appeal to a wider 
constituency. The 1921 general elections graphically demonstrated that secession, though 
tactically helpful in building an ethnic support base, was also, ultimately, an impediment 
to securing political power. The referendum critically allowed the party to assume a 
republican position, yet pursue a broader appeal. The pledge also provided a modicum of 
constructive ambiguity and consensus in the party on the constitutional issue. This was 
essential, for the creation of a third, Republican Party, or provincial party, would spell 
disaster for the NP, in a polity with a Westminster first-past-the-post electoral system. Jan 
Smuts and the ruling South African Party (SAP) or the United Party (UP) would be the 
only beneficiaries.
More importantly, the pledge that any change in the Union’s constitutional status 
only follows a referendum reflected Hertzog’s civic definition of White nationalism. By
1 PV 734, F.W. de Klerk Collection, File M7/6/11 Vol 189, Speech following the announcement o f the 
referendum result, 18 March 1992.
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insisting that a change in the country constitutional status only come about on the basis of 
an expression of broad popular will (a referendum), Hertzog demonstrated his 
commitment to incrementalism and gradually forging a White identity by consent. Given 
Hertzog’s early dominance of the party, his pledge cast a 'long shadow' over policy 
formulations and tactical thinking on the constitutional issue.
The NP’s early tactical thinking on the referendum was graphically reflected in the 
party’s response to efforts to incorporate Southern Rhodesia in 1922. The demand for a 
referendum allowed Hertzog to paint Smuts as someone who was not serving the interests 
of the volk, but rather those of mining capital and Imperial Britain. And, indirectly, 
Winston Churchill and the Colonial Office contributed to the introduction of the 
referendum, by imposing it upon the people of Southern Rhodesia. The spread of the 
referendum from Europe and North America to the 'third world,' through coercive 
isomorphism, was not unique to South Africa.
In the case of the promise to stage a flag referendum in 1926, the decision was 
consistent with what the literature on controlled referenda suggests. Both the coalition and 
the NP were divided on this salient issue, and the existing mechanisms to resolve internal 
differences proved futile. Moreover, a referendum was viewed as a 'lightening rod,' to 
remove the issue from electoral politics, and take the wind out of the opposition’s sails. 
Though the vote was, ultimately, not deployed the first decade in opposition and the flag 
question ensured that the referendum was further accepted in the political repertoire of the 
NP. The referendum had taken one step closer towards becoming a 'constitutional 
convention' for addressing symbolic and constitutional issues that divided the two 
communities.
The break with Hertzogism:
After the 'Fusion' of 1934, the reduced and lustrated NP returned to the opposition, and the 
party assumed a far more republican posture. In doing so, Malan used the republican 
standard to differentiate his party from the UP, which captured the middle ground. 
Moreover, Malan depended on the republican elements from the old NP, who became 
increasingly prominent outside of the Cape, as the moderate Free State and Transvaal 
leadership followed Hertzog. The break with the old principles of Hertzogism heralded the 
strengthening of the ethnic variant of Afrikaner nationalism, which embraced an organic 
conception of nationhood. Despite this, the Purified National Party (GNP) continued to 
view the referendum as a vital tactical tool in its incumbency struggles until 1939. It is
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important to recall that Malan’s ability to maintain the former NP position was a direct 
result of the Cape’s dominance in the new party. Moreover, it also confirms that Hertzog’s 
traditional policy had served to accommodate the Cape, which was less republican, in the 
old NP. The referendum pledge also served to provide the party with a modicum of 
constructive ambiguity on a divisive issue.
The commitment to a referendum on constitutional change was only abandoned 
after the controversial war vote in 1939. The trauma of the war declaration led to 
Afrikaner disillusionment with party politics and made incumbency struggles, the 
referendum included, seem irrelevant. The struggle over the referendum between the Cape 
leadership and the radical republicans -  from 1935-1936 -  provides valuable insights into 
how the party machine viewed the tactical role of the referendum. It was viewed as an 
indispensable form of electoral heresthetics designed to enable the NP to reach out to 
urban voters. After the War vote and failure to unify with Hertzog, Malan was unable to 
deflect the radical wing of the party. Besides, outbidding radical contenders -  like the 
Ossewbrandwag -  required embracing radicalism. As a result, the early 1940s saw the 
party totally break with Hertzog’s prescription.
Paving the way to Nationalist victory and hegemony:
After the party had seen off the challenges to its role as representative of the volk, and 
once the phantasm of a Nazi victory had evaporated, it began to plot its route to capturing 
political power. Tactically, Malan understood that ultimate electoral success against the 
UP, notwithstanding the successful consolidation of Afrikaner support, would require the 
support of the non-republican Afrikaners (especially urban voters) and disaffected English 
speakers. The republic would have to play second fiddle to A partheidhence, the 
referendum’s centrality in party’s post-1943 election incumbency struggles.
The referendum pledge on a republic was not only instrumental in the party’s 
struggle for incumbency in 1948, but also in its maintenance. The surprise success of the 
NP in these elections reinforced the sense amongst the Cape party that its republican 
prescription and its focus on Apartheid were correct. Furthermore, the tenuous nature of 
the victory buttressed the argument for caution. Malan -  to the chagrin of the northern 
Nationalists -  was quite explicit in this regard, in the lead up to the 1953 elections. In this 
regard, Malan again emulated Hertzog, who in 1926 placed discriminatory labour market 
legislation ahead of the flag issue. A general election on the republican issue in 1953 
might have allowed the UP to regain lost seats.
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Thus the referendum pledges on the republic from 1946 to 1953 were important in 
laying the platform for, and consolidation of, power. But the frequent use of the 
referendum as a tool of electoral heresthetics also tied the party to a referendum on a 
republic. In effect, the NP was unable to sidestep the referendum. Straitjacketed by its past 
tactical pledges, the debate now shifted to how best to obtain the republic. This was the 
nub of Transvaal-Cape tensions after 1948, and the 'painless' approach, advocated by the 
Cape, emerged victorious. The key consequence was a decision to separate the republican 
and Commonwealth membership issues.
Malan’s dithering on the republican question also suggests that he, like Hertzog, 
was at heart a gradualist, perhaps even a reluctant republican. Moreover, Malan 
recognised that a republic, introduced by a simple parliamentary majority, at a time when 
the NP did not yet enjoy an absolute majority of support amongst all voters, would lack 
legitimacy.
Creating the Apartheid republic:
As the NP consolidated its hold on power through the 1953 and 1958 elections, the need to 
expedite the republican issue increasingly came to the fore. J.G. Strijdom and H.F. 
Verwoerd viewed Apartheid and a Christian-national republic as consummative, and not 
conflicting, objectives. The two, thus, inverted Malan’s position, arguing that cutting ties 
with Britain would force English speakers to support Apartheid. Despite their neo- 
Fichtean misgivings, Strijdom and Verwoerd realised that they would need to co-opt 
English speakers in a post-colonial era, as Afrikaners could not go it alone. The 
unavoidable referendum, therefore, soon became a means to engineer a realignment of 
White politics -  between those who subscribed to a 'conservative' and 'Liberalistic' 
approach on the race issue.4 The Afrikaans press and Broederbond academics echoed this 
theme.5
Hence, The Star lamented that Verwoerd had 'bent his energies and those of his 
administration towards unifying the Whites in a single pattern of political thought namely
2 Verwoerd speaking at Heidelberg, Die Burger. 6 October 1958.
3 PV 28, M.C.G.J. (Basie) van Rensburg Collection,. File 532. Strijdom and Verwoerd in parliament, 8 July 
1958,18 September 1958, 27 January 1959,4 May 1959, Extracts from Hansard.
4 Verwoerd addressing NP’s Natal conference. The Cape Times, and The Natal Mercury. 7 November 1958; 
The Star. October 8, 1960; PV 93, HF Verwoerd Collection, File 1/45/1/3, Radio Broadcasts, 3 August 1960 
and 3, 7 October 1960.
5 Die Volksblad. 11, 12 October 1960, Die Burger. 22 May 1958.
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his own concept of separate development.'6 I submit that Verwoerd viewed the referendum 
as an exercise to institutionalise Apartheid and push it over the ideological threshold. The 
referendum, thus, moved from a resource in incumbency struggles -  until 1958 -  to being 
that of a 'war of position.'
Prior to the referendum, Verwoerd despatched a letter to White voters, which is 
instructive in understanding his objectives. In his appeal, he noted that only a republic 
would enable the country to give 'full attention' to developing a 'safe future for our White 
population.' Playing on White fears, at a time of de-colonisation, Verwoerd warned that if 
South Africa’s Whites did not 'take this step now,' they would endure the suffering that 
Whites had in other parts of Africa.7 And writing to Thomas Boydell, a former Labour 
Party leader, after the referendum, Verwoerd concluded his letter by noting that 'together 
we must succeed in establishing our White South Africa firmly, while safeguarding too
o
the future of our non-European groups.'
The campaign was, thus, about ensuring 'that the republic remains a White
republic.'9 And like his predecessor, Strijdom,10 Verwoerd11 was also convinced that a
republic was essential for White survival. It was for this reason that he charged that the
opponents of a republic wanted a multiracial state. And, it was for this reason that Jan
1 ^Steytler and the Progressive Party warned of the creation of the 'wrong republic.' 
Interestingly, Gary Allighan suggests that the opposition gravely erred by converting the 
referendum into a confidence vote in Verwoerd’s policies, as he was thus able to view the 
'yes' vote as a mandate for his programme.14 The outcome of the referendum was also 
hegemonic in that the republican victory served to ensconce the NP and weaken its 
opposition, as predicted. And the referendum cemented Verwoerd's leadership, thereby 
allowing him to take the offensive against dissident moderates who opposed his policies 
regarding the Coloureds.15 Besides, Verwoerd’s success heralded the introduction of the
6 The Star. 3 October 1961.
7 PV 93, HF Verwoerd Collection, File 1/45/3/1, HF Verwoerd letter to voters. 21 September I960..
8 PV 93, HF Verwoerd Collection, File 1/30/1/8.
9 Die Bureer. 20 October 1958.
10 Hans Strijdom, 15 November 1952, quoted in Die Nasionale Partvnuus. Number 9 (1954).
11 Die Transvaaler. 24 February 1960.
12 Die Transvaaler. 30 August 1960, Die Volksblad. 30 August 1960.
13 Sakkie van der Merwe, 'Die Totstandkoming van die Republiek van Suid Afrika', in F.A. van Jaarsveld en 
G.D. Scholtz (eds), Die Republiek van Suid Afrika. Agtergrond. Onstaan en Toekoms (Johannesburg, 
1966), p. 202.
14 Garry Allighan, Verwoerd -  The End. A Look Back from the Future (London, 1961), pp. 2-3.
15 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years. The Apartheid State and the Politics o f  the National Party. 1948 - 1994 
(Randburg, 1996), pp. 106-107.
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referendum mechanism in the political repertoire of the NP. A template had been created 
and an institution for dealing with seminal constitutional issues inaugurated.
The unravelling of Apartheid hegemony:
The republican referendum, however, also proved to be a double-edged sword for the NP. 
A consequence of attaining the republic was that the party lost its unifying project. 
Instead, its focus shifted to separate development and the preservation of 'White South 
Africa from the forces of Communism through White unity and resolve.'16 Botha perfected 
the politics of security, which he began under Verwoerd, serving as Minister of Defence. 
And the NP leadership, no doubt, viewed the cold war as an opportunity to recast the 
terms of the South African conflict, especially in an age when there was increasing 
intolerance of Apartheid. This opportunism is analogous to the way in which the Israeli or 
the Russian governments have re-framed their policies of dealing with the Palestinian and 
Chechnyan challenges to their domination, as part of a wider struggle against the scourge 
of Islamic terror, after 11 September 2001.
This move to re-frame the Apartheid project, in turn, made the crucial clash 
between hardliners and soft-liners possible, especially after Verwoerd’s assassination. For, 
the politics of survival also produced a need to amend Apartheid and do away with its 
more brutal components, and accentuated the imperative of 'winning hearts and minds.' 
Both implied a break with Verwoerdian orthodoxy. This process was begun under Vorster, 
and carried forward by Botha who increasingly needed to cater to the verligte wing of the 
party and also co-opt Coloureds and Indians when it became apparent that Whites could 
not, 'go it alone.' This break implied a costly struggle, in which P.W. Botha would also 
employ the referendum.
Breaking with Verwoerd:
Many consider PW Botha’s role, and that of Chris Heunis, as instrumental in paving the 
way for the country’s later reforms.17 The importance of these reforms is that they were
16 Newell M. Stultz, 'The Politics o f Security: South Africa Under Verwoerd, 1961-6', The Journal o f  
Modem African Studies. 7, 1, 1969, p. 8.
17 Leon Wessels. Die Einde van 'n Era (Kaapstad, 1994), pp. 8-9; Fanie Cloete, 'Engineering the Erosion o f  
Apartheid: Constitutional Policy Planning in South Africa: 1980-1989', Plural Societies. XXII, 1 and 2, 
November 1992, pp. 45-73.
Interviews with Colin Eglin (11 December 2001), Willie Breytenbach (4 December 2002), Fanie Cloete (4 
December 2002), Neil Barnard (5 December 2002) and Ken Owen (10 December 2002).
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essentially ideological, and, as a result, de Klerk 'inherited a half full glass.'18 Brian 
Pottinger argues that the 1983 constitution 'established, irrevocably, that South Africa’s 
future lay along the road of inclusive, and not exclusive, citizenship and political 
structures.'19 And, Hermann Giliomee adds that whilst the two new chambers were 
relatively powerless, the new Parliament 'irrevocably undermined the symbolism of White 
supremacy. Unexpectedly it also materially contributed to the destruction of two of the 
three pillars of the Afrikaner’s power: their own unity and Black political fragmentation.' 
Responding at the time, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) viewed the new constitution 
as anchored in the 'ideology of departing from discrimination,'21 whilst the CP viewed it as
99the 'destruction of White sovereignty.'
Such assessments are at variance with the claims of Botha’s critics, at the time.
9 ^
They viewed his reforms as an attempt to merely modify the existing model. 
Nevertheless, while it was probably not Botha’s intention, the ultimate consequences of 
his reforms (and the 1983 referendum) were radical. As Steven Friedman notes, the 
sacrifice of what were perceived to be marginal issues, in order to preserve the core, only 
'succeeded to expose it [the core of Apartheid\ to further attack.' And once the NP had 
begun its strategic retreat, it was 'never to be undone.'24
Given that the NP was still such a powerful party prior to the 1982 skewing, and 
given the overwhelming imperative of ensuring party and Afrikaner unity, the eventual 
split is testimony to the level of resistance to the reform process within the party and 
Afrikanerdom. Skewing also proves that the existing means of resolving conflicts within 
the party had failed. Writing at the time, Willie Esterhuyse argued that the NP 'could not 
afford to move in a more dramatic way on the constitutional issue,' cautioning that too 
much of a reform would only benefit the right.25
With hindsight then, the 1983 referendum was the seminal event in the NP’s 
retreat. It expanded the demos, in order to co-opt so-called Coloureds and Indians. And, in
18 Interview with Ken Owen (10 December 2002).
19 Brian Pottinger, The Imperial President. P.W. Botha and the First 10 Years (Johannesburg, 1988), p. 111.
20 Hermann Giliomee, 'Surrender Without Defeat: Afrikaners and the South African "Miracle."', Daedalus. 
Spring 1997, p. 129.
21 Die Transvaaler. 19 April 1983.
22 Die Patriot. 9 September 1983; Koos van der Merwe, Die Transvaaler. 20 April 1983.
23 Andre du Toit, The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983, Allen Boesak, 'No positive side to Apartheid', 
South African Outlook. 113,1348, October 1983, p. 156.
24 Steven Friedman. 'HIDDEN TOMORROWS: Using the South African Experience to Understand 
Emerging Alternatives in a Time o f Conflict', Paper presented at ’A South African Conversation on Israel 
and Palestine' Institute for African Studies, Columbia University (20-21 September 2002).
25 Willie Esterhuyse, 'The Catch 22 Afflicting White Politics', in Fleur de Villiers (ed.). Bridge or Barricade? 
The Constitution. A First Appraisal (Johannesburg, 1983), p. 68.
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making this qualitative break with his predecessors, Botha jettisoned the conservative and 
exclusivist wing of his party, freeing up the reformists. This development, according to de 
Klerk, was 'liberating' for the NP.26 As Adam Przeworski notes, 'a regime begins to crack
f j n
when members of the ruling block go outside for support.' P.W. Botha cracked the NP 
regime, and thrust it well over the ideological threshold through his referendum. This was 
his great contribution to the later making of a democratic polity.
De Klerk’s lessons in appropriateness:
At Ladysmith, Botha promised a referendum in an effort to remove the reform debate 
from the party’s provincial and federal structures, in order to maintain party unity, and in 
order to deny the HNP an opportunity to make gains in the 1981 general election. His 
stratagem, however, failed in the former regard. And, once skewing was inevitable, Botha 
skilfully used the referendum, at first, in order to play down the significance of the split. 
Next, he sought to check the CP’s growth, by removing the constitutional issue from a 
string of by-elections in mid 1983 (the 'Battle of the Berge% that could potentially give 
momentum the newly formed CP. The referendum was, thus, used to 'take the wind out of 
the opposition’s sails.'
Once the skewing was a fait-accompli, Botha’s pre-occupation shifted to capping 
the CP’s growth and realigning White politics in order to compensate for the loss of CP 
supporters. Botha also wished to demonstrate the extent to which the existing electoral 
system distorted the CP’s strength. In order to do so, he needed the votes of the English 
speakers. And as a graduate of the 1960 referendum he was well aware that only a 
referendum would allow English voters to break with their 'sectional loyalties.'
By the time of the referendum campaign, Botha began to view the referendum as a 
means of re-aligning White politics and weakening the PFP. This was to be done by 
attacking its leader. Strategically, van Zyl Slabbert was seen as no less of a threat than 
Andries Treumicht. What the split and the referendum, therefore, did was to make 
English-speaking White voters relevant to the NP, and supporters of reform Apartheid. 
Skewing also, however, transformed the NP into a bourgeois party, speeding up the 
demise of its ideological component.
26 F.W. de Klerk, Die Laaste Trek - ’n Nuwe Begin (Kaapstad, 1999), p. 106.
27 Adam Przeworski, 'Some Problems in the Study o f the Transition to Democracy', in Guillermo O’Donnel, 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, 
1986), p. 56.
28 The Rand Daily Mail. 28 October 1983.
29 The Rand Daily Mail. 5 September 1983.
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Botha’s reasoning for turning to the referendum was two-fold. One, was his 
sincere belief that the reforms were, at least, as important as the creation of the republic. 
Hence, in his mind he drew a parallel with Verwoerd. His second reason was his belief 
that a situation in which the leader deviated from the policy of his predecessors required a 
referendum. This was his subjective interpretation of the 1960 referendum, and 
Verwoerd’s decision to proceed with a simple majority, which broke with the pledges of 
his predecessors. This was Botha’s logic of appropriateness. This was why Botha viewed a 
referendum as the appropriate solution for the particular problem at hand; he had deviated 
from the 1977 proposals.
For the party’s new Transvaal leader, F.W. de Klerk, the referendum was primarily 
a resource in an incumbency struggle - coping with messy by-elections, like the three 
produced by the 'Battle of the Berge'- in his province. But Botha also demonstrated to de 
Klerk how the referendum set a ceiling on the CP’s real strength. Above all, Botha showed 
de Klerk how to construct a reform coalition, against the conservatives, who benefited 
from the Westminster system and its distortions.
De Klerk’s referendum:
During the 1983 campaign the government’s media insinuated that the referendum was a 
means to an end, and not an end in itself. Attaining that end became increasingly 
difficult, and Botha’s early zest for reform was replaced by dithering, and divisions 
between hardliners and soft-liners over the full implications of a 'step in the right 
direction,' paralysed the party.
By the time that de Klerk had become party leader and State President in late 1989, 
mounting domestic and internal pressures demanded a serious and swift reform effort. As 
Roelf Meyer notes, de Klerk 'was aware that the greatest risk he could take at the time was 
to take no risk at all.'31 And even before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, de Klerk had 
decided to embark on a bold five-year long transition. His intrepidity was only 
strengthened by the collapse of Communism.
One of de Klerk’s key working assumptions, in embarking upon this attempt at a 
managed transition, was that he could not afford another general election, once he had 
begun his reforms. He further assumed that his control over a blitz process would produce 
a favourable outcome -  a consociational democracy -  and allow him to outwit the ANC.
30 Die Burger. 9 November 1983.
31 Roelf Meyer, 'Paradigm Shift: The Essence o f Successful Change, A Personal Experience', INCORE 
Occasional Paper (2001), p. 13.
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Successfully implementing a swift transition, however, required that de Klerk placate 
Whites and operate with a free hand. He did so by giving them a sense that they had 
ultimate control over the process. De Klerk, who had sagaciously anticipated the CP’s 
response to his reforms (claiming that de Klerk did not have a mandate and undermining 
his legitimacy), did so by promising a referendum at the outset.
A series of unanticipated by-elections, however, provided his opponents with 
ample opportunities to undermine his ability to control the process, and increasingly 
eroded his public legitimacy as a reformer. Having previously played the reform game 
against the CP, and being a 'self-reflective' actor, the veteran of the 'Battle of the Berge' 
applied Botha’s post skewing solution to his by-election problems. De Klerk applied his 
logic of appropriateness to his context, as Botha had previously done. The fact that the 
referendum was part of the NP’s repertoire, and the fact that Botha had used one in his 
reforms, did not ordain that de Klerk would use one. Previous use did, however, make it 
more likely that de Klerk apply a tested response to a familiar problem. De Klerk knew 
that a referendum was a 'loaded dice.' It was safer than another general election in giving 
legitimacy to his reform process. But the referendum served as more than an incumbency 
struggle, it blocked a round of potentially disastrous elections under the existing 
dispensation.
Once he had secured the mandate, and ended White politics and incumbency 
struggles, de Klerk, squandered it by overplaying his hand at CODESA. Despite his ill- 
judged behaviour, the referendum was still one of his finest political moments. Ironically, 
de Klerk who played a masterful game against the CP was less successful in his game 
against the ANC. Having never negotiated with the ANC, or a representative Black leader, 
the NP was hopelessly ill prepared and arrogantly over-confident. Though the NP won the 
battle against the CP; they lost the war for a consociational democracy.
Lessons from South Africa:
This study has demonstrated that both Botha and Verwoerd displayed both consequential 
and appropriate behaviour in their respective decisions to use referenda. As suggested, 
understanding Botha is seminal to understanding de Klerk’s use. Botha’s behaviour, on 
the other hand, cannot be understood in isolation from Verwoerd’s use of the referendum, 
and an analysis of the origins of the referendum in NP repertoire.
The referendum owes its introduction into South African politics to the NP’s 
incumbency struggles (1914-1924,1934-1948) and its efforts to retain incumbency (1948-
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1958). Throughout, the referendum primarily served as a resource of electoral 
heresthetics. Over time, the notion that a referendum on the republic was handy at election 
time, probably unfounded, became a praxis. And, having used the referendum pledge so 
often, it later became increasingly difficult for the NP not to hold one. The referendum 
also, in part, owes it introduction to earlier efforts by Afrikaner nationalism to be 
'isomorphic' with Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of popular sovereignty, and Britain’s use of 
the referendum in Rhodesia in 1922. Moreover, both Hertzog and Malan were actually 
reluctant republicans, who supported the idea for tactical reasons. Their tactical use of 
republicanism was balanced by the referendum pledge. Both leaders had the ability to 
impose a referendum upon the party, and their legacy cast a long shadow over future 
behaviour. In the case of Malan, the dominance of the Cape machine after Fusion was 
critical.
This historical agency laid the platform for the later emergence of the referendum 
as the legitimate and appropriate manner to deal with particular issues in White politics. 
Existing accounts of controlled referendum use, like Bjorklund’s account do bear out in 
South Africa, as this research suggests. But they only partially help us to understand the 
motivations for embracing the referendum, and though party feuds are important, they do 
not tell the entire story of referendum use.
This research makes several contributions to our understanding of referendum use. 
It also makes an important endowment to the historical institutionalist research effort, by 
demonstrating how de Klerk’s behaviour tied together both logics of behaviour -  
consequential and appropriate -  as the literature would suggest.
This study establishes that, once used, a referendum convention is created, thereby 
demonstrating the salience of path dependency in referendum use. It also shows how the 
referendum becomes a tool in the political repertoire of a party, and how, over time, it 
becomes associated with certain issues. In the case of the NP and de Klerk it came to be 
viewed as a resource in navigating reform. Moreover, this probe suggests that politicians 
cannot easily ignore the precedent of previous referendum use.
One further insight that this research provides is how the elite perceptions of the 
referendum evolve over time, in response to political developments. Beyond this 
evolution, within a particular struggle and context (as graphically shown by the 1983 and 
1992 referenda), a party’s understanding of the referendum (i.e. its 'logic of 
appropriateness') and its view of the referendum’s tactical role evolves over time. In the 
case of the NP it evolved from a tactical tool in opposition, to an adroit stratagem in
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government at the time of the flag bill. Later it served as a tool to balance a narrow 
republican focus and the exigencies of ensuring a broader appeal at election time. Once in 
power it was seen a critical to entrenching NP power. After the first referendum, it came 
to be viewed as a resource in navigating political reform, away from orthodox Apartheid. 
Later still, it became a resource in the quest for a managed transition.
The study also demonstrtaes how particular interests -  especially of Hertzog and 
the Cape -  imposed the notion of broad popular will on the party. This focus on the 
politics of the referendum within political parties -  whilst in opposition and power -  is an 
oft-neglected aspect. Pre-occupied with science, referendum scholars have often ignored 
the naked politics behind the referendum. For the referendum is, ultimately, a tool of party 
and machine politics. It serves to navigate internal differences, sell policies and fudge 
differences. Moreover, it is a resource in electoral heresthetics. It allows parties to pursue 
policies that have a narrow focus, yet appeal to a wider audience at election time. 
Moreover, a referendum pledge (or a demand for one), serves to embarrass competitors, 
hinting that they do not serve the interests of the people.
. What also emerges from this study is that pledges to make referenda are no less 
important than the decision to use one. And, such pledges (as a part of incumbency 
struggles, or wars of manoeuvre and position), often lead to referenda. Once frequently 
used as a resource of electoral heresthetics, it is hard for politicians to jettison the 
referendum pledge.
The research also verifies the existence of a 'leadership effect' South Africa’s 1992 
referendum. De Klerk took full advantage of his popularity, and that of the reform 
government, in securing an overwhelming 'yes' result. Moreover, the NP used fear of a 'no' 
result to great effect in all three referenda. The three South African referenda, therefore, 
also provide further evidence that referenda, that have the appearance of being substantial 
policy issues, allow governments to undermine partisanship, and secure support for their 
initiatives from opposition voters. In 1992 de Klerk not only got full support from the 
DP’s voters, but he also appears to have got CP voters to cast their lot with his reforms.
The research also enhances our understanding of the role of referenda in political 
transitions. In particular, it highlights the role of the referendum in F.W. de Klerk’s quest 
for a managed transition, and his attempt to outsmart the ANC through a swift transition, 
whilst at the same time outmanoeuvring the White conservative opposition. De Klerk’s 
referendum proves just how handy a well timed vote can be in 'de-certifying' extremists 
and weakening their cause. Like de Gaulle, de Klerk harnessed a referendum in his war of
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manoeuvre against those opposed to his efforts to extricate South Africa form Apartheid. 
Moreover, the 1992 vote shows how leaders, leading complex and controversial processes, 
can articulate support for such process, especially where the electoral system distorts in 
favour of their opponent. The referendum, as de Klerk notes, serves as a 'magnifying 
glass,' and gets voters to set aside sectoral interests, in order to pass judgement on issues 
that divide their societies. Moreover, I have established how de Klerk -  a self-reflective 
actor -  benefited from Botha’s reforms (which took whites well over the ideological 
threshold), and from his own involvement in Botha’s reforms. Having previously played 
the reform game against the CP, de Klerk got his referendum and transition politics right.
This study also provides a fascinating insight into the use of the referendum in a 
wider effort to construct and de-construct boundaries: in this case racial and constitutional 
border of the demos. One final contribution that this research makes is the typology for 
ethno-national referenda, which allows for a more nuanced understanding of how 
referenda impact upon ethno-national questions. Referenda, as we have seen, are an 
important resources in fashioning and dismantling constructs of society, borders and 
nation.
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